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The Logical Problem of the Trinity
Abstract
by
Beau Branson
The doctrine of the Trinity is central to mainstream Christianity. But insofar
as it posits “three persons” (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), who are “one God,”
it appears as inconsistent as the claim that 1+1+1=1.
Much of the literature on “The Logical Problem of the Trinity,” as this has
been called, attacks or defends Trinitarianism with little regard to the fourth
century theological controversies and the late Hellenistic and early Medieval
philosophical background in which it took shape. I argue that this methodol-
ogy, which I call “the Puzzle Approach,” produces obviously invalid arguments,
and it is unclear how to repair it without collapsing into my preferred method-
ology, “the Historical Approach,” which sees history as essential to the debate.
I also discuss “mysterianism,” arguing that, successful or not, it has a different
goal from the other approaches. I further argue that any solution from the His-
torical Approach satisfies the concerns of the Puzzle Approach and mysterianism
anyway.
I then examine the solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity found
in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s writings, both due to his place in the history of the
doctrine, and his clarity in explicating what I call “the metaphysics of synergy.”
I recast his solution in standard predicate logic and provide a formal proof of
its consistency. I end by considering the possibilities for attacking the broader
philosophical context of his defense and conclude that the prospects for doing
so are dim. In any case, if there should turn out to be any problem with the
doctrine of the Trinity at all, it will not be one of mere logical inconsistency in
saying that “These Three are One.”
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Introduction
Why a Philosophical Evaluation of the Doctrine of
the Trinity?
For decades after the rise of logical positivism, philosophers frequently took
talk about God to be, not merely false, but without meaning altogether. If it
was admitted that talk about God was more than meaningless, the next lines
of argument from the skeptic were typically first the negative point that there
was not sufficient evidence for God’s existence, and second the positive points
that there were internal contradictions among God’s supposed attributes them-
selves, or external contradictions between the Divine attributes and manifest
facts about the world, such as our own free will or the existence of evil.
As the positivists’ verificationist position on meaning crumbled, these next
lines of argument began to be chipped away at as well. New developments in
epistemology led some to take the position that belief in God could count among
the “properly basic” beliefs an individual might hold. Others revived various
strands of the tradition of natural theology. Likewise, new developments in
modal logic helped to clarify arguments involving God’s attributes, the existence
of evil, and free will. Soon there was an explosion in the philosophy of religion, as
religious belief ceased to be an occasion for embarrassment among philosophers
and came to be seen as rationally defensible. While theistic philosophers have
by no means won the day, they have certainly made religious belief much more
respectable. Where is the debate likely to go from here?
One can see the “New Atheists” of the current science and religion wars –
Dawkins, Dennet, Gould, Harris, Hitchens, etc. – as continuing along the trajec-
tory that addresses the evidence or lack thereof for traditional religious beliefs.
Without necessarily relying on problematic assumptions in the foundations of
epistemology, they take up the issue of the relation of religious belief to the find-
ings of our best science (as well as adding to the mix the issue of how various
religious beliefs might affect the believer’s behavior in ways that are unhealthy
or even dangerous).
But while the alleged war of science and religion has received more press,
there are equally serious issues to be addressed that lie along the other trajectory,
the one that addresses the very consistency of religious beliefs.
Arguments about the compossibility of the traditional Divine Attributes,
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and their compatibility with obvious facts about the world, seek to discredit all
traditional monotheistic religions on the basis of very general features they share
in common. On the assumption that arguments based on such general features
of all forms of monotheism have been or could be adequately addressed, the next
reasonable step would seem to be to move to more specific features of particular
versions of monotheism. (If one cannot defeat all forms of monotheism at once,
one can try to do so piecemeal.) In the case of mainstream Christianity, no
doctrine could be at the same time more centrally important, or more apparently
incoherent, than the doctrine of the Trinity. Insofar as the doctrine posits three
distinct “persons” (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), each of whom “is God,” and
yet at the same time that there is only one God, the doctrine would appear to
be as contradictory as the claim that 1+1+1=1 and thus an easy target for anti-
Christian polemic. This problem has come to be called “the Logical Problem of
the Trinity,” and given the brief history of recent philosophy of religion sketched
above, it should come as no surprise that a great deal of attention has begun
to be given to the doctrine of the Trinity by analytic philosophers of religion in
recent decades. . . Or has it?
Why Another Philosophical Evaluation of the
Doctrine of the Trinity?
There now exists a quite substantial philosophical literature on the Logical Prob-
lem of the Trinity. Philosophers have constructed, analyzed and evaluated a
number of different accounts of the Trinity in an attempt to defend the logical
coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity. This might seem puzzling since we have
formal languages in which we can decide questions of logical consistency with
mathematical precision. However, once we define the problem carefully, we can
see that what is really being disputed is the very logical form of the doctrine
itself, and that different proposed solutions correspond to different logical forms
attributed to the doctrine of the Trinity. This raises a question as to how one
could determine which logical form a doctrine truly has, or barring that, at least
find some indirect way to determine its consistency, when the logical form of
that doctrine is itself a matter of dispute.
Though there are infinitely many possible logical forms one could ascribe to
the doctrine of the Trinity, I show that they can all be grouped together into a
small number of related “Families” based on a few general logical features that
correlate to some of the major criticisms of various proposed solutions in the
literature. This shows that if the major proposed solutions are all flawed due
to the features used to construct this taxonomy, then there can be no solution
to the Logical Problem of the Trinity at all. One fact this taxonomy therefore
reveals about the debate is that some Trinitarians have been overly critical of
the on-offer solutions. That is, although they hold out hope that some solution
can be found, they have not realized that their reasons for rejecting the on-offer
solutions in fact rule out all possible solutions.
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There then remains the project of determining, of all of the possible logical
forms to ascribe to the doctrine, which one(s) would be correct. I note that,
while some of the philosophers involved in this debate have done their fair
share of research into the history of the doctrine, many have quite consciously
attempted to carry out this project in relative isolation from the historical data.
Some have even more or less explicitly committed to the view that historical
inquiry is not strictly necessary for completing it. Yet others, while not explicitly
disavowing history, have presented arguments in defense of the doctrine with no
mention of history, apparently tacitly presuming that grounding their account
in history is not necessary.
I refer to this general methodological approach within philosophical theol-
ogy, viewing the history of a doctrine as inessential, as “the Puzzle Approach”
(and its followers “puzzlers”) as they seem to be modeling their methodology
in the field of philosophical theology on an analogy to familiar metaphysical
“puzzles.” I contrast this with my preferred methodology, which sees historical
inquiry as essential to arguments in philosophical theology, and which I call
“the Historical Approach” (and its followers “historicists”). I argue that, to the
extent that the arguments in this literature fail to be appropriately grounded in
the relevant history, they thereby fail to be valid arguments for or against the
logical consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity.
The result is that the vast majority of what has been written in this literature
consists of arguments (sets of premises) that have been left logically unconnected
to their conclusions in a way that renders them either non-sequitur or obviously
question-begging. I argue that it is unclear whether there is any way for the
puzzler to patch up his methodology in a way that would make these arguments
valid, but which would not either simply collapse into the Historical Approach
or at least render the essence of the Puzzle Approach literature superfluous.
I also explore what has come to be called “mysterianism,” or as I will also
call it “the Mysterian Approach.” There are deep questions about whether the
Mysterian Approach is, or could be, successful in its aims. But I argue that,
ultimately, it simply aims at a different goal from the Puzzle Approach and the
Historical Approach alike, and so counts not so much as a rival methodology as
simply a methodology for a different project.
I further argue that any solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity to
come out of a successful application of the Historical Approach methodology
will also count as a successful solution by the lights of Puzzle Approach, and
that achieving the goal of the Historical Approach will also achieve the goals of
the Mysterian Approach. So that we have nothing to lose, and much to gain, in
seeking a solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity through the Historical
Approach.
At the same time, while I argue that most philosophical discussion of the
doctrine of the Trinity has not paid enough attention to history, inquiry into
this doctrine on the part of historians and historical theologians has typically
failed to be done in a way rigorous enough to satisfy the analytic philosopher.
Often this is simply because the historian and the theologian have not been
operating with precisely the same set of concerns as the analytic philosopher.
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The result of these tendencies in philosophy and theology is that there has so far
been relatively little inquiry specifically into the Logical Problem of the Trinity
that is at once philosophically rigorous and also historically sensitive.
It would be unfair for the philosopher to blame this situation on the historian.
The historian, as such, is not trained in the methodology of the analytic philoso-
pher. And if the historian’s concerns are not the concerns of the philosopher, it
is no shortcoming on the historian’s part if the results of his investigation do not
adequately address the philosopher’s concerns. To the extent that inquiry into
and evaluation of the relevant history is necessary for the philosopher’s ends,
and to the extent that the historian’s work has not already satisfied those ends,
it falls to the philosopher to complete what is lacking.
To that end, I have chosen to examine the solution to the Logical Problem
of the Trinity found in the writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa. I have chosen
Gregory, first because he is uncontroversially acknowledged to be at the heart
of the development of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and second because,
among the more significant figures in that development, he is one of the most
careful and precise in his statements of certain views of central importance in
evaluating the logical coherence of the doctrine. In particular, he is to my mind
the clearest about what I will call “the metaphysics of synergy,” which lies at the
heart of his defense of the doctrine of the Trinity against the Logical Problem of
the Trinity, and which I believe was common within what has come to be called
the “pro-Nicene consensus.” I examine his writings, mapping out the logic of his
views on the Trinity precisely, and give a formal proof of the consistency of the
doctrine of the Trinity as found in St. Gregory’s writings.
An Outline of the Dissertation
The dissertation thus proceeds in five parts. In Part I, I give a precise definition
for the Logical Problem of the Trinity and what would count as a solution to
the problem. I next construct a taxonomy of all possible answers to the Logical
Problem of the Trinity, showing that any non-heretical solution to the Logical
Problem of the Trinity will exhibit the same (allegedly) problematic formal
features as those of the familiar Social Trinitarian and Relative Identity types
of accounts.
In Part II, I exhibit the invalid nature of Puzzle Approach Methodology
discussed above. I also discuss the Mysterian Approach. The questions about
whether mysterianism can be successful are deeper than can be decided in this
dissertation. But I argue that, whether successful or not, it does not actu-
ally constitute a rival methodology to either the Puzzle Approach or Historical
Approach, even if it initially appears to.
In Part III, I turn to history, examining St. Gregory of Nyssa’s proposed so-
lution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity. I argue, among other things, that
a failure to adequately appreciate his purposes has led to a misunderstanding
of his actual views. Further, I point out an important but under-appreciated
distinction in his metaphysics of action and event individuation. Once we un-
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derstand this, we can understand what I call his “metaphysics of synergy.”
In Part IV, I organize the results of Part III more systematically and formu-
late Gregory’s account of the Trinity more precisely in predicate logic, providing
a formal proof of the consistency of his account, completing the project taken
on in Part I.
Finally, in Part V, I step outside the primary scope of the dissertation (the
alleged logical problem with the doctrine of the Trinity) to the overall philosoph-
ical framework in which Gregory situates his solution. I present some general
considerations to show that it would be difficult to fault his view on the grounds
of implausibility of his metaphysical and semantic assumptions. In any case,
not in any way that would still count as the simple, “logical” problem alleged
by anti-Trinitarians.
5

Part I
Defining the Problem
7

Chapter 1
Definitions
In the case of divine dogma, the indiscriminate use of words is no
longer free from danger. For in these subjects, that which is of small
account is no longer a small matter.
–St. Gregory of Nyssa
1.1 What is the Logical Problem of the Trinity?
Consider the claims made by the following set S of natural language sentences:
(S1) The Father is God
(S2) The Son is God
(S3) The Holy Spirit is God
(S4) The Father is not the Son
(S5) The Father is not the Holy Spirit
(S6) The Son is not the Holy Spirit
(S7) There is exactly one God
Let us call the set of propositions that the sentences of S express P and let
us call each of the propositions each S-n expresses P-n. Of course, P is not the
entirety of the doctrine of the Trinity.1 But it is at least a very important subset
of, or is otherwise logically entailed by, the doctrine of the Trinity.2 Intuitively,
what is called “the logical problem of the Trinity” (LPT) is just the question
how, or whether, all the members of P can be true at the same time, for they
seem inconsistent.
1. See below, 1.2, p. 17.
2. (Cartwright 1987) seems to be the first to have formulated it this way in the current
debate, and most follow him.
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But what does it mean for them to be inconsistent? Following Plantinga,3
let us distinguish between three different senses in which a set of propositions
can be consistent or inconsistent:
1. A set of propositions is explicitly inconsistent if and only if (at least) one
member of the set just is the denial or negation of (at least) one member
of the set.
2. A set of propositions is formally inconsistent if and only if a(n explicit)
contradiction can be derived from its members using only “the rules of
ordinary logic.”
3. A set of propositions is implicitly inconsistent if and only if adding some
necessarily true proposition(s) to it yields a formally inconsistent set.
(And if, in one of these senses, a set of propositions is not inconsistent, it is, in
that sense, consistent.)
Notice the three form increasingly large supersets of propositions. Any set
that is explicitly inconsistent is formally inconsistent, though not vice-versa.
And any set that is formally inconsistent is implicitly inconsistent, though not
vice-versa.
They also correspond to decreasingly bad problems for a view. There are
decreasing levels of cognitive deficiency one would have to exhibit to hold such
an inconsistency in one’s belief system, and there are decreasingly good reasons
for us to chastise a person for having such an alleged cognitive defect. Explicit
inconsistencies are obviously false, and it is a serious problem if we embrace
one. Formal inconsistencies run the gamut from almost as obviously false as
explicit contradictions, to points so subtle they trip up a great many students
in formal logic classes. Finally, the obviousness of the falsehood of an implicit
inconsistency depends both on the obviousness of the necessity of the truth of the
auxiliary proposition we have to add to the set to yield a formal inconsistency
and on the obviousness of the logical relations between the auxiliary proposition
and the rest of the set. Even though, once we’re clear on the logical forms of the
relevant propositions, one can’t very well question a proof of their consistency
or inconsistency, one can often reasonably question the modal intuitions behind
the claim that the auxiliary proposition is not only true but necessary.4
Explicit inconsistencies, of course, are rarely embraced by anyone, and no-
body accuses the doctrine of the Trinity of being one. But the situation is nearly
as bad, as the problem raised in the literature about the doctrine of the Trinity
seems to be the allegation that the doctrine of the Trinity is not even formally
consistent. This seems to be what is meant by calling it the logical problem of
the Trinity.5
On the other hand, we could call the accusation that the doctrine of the
Trinity is merely implicitly inconsistent “the metaphysical problem of the Trin-
ity” (MPT). Since the accusation made by anti-Trinitarians seems to be that
3. (A. Plantinga 1974), pp. 12–16.
4. See (van Inwagen 1998) for a good discussion of this issue.
5. See, for example, (Yandell 1994).
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the doctrine of the Trinity is not even formally consistent, my focus will be
on the logical problem of the Trinity. However, current responses to the LPT
often make an elision between the LPT and the MPT. Therefore, since I want to
address the methodology of the current literature, it will not always be possible
to narrow the discussion down to the logical problem alone.
For now, we should keep in mind two things. First, on the one hand, at a
certain level the anti-Trinitarian only wants to prove that the doctrine of the
Trinity is impossible. And the anti-Trinitarian wins on that point if the doctrine
of the Trinity is even implicitly inconsistent, even if it is still formally consistent.
Thus, while the Trinitarian certainly wants some way to dissolve the LPT, it
may seem not to be enough in the grand scheme of things. A solution to the
LPT is not necessarily a solution to the MPT.
But second, on the other hand, it would still be a major embarrassment to
the anti-Trinitarian if the logical argument against the doctrine of the Trinity
were to fail. In that case, the debate between Trinitarians and anti-Trinitarians
would be less like a debate between people who can’t count and people who can –
as the anti-Trinitarian wants to portray it – and more like a debate between, say,
endurantists and perdurantists in the metaphysics of time. The anti-Trinitarian
portrays his argument as a knock-down – a matter of simple logic – not as
just another of the many uncertain arguments found in metaphysics and in
philosophy generally. We will return to this issue in our final evaluation in Part
V.
I believe that the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least the particularly “prob-
lematic” part of it, P) can be shown to be consistent using the “rules of ordinary
logic.” That result alone is significant in that it decisively shifts the debate from
the level of formal consistency (the LPT) to the level of implicit consistency
(the MPT).
Since P will have been shown to be formally consistent, the burden of proof
for the anti-Trinitarian will be to either:
1. find some additional proposition that is plausibly “part of,” or entailed
by, the doctrine of the Trinity, that when added to P, yields a formally
inconsistent set, or
2. find some necessarily true auxiliary proposition that, when added to P,
yields a formally inconsistent set (or some combination of such proposi-
tions).
But this of course is a distinct question from the LPT. I will not attempt to
prove that no such additional proposition exists that could show the doctrine of
the Trinity to be implicitly inconsistent in one of the above ways. But in Part
V I do discuss these broader questions, and give some considerations to show
that the prospects for attacking the doctrine of the Trinity in this way are dim.
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Formal Consistency and the “Rules of Ordinary Logic”
If the LPT is about formal consistency, and formal consistency is determined
by the “rules of ordinary logic,” what exactly are the “rules of ordinary logic”?
And how would one show whether or not a set of propositions entails an explicit
contradiction using them?
Logic as practiced today does not deal directly with propositions, or even
with their expressions in sentences of ordinary, natural human languages. Ra-
ther, the modern logician constructs artificial languages with (so far) less ex-
pressive power than natural languages, but with no possibility for ambiguity
in the logical forms of its sentences. With no such ambiguity possible in these
artificial languages, precise rules and methods can be given for determining the
consistency or inconsistency of a set Φ of sentences of these languages.
There are two senses in which we might say that a set of sentences Φ in a
formal language L is inconsistent. It may be that, given the rules of inference
that are valid in L, Φ entails a contradiction, entails its own negation, or for
whatever reason the inference rules for that language say that the conjunction
of the members of Φ must be false. If this is so, Φ is “syntactically inconsistent
in L.” If there is no such valid proof in L, Φ is “syntactically consistent” in L.
This is the strict meaning of “consistency,” and pertains, obviously, to syntax.
On the other hand, it may be that there is no interpretation I of the non-
logical constants of L such that all of the members of Φ are true in L on I
(i.e. there is no “model” for Φ in L). If this is so, Φ is not “satisfiable” with
respect to the class of possible interpretations of the non-logical constants of
L. If there is such an interpretation (a model) for Φ in L, Φ is satisfiable in
L. This is not strictly consistency. It pertains not to syntax but to semantics.
But it is just as important a consideration, and in a formal language with the
features of soundness and completeness, the syntactic feature of consistency and
the semantic feature of satisfiability go hand in hand.
Since the “rules of ordinary logic” should encompass both syntax and se-
mantics, it would seem that the phrase “formally inconsistent” should cover
both strict, syntactic inconsistency, and the semantic notion of unsatisfiability.
That is, it would seem we should say that a set Φ of formulae of L is “formally
inconsistent in L” if and only if it is either inconsistent in L or unsatisfiable in
L. Φ is “formally consistent” in L if and only if it is both consistent in L and
satisfiable in L.
In any formal language L worth studying, any language with the property
logicians call “soundness,” if Φ is inconsistent in L, then it will be unsatisfiable
in L as well. (Otherwise there could be “valid” proofs from true premises to false
conclusions, and what good is a language like that?)6 So, although these are
not the only ways to do so, a usually good strategy for showing “formal incon-
sistency” is to give a proof of the negation of the conjunction of the members of
Φ (because the syntactic feature of inconsistency will show the semantic feature
of unsatisfiability as well), and a usually good strategy for showing “formal con-
6. On the other hand, we know that there are interesting languages where a formula can be
semantically unsatisfiable, but still syntactically consistent – languages that are incomplete.
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sistency” is to give a model for all of the members of Φ (because the semantic
feature of satisfiability will show the syntactic feature of consistency as well).
But since the modern logician’s methods of determining consistency and
inconsistency only apply within the artificial languages they construct, how does
one determine whether a set of propositions P is consistent or inconsistent?
In order to make any use of the tools developed by the logician, the set P
of propositions must be given some regimentation Φ in some formal language
L such that the logical forms of the sentences in Φ accurately represent the
logical forms of the propositions in P. Within this artificial language, questions
of consistency can be determined (if at all) with mathematical precision. Thus,
if a regimentation, Φ in L, of P can be found such that all parties to the debate
can agree that:
1. the formal language L is suitably expressive that there are possible sen-
tences (well-formed formulae, “wffs”) of L that could capture the logical
forms (or at least all of the relevant aspects of the logical forms) of the
propositions in P (for short “L is a formally adequate language for P”),
and
2. the logical forms of the sentences of Φ in L do reflect the logical forms (or
at least the relevant aspects of the logical forms) of the propositions in P
(for short “Φ is a formally adequate regimentation of P”)
then the question of the formal consistency of the propositions in P can be
decided on the basis of the formal consistency of the sentences Φ in L.
Could there be different formally adequate regimentations, Φ1 in L, and Φ2
in L, of a set of propositions P such that Φ1 is formally consistent in L, but Φ2
is not? Similarly, could there be different formally adequate languages, L1 and
L2, such that a regimentation Φ is, in L1, both formally adequate for P and
consistent, while in L2 it is formally adequate for P but inconsistent?
Presumably in the first case either the sentences of Φ1 or the sentences of Φ2
(or both) do not “reflect the logical forms of the propositions in P in all relevant
ways,” i.e. either Φ1 in L or Φ2 in L (or both) must not be “a formally adequate
regimentation of P.”
Likewise, in the second case, presumably either:
1. one or the other of L1 or L2 (or both) are not expressive enough that
their sentences can capture the relevant aspects of the logical forms of the
propositions in P, or
2. Φ has an importantly different logical form as interpreted according to the
grammar of L1 as compared to its form as interpreted according to the
grammar of L2. And either Φ in L1 or Φ in L2 (or both) is (are) not “a
formally adequate regimentation of P.”
Thus, either every pair of formally adequate language plus formally adequate
regimentation for P is formally consistent, or none is.
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So, in any debate over the formal consistency of a set of propositions P, the
real work, and matter for debate, ironically does not lie so much in proving
the formal consistency or inconsistency of any set of sentences, but in finding a
suitable artificial language L and a suitable regimentation Φ, such that it can
be shown that:
1. L is a formally adequate language for P, and
2. Φ in L is a formally adequate regimentation for P.
(With one important exception, most philosophers involved in this debate
would probably agree that some standard version of predicate logic with (clas-
sical, absolute, non-relative) identity (“PLI” for short) would be a formally ade-
quate language for P. What will be called “pure” Relative Identity Trinitarianism
seems to be the only camp in the debate that demands the use of an impor-
tantly different formal language in which to address the issue. Since rejecting
PLI is controversial in itself, we will adopt a certain mild “prejudice” toward
PLI throughout the dissertation. Specifically, as long as a view can be given
a formally adequate regimentation in PLI, we will regiment it in PLI. In other
words, if it is possible to represent a certain logical form via formulae of PLI,
we will use formulae of PLI as the means by which we will represent that logical
form.)
So, why does the anti-Trinitarian think that the logical form of P is incon-
sistent?
Suppose we take “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” univocally as names for
individuals wherever they appear in P. Suppose we take “God” in S1 through
S3 univocally as the name of an individual. Suppose we take “is” univocally
as the “is” of (classical) identity in S1 through S6. And suppose we analyze
the counting statement expressed by S7 in the standard way, and understand
“is God” as it occurs there in the same way we did in our interpretation of S1
through S3. The logical form of the claims expressed by S on this interpretation
of it can be represented in PLI as:
ΦLPT-1:
(1LPT-1) f=g
(2LPT-1) s=g
(3LPT-1) h=g
(4LPT-1) f6=s
(5LPT-1) f6=h
(6LPT-1) s6=h
(7LPT-1) (∃x)(∀y)(x=g & (y=g → y=x))
ΦLPT-1 is inconsistent in PLI.7 ((7LPT-1) is not strictly necessary to derive
a contradiction here, but I include it for completeness’ sake.)
7. Proof is trivial.
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On the other hand, suppose we instead take “is God” in S1 through S3 uni-
vocally and take “God” to be a predicate and “is” to be the “is” of predication.
Suppose we analyze the counting statement expressed by S7 in the standard
way, and understand “is God” as it occurs there in the same way we did in
our interpretation of S1 through S3. And suppose we otherwise leave our reg-
imentation unchanged. The logical form of the claims expressed by S on this
interpretation of it can be represented in PLI as:
ΦLPT-2:
(1LPT-2) Gf
(2LPT-2) Gs
(3LPT-2) Gh
(4LPT-2) f6=s
(5LPT-2) f6=h
(6LPT-2) s6=h
(7LPT-2) (∃x)(∀y)(Gx & (Gy → y=x))
ΦLPT-2 is also inconsistent in PLI.8
Since both of the logical forms we have in mind here can be represented
in PLI, we will use PLI. So, a more precise way to put the anti-Trinitarian
argument would be as follows:
1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P, and
2. at least one of ΦLPT-1 in PLI or ΦLPT-2 in PLI is a formally adequate
regimentation of P, and
3. both ΦLPT-1 and ΦLPT-2 are (syntactically) inconsistent in PLI.
As mentioned above, since at least one formally adequate regimentation of P
in a formally adequate language for P is inconsistent, all are. So, by definition
of “formally adequate language” and “formally adequate regimentation,” P is
formally inconsistent. So, since the doctrine of the Trinity contains or entails
P, the doctrine of the Trinity itself is inconsistent.
But, if this is the “problem”. . . what exactly would count as a solution?
1.2 What Would Be a Solution?
In the previous section, we saw that the logical problem of the Trinity could
be seen intuitively as the question how, or whether, all of P1 through P7 could
be true at the same time. We saw that the LPT could be seen more precisely
as the question what, if anything, is wrong with the following anti-Trinitarian
argument:
8. Proof is trivial.
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1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P, and
2. at least one of ΦLPT-1 in PLI or ΦLPT-2 in PLI is a formally adequate
regimentation of P, and
3. both ΦLPT-1 and ΦLPT-2 are formally inconsistent in PLI,
4. therefore, P is formally inconsistent.
But if that is the “problem,” what would count as a solution or answer to it?
If the anti-Trinitarian is right that PLI is a formally adequate language for
P, and that one or the other of ΦLPT-1 in PLI or ΦLPT-2 in PLI is a formally
adequate regimentation of P, then that just is the answer. There is no “solution.”
So the Trinitarian must maintain that neither regimentation, in PLI, is formally
adequate for P (or else that PLI itself is not formally adequate for P).
Let us say that a “proposed answer” to the LPT is a set that includes:
1. Exactly one formal language L in which to regiment P, and
2. Exactly one set Φ of sentences of L with which to regiment P,9 and
3. A proof of the formal consistency or inconsistency of Φ in L.
Let us say that a “formally adequate answer” to the LPT is a proposed
answer to the logical problem of the Trinity such that:
1. L is a formally adequate language for P, and
2. Φ in L is a formally adequate regimentation of P
(3. and the proof of formal consistency or inconsistency of Φ in L is correct.)
A “proposed solution” to the LPT is a proposed answer to the logical problem
of the Trinity that proves that Φ is formally consistent in L.
A “proposed non-solution” to the LPT is a proposed answer to the logical
problem of the Trinity that proves that Φ is formally inconsistent in L.
A “formally adequate solution” to the LPT is a formally adequate answer
that is a proposed solution (i.e., a formally adequate answer to the LPT that
proves that Φ is formally consistent in L).
A “formally adequate non-solution” to the LPT is a formally adequate answer
that is a proposed non-solution (i.e., a formally adequate answer to the LPT
that proves that Φ is formally inconsistent in L).
(Since, as mentioned above, either every pair of formally adequate language
for P plus formally adequate regimentation of P is formally consistent, or none
9. We will relax this requirement in an obvious and non-problematic way in the case of
a couple of dilemmas, where two different possible regimentations are offered, and the claim
made is only that at least one of them is formally adequate. Specifically, the anti-Trinitarian
LPT1 and LPT2, and the Naïve Modalist NM1 and NM2.
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is, either every formally adequate answer to the logical problem of the Trinity
will be a (formally adequate) solution to the LPT, or every formally adequate
answer to the LPT will be a (formally adequate) non-solution to the logical
problem of the Trinity.)
Thus, the anti-Trinitarian argument above can be seen as a constructive
dilemma. One of two proposed non-solutions to the LPT (call those LPT1 and
LPT2) is formally adequate. Thus, there is some formally adequate non-solution
to the LPT. (Thus, all formally adequate answers to the logical problem of the
Trinity are non-solutions.) So, by definition of “formally adequate language”
and “formally adequate regimentation,” P is formally inconsistent.
We focus on P here because, in order for the anti-Trinitarian to show the
doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent, he need not regiment the doctrine of the
Trinity in its entirety. It is enough to argue that the doctrine of the Trinity
contains or entails all the propositions in P, and that P is inconsistent.
There are undoubtedly other propositions that count as elements of the doc-
trine of the Trinity. For example, the propositions that the Father is unoriginate,
that the Son is the only-begotten, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from (at
least) the Father, are all parts of the doctrine of the Trinity, along with other
propositions. And additional propositions can never yield a consistent set from
an inconsistent set. But they can yield an inconsistent set from a consistent
one. So, the fact that there is more to the doctrine of the Trinity than just P
can only help the anti-Trinitarian and can only harm the Trinitarian.
So, showing that P is formally consistent is not strictly enough for the Trini-
tarian to show that the doctrine of the Trinity is formally consistent. Nonethe-
less, most of the literature seems to take the question whether the doctrine of
the Trinity is formally consistent to still be nearly equivalent (close enough for
practical purposes) to the question whether P is formally consistent, i.e., whe-
ther the LPT as I have defined it here has a formally adequate solution or a
formally adequate non-solution. That is, they seem to assume that:
1. if there is a formally adequate non-solution to the LPT, then the doctrine
of the Trinity is certainly (formally) inconsistent, since the doctrine of the
Trinity does in fact include or entail all of the propositions in P. (That is
true, and should be uncontroversial), and
2. if there is a formally adequate solution to the LPT, then the doctrine of
the Trinity is at least probably formally consistent.
How so?
Philosophers on both sides of the argument would probably agree to the
following. It is true that there are other aspects of the doctrine of the Trinity,
and that adding additional propositions to P, such as that the Son is the only-
begotten, that the persons are consubstantial, etc., could in theory produce
an inconsistent set, even though P itself is consistent. Nevertheless, no such
alleged inconsistency has so far been raised. Further, it is hard to see how such
additional elements could cause a bigger problem than what we’ve already seen.
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So, arguably, the Trinitarian may safely ignore that possibility – unless and
until the anti-Trinitarian actually proposes some such auxiliary proposition as a
problem for the doctrine of the Trinity. But no such auxiliary propositions have
been pointed out by the anti-Trinitarian. And the LPT, as we’ve defined it, will
probably be the most difficult problem facing the doctrine of the Trinity. So, if
the Trinitarian can show that there is a formally adequate solution to the LPT,
i.e. show the formal consistency of P, then, although there is no guarantee that
there will not be other problems for the doctrine of the Trinity, there probably
are not, and if it turns out that there are, they would probably not be as difficult
to deal with as the LPT. Finally, even if such a proposition were found, it is
not clear that the resulting problem would deserve to be called by the same
name as the LPT. It seems it would most usefully be counted as some distinct
argument It is in this sense that finding a formally adequate solution to the LPT
is “nearly” equivalent to showing that the doctrine of the Trinity is (formally)
consistent.
As things stand, however, anti-Trinitarians have presented their proposed
non-solutions to the LPT (LPT1 and LPT2), which one must admit at least
prima facie seem like the most plausible, straight-forward ways of understanding
P. Thus, to defend P, the Trinitarian must argue at least that it might (for all we
know) be the case that neither LPT1 nor LPT2 is a formally adequate answer
to the LPT, that is, either:
1. PLI is not a formally adequate language for P, or
2. Neither ΦLPT-1 in PLI nor ΦLPT-2 in PLI is a formally adequate regimen-
tation of P.
(Or both.)
In principle, this very weak response (“for all we know,” either the language is
inadequate or the regimentations are) would be a sufficient defence of Trinitarian
beliefs. But most philosophers in the literature have wanted to do more. They
have wanted to argue that it can be shown that P really is consistent (not just
that it’s not unreasonable for us to believe that it is).10 But it might seem hard
to see how one would argue that PLI is not formally adequate for P, except
by arguing that some other language L is formally adequate for P, and that
L is importantly different from PLI in some relevant way. Likewise, assuming
that PLI is formally adequate for P, it might seem hard to see how one would
argue that neither ΦLPT-1 in PLI nor ΦLPT-2 in PLI is a formally adequate
regimentation for P, except by arguing that some other regimentation Φ in PLI is
a formally adequate regimentation for P, and that Φ’s being a formally adequate
regimentation of P in PLI is somehow incompatible both with ΦLPT-1 in PLI
being a formally adequate regimentation of P and with ΦLPT-2 in PLI being
a formally adequate regimentation of P (as will be the case if the alternative
proposed answer has an importantly different logical form, which of course must
be the case if it is a proposed solution). And so, the majority of the literature
10. I discuss this issue in much greater detail below in Chapter 3.2 p. 80 ff.
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has centered around the search for alternative proposed answers to the LPT to
supplant LPT1 and LPT2.
But if one wants to replace LPT1 and LPT2. . . what alternative answers
could one propose?
1.3 Proposed Solutions
In the previous section, we saw what form an answer to the logical problem of
the Trinity must take. But how could that outline be filled in in such a way as
to avoid both of the non-solutions proposed by the anti-Trinitarian: LPT1 and
LPT2?
Of course, contemporary philosophers are not the first to have addressed
the issue of the logical consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity. Thinking on
the subject goes back to ancient times, to the earliest centuries of the church.
And not just any way of understanding the “three-ness” and “one-ness” of God
has been received as within the bounds of orthodoxy. Certain views, consistent
though they may have been, were rejected as heretical during the course of the
Trinitarian controversies of roughly the 3rd through the 5th centuries AD. I will
refer to these as the “Classical Trinitarian Heresies” (CTHs). Most philosophers
seem to count avoiding being some form of a CTH as a constraint on what Dale
Tuggy has called “Trinitarian theorizing.”11 That is, contemporary philosophers
attempt to construct accounts of the Trinity that avoid both (1) inconsistency,
and (2) being just another form of one of the CTHs.
So, for completeness’ sake, we will discuss the CTH’s in some detail. How-
ever, I think contemporary views will be easier for most of my readers to un-
derstand, will certainly require less textual interpretation, and will be easier to
regiment in a standard way. Also, some of that discussion will help to shed light
on the CTHs. And so, we will begin with contemporary proposed solutions to
the LPT.
Our purpose at the moment is to collect various proposed solutions to the
LPT. And what concerns us most at the moment is the matter of formal con-
sistency. So we will not try to give an exhaustively detailed discussion of any of
these views, but only so much as to give us a clear enough idea of its logical form
that we can represent it in a formal language and determine its consistency or
inconsistency.
1.3.1 Contemporary Proposed Solutions
Social Trinitarianism (ST)
Probably the easiest contemporary proposal to understand is Social Trinitarian-
ism (ST). Paradigmatic versions of ST hold that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are
straightforwardly numerically distinct persons – in the fullest sense of the term
11. (Tuggy 2003).
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“person” – each of whom is fully divine, omniscient, omnipotent, etc. Instances
of the phrase “is God” in reference to the persons individually are read as predi-
cations (“is divine” or “is god” with a little “g”) rather than as identifications to
an individual called “God.” But it is the Trinity as a whole – the collective or
“community” or “society” they compose – to which the term “God” is properly
applied when we speak of “one God” (either as a name for the collective or as
a predicate that is not, at least not precisely, univocal with “is God” as applied
to the persons).
One might suspect the equivocation on “is god” as a predicate applied to
the persons and “is God” as either a name or equivocal predicate applied to
the one God of being merely an ad hoc logical escape route invented by Social
Trinitarians. But in fact there is some biblical warrant for it. In Greek, there
is a distinction between using “θεός” without a definite article, which looks
like a predication (“is divine,” or “is a god”) and “ὁ θεός” with the definite
article, which looks more like a proper name or definite description (“God,” or
“the divine thing”). And the Bible itself seems to make this distinction. For
example, John 1:1, usually translated as “. . . the Word was with God and the
Word was God,” is “ . . . ο λογος ην piρος τον θεον και θεος ην ο λογος,” which
looks like the Logos bears a relation (literally “was towards”) to an individual
called “God,” and also has a certain property (“is divine”).
Also, the Cappadocians made use of analogies between the persons of the
Trinity and human persons such as Paul, Silas and Timothy (clearly numerically
distinct individuals) to describe the distinctness of the persons,12 and support
for ST often relies heavily on the authority of the Cappadocians.13, 14
This kind of view can potentially raise questions regarding mereology and
the metaphysics of composition (if composition is the relation an ST-er posits
between the persons and God, or the Trinity, which the persons. . . compose?),
the ontological status of “communities” (if that is the sort of thing God is sup-
posed to be), etc. At its least palatable, ST would have the unwelcome con-
sequence that God was just an abstract object, a particular set (among many
other sets), or that “God” was just a word, useful in abbreviating some other-
wise complicated talk about divine persons (“arranged God-wise,” perhaps?),
but denoting nothing of a sufficiently ontologically “beefy” status. (Think of
how certain libertarians and anarchists would claim that talk about “the state”
is just abbreviated talk about uses, and threats of use, of force by various indi-
viduals against various other individuals.) However, as we will be focusing on
12. We’ll see an example of this in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Ad Ablabium below.
13. E.g., (C. Plantinga J. 1986), (C. Plantinga J. 1988), (C. Plantinga J. 1989), etc.
14. This seems legitimate enough as far as concerns the distinctness of the persons. Indeed,
see my discussion of modalism below; I am in need of no persuading that they had a consensus
on the very strong, numerical distinctness of the persons. However, as we will see, that is not
the logical feature that saves ST from inconsistency. It is rather the equivocation on “is God”
or “is god.” Thus, to find patristic support for ST, one would need to find patristic support for
this equivocation, not for a strong distinction between the persons. Furthermore, I think that,
understood in context, the Cappadocians provide little support for Social Trinitarianism, if
not outright opposition to it. See 4.2.1, p. 126 ff., and 4.2.2, esp. p. 132, footnote 47 below
for more.
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the logical form of the doctrine, such objections need not detain us.
Both proponents and critics of ST tend to focus on its taking the divine
“persons” to be fully “persons” in our modern, post-Cartesian sense – fully aware
centers of consciousness, reason, will, etc. This is thought to be its distinctive
feature. But again, from the point of view merely of logical form, the issue is
irrelevant. The “persons” could be beans as far as the LPT is concerned. But if
there are three of them, and each is a bean, yet there is only one bean, LPT2
would provide a formally adequate regimentation of the view, and ST would
not.
So what features of ST are relevant to our concerns?
First, it is clear that Social Trinitarians insist on making a very strong, real
distinction between the persons. But classical non-identity ( 6=) is the weakest
(real) distinction one can make. (If it doesn’t entail x6=y, then in what sense is
it a “real” distinction between x and y? If it is a “real” distinction between x
and y, surely it (at least) entails x6=y.)
It’s clear then that Social Trinitarians will agree with LPT1 and LPT2 on
their regimentation of P4 through P6. (Indeed, Social Trinitarians often want to
go even further in distinguishing the persons, but they must at least admit the
non-identity of the persons.) And in so doing they will (they may as well) take
PLI to be a formally adequate language for P. In keeping with this emphasis on
the distinctness of the persons, it is also clear that Social Trinitarians will want
to treat “is god” in P1 through P3 not as identity claims to some individual,
but as predications. (Perhaps these will mean “is divine,” perhaps something
related. Again, the content here need not concern us at present.) Thus, Social
Trinitarians will deny the formal adequacy of 1LPT-1 through 3LPT-1 in PLI.
It is also clear that Social Trinitarians make no distinctions between the
persons as to their divinity, omniscience, etc. That is, each person is divine, is
omniscient, is a person, etc., in exactly the same sense as either of the other two
persons. So, whatever “is God” might mean (again, it could mean “is divine” or
even “is a bean” as far as we are concerned right now), it will mean the same
thing with respect to each person. There will be no equivocation. Thus, while
Social Trinitarians will deny the formal adequacy of 1LPT-1 through 3LPT-1 in
PLI, they will admit to the formal adequacy of 1LPT-2 through 3LPT-2 in PLI
(or something relevantly similar, in a sense that will become clear later.)
ST, then, so far agrees with LPT2. If ST is to count as a solution, then,
it must regiment P7 differently. But there is no indication in ST literature
that Social Trinitarians have any problem with standard logical regimentations
of counting statements, either with the general schema that logicians usually
employ, or with the classical identity relation (=) in particular. (Indeed, one
of the motivations for adopting ST is precisely to avoid having to give up on
classical identity. See the discussion of Relative Identity Trinitarianism below
for more.) The only way, then, that ST could possibly avoid contradiction
would be to equivocate on “is god,” not among its applications to the persons
themselves, individually (in P1 through P3) but between its application there
on the one hand and in P7 on the other. And it is this purely formal feature
that lies at the heart of a major criticism of ST. Brian Leftow writes:
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But even if Trinity monotheism avoids talk of degrees of deity, it
faces a problem. Either the Trinity is a fourth case of the divine
nature, in addition to the persons, or it is not. If it is, we have too
many cases of deity for orthodoxy. If it is not, and yet is divine, there
are two ways to be divine – by being a case of deity, and by being
a Trinity of such cases. If there is more than one way to be divine,
Trinity monotheism becomes Plantingian Arianism. But if there is
in fact only one way to be divine, then there are two alternatives.
One is that only the Trinity is God, and God is composed of non-
divine persons. The other is that the sum of all divine persons is
somehow not divine. To accept this last claim would be to give up
Trinity monotheism altogether.
I do not see an acceptable alternative here. So I think Trinity
monotheism is not a promising strategy for ST.15
Leftow here uses “Trinity monotheism” for what he takes to be just one
version of ST. But as we’ve seen, if all versions of ST admit the non-identity of
the persons, and if all versions of ST treat “is god” as univocal across P1 and
P3, and if no versions of ST take issue with standard logical regimentations of
counting statements, then all versions of ST will have to confront the problem
Leftow raises. (At least, they will have to confront the purely formal problem
Leftow’s argument relies on.) Namely, first, that ST must equivocate on “is
god” in P1 through P3 on the one hand and “is God” in P7 on the other hand
(otherwise we end up with four gods instead of one). But then it follows that
either (1) there is more than one “way” of legitimately being divine or being “a
god” (a position Leftow calls “Plantingian Arianism”), or else (2) the persons
are not legitimately divine or “god,” or else (3) the one God (the Trinity) is not
legitimately divine or “god.”
So, although, again, both proponents and critics tend to characterize ST in
terms of its taking the divine “persons” to be distinct centers of consciousness
and so forth (a particular aspect of its content), for our purposes it will be more
useful to characterize it in terms of the formal feature Leftow’s criticism relies
on. For even if “x is god” means that x is a bean, we can run essentially the
same argument to the effect that one will have to equivocate on “is god.” If the
persons (for whatever reason) satisfy that predicate (whatever it means), and
they are all non-identical, yet there is only one thing that (for whatever reason)
satisfies that predicate (whatever it means), then LPT2 is formally adequate.
So, if ST is to count as a solution (i.e., not be inconsistent), it must reject
the formal adequacy of 7LPT-2 and replace it with an equivocation on “is god.”
Thus, we can pin down a formal regimentation for ST and give an ST proposed
solution to the LPT as follows:
1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P.
2. ΦST in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P:
15. (Leftow 1999), p. 221.
22
ΦST:
(1ST) G1f
(2ST) G1s
(3ST) G1h
(4ST) f 6= s
(5ST) f 6= h
(6ST) s 6= h
(7ST) (∃x)(∀y)(G2x & (G2y → x=y))16
3. ΦST is formally consistent in PLI.17
(“Pure”) Relative Identity Trinitarianism (Pure RI)
The major strand of Relative Identity Trinitarianism (RI) in contemporary phi-
losophy of religion, called “pure” RI by Mike Rea,18 began with Peter Geach’s
discussions of relative identity, and his application of it to the doctrine of the
Trinity.19 A. P. Martinich also endorsed an RI view a few decades ago,20 as
did James Cain.21 But probably the clearest, fullest and most influential state-
ments of the view are van Inwagen’s.22 In his earlier statement of the view,
van Inwagen does not answer the question whether classical identity exists or
not.23 But in his later statement, he explicitly rejects the existence of classical
identity.24
Pure RI may be, in some sense, the most difficult proposed solution to the
LPT to wrap one’s head around, given that it rejects the existence of classical
identity altogether, and given how intuitive classical identity seems to most of
us. But in another sense (happily, the sense that will matter for us), it is among
the easiest. This is especially so as it appears in van Inwagen’s work, which,
also happily, is what we might call the canonical version of Pure RI. As I noted
16. It might be objected that this treats “is god” in P7 as another predication, whereas Social
Trinitarians might claims it should be treated as a name in P7, thus: (7ST)´ (∃x)(∀y)(x=g &
(y=g → x=y)). However, that is still an equivocation, and so, when we give a more general
characterization of a “Family” of views into which ST will fall, such a version of ST will be
included in our “Family” anyway.
17. It should be obvious that there is a model for ΦST, and the proof is left as an exercise
for the reader.
18. The distinction begins in (Rea 2003) p. 433 and passim.
19. See (Geach 1968), pp. 43-48 and 69-70; (Geach 1967) and (Feldman andGeach 1969),
both reprinted in (Geach 1972); and his chapter, (Geach 1973).
20. (Martinich 1978) and (Martinich 1979).
21. (Cain 1989).
22. (van Inwagen 1988), and (van Inwagen 2003) in (Rea 2009a), pp. 61-75.
23. In (van Inwagen 1988), p. 241, van Inwagen considers three arguments concerning clas-
sical identity and its relation to relative identity, and says “I regard these arguments as incon-
clusive. In the sequel, therefore, I shall assume neither that classical identity exists nor that
it does not exist.” Thus, strictly speaking, in this paper, van Inwagen counted as an adherent
of “impure” Relative Identity theory, to be discussed below.
24. In (van Inwagen 2003), p. 70, he says, “I deny that there is one all-encompassing relation
of identity. . . there is no relation that is both universally reflexive and forces indiscerniblility.”
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above,25 many in this debate have an unfortunate tendency to slide from the
purely formal, logical problem of the Trinity, to the metaphysical problem of
the Trinity, to biblical hermeneutics, etc. in illegitimate ways.26 Van Inwagen
(wisely in my view) keeps the discussion always at the level of logic. So, distilling
merely the formal aspects of his view is no trick.
First, Pure RI very explicitly rejects the very existence, or intelligibility, of
classical identity, and so explicitly rejects PLI as a formally adequate language
for P (PLI being “predicate logic with identity”). Van Inwagen has given his
own preferred formal language for this purpose, Relative Identity Logic, which
he shortens to “RI-logic,”27 and which I will shorten even further to “RIL.” So,
first we can say that Pure RI will not accept PLI as a formally adequate language
for P, but will claim that RIL is a formally adequate language for P.
Second, Pure RI replaces the classical (non-)identity predicate “ 6=” in the
regimentations of P1 through P6 with various relative (non-)identity predicates,
the two relevant for our purposes being: “is the same being as” in its equivalents
of P1 through P3, and “is (not) the same person as” in its equivalent of P4
through P6.28 It can then use the “is the same being as” predicate in its equiv-
alent of P7 without generating inconsistency. Although van Inwagen uses the
English “is the same being as” and “is (not) the same person as,” I will shorten
these to “=B” and “ 6=P,” respectively.
One might think we could now state a Pure RI proposed solution to the LPT
as:
1. RIL is a formally adequate language for P.
2. ΦPure-RI* in RIL is a formally adequate regimentation of P:
ΦPure-RI*:
(1Pure-RI*) f =B g
(2Pure-RI*) s =B g
(3Pure-RI*) h =B g
(4Pure-RI*) f 6=P s
(5Pure-RI*) f 6=P h
(6Pure-RI*) s 6=P h
(7Pure-RI*) (∃x)(∀y) ( x =B g & ( (y =B g) → (y =B x) ) )
3. ΦPure-RI* is formally consistent in RIL.
However, this would not be accurate. At least, not without some qualifica-
tions about the uses of “f,” “s,” and “h” in RIL. As van Inwagen points out,
25. (Chapter 1.1, p. 11).
26. My reasons for taking these distinctions to be important should become clear in my
concluding evaluation in Chapter 6, p. 265 ff.
27. (van Inwagen 1988), p. 231.
28. It will become clear why I say its “equivalents” shortly.
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The philosopher who eschews classical, absolute identity must also
eschew singular terms, for the idea of a singular term is – at least
in currently orthodox semantical theory – inseparably bound to the
classical semantical notion of reference or denotation; and this no-
tion, in its turn, is inseparably bound to the idea of classical identity.
It is a part of the orthodox semantical concept of reference that ref-
erence is a many-one relation. And it is a part of the idea of a
many-one relation – or of a one-one relation, for that matter – that
if x bears such a relation to y and bears it to z, then y and z are
absolutely identical.29
To cut a long story short, RIL must replace singular reference with relative
singular reference, and this boils down to certain kinds of general or quantified
statements employing relative identity relations. Thus, a Pure RI proposed
solution to the LPT would instead come to something like this:
1. RIL is a formally adequate language for P.
2. ΦPure-RI in RIL is a formally adequate regimentation of P:
ΦPure-RI:
(∃x) (∃y) (∃z)
(Gx & Gy & Gz & (cf. P1 to P3)
x 6=P y & x 6=P z & y 6=P z & (cf. P4 to P6)
(∀v) (∀w) ((Gv & Gw) → (v =B w))) (cf. P7)
3. ΦPure-RI is formally consistent in RIL.30
ΦPure-RI is just one long formula. I have split it onto different lines for ease
of reading. Obviously the first line is just the initial three quantifiers, which
we must use in the place of singular terms. With that in place, the second line
corresponds in a way to P1 through P3. The third line corresponds in a way
to P4 through P6. And the fourth line corresponds in a way to P7. Thus, the
different parts of ΦPure-RI are in some sense the “equivalents” of different parts
of P. (One can usefully compare ΦPure-RI to other proposed answers by taking
the conjunction of their regimentations of P1 through P7 in order, and then
“Ramsifying” away the names of the persons.)
“Impure” Relative Identity Trinitarianism (Impure RI)
The final contemporary proposal we will look at has been defended by Mike Rea
(and his sometimes partner in philosophical crime, Jeff Brower). In the Rea-
Brower account of the Trinity, the persons stand in a “constitution” relation
to one another, and the word “God” is systematically ambiguous between the
29. (van Inwagen 1988), p. 244.
30. I will give no proof of this. It is easy enough to see that this will be consistent, but for
more, one can see (van Inwagen 1988) pp. 249-250.
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persons.31 That relation does not entail classical identity, but the account does
not deny the existence or intelligibility of classical identity as on the “pure” RI
view. It simply holds, as does Pure RI, that our ordinary counting practices rely
not on classical, or “strict,” identity, but on various relative identity relations.
The constitution relation either is, or at least entails, a species of relative identity
between the persons, such that we should count them as three persons but one
god. (For the time being, we will follow Rea’s terminology in calling this “impure
Relative Identity” (Impure RI) as distinguished from “pure” RI. We will see later
why there may be a more useful term to cover both of these views.)
Since Impure RI accepts classical identity, it can (it may as well) accept
PLI as a formally adequate language in which to regiment P. Furthermore, it
can regiment P4 through P6 as classical non-identity claims just as in LPT1
and LPT2. However, like Pure RI, it rejects classical identity as the relation by
which we count, and instead analyzes counting statements as operating by way
of relative identity relations. So, it will regiment P7 differently.
To claim that we count by classical identity is to claim that we count one or
two (. . . or n) Fs when there are one or two (. . . or n) terms (t1, t2, . . . tn) of
which “F” is true and the appropriate claims of classical non-identity involving
those terms (t1 6= t2, . . . ) are all true, and any other term tn+1 of which “F” is
true is such that at least some claim of classical identity involving tn+1 and one
of the previous terms is true (thus, tn+1 = t1 or tn+1 = t2, or . . . tn+1 = tn).
To claim that we count by relative identity is to claim that we count one or
two (. . . or n) Fs when there are one or two (. . . or n) terms (t1, t2, . . . tn) of
which “F” is true and the corresponding claims of relative non-identity involving
those terms and that predicate (t1 6=F t2, . . . ) are all true, and any other term
tn+1 of which “F” is true is such that at least some claim of relative identity
involving tn+1 and one of the previous terms and the appropriate predicate is
true (thus, tn+1 =F t1 or tn+1 =F t2, or . . . tn+1 =F tn).
Thus, Impure RI’s regimentation of P7 will look much like Pure RI’s in a
way, but stated in PLI instead of RIL. But how does Impure RI analyze P1
through P3?
Over the course of several papers, the Rea-Brower view becomes fairly com-
plex, involving the sharing by the persons of a trope-like divine nature that
“plays the role of matter” for the persons, each of which is constituted by the di-
vine nature plus its own hypostatic property (Fatherhood, Sonship, Spiritude).
But the deeper importance of that theoretical machinery lies in its licensing of
a relative identity claim involving the term “God” (here used as a name or other
singular term again) and each of the names of the persons. Namely, the claim
that the “same god as” relation obtains. We can symbolize this relative identity
relation as “=G,” which allows us to regiment the view more simply, and give an
Impure RI proposed solution to the LPT as follows:
31. The view is explicated, defended, and developed in more detail over the course of a
number of articles. See (Rea 2003), (Brower and Rea 2005a), (Brower and Rea 2005b),
(Rea 2006), and (Rea 2009b). See also Rea and Michael Murray’s discussion of the Trinity
in (Murray and Rea 2012).
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1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P.
2. ΦImpure-RI in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P:
ΦImpure-RI:
(1Impure-RI) f =G g
(2Impure-RI) s =G g
(3Impure-RI) h =G g
(4Impure-RI) f 6= s
(5Impure-RI) f 6= h
(6Impure-RI) s 6= h
(7Impure-RI) (∃x)(∀y)(x =G g & (y =G g → y =G x))
3. ΦImpure-RI is formally consistent in PLI.32
Is it really OK to just ignore whatever more intricate logical structure might,
given Rea and Brower’s fuller account, be entailed by the “=G” relation, such
as a reference to the divine nature and the constitution relation? Yes. How so?
Whatever the “same god as” relation might entail, as long as “x is the same
god as y”:
1. is not in itself formally inconsistent, and
2. does not entail (classical) identity between x and some other term ti,33
then (1Impure-RI) through (7Impure-RI) is still consistent.
On the other hand, if “x is the same god as y” does entail a (classical) identity
between x and some other term ti, then (1Impure-RI) through (6Impure-RI) will
be inconsistent without even appealing to (7Impure-RI). But not for any reasons
interestingly related to Impure RI. It will be inconsistent for the same reasons
(1LPT-1) through (6LPT-1) were.
More precisely, for any formula φ, where φt1,t2x,y is the result of replac-
ing every occurrence of the variables x and y in φ with the terms t1 and t2,
respectively, if:
φt1,t2x,y |= t1= ti for some ti 6= t1
then
φf,gx,y & φs,gx,y & φh,gx,y & f 6= s & f 6= h & s 6= h
is inconsistent anyway, but if:
32. It should be obvious that there is a model for ΦImpure-RI, and the proof is left as an
exercise for the reader.
33. I include 1 merely to aid comprehension. Given 2, 1 is in fact redundant.
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φt1,t2x,y 2 t1= ti for any ti 6= t1
then
φf,gx,y & φs,gx,y & φh,gx,y & f 6= s & f 6= h & s 6= h &
(∃x)(∀y)(φgy & (φy,gx,y → φy,xx,y))
is consistent.
So, as long as “x is the same god as y” doesn’t entail a classical identity claim
between x and some other term, we are safe. And it doesn’t seem that it would
on the Rea-Brower account. The only other term that might be involved would
be “the divine nature.” But on the Rea-Brower account, the divine nature is
definitely not classically identical to any of the persons. So, we needn’t go into
more detail on the precise logical structure, or further semantic content, of the
“same god as” relation. The above will do.
1.3.2 Classical Trinitarian Heresies
Arianism
Although not the first chronologically, the CTH of all CTHs was Arianism. It
was Arianism that occasioned the First (and Second) Ecumenical Council(s) and
the heated controversies of the 4th century and beyond. Historically, Arianism
was not motivated by the search for a solution to the LPT. Nor was its rejection
by the orthodox motivated by concerns about the LPT. Still, the logical problem
of the Trinity did have a role in the debate, albeit a more minor one, more as an
after-thought or “back-up” argument tacked onto what seemed like more serious
issues in the debate.
The more central concerns of that debate were in some sense ultimately
Christological. Was the Logos a creature, or uncreated? Did it have the same
nature as the Father, or a different one (that is, were the Father and Son ho-
moousios, “consubstantial” or “co-essential,” or merely homoiousios, “similar in
essence”? Or were they outright anomoios or heteroousios, “not of the same
essence” or “of a different essence”)? These were the important questions, and
especially as they in turn led to soteriological consequences. (If we want to hold
the traditional, Irenaean soteriological claim that “God became man, that man
might become god,” then must the pre-incarnate Logos be “god,” or “divine” in
the fullest sense, as the orthodox held, or not necessarily, as the Arians held?)
But how do these issues bear on a solution to the LPT?
Some Arians clearly thought that the LPT was a problem for orthodox
Trinitarians, but not for Arians, for they raised the LPT as an objection to
orthodox Trinitarianism.34 Gregory Nazianzen in his Fifth Theological Oration
34. Are these Arians best described as raising the purely formal, logical problem of the
Trinity, or the broader, metaphysical problem of the Trinity?
The fact that no formal languages existed at the time does not settle the issue. The
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(On the Holy Spirit) discusses this Arian argument:35
εἰ θεός, φασι, καὶ θεός, καὶ θεός, “If,” they say, “there is God, and
piῶς οὐχὶ τρεῖς θεοί· ἢ piῶς οὐ piολυ- God, and God, how are there not
αρχία τὸ δοξαζόμενον·36 three gods? Or how is that which is
glorified not a poly-archy?”37
But why did those Arians not think the LPT was a problem for them? What
was their proposed solution to the LPT?
For the first part of the answer, we have to go back to Gregory’s Third
Theological Oration (On the Son). Arians took the position that Father and
Son have different natures (that they were not “consubstantial”). Second, they
took the position that “is god” as applied to the Father expresses the divine
nature. (Both of these views, we shall see, were rejected by Gregory of Nyssa,
and for that matter all of the Cappadocians and most “Eastern” Trinitarians in
general).38 It follows directly from these two views that applying “is god” to the
Son could only be done equivocally (regardless of concerns about the LPT).
And this is a consequence they themselves acknowledged. We read in Gre-
gory’s Third Theological Oration:
῎Οταν δὲ ἀνθυpiοφέρωμεν αὐτοῖς· And when we advance this ob-
jection against them,
τί οὖν· οὐ κυρίως θεὸς ὁ υἱός, “What do you mean to say then?
ὤσpiερ οὐδὲ ζῷον τὸ γεγραμμένον· That the Son is not properly God,
just as a picture of an animal is not
properly an animal?39
piῶς οὖν θεός, εἰ μὴ κυρίως θεός· And if not properly God, in what
sense is He God at all?”
distinction between the two problems does not turn on whether we rely on recasting the
argument in a modern, formal language to determine the formal (in)consistency of the relevant
propositions, rather than expressing those claims in a natural language like Greek. Rather, the
distinction between the two problems is whether (a) a certain set of propositions is by itself
formally inconsistent, or whether (b) there exists some allegedly necessarily true auxiliary
proposition that, when added to the original set, would produce a formally inconsistent set.
The Arians here seem to be saying that the orthodox Trinitarian understanding of P1
through P7 is formally inconsistent all by itself, not that there are additional propositions
that, when added to the orthodox understanding of P, would produce an inconsistency. So,
at least in this particular instance, Arians and orthodox in the original debate seemed to be
focusing on the logical, not the metaphysical, problem of the Trinity.
35. Note that for all Greek text in this dissertation, I have relied on the text available online
at the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae, and so in certain cases cannot give page numbers, in which
case I supply whatever section numbers or other information is available on the TLG.
36. (St. Gregory Nazianzen 1963), Fifth Theological Oration (31), On the Holy Spirit,
section 13.
37. Translation mine.
38. On the point that the Cappadocians, and specifically Gregory of Nyssa, rejected the
claim that “is god” expresses the divine nature, see below, Chapter 4.2.3, p. 134. On the point
that this was a fairly widespread assumption in the pro-Nicene tradition, see below, Chapter
4.2.3, p. 146.
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τί γὰρ κωλύει, φασί, καὶ ὁμώνυμα They reply, “Why should not
ταῦτα εἶναι, καὶ κυρίως ἀμφότερα these terms be [both] ambiguous
λέγεσθαι· [homonyma], and <yet> in both
cases be used in a proper sense?”
καὶ piροσοίσουσιν ἡμῖν τὸν κύνα, And they will give us such in-
τὸν χερσαῖον, καὶ τὸν θαλάττιον, stances as the land-dog and the dog-
ὁμώνυμά τε ὄντα, καὶ κυρίως λεγό- fish; where the word “dog” is am-
μενα, biguous, and yet in both cases is
properly used,
—ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον εἶδος for there is such a species among
ἐν τοῖς ὁμωνύμοις, — the ambiguously named,
καὶ εἴτε τι ἄλλο τῇ αὐτῇ piροσχρῆ- or any other case in which the
ται piροσηγορίᾳ, καὶ μετέχει ταύτης same appellative [prosegoria] is used
ἐpi’ ἴσης, τῇ φύσει διεστηκός.40 for two things of different nature.41
So there is step one in the Arian solution to the LPT: equivocate on “is god.”
Not between P7 on the one hand and P1 through P3 on the other, as in ST,
but among P1 through P3 themselves.
Step two is that they paired the characteristically Arian equivocation on “is
god” with a related view about counting statements involving ambiguous count
nouns. Gregory continues a little later in the Fifth Theological Oration:
Τοὺς δὲ σοὺς λόγους οὐκ οἶδα As for the arguments with which
piότερον piαίζοντος εἶναι φήσομεν, ἢ you would overthrow the Union
σpiουδάζοντος, οἷς ἀναιρεῖς ἡμῶν τὴν which we support, I know not whe-
ἔνωσιν. ther we should say you are jesting
or in earnest.
τίς γὰρ δὴ καὶ ὁ λόγος· For what is this argument?
τὰ ὁμοούσια συναριθμεῖται, φῄς· “Things of one essence,” you say,
“are counted together,”
συναρίθμησιν λέγων τὴν εἰς ἀρι- and by this “counted together,”
θμὸν ἔνα συναίρεσιν· you mean that they are collected
into one number.
οὐ συναριθμεῖται δὲ τὰ μὴ ὁμο- “But things which are not of one
ούσια· essence are not thus counted;
ὤστε ὑμεῖς μὲν οὐ φεύξεσθε τὸ so that you [=orthodox Trinitar-
λέγειν τρεῖς θεοὺς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ians] cannot avoid speaking of three
τοῦτον· gods, according to this account,
ἡμῖν δὲ οὐδὲ εἷς κίνδυνος· while we [=Arians] do not run
any risk at all of it,
οὐ γὰρ ὁμοούσια λέγομεν.42 inasmuch as we assert that they
39. In Greek, ζῷον means either an animal or a painting.
40. (St. Gregory Nazianzen 1963) Third Theological Oration (29), On the Son, section
14.
41. Translation from (St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Gregory Nazianzen 1894), p.
306.
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are not consubstantial.”43
So the accusation made against Trinitarians by Arians is something like this.
When we count by a count-noun F, for example “dog,” that noun must express
some essence or nature, in this case dog-hood. And the number of Fs will be
the number of things instantiating this essence or nature. So, if there are three
things that all instantiated dog-hood, then there are three dogs.
Applied to the Trinity, the Arian argues as follows. The orthodox Trinitarian
holds precisely this sort of view with respect to the persons of the Trinity. That
is, the orthodox Trinitarian holds that each of the persons instantiates god-hood
(or “the Godhead,” as the old-fashioned like to call it). So, given the Arian view
of counting, the orthodox Trinitarian will have to say that there are three gods.
On the other hand, if we have a count-noun that is ambiguous between two
essences or natures, then we have to precisify (whether explicitly, or tacitly,
given a certain context), and only given that precisification can we answer the
question how many Fs there are. For example, if “dog” is ambiguous between a
kind of mammal and a kind of fish, and there is one land-dog and one dog-fish in
the vicinity, and we ask “how many dogs are there?” the Arian will say that we
have to precisify. In this context, there are two admissible precisifications. On
one, the question comes to, “how many land-dogs are there?” and the answer
is “one.” On the other , the question comes to, “how many dog-fish are there?”
and the answer is “one.” So, on every admissible precisification in this context,
the answer is “one.” And on no admissible precisification in this context is the
answer anything other than “one.” So, it is right to answer “one” in a context
like that.
Applied to the Trinity, the Arian argues as follows. The Arian doctrine of the
Trinity holds precisely that the three persons do not exemplify a single essence
or nature, expressed by the count-noun “god.” Rather, there are three different
essences or natures – one for each of the persons. So, in this context, there are
three admissible precisifications of the predicate “is god.” On any admissible
precisification of the question “how many gods are there?” in this context, the
answer will be “one.” And on no admissible precisification of the question in this
context is the answer anything other than “one.” So, it is right (for the Arian)
in a context like this to answer “one” to the question “how many gods are there”
(likewise for, “how many gods do you believe in, or worship?” etc.)
Gregory goes on in the Fifth Theological Oration to argue against both sides
of the Arian biconditional about counting, proposing counter-examples to each.
But these need not detain us at present. For, although I think Gregory is right
in his criticisms, Arianism need not be true, or even formally adequate for P, to
be logically consistent. And for the time being that is all that concerns us. So,
for our current purposes, we can understand well enough the logical form that
42. (St. Gregory Nazianzen 1963), Fifth Theologian Oration (31), On the Holy Spirit,
section 17.
43. Translation from (St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Gregory Nazianzen 1894), p.
323.
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Arians attribute to P and how it is consistent, and can thus end our inquiry into
Arianism, and state a proposed Arian solution to the LPT as follows:
1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P.44
2. ΦAR in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation for P:
ΦAR:
(1AR) G1f
(2AR) G2s
(3AR) G3h
(4AR) f6=s
(5AR) f6=h
(6AR) s6=h
(7AR) (∃x)(∀y)(Gix & (Giy → x=y))
(for every admissible precisification of Gi in this context)
3. ΦAR is formally consistent in PLI.45
44. One might object that it is anachronistic to put into the mouths of Arians the statement
that “PLI is a formally adequate language for P,” and so forth, given that they had no concept
of PLI, perhaps no concept even of formal adequacy, and certainly did not, and would not
have been able to, formulate their views in sentences of PLI. None of this, however, is being
claimed here.
First, we put into the mouths of Arians the statement that PLI is a formally adequate
language for P, not because they thought so, or would have thought so, but because of the
“prejudice” we have adopted in favor of PLI ourselves (see 1.1, p. 14). That is, unless there
is a reason to reject the formal adequacy of PLI, and specifically classical identity, we assume
it is formally adequate, as a concession to the anti-Trinitarian. Arians do not seem to have
rejected the existence of classical identity, so we will “force” them to use PLI (since they may
as well use it, and we have adopted the “prejudice” of using it if we can.)
Second, as to the regimentation itself, we are not saying that Arians would have given, much
less that historically they did give this regimentation. Rather, we are here saying that the
formulae of this regimentation have the logical forms that Arians attributed to the propositions
in P. Of course they did not use this regimentation, or PLI at all, as the means by which they
attributed a certain logical form to P. They used Greek. But there is nothing preventing us
from using a different language, and a regimentation within that language, as the means by
which to attribute the same logical form to the same set of claims. (If it was illegitimate to use
anything other than the exact formulae, or sentences, that Arians used, then not only would
it be illegitimate to employ PLI here, but it would be illegitimate even to use English, or any
language other than Greek. Furthermore, we could not even use the PLI regimentations we
have given of ST and Impure RI, since their proponents have not given these regimentations
themselves.)
In principle, of course, we could eschew PLI, and formal languages altogether, throughout
the dissertation, as long as we have some way of saying with precision what logical form
this or that person takes P to have. And that could all be done in English, or Greek, or
any other language. The use of formal languages is not essential. It is merely a (very great)
convenience and means of clarification, given that, as we said before (refrulesoflogic, p. 12),
formal languages permit no ambiguity in the logical forms of their sentences.
45. Proof is left as an exercise for the reader.
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(Naïve) Modalism
Modalism, variously known as monarchianism, patripassianism or Sabellianism
(after one of its more famous proponents, Sabellius) was an early Trinitarian
heresy, or family of heresies, that in some way denied the distinctness of the
divine “persons” or “hypostases.”
We are in a more difficult position to determine precisely the content of
Modalist doctrine, as compared to Arianism or orthodox Trinitarianism, due
to lack of evidence. No complete modalist writings survive; what we have are
fragments quoted by the church fathers and descriptions of their views by the
church fathers. And the Fathers may not always have shared our concern for
charitably interpreting one’s opponents. Perhaps because of this, or perhaps for
some other reasons, a certain interpretation of modalism has been quite popular.
I have misgivings about the historical accuracy of that account, but since we
will be able to do well enough with the standard account, I will not explore the
issue, but will simply label the standard account of modalism “Naïve Modalism”
and merely note that, in my opinion, there were probably at least some versions
of modalism that were more sophisticated.
Now, what seems to me the less charitable interpretation (or perhaps a
perfectly good interpretation of a much less plausible version of modalism) can
be seen in passages such as this one from St. Basil:
σφάλλονται γάρ, ὡς ὄτι ὁ piατὴρ For they get tripped up [think-
αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ ὑιός, καὶ ὡς ὄτι ὁ ὑιὸς ing] that the Father is the same as
αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ piατήρ, ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ the Son, and that the Son is the
ἄγιον piνεῦμα, ὤστε εἶναι ἓν piρόσω- same as the Father, and similarly
piον, τρία δὲ ὀνόματα.46 also the Holy Spirit, so that there
is one person, but three names.47
Similar statements can be found in other patristic descriptions of Sabellian-
ism (as well as the related heresies of Praxaeus, Noetius, etc.)
Perhaps it has seemed reasonable to some philosophers and theologians to
reason in something like the following way. If we today were to say that “Samuel
Clemens” and “Mark Twain” are two names for the same person, then we would
express that in PLI by making, say “s” in PLI have the same semantic value as
“Samuel Clemens” in English, “m” in PLI have the same semantic value as “Mark
Twain” in English, and asserting “s=m” in PLI. (At least, those of us who accept
classical identity probably would.) So, if “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” (in
English, or their equivalents in Greek) are just three names for the same person,
then, the persons of the Trinity are related in the way we would express using the
“=” sign in PLI. So, it would be appropriate to think of modalism as asserting
the classical identity of the persons of the Trinity. And a formally adequate way
to regiment that view in PLI would be “f=s,” “f=h,” and “s=h.” I will call this
view “Naïve Modalism” (NM).
46. (St. Basil the Great 1897), pp. 308-310.
47. Translation mine.
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So, if a Naïve Modalist accepts PLI (and he could), the NM view might be
regimented as either of:
ΦNM-1: ΦNM-2:
(1NM-1) f=g (1NM-2) Gf
(2NM-1) s=g (2NM-2) Gs
(3NM-1) h=g (3NM-2) Gh
(4NM-1) f=s (4NM-2) f=s
(5NM-1) f=h (5NM-2) f=h
(6NM-1) s=h (6NM-2) s=h
(7NM-1) (∃x)(∀y)(x=g & (y=g→ y=x)) (7NM-2) (∃x)(∀y)(Gx & (Gy→ y=x))
And we can give a proposed NM solution to the LPT as:
1. PLI is a formally adequate language for P.
2. At least one of ΦNM-1 in PLI or ΦNM-2 in PLI is a formally adequate
regimentation for P.
3. Both ΦNM-1 and ΦNM-2 are formally consistent in PLI.48
(Similar considerations to those discussed in reference to Impure RI show
that it doesn’t matter what further logical content might be packed into the
Naïve Modalist understanding of “is god” in a regimentation of P1 through P3
as long as “x is god” doesn’t entail x 6= f, x 6= s, or x 6= h. More precisely, if:
φt1x |= t1 6=f ∨ t1 6=s ∨ t1 6=h
then
φfx & φsx & φhx
is inconsistent anyway. On the other hand, if:
φt1x 2 t1 6=f ∨ t1 6=s ∨ t1 6=h
then
φfx & φsx & φhx & f=s & f=h & s=h & (∃x)(∀y)(φx & (φy → y=x))
is consistent.)
But although both of these regimentations are consistent (given the caveat
in the preceding paragraph), neither is much in the way of a regimentation of P,
because however P4 through P6 ought to be analyzed, this isn’t it. NM avoids
the inconsistency of LPT1 and LPT2, not by so much by offering legitimate
48. It should be obvious that there is a model for ΦNM-1 as well as a model for ΦNM-2, and
each proof is left as an exercise for the reader.
34
alternative regimentations of P4 through P6, but by simply denying them. NM
is certainly heretical by the lights of historical orthodoxy, and entails what
I think the orthodox saw as problematic in SM anyway. So for our current
purposes, this will complete our discussion of alternative answers to the LPT
that have actually been proposed, both in ancient times and in our own.
But one wonders. . . are these the only ways one could possibly solve the
LPT? And if not, what other options could there be for the Trinitarian? If there
are no other options, how could we know that?
Some philosophers seem to hope that further “Trinitarian theorizing” may
bring forth creative new solutions to the LPT.
But is that even possible?
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Chapter 2
Taxonomy of Possible
Solutions
They find fault with those who keep silent
They find fault with those who speak much
They find fault with those who speak moderately
In this world, there is no one they do not find at fault
– The Dhammapada, verse 227
In the last section, we saw several alternative proposed answers to the LPT.
But are these the only possible answers to the LPT? Or could we invent new
ones?
Some philosophers find fault with all of the on-offer solutions to the LPT, but
hold out hope for new avenues in “Trinitarian theorizing.” They hold that the
“business of Trinitarian theorizing” is simply “unfinished,” and that there may
be fresh, new ways of creatively answering (and hopefully solving) the LPT. For
example, Dale Tuggy in “The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing,”
asks us to consider an analogue of what I have called P. He writes:
Consider the following six Trinitarian claims:
(1) God is divine.
(2) The Father of Jesus Christ is divine.
(3) The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine.
(4) The Holy Spirit is divine.
(5) The Father is not the Son is not the Holy Spirit is not God.
That is, these four – Father, Son, Holy Spirit, God – are nu-
merically distinct individuals.
This last claim can be broken into two parts:
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(5a) These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit.
(5b) God is numerically distinct from any of these: Father, Son,
Holy Spirit.
(6) Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the
Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit.1
And in an endnote, Tuggy gives a regimentation of these claims in PLI:
In contemporary logical symbolism:
(1) Dg
(2) Df
(3) Ds
(4) Dh
(5) f 6= s 6= h 6= g (That is, f 6= s & s 6= h & f 6= h & f 6= g & s 6=
g & h 6= g.)
(5a) f 6= s & s 6= h & f 6= h
(5b) f 6= g & s 6= g & h 6= g
(6) (x ) (Dx → (x = f ∨ x = s ∨ x = h))
(5) is compatible with g=(f, s, h), the claim that God is identical to
the mereological sum of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.2
Tuggy claims that (5b) is the only claim that is “not a datum of the New
Testament.”3 He explores a few of what he seems to think of as different “ver-
sions” of the doctrine of the Trinity,4 and finds fault with all of them. However,
at least at the time of writing, he still held out hope. “We Christian theologians
and philosophers came up with the doctrine of the Trinity; perhaps with God’s
help we will come up with a better version of it.”5 I think the sentiment is not
atypical of many philosophers in the field. In this paper, Tuggy claims that,
if we reject (5b), “There are materials left ((1)–(4), (6)) for a different kind of
Trinitarian theory, whatever we replace (5) with. . . Whatever we come up with
won’t be a version of either LT [i.e., RI] or ST.”
But could there really be any importantly different solution to the LPT?
Something that is neither a form of RI nor of ST? Is there hope that fur-
ther “Trinitarian theorizing” may someday pay off in a creative, new way of
1. (Tuggy 2003), p. 166. It should be noted that Tuggy has since abandoned altogether
the project of “Trinitarian theorizing” and now simply adheres to what he calls “humanitarian
unitarianism,” more commonly called by its proponents, “biblical unitarianism.”
2. (Tuggy 2003), p. 181.
3. (Tuggy 2003), p. 167.
4. See Chapter 3.1, p. 65, for criticism of such talk of “versions” of the doctrine of the
Trinity.
5. (Tuggy 2003), p. 179.
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understanding the Trinity, heretofore undreamt of, and that avoids the anti-
Trinitarian’s criticisms in some previously unimagined way? Is “the business of
Trinitarian theorizing” really “unfinished” in this sense?
No.
This can be proven in the following way. First, we will note the key logical
features of the already proposed answers to the LPT. Second, we will use these
features to create a jointly exhaustive (though not mutually exclusive) taxonomy
of sets, or “Families,” of answers to the LPT.
Method, Briefly
Of course, there are infinitely many possible languages in which to regiment
P, and within many of those languages, infinitely many sets of sentences with
which to regiment P. But for the purposes of showing there to be a formally
adequate solution to the LPT, it would be “overkill” to map out all of them.
For example, once we see how Pure RI avoids inconsistency by eschewing
classical identity and positing alternative, relative identity relations in its place,
it doesn’t matter whether we go on to equivocate on “is god” among P1 through
P3 or not. Once we see what minimal set of logical features of Pure RI allows
it to avoid formal inconsistency, we can group together all proposed answers to
the LPT that share those features into one set, or “family,” of answers to the
LPT. Then we can go on to consider only other proposed answers that do not
share those features.
We will proceed in 7 steps, plus three initial caveats.
Three Caveats
First, aside from the Pure RI-er, everyone involved in the debate seems to
accept some version of PLI as a formally adequate language for P. Or in any
case, they may as well. Therefore, we will continue with our “prejudice” towards
PLI. Specifically, we will assume (or pretend) that: PLI is a formally adequate
language for P if and only if there is such a thing as classical identity. And if
we accept that PLI is a formally adequate language for P, PLI is what we will
use to regiment P.
Second, nobody involved in the debate takes it to be legitimate to equivocate
on the terms “the Father,” “the Son,” or “the Holy Spirit.” Nor does anyone
take them to be anything other than singular terms, if there are such things
as singular terms.6 So, we will also adopt the policy that, so long as we are
working within a language in which there are such things as singular terms, we
will insist on treating “the Father,” “the Son,” and “the Holy Spirit” as singular
6. There is an exception to every rule. See (Baber 2008).
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terms, and on regimenting them univocally wherever they appear.7 (RIL, as
we have seen, has its own way of analyzing what appear to be singular terms
in natural languages that gets around the too-cozy relation between singular
terms and classical identity.)
Third, while both Pure and Impure RI-ers count by a relation other than
classical identity, neither they nor anybody else rejects the general schema with
which logicians typically analyze counting statements. In other words, nobody
denies that, a formally adequate regimentation of “There is exactly one God”
would have the schema:
(7SCHEMA) (∃x)(∀y)(φx & (φy → y R x))
(where R is a meta-linguistic variable to be filled in with a predicate standing
for whatever relation we count by).
Further, it’s hard to see what other schema one could count by. So, we
will only consider answers to the logical problem of the Trinity where P7 is
regimented as some instance of (7SCHEMA), whether those instances give R the
value of classical identity, some relative identity relation, or whatever.
(It should be noted that, even if one were to disagree with all three of these
provisos, it would by no means wreck the attempt to create a complete tax-
onomy of possible answers to the LPT. It would only mean that there would
be, at most, an additional three Families of answers to the LPT – one Family
of answers that does not treat “Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit” as singular
terms (despite accepting the formal adequacy of a language that includes sin-
gular terms) and/or equivocates on those terms, one Family that acknowledges
classical identity but that for some reason does not find PLI formally adequate,
and one Family that regiments P7 according to some schema other than the
usual one. I don’t find any of those suggestions plausible enough to warrant
attention, and I think few in the debate would. But again, even if I am wrong,
we could still give a complete taxonomy of all possible answers to the LPT.
In other words, we can group all answers to the LPT that have any of these
three features into “the Bastard Step-Child Family,” which we will then simply
ignore.)8
7. In what follows, we shall always let those singular terms be, respectively, “f,” “s,” and “h,”
when we are using PLI. Strictly speaking, then, we are leaving out regimentations that use
other terms, other logical names, in PLI, such as “a,” “b,” and “c,” to refer to the persons. To
be more logically precise, we should instead use meta-linguistic variables such as “α,” “β,” and
“γ” to range over all possible terms in the language, with the stipulation that α 6= β 6= γ (i.e.,
that the values of these meta-linguistic variables, the terms or “logical names,” be distinct,
not necessarily that their bearers be distinct, which would be the substance of P4 through
P6 in all non-NM regimentations). But while this latter course is the more logically precise,
it would introduce needless complexity, in this context, in what will already be a complex
taxonomy. So, we will simply choose always to use “f,” “s,” and “h,” in PLI as the terms for
the persons.
8. In conversation, Donald Smith has expressed, not quite endorsement, but enthusiastic
curiosity and willingness to explore, a view in which “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” would
be something like mass terms, and “God” a count noun, designating a thing constituted out
of three different kinds of stuff. I hasten to emphasize, then, that I would count only such a
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2.1 The LPT1 Family
As we did in Section 1, suppose that in P1 through P3 we take “is God” to be
univocal, treat “God” as the name of an individual, and treat “is” as the “is” of
(classical) identity. Then suppose we take “is not” in P4 through P6 as univocal
claims of (classical) non-identity. In this case, there is such a thing as classical
identity, so we take PLI to be a formally adequate language for P, and we use
it. The result is, or at least entails, LPT1, or something just like LPT1 except
for 7LPT-1.
But since 7LPT-1 is not necessary in order to derive a contradiction, we will
group together any proposed answers to the LPT that share the problematic
features of its regimentation of P1 through P6. What exactly are those prob-
lematic features?
It might seem that the most salient feature of LPT1 is that it treats “God” as
a logical name instead of a predicate. But of course, a contradiction would arise
even if there were another name being used besides “God.” And a contradiction
would arise even if we treated P1 through P3 not as identity claims, but in a
way that entailed a certain kind of identity claim.
For example, suppose I regiment “x is God” as a predication meaning “x is
divine,” but then analyze “x is divine” as meaning “x is identical to Lucifer.”
I will still have a contradiction, and for essentially the same reasons, logically
speaking, as LPT1. Indeed, if there is any term ti such that ti 6= x and my
analysis of “x is God” entails “x = ti” I will end up with a contradiction. That
is because “The Father is God” will now entail “The Father = ti” and “The Son
is God” will entail “The Son = ti.” And those will entail “The Father = the
Son,” and that will contradict 4LPT-1, or anything that entails 4LPT-1. So, we
can group together any answers to the LPT that:
(1) use PLI, and
(2) give some univocal regimentation φ to “is God” in P1 through P3, such
that
(3) φα |= α = ti for some term ti such that ti 6= α, and
(4) either regiment “is not” in P4 through P6 univocally as 6=, or for any other
reason entails 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1
into the “LPT1 Family.”9 Any member of the LPT1 Family will be a non-solution
to the LPT.
So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that
do at least one (or more) of the following:
view as falling within a category I have merely stipulatively tagged with the label of “Bastard
Stepchild.” I would not of course count adherents of such views as having the nature of a
bastard stepchild.
9. 1 is strictly speaking redundant, given 3 and our “prejudice” that, as long as there is
such a thing as classical identity, PLI is a formally adequate language for P, and the language
we will use to regiment P.
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(1) use a language other than PLI (and so reject the existence of classical
identity), or
(2) fail to give a univocal regimentation φ to “is god” in P1 through P3, or
(3) give a univocal regimentation φ to “is god” in P1 through P3 such that
φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α, or
(4) regiment “is not” in any of P4 through P6 in some way other than 6=, and
do not for any other reason entail 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, or 6LPT-1.
2.2 The Non-PLI (Pure RI) Family
We’ve seen how Pure RI escapes inconsistency by rejecting classical identity,
and with it PLI (option (1) above). By doing so, Pure RI obviously need not
treat “is god” in P1 through P3 as being (or entailing any) classical identity
claims at all. Nor need it treat “is not” in P4 through P6 as being (or entailing
any) classical non-identity claims. Nor need it treat “one god” in P7 as involving
classical identity.
Since we are assuming (or pretending) that PLI is a formally adequate lan-
guage for P if and only if there is such a thing as classical identity, we will
group together all answers to the LPT that reject classical identity, and with it
PLI, into the “Non-PLI Family” of answers – the family of answers all of which
choose option (1) above. Since we have already seen at least one member of the
Non-PLI Family that has a logically consistent regimentation of P (our Pure RI
proposed solution), we know that the Non-PLI Family contains solutions to the
LPT.10
So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that ac-
cept the existence of classical identity and that (therefore, given our “prejudice”
towards PLI) use PLI as the language in which to regiment P.
2.3 The Naïve Modalist Family (and Cousins)
We’ve seen how NM escapes inconsistency by analyzing P4 through P6 in such
a way as to essentially reject them.
A related move would be to regiment P4 through P6 in a a non-committal
way that simply does not entail any of the relevant classical identity claims,
i.e. 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, or 6LPT-1, despite accepting that there is such a thing as
classical identity, thus falling into option (4) above.
We’ve seen that orthodox Trinitarians intended to draw a strong, real dis-
tinction between the persons. And, assuming classical non-identity exists, it is
the weakest real distinction that can be drawn. But P4 through P6 seem to be
intended to draw that distinction between the persons.
10. It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
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So, if the orthodox Trinitarian accepts the existence of classical (non-)identi-
ty, he himself will insist on regimenting P4 through P6 as classical non-identity
claims (4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1). Or in any case, he would certainly accept,
and not deny, what such a regimentation expresses. Indeed, he would insist on
it. If the orthodox Trinitarian wanted to analyze P4 through P6 as drawing
an even stronger distinction than classical non-identity, he would still at least
accept 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1. Indeed, if his preferred analysis involved a
“stronger” relation, he would no doubt insist that, in some way or another, his
preferred analysis entailed 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1.
Thus, we will group together all proposed answers to the LPT that (a) ac-
cept the existence of classical (non-)identity, but (b) do not entail all of 4LPT-1,
5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1, into the “Naïve Modalist Family” (“NM Family”) of an-
swers.11 Since we have already seen at least one member of the NM Family
that has a logically consistent regimentation of P, we know that the NM Family
contains solutions to the LPT.12
Note that defining the NM Family this way means there will be certain
“cousins” of Naïve Modalism included in the NM Family that will regiment, for
example, “the Father is not the Son” simply as some “ho-hum” relation, “f R s,”
that neither commits us to the classical identity of the persons (characteristic
of NM), nor the classical non-identity of the persons (characteristic of orthodox
Trinitarianism). Is it right to include such non-committal answers in the NM
Family?
I think so. Again, the intent of the orthodox Trinitarian in saying that “the
Father is not the Son,” is to draw a strong, real distinction between the two,
and, at least within a framework that accepts classical non-identity in the first
place, classical non-identity will be the weakest real distinction there is. Thus,
any regimentation of “is not” that does not even entail classical non-identity
(within a framework that admits the existence of classical non-identity) clearly
subverts the intent of the claim. Or in any case, it clearly fails to say what
the orthodox Trinitarian wants to be saying when he says “the Father is not
the Son.” On the other hand, regimentations of “is not” in P4 through P6 that
are not classical non-identity statements but that do entail them will still be
inconsistent with anything that 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1 are inconsistent with
anyway (since they will entail 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1).
11. A bit of logical housekeeping is in order. What about an answer to the LPT that, say,
entails 4LPT-1, but fails to entail either 5LPT-1 or 6LPT-1? Thus, the Father and Son would be
identical, but the Holy Spirit would be distinct from the Son/Father, a possibility St. Photios
calls “a semi-Sabellian monster” in his arguments against the filioque, ((Photius 1983), p.
73.)
As we’ve defined the NM Family (any regimentation that does not entail 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1,
and 6LPT-1 – all three), it includes such “semi-Sabellian monstrosities.” And this seems like
a reasonable grouping. Clearly the orthodox Trinitarian wants to understand P4 through P6
univocally. Any kind of semi-Sabellian view is just about as bad, from the point of view of
orthodoxy, as all-out Sabellianism.
Of course, this will mean that some members of the NM Family will still be inconsistent,
and for just the same reasons (at least some subset of the same reasons) as LPT1 is. But
that is fine. All I am claiming here is that some members of the NM Family are consistent.
12. It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
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So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that
do not reject P4 through P6 and that either do regiment them univocally as
classical non-identity claims between the persons, or else as some formula χ that
in some other way at least entails those classical non-identity claims.
That means that at this point we can “lock in” our regimentation of P4
through P6 as:
(4LPT-2-FAMILY) χ1 such that χ1 |= f 6= s
(5LPT-2-FAMILY) χ2 such that χ2 |= f 6= h
(6LPT-2-FAMILY) χ3 such that χ3 |= s 6= h
2.4 The Equivocation1 Family (Arian)
We’ve seen how Arianism escapes inconsistency by equivocating on “is god”
among P1 through P3 (option (2) above). So, we will group together all such
answers to the LPT into the “Equivocation1 Family” of answers. Since we
have already seen at least one member of the Equivocation1 Family that has a
logically consistent regimentation for P, we know that the Equivocation1 Family
contains solutions to the LPT.13
So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that
do not equivocate on “is god” among P1 through P3.
Thus, we can now “lock in” at least the univocality of our regimentation of
P1 through P3 as follows:
(1LPT-2-FAMILY) φf such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(2LPT-2-FAMILY) φs such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(3LPT-2-FAMILY) φh such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
Why will φ be such that φα 6|= α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α?
After Step 1 we decided to only consider answers to the LPT that do one of the
following:
(1) use a language other than PLI (and so reject the existence of classical
identity), or
(2) fail to give a univocal regimentation φ to “is god” in P1 through P3, or
(3) give a univocal regimentation φ to “is god” in P1 through P3 such that
φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α, or
(4) regiment “is not” in any of P4 through P6 in some way other than 6=, and
do not for any other reason entail 4LPT-1, 5LPT-1, or 6LPT-1.
13. It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
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After Step 2 we decided only to consider proposed answers to the LPT that
do use PLI (so, option (1) is no longer open). After Step 3 we decided only to
consider proposed answers to the logical problem of the Trinity that do regiment
“is not” in P4 through P6 as 6= (or at least for some other reason entail 4LPT-1,
5LPT-1, and 6LPT-1) (so, option (4) is no longer open). After Step 4, we decided
to no longer consider answers to the LPT that equivocate on their regimentation
of “is god” among P1 through P3 (so, option (2) is no longer open).
But since we are only considering answers to the LPT that choose at least
one of the above four options, we can now only consider answers that take option
(3), that is, that give a univocal regimentation φ to “is God” in P1 through P3,
but such that φα 2 α = ti, for any term ti such that ti 6= α.
Since φα 2 α = ti, for any term ti such that ti 6= α, it will not contradict
any of:
(4LPT-2-FAMILY) χ1 such that χ1 |= f 6= s
(5LPT-2-FAMILY) χ2 such that χ2 |= f 6= h
(6LPT-2-FAMILY) χ3 such that χ3 |= s 6= h
simply on the basis of the non-identity claims. That is, whatever other logical
form may be buried within χ1, χ2, and χ3, could still generate a contradiction,
but the non-identity claims themselves will not.
So, from here on out, we know we are dealing with families of answers to the
LPT such that their regimentations of P1 through P6 will be consistent barring
any problematic logical features that might be tucked away in the regimentation
of “is not” beyond mere non-identity. Their regimentations of P1 through P6 will
certainly be consistent if “is not” in P4 through P6 is simply analyzed univocally
as classical non-identity.
So, our focus now will be on the regimentation of P7.
2.5 The Equivocation2 Family
(Social Trinitarian)
We’ve seen how Social Trinitarianism escapes inconsistency by equivocating on
“is god” between P7 on the one hand, and P1 through P3 on the other. Thus,
different versions of ST will give regimentations of the form:
(1LPT-2-FAMILY) φf such that φα 6|= α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(2LPT-2-FAMILY) φs such that φα 6|= α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(3LPT-2-FAMILY) φh such that φα 6|= α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(4LPT-2-FAMILY) χ1 such that χ1 |= f 6= s
(5LPT-2-FAMILY) χ2 such that χ2 |= f 6= h
(6LPT-2-FAMILY) χ3 such that χ3 |= s 6= h
(7SCHEMA-ψ) (∃x) (∀y) (ψx & (ψy → y R x))
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That is, the regimentation φ of “is god” for P1 through P3 will be different
from the regimentation ψ of “is god” in P7. As we said earlier, not all such
answers to the LPT will involve anything particularly “social.” This is sim-
ply the salient logical feature of ST that allows it to escape contradiction. So
we will group together all such answers to the LPT into the “Equivocation2
Family” of answers.14 Since we have already seen at least one member of the
Equivocation2 Family that has a logically consistent regimentation, we know
that the Equivocation2 Family contains solutions to LPT.15
So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that
do not equivocate on “is god” between P7 on the one hand, and P1 through P3
on the other.
We have already “locked in” regimentations of P1 through P6. We are no
longer considering answers to the logical problem of the Trinity that equivocate
on “is god” between P7 on the one hand, and P1 through P3 on the other. So,
however we regiment “is god” in P1 through P3, it will have to be the same as
it appears in P7. Since we are assuming that counting can only work according
to the usual schema (only the precise relation may be disputed), we can now
“lock in” regimentations of all of P1 through P7 as:
(1LPT-2-FAMILY) φf such that φα 6|= α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(2LPT-2-FAMILY) φs such that φα 6|= α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(3LPT-2-FAMILY) φh such that φα 6|= α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(4LPT-2-FAMILY) χ1 such that χ1 |= f 6= s
(5LPT-2-FAMILY) χ2 such that χ2 |= f 6= h
(6LPT-2-FAMILY) χ3 such that χ3 |= s 6= h
(7SCHEMA-φ) (∃x)(∀y)(φx & (φy → y R x))
(such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α)
leaving open only the question of precisely what relation “R” will represent in
(7SCHEMA-φ).
2.6 The Non-Classical-Identity-Counting Family
We’ve seen how Impure RI escapes inconsistency by claiming that our count-
ing practices (at least sometimes) employ some relation(s) other than classical
identity. We are assuming that the logical form of “is god” is not itself formally
14. Note that, as we are defining the Equivocation2 Family, it is necessary that a member of
the Equivocation2 Family family equivocate on “is god,” but it is not necessary that it employ
classical identity. A view that both equivocates in this way and employs a relation other than
classical identity here would still fall into the Equivocation2 Family as we are defining it. Of
course, if one finds it more useful, one could have a separate “hybrid” family, the members of
which would both equivocate on “is god” and count by a relation other than classical identity,
then have a “pure” Equivocation2 Family, the members of which equivocate on “is god” and
do count by classical identity. For now, I will find it more convenient simply to group these
all together into one Equivocation2 Family, albeit a family, like Joseph’s, that is “splittable”
into the half-tribes of “Pure Equivocation2 Family” and “Hybrid Equivocation2 Family.”
15. It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
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contradictory and that it does not entail a classical identity claim to some single
individual.16 Thus, as long as the relation we give for R in (7SCHEMA-φ) is not
classical identity and as long as y R x does not entail y=x, no contradiction will
be derivable.
So, we will group together all answers to the LPT that analyze counting
statements via a relation other than classical identity, and that do not en-
tail classical identity, into the “Non-Classical-Identity-Counting Family” (“NCIC
Family”) of answers.17 Since we have already seen at least one member of the
NCIC Family that has a logically consistent regimentation of P, we know that
the NCIC Family contains solutions to the LPT.18
So, from here on, we will only consider proposed answers to the LPT that do
count by classical identity. Since we are assuming that we must use the usual
schema for counting, and since we are not equivocating on “is god” between P7
on the one hand, and P1 through P3 on the other, if we use classical identity
as the relation to count by in P7, we fill in the variable R in:
(7SCHEMA-φ) (∃x)(∀y)(φx & (φy → y R x))
with “=” and have:
(7LPT-2-FAMILY) (∃x)(∀y)(φx & (φy → y = x))
(And if we used any other relation R such that R entails classical identity,
then our regimentation of P7, whatever it might be, would still at least entail
(7LPT-2-FAMILY).)
Thus, we are now out of formally consistent alternatives to LPT1. We can
now “lock in” our entire regimentation of P1 through P7 as:
2.7 The LPT2 Family
(1LPT-2-FAMILY) φf such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(2LPT-2-FAMILY) φs such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(3LPT-2-FAMILY) φh such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α
(4LPT-2-FAMILY) χ1 such that χ1 |= f 6= s
(5LPT-2-FAMILY) χ2 such that χ2 |= f 6= h
(6LPT-2-FAMILY) χ3 such that χ3 |= s 6= h
(7LPT-2-FAMILY-SCHEMA) (∃x)(∀y)(φx & (φy → y R x))
(such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α)
16. Again, the assumption that the logical form of “is god” is not in itself contradictory is
redundant, given the assumption that it doesn’t entail a certain kind of identity claim. A
contradiction entails anything.
17. Note that this means that Pure RI will fall into both the Non-PLI Family and the NCIC
Family. That is fine, since this is only intended to be a jointly exhaustive, not mutually
exclusive, taxonomy of answers to the LPT. I will have more to say about this below under
the heading “Consolidating our Taxonomy of Proposed Answers.”
18. It also contains non-solutions, but that will not matter for present concerns.
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(such that y R x |= y = x)
All proposed answers to the LPT that fall into the LPT2 Family will be
non-solutions.
Consolidating our Taxonomy of Proposed Answers
We can now usefully reduce the number of options by grouping together some
of these families of answers.
First, anti-Trinitarians need not be picky about whether it is some mem-
ber(s) of the LPT1 Family or of the LPT2 Family that is(are) formally ade-
quate. So we can group these together and talk simply of the “LPT Family.”
This leaves only 6 families of answers to the LPT.
Second, orthodox Trinitarians will want to reject all of the answers in the
Equivocation1 Family and all of the answers in the NM Family as heretical.
Thus, we can usefully group all of these answers together into the “CTH Family.”
(And since we are including the Equivocation1 Family into the CTH Family, we
will also now allow ourselves to refer to the Equivocation2 Family simply as “the
Equivocation Family.”)
Of course, this is not to say that other regimentations contained in other
families of answers might not in some way involve us in some kind of heresy.
So, while we will call the set of answers to the LPT that includes both the
Equivocation1 Family and the NM Family the “CTH Family,” we will do so with
the caveat that while only heretical views on the Trinity will have regimentations
that fall into the CTH Family, not all heretical views about the Trinity will have
regimentations that fall into the CTH Family. (One can usefully think of the
“CTH Family” as the “Purely Heretical Family,” while regimentations of P found
in other families of answers to the logical problem of the Trinity could still be
used to express heretical views about the Trinity, once the content is filled in.)19
This leaves only 5 families of answers to the LPT.
Third, by rejecting classical identity altogether, Pure RI perforce counts by
a relation other than classical identity. But that is the characteristic feature of
Impure RI that allows it to escape contradiction. So, from the point of view
of formal consistency, it is really irrelevant whether one then goes on to accept
or reject the existence of classical identity and the formal adequacy of PLI.
That is, as long as a Pure RI answer agrees with an Impure RI answer in its
regimentation of P7 (or its equivalent of P7) as involving a relation other than
classical identity, and which doesn’t entail classical identity (and Pure RI must
agree with Impure RI about that), and as long as whatever formula φ it uses
in its regimentations of P1 through P3 (or its equivalent of P1 through P3) is
such that φα 2 α = ti for any term ti such that ti 6= α (and Pure RI must agree
with Impure RI about that as well), then it is irrelevant whether we say that
there is such a thing as classical identity or not. And it is irrelevant whether
19. “God is good” and “God is evil” have the same logical form. Clearly, there is more to
heresy and orthodoxy than simply logical form.
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we regiment P4 through P6 (or the Pure RI equivalent of P4 through P6) as
involving classical non-identity, as in:
(4Impure-RI) f 6= s
(5Impure-RI) f 6= h
(6Impure-RI) s 6= h
or as involving only some relative non-identity relation, as in:
(ΦPure-RI): . . . x 6=P y & x 6=P z & y 6=P z . . . (cf. P4 to P6)
(Either can yield consistent regimentations, as has already been proven.)
And since we grouped together all answers to the LPT that claim that count-
ing works by some relation other than classical identity, and that does not entail
classical identity, into the NCIC Family of answers, Pure RI is already included
in it anyway.20
We can see that the appearance of Pure RI being importantly distinct from
Impure RI (in a sense relevant simply to the question of formal consistency at
least) is an illusion. Pure RI may have rhetorical (or other) advantages (if there
is no such thing as classical identity, then we must count by a relation other
than classical identity). But any advantages it may have are not formal.
The rejection of PLI is in itself controversial. And no proposed answers to
the LPT have been presented that fall into the Non-PLI Family that do not
also fall into the NCIC Family. And it is hard to imagine what such an answer
might look like, and what might motivate such a view.
Thus, it seems to me we may as well ignore any members of the Non-PLI
Family that are not also members of the NCIC family, relegating them to the
“Bastard Stepchild Family,” while their NCIC brothers will remain in the NCIC
Family.
That leaves only 4 families of answers to the LPT,21 namely:
1. the Equivocation Family,
2. the NCIC Family,
3. the CTH Family, and
4. the LPT Family.
All answers in the LPT Family are non-solutions. All answers in the CTH
Family will be unacceptable to the orthodox Trinitarian. So, if the orthodox
Trinitarian wants to give an answer to the LPT that is both (a) non-heretical
and (b) a solution to the LPT, it must fall into either:
20. This is one example of why the categories of our taxonomy are jointly exhaustive, but
not mutually exclusive.
21. Aside from the Bastard Stepchild Family, of course, which we are, appropriately enough,
ignoring.
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(a) the Equivocation Family, which equivocates on “is god” between P7 and
P1 through P3, or
(b) the NCIC Family, which counts by a relation other than classical iden-
tity.22
Thus, anyone who takes the “business of Trinitarian theorizing” to be “un-
finished,” who is holding out hope for some fresh, new way of understanding the
doctrine of the Trinity (or at least P), is out of luck. Every answer to the LPT
must fall into one (or more) of the categories we have discussed. Only two of
these categories contain any solutions to the LPT that are non-heretical. These
two categories do indeed roughly correspond to the usual divide between Social
Trinitarianism and Relative Identity Trinitarianism (or “Latin Trinitarianism”
as it is sometimes, but unfortunately, called).23
Anyone who rejects ST on the basis of its characteristic equivocation must
reject all answers in the Equivocation Family. And anyone who rejects RI on the
basis of its analysis of counting must reject all answers in the NCIC Family. As
for any new twist that a philosopher’s Trinitarian theory might incorporate, it
may help with the metaphysical problem of the Trinity, or have some rhetorical
benefit or other nice features, but from a purely formal point of view, they will
be just another member of one of the families of answers to the LPT we have
defined in this section.24
So, we know what the LPT is. We know what form a proposed answer to
the LPT must take. We also have a useful taxonomy of “families” into which all
proposed answers to the LPT must fall.
But none of this tells us which proposed solution(s) or non-solution(s) to
the LPT is (are) right (viz. formally adequate). How would we tell a formally
adequate answer if we saw it? And here is where we will see that there is a
parting of ways in the methodology of the literature.
22. It could fall into both, since, again, these categories are jointly exhaustive but not mutu-
ally exclusive. If one prefers a mutually exclusive taxonomy here, one could stipulate that the
NCIC Family not equivocate on “is god,” then split the Equivocation2 Family into the “pure”
and “hybrid” ST families, and relabel them as the “pure NCIC Family,” “pure ST family” and
“hybrid family,” respectively.
23. Although we have seen that it is the feature of equivocation and not the “social” aspect
of ST that matters to the question of consistency. Also that the family corresponding to Latin
or Relative Identity Trinitarian views is perhaps broader than one might have thought. There
is, however, still a rough correspondence, at least.
24. What, then, was wrong with Tuggy’s way of formulating the LPT? It clearly leaves
something out of the equation. If we look at his formalization of the problem, we can see
that it is not, in fact, equivalent to P. One could escape the inconsistency he points to just by
admitting that while all three persons are “divine,” the word “God,” when used as a proper
name, refers to the Father (f=g), but not to the Son or Spirit. Indeed, this is eventually the
position taken by Tuggy. Despite Tuggy’s idiosyncratic definitions of "Trinitarian" and "Uni-
tarian," this view seems “Trinitarian” enough, and doesn’t even seem particularly unorthodox,
and it would avoid the contradiction he points out. But it doesn’t solve the LPT at all. Thus,
Tuggy’s formulation of the logical problem of the Trinity is inadequate. That is the source of
the false hope it gives.
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Those I will call “puzzlers” hold that the question is something like a meta-
physical “puzzle” to be solved. More Trinitarian theorizing is what we need.
Those I will call “historicists” hold that the question is best seen as a his-
torical one, as an inquiry into what beliefs certain people in the past actually
held. Historical inquiry is what we need. . .
. . .Which is the right way to proceed with our inquiry?
51

Part II
Methodology
53

Chapter 3
Methodology
I wanted to [. . . ] warn him, while there was still time, against such
English hypothesis-mongering into the blue. It is quite clear which
color is a hundred times more important for a genealogist than blue:
namely grey, which is to say, that which can be documented, which
can actually be confirmed and has actually existed. . .
But it is unfortunately a fact that historical spirit itself is lacking in
them. . . As is now established philosophical practice, they all think
in a way that is essentially unhistorical. . . .
– Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals
Business Plan:
Phase 1: Collect Underpants
Phase 2: ?
Phase 3: Profit
– South Park, Season 2, episode 17 – “Gnomes”
We ended the last section with the question, of all of the possible logical forms
we might ascribe to P, which one is right. (Or, if more than one is right, which
ones?)
Not much has been written explicitly about the methodology of this ques-
tion, but the literature reveals that most authors dealing with the LPT seem
to approach it with a similar set of methodological assumptions on which the
LPT can be treated as something like a philosophical “puzzle.” I call their
methodological approach “the Puzzle Approach” and its followers “puzzlers.”
This methodology centers around giving accounts of the Trinity that have the
virtue of being logically consistent, and in most cases some other theoretical
virtues as well. But I will argue that, if their conclusion is supposed to be that
the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least P) is logically consistent, then, like the
methodological approach of the Underpants Gnomes, theirs is missing a critical
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link. And this lacuna renders their arguments either invalid or question-begging
in the context of the LPT. Furthermore, I will argue it is not clear how they
could shore up the methodology without simply collapsing into the methodol-
ogy I will advocate, which I call “the Historical Approach” (and its followers
“historicists”).1
Next, I will consider another identifiable methodological approach I will “the
Mysterian Approach,” or (following Dale Tuggy’s nomenclature) “mysterianism”
(and its followers “mysterians”). The mysterian eschews giving any definite an-
swer to the LPT, but still maintains that the doctrine of the Trinity is consistent,
and that it can be reasonable to believe in the doctrine of the Trinity despite
its being apparently contradictory. We will look at a bit of the debate about
mysterianism, though we will not have the space to adjudicate it. However, I
will add one novel criticism to the mix – namely that mysterianism likely seems
attractive to its defenders only because they have been working in ignorance
of the extent of what solutions are possible – an issue which is clarified by our
taxonomy. But I will argue that, once the taxonomy is in place, we can see
that what is required in order to make sense out of a mysterian position is at
odds with what is likely the deeper motivation for the position. Finally, we will
show that, while the Mysterian Approach may initially appear to represent a
rival methodology to the Puzzle Approach and the Historical Approach, it in
fact turns out to be compatible, in principle, with either. Upon examination,
it turns out that mysterians do not have a rival methodology for achieving the
same goals as those of historicists and puzzlers; rather, mysterians simply have
a different goal they are trying to achieve.
Finally, I will discuss my preferred methodology, the Historical Approach,
briefly explaining it and then defending it from a few potential objections by
puzzlers, mysterians and anti-Trinitarians. I conclude by noting that any solu-
tion to the LPT that meets the standards of the Historical Approach will also
meet those of the Puzzle Approach, and that achieving the goals of the Histori-
cal Approach also achieves the goals of the Mysterian Approach. So that, even
if puzzlers and mysterians want to argue the Historical Approach is “overkill,”
they have no reason to object to any solution to the LPT that happens to arise
out of the Historical Approach.
I want to emphasize that I do not claim that the considerations I will put
forward against these other approaches are “knock-down” arguments. But I
do think the criticisms I will present in this section, particularly of the Puzzle
Approach are serious concerns that need to be addressed.2
1. I do, however, accept that the methodology of the Puzzle Approach is appropriate in the
context of the metaphysical and other philosophical “puzzles” from which the methodology
seems to be drawn.
2. I should also perhaps emphasize that this division is not intended to be exhaustive either.
It only gives what seem to me the most common approaches in the literature.
In particular, van Inwagen’s papers on the Trinity are hard to place, and do not fit neatly
into any of the categories I’ll discuss. Although van Inwagen’s methodology is probably
closest to the Mysterian Approach, he does more than to merely say that there is “some” kind
of solution or, in James Anderson’s terms some “unarticulated equivocation,” leaving it at that
(even though, at one point, he might seem to say exactly that). Rather, on examination, he
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3.1 The Puzzle Approach
The essence of the Puzzle Approach is that it attempts to show the consistency of
the doctrine of the Trinity through what I will call an “account” of the Trinity
in a way that is fundamentally ahistorical. We can characterize the Puzzle
Approach as seeking to prove P to be consistent by:
1. providing some fairly explicit “account” A of the Trinity,
2. showing that A is consistent (and, optionally, that it has various other
theoretical virtues),
and, the critical distinction from the Historical Approach,
3. supporting A on the basis of its consistency (and/or other theoretical
virtues), rather than historical considerations.
What I am calling “accounts” are called by various names by different au-
thors, but they seem to all be recognizably the same sort of thing. An account of
the Trinity is just some more or less clear story about how the Trinity “works.”
Much like a philosophical paraphrase, an account will in some sense go beyond
P, but primarily it seems to be intended to preserve the important content of
P while somehow explaining or clarifying that content so as to show how it is
consistent. Thus, an account is supposed to (at least implicitly) provide a pro-
posed answer to the LPT. The proposed answer to the LPT that is implicitly
being given by A is just the one that attributes to P the same logical form A
has. The proponent of a given account then argues in favor of accepting his
particular account on the basis of its consistency and other theoretical virtues.
Accounts run a wide gamut. Some are clearly meant to be taken merely as
analogies. E.g. Brian Leftow’s time-traveling Rockette(s).3,4 Others seem to
seems very much committed to that equivocation being specifically about the identity relation,
and not the predicate “is God” (as Arians and Social Trinitarians would say). Additionally, in
multiple casual conversations he has mentioned his apparently quite earnest wish that Social
Trinitarianism had existed in the fourth century so that it could have been officially declared
a heresy at that time. Presumably, then, he is firmly committed to the view that the correct
answer to the LPT falls within the NCIC Family and not the Equivocation Family.
Thus, although he may take the content of P to be a mystery, and does not actually offer any
specific metaphysical account of the workings of the Trinity (departing there from the Puzzle
Approach), there seems to be no mystery as to what he takes the logical form of P to be, at
least in a general way (departing somewhat from mysterians like Anderson.) Thus, his work
does not fall neatly into either the Puzzle Approach or the Mysterian Approach. Finally,
as we will see, he very clearly acknowledges the main thrust of the historicist argument –
that merely giving a consistent account of the Trinity is not sufficient, by itself, to defend
the doctrine of the Trinity, and that what is necessary in addition has to do with historical
facts about the doctrine of the Trinity itself. We will thus discuss his view in a somewhat
scatter-shot manner throughout this chapter.
3. Originally put forward in (Leftow 2004). Leftow further elaborates and defends his
view of the Trinity in (Leftow 2007), (Leftow 2010), (Leftow 2012a) and (Leftow 2012b).
Much of this in response to Hasker. See esp. (Hasker 2009) and (Hasker 2012).
4. Presumably these are supposed to be analogies in which we can somehow see that the
analogue would be logically consistent and logically isomorphic to P. See p. 61 ff.
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be very in-depth philosophical explanations of the metaphysics involved in the
Trinity along with discussions of the semantic links between these explanations
and the corresponding linguistic expressions in S. E.g., Moreland and Craig’s
version of Social Trinitarianism seems to be intended as the literal truth about
the metaphysical workings of the Trinity, along with some discussion of the
semantics of analogous predication to obviate objections to equivocating on
“is God.”5 Finally, some accounts seem to be intended to fall somewhere in-
between mere analogy and literal explanation. E.g., Mike Rea and Jeff Brower’s
“Material Constitution” account, in which the divine nature can be thought of
as “playing the role of matter” and what we will later call the idiomata can
be regarded as playing the role of form, in three non-identical, but accidentally
numerically one, persons who bear constitution relations to one another.6
Once some account A of the Trinity is explained in some detail, the method-
ology of the Puzzle Approach is to show that A is consistent, and, for many
puzzlers, that it also has various other theoretical virtues the author may iden-
tify as desiderata. This is taken to be somehow definitive of the “success” of an
account. Importantly, the other major defining feature of the Puzzle Approach
5. See (Moreland and Craig 2003). Craig also defends his version of Social Trinitarianism
against criticisms in (Howard-Snyder 2003) in (Craig 2006) with, among other things,
photographs of various two-headed animals, quite hilariously used to defeat Howard-Snyder’s
assertion that such a thing is metaphysically impossible.
6. I say it falls somewhere in-between, since, on the one hand, it provides a much more
philosophically rich understanding of how P could possibly be true than a mere analogy like
Leftow’s Rockette(s). Yet, on the other hand, Rea and Brower don’t appear to want to commit
to whether they have found “the sober metaphysical truth” about the Trinity.
In (Brower and Rea 2005a) (p. 68), Brower and Rea state:
Thus, we can think of the divine essence as playing the role of matter; and we
can regard the properties being a Father, being a Son, and being a Spirit as
distinct forms instantiated by the divine essence, each giving rise to a distinct
Person. As in the case of matter, moreover, we can regard the divine essence not
as an individual thing in its own right but rather as that which, together with
the requisite “form”, constitutes a Person. Each Person will then be a compound
structure whose matter is the divine essence and whose form is one of the three
distinctive Trinitarian properties. On this way of thinking, the Persons of the
Trinity are directly analogous to particulars that stand in the familiar relation
of material constitution.
Of course, there are also some obvious disanalogies. . . (Emphasis mine.)
So the idea, I believe, is something like the following. This metaphysics, or something very
much like it, may be how the Trinity works, or at least it may be very similar to how the
Trinity works. Similar enough, and in the right sorts of ways, that it at least shows that there
are ways in which P could be true, because things very analogous to P (to the right degrees
and in the right ways) could be true.
Finally, although I put them in the puzzler camp during this paper, Rea’s work has become
ever more and more historically grounded over time. (See, in particular, his chapter on the
Trinity in (Rea 2009b), in which he goes into just the sorts of historical issues the historicist
would advocate. Whether or not he regards that sort of discussion as essential in the way
historicists would, I don’t know. Also, we will see later that the view I am here attributing
to Rea and Brower in (Brower and Rea 2005a) would also have much in common with the
Mysterian Approach, and at the end of the section on mysterianism, I will give a friendly
suggestion as to how puzzlers might modify or clarify their arguments in service of a slightly
different, more mysterian, conclusion.
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is what the puzzler then does not do: seriously discuss the historical credibility
of his account, more on which below (3.3, p. 95, ff.).
A good example of the sorts of criteria puzzlers give for a successful account
of the Trinity, as well as the way in which they believe it possible, even desirable,
to set aside the sorts of historical concerns I will argue shouldn’t be set aside,
can be found in, “The Unfinished Business of Trinitarian Theorizing,” by Dale
Tuggy, in which he writes:
The doctrine of the Trinity has a long and interesting history. . . In
this paper I will avoid as much of this post-biblical tradition as I
can, along with its Latin and Greek terminology. I do this not out
of disrespect, lack of interest, or a mistaken belief that folks from
the distant past have nothing relevant to say, but only because I
want to focus on the most difficult philosophical problems facing
various versions of the doctrine, problems which are often obscured
by historical concerns. . . 7
Tuggy does well in noting that he avoids the relevant history “not out of
disrespect, lack of interest, or a mistaken belief that folks from the distant past
have nothing relevant to say.” Yet he still obviously considers it possible to
avoid discussing the history of the doctrine of the Trinity to a great extent,
and yet still provide a satisfying discussion of it. Indeed, he seems to think
it not only possible, but apparently even preferable. In his view, the relevant
philosophical problems are “often obscured by historical concerns. . . ” rather
than being illuminated by them, and he clearly doesn’t see history as essential
in the way I will argue it is.
So then, with his account A of the Trinity described and explained, the
puzzler believes that if he can demonstrate the consistency of A (plus perhaps
his favorite other theoretical virtues – intelligibility, biblicality, etc.), this by
itself (no serious discussion of history necessary) will be – somehow – sufficient
to show the coherence of the doctrine of the Trinity itself (or at least of P).
A clear, and possibly the most entertaining, example of this sort of view is
found in “Divine Fission: A New Way of Moderating Social Trinitarianism,” by
Peter Forrest,8 which uses the term “speculation,” or some inflection thereof, to
refer to his and others’ accounts of the Trinity a total of 34 times in barely over
16 pages. Indeed, he explicitly describes his project in the paper as providing
a “speculation” about the Trinity that relies heavily on what he describes as
Swinburne’s “important speculation” about the Trinity, and in the course of
arguing that his speculation is coherent, makes it very explicit that he regards
this as all that is required. (But required for what? He never fully explains.)
In the abstract of the paper, Forrest states:
. . . I follow Swinburne. . . in the important speculation that the
Trinity arose from a primordial ‘unitarian’ God. In this paper I
7. (Tuggy 2003), pp. 165-166. Emphasis mine.
8. (Forrest 1998).
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explain why I disagree with Swinburne’s account of how the Trinity
came into being and I propose an alternative. . . 9
Then in the first paragraph, we read, “The topic of this paper is a way of
speculating about the Trinity. . . ”10
As is typical of this kind of approach, Forrest spends almost the entirety of
his paper explaining his speculation about (i.e., account of) the Trinity, arguing
for its coherence and showing how it satisfies various other desiderata. Only
briefly does he touch upon methodology, saying:
I grant that the above argument is just the sort of thing that brings
metaphysics into disrepute. How could anyone know, readers might
protest, about such matters? . . . I grant that all this is specula-
tive. But in order to defend a moderate Social Trinitarianism it
suffices to provide a speculative metaphysics which is no worse than
its rivals. . . 11
Defend it from what, or in what sense? He never says. Likewise, concerning
what, if any, relation his own, personal “speculation” about the Trinity might
bear to the actual, historical, orthodox doctrine of the Trinity itself, again he
says nary a word. And while one must praise Forrest for his honesty in describing
his account of the Trinity as nothing more than a “speculation,” one must fault
him for his logic.
For one imagines that the conclusion he wants to establish is that “the doc-
trine of the Trinity (or at least P) is consistent.” But without saying anything
about the relation between his speculation about the Trinity and the doctrine of
the Trinity itself, “providing a speculative metaphysics which is no worse than
its rivals” (even if that is meant to include showing it to be consistent) certainly
does not suffice to show the the doctrine of the Trinity itself (or even only P)
is consistent. One would have to also show that one’s account is, say, identical
to, or entails, or is logically isomorphic to, or is in some other manner logically
related in the right way to, the doctrine of the Trinity (or at least P).
Otherwise, the anti-Trinitarian could of course admit that Forrest’s specula-
tion is consistent, while still maintaining that the doctrine of the Trinity itself
is incoherent, since they may be logically unrelated – or, for all we know, even
logically incompatible. For example, both modalism and Arianism are accounts
of the Trinity (descriptions of how the Trinity “works”), but neither could count
as a defense of doctrine of the Trinity itself. Indeed, atheism would technically
be one account of the Trinity – and a logically consistent one at that. It is
the account of the Trinity that says there is no Trinity (or binity, or. . . ). But
that clearly isn’t a defense of the doctrine of the Trinity. So why shouldn’t the
Anti-Trinitarian agree with everything Forrest has to say about his speculation,
and simply conclude that Forrest’s (apparently perfectly consistent) speculation
9. (Forrest 1998), p. 281.
10. (Forrest 1998), p. 281.
11. (Forrest 1998), p. 293 – emphasis mine.
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about the Trinity is simply better than the (apparently inconsistent) doctrine of
the Trinity itself. In the best case scenario, we can only validly conclude that
Peter Forrest’s own, personal speculation about the Trinity is coherent – not
that the doctrine of the Trinity itself is coherent.
And that is the historicist’s objection to the Puzzle Approach in a nutshell.
That it is simply a large body of invalid arguments. Or, perhaps collections of
premises in search of a conclusion (we will suggest an alternative conclusion for
puzzlers at the end of 3.2, p. 93).
But what’s worse is that it isn’t at all obvious what could be done to get
the argument into a valid form. Not in a way that both:
1. would allow for the the puzzler to give us good reasons for thinking his
premises are all true, and
2. would not, in doing so, simply collapse into the Historical Approach, or
at least render superfluous the whole business of constructing some spec-
ulative account of the Trinity.
For, to make the argument valid, the puzzler must demonstrate that there
is a very particular sort of relation between his account A of the Trinity, and
the doctrine of the Trinity itself (or at least P. And since the LPT focuses on
P, to cut down on verbiage, I’ll stick to talking just about P from here on out.)
Specifically, it needs to be some relation R, such that, if A bears R to P,
then if A is consistent, P is also consistent. Let us call any such a relation a
“consistency transferring relation.”
More precisely, we can give the following definitions (more intuitive charac-
terizations immediately afterwards):
For any relation R, for any propositions P and Q,
R is a consistency transferring relation from P to Q iffDef:
If P bears R to Q, and if P is consistent,
then Q is consistent.
For any relation R, for any proposition P,
R is a consistency transferring relation from P iffDef:
For any proposition Q,
if P bears R to Q and P is consistent,
then Q is consistent.
For any relation R, for any proposition Q,
R is a consistency transferring relation to Q iffDef:
For any proposition P,
if P bears R to Q and P is consistent,
then Q is consistent.
For any relation R,
R is a general consistency transferring relation iffDef:
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For any propositions P and Q,
if P bears R to Q, and if P is consistent,
then Q is consistent.
Intuitively, to say that R is a consistency transferring relation from P to Q
means that R “transfers consistency” from P to Q – but that does not imply
that it transfers consistency between any other two propositions.
Intuitively, to say that R is a consistency transferring relation from P means
that R “transfers consistency” from P to any given proposition – but that does
not imply that it transfers consistency “from” any other proposition besides P.
Intuitively, to say that R is a consistency transferring relation to Q means
that R “transfers consistency” from any given proposition to Q – but that does
not imply that it transfers consistency “to” any other proposition besides Q.
Intuitively, to say that R is a general consistency transferring relation means
that R “transfers consistency” between any two propositions whatsoever.
For example, identity, logical entailment, and logical isomorphism are all
general consistency transferring relations.
Strictly speaking, then, to use his account A to show the consistency of P,
the puzzler only needs to show, for his particular account A of the Trinity, that:
1. A is consistent, and
2. there exists some relation R such that
(a) R is a consistency transferring relation from A to P, and such that
(b) A bears R to P.
From those two premises, together with the definition of a consistency transfer-
ring relation from A to P, it would indeed follow validly that:
3. P is consistent.
Call this argument (although really a general argument schema) “the Puzzler
Argument.”12
Puzzlers, of course, have provided lengthy explanations of the content of
their preferred accounts of the Trinity, and arguments that these accounts are
consistent. (Or even “broadly logically possible,” a step above the “narrowly
logical” consistency we are discussing in the LPT. The same considerations I’ll
present here will apply to being broadly logically possible, given parallel defi-
nitions of “possibility transferring relations” or indeed to any other theoretical
virtue, given parallel definitions of various “virtue-transferring relations.”)
So, let us simply grant, for argument’s sake, that all puzzlers are always
successful in supporting step 1 of the Puzzler Argument, that any given puzzler’s
12. Perhaps it would be better to use “the Puzzler Argument,” to refer to the above argument
minus premise 2, since that is essentially what I am accusing puzzlers of offering. But the
point is to think about what it might look like if the puzzler were to attempt to offer an
argument that was at least valid.
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account A will be consistent (indeed, that it will have whatever other theoretical
virtues the puzzler likes as well).
As with the business plan put forward by the Underpants Gnomes, the
problem comes in step 2. In particular, there seem to be some tensions involved
in supporting both parts of step 2 at the same time. Here’s why I think so.
First, it’s of course easy to find all sorts of relations A bears to P (the “I
mentioned X at T1, just before I mentioned Y at T2” relation, for example),
taking care of 2b. Pick one such relation R, and grant that A bears R to P. But,
although for 2a it is only necessary to show R to be a consistency transferring
relation from A to P (or a consistency transferring relation from A, or to P),
how would one show that R is a consistency transferring relation from A to P (or
from A, or to P) unless one simply picks some general consistency transferring
relation (like identity or logical entailment)? But then, pick some known general
consistency transferring relation R. Now how would one show that A bears this
relation to P? How, without doing so much history that essentially one has given
up the Puzzle Approach altogether, and fallen into the Historical Approach after
all? Or, if some other way can be found, then at least making all the business of
giving an account of the Trinity superfluous? Let me now explain this further
worry in a bit more detail.
Take again the trivial, “I mentioned X at T1, just before I mentioned Y at
T2” relation as an example. It’s easy to show A bears that to P (check off 2b).
But what about showing that it’s a consistency transferring relation from A to
P (what about 2a)? We can show that it’s a consistency transferring relation
from A to “it’s raining or not raining,” because we can show that every relation
is a consistency transferring relation to “it’s raining or not raining,” because we
can show that (we have an independent way to show that) “it’s raining or not
raining” is consistent. (Likewise, we can show that any relation is a consistency
transferring relation from “it’s raining and not raining” or to “it’s raining or not
raining,” because we have an independent way to show that “it’s raining and not
raining” is inconsistent and an independent way to show that “it’s raining or not
raining” is consistent.) But, unless some relation R is just a general consistency
transferring relation, how would we show it to be a consistency transferring
relation from A to P (or from A, or to P), unless we had some independent
way to show that P was consistent?13,14 But first, how would we have some
independent way of showing P to be consistent except by just examining it
“directly”? And what would it mean to examine it “directly,” except to do some
kind of historical inquiry into what it is? Second, even if the puzzler has some
response to the first question that doesn’t involve historical inquiry, if we had
any independent way to determine that P was consistent,15 then the whole
business of providing an “account” of the Trinity and going through the Puzzler
Argument would be superfluous.
13. Independent of account A, that is.
14. Or or showing that A is inconsistent. But that would obviously not help the puzzler at
all.
15. Independent of account A, that is.
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So, even though, theoretically, the Puzzler Argument could be done with one
of the more limited consistency transferring relations we’ve defined, it seems
likely that the puzzler will ultimately need to deal with general consistency
transferring relations (like identity, entailment, isomorphism, etc.) to make his
case.
But in that case, let us begin, not with a relation we know A bears to
P, but with a relation we already know is a general consistency transferring
relation, like logical entailment. In this case, in contrast to the trivial relation
we picked above, it’s easy to show that logical entailment is a general consistency
transferring relation (check off 2a). But now what about showing that A actually
bears R to P (what about 2b)? We can show that A bears the logical entailment
relation to “it’s raining or not raining,” because we can show that everything
does, because “it’s raining or not raining” is a tautology. And we can similarly
show that a contradiction entails anything. But could we show that P is a
tautology? Not likely. Alternatively, the puzzler could show his own account
A to be inconsistent. But that would wreck his project in the end (premise 1
of the Puzzler Argument would no longer be true). How then would we show
that a non-contradictory account A entails a non-tautological P? How unless we
explicate both the logical forms of A and of P, along with the overlap of their
content,16 in enough detail that we could have just determined P to be logically
consistent anyway,17 once again rendering the whole business of providing an
“account” of the Trinity superfluous?18
Furthermore, once again, how would the puzzler come to a sufficient under-
standing of the relevant content shared by A and P in the first place without
doing the sort of historical work he intends to avoid?19 Wouldn’t he need to
know what the authors of various Trinitarian creeds intended by those creeds
(or at least what they intended by S in particular)? Or what the words used
in the original (in this case Greek) expressions of the doctrine of the Trinity
(or at least S), meant, given the linguistic practices of the linguistics commu-
nities of which the originators of the doctrine of the Trinity were a part (i.e.,
Greek-speaking, fourth-century theologians with a particular philosophical and
theological technical vocabulary, stemming from a particular historical tradi-
tion)? In short, how would the puzzler explicate enough of the content of P
16. What I mean by “overlap of content” is this. For example, “P → Q” and “Q → R” entail
“P → R,” not merely in virtue of their logical forms (not just any two conditionals entail just
any third conditional), but in virtue of their logical forms plus the further fact that the first
premise shares the same antecedent as the conclusion and the second premise shares the same
consequent as the conclusion. Any two propositions with the logical forms of conditionals
such that one has the same content in its antecedent as and the other has the same content
in its consequent as a third conditional, entail that third conditional. This is what I mean by
saying that, to show that A entails P, one would have to both explicate the logical forms of
A and P and show certain relevant “shared” or “overlapping” content.
17. Obviously this holds all the more so for identity or logical isomorphism than for entail-
ment.
18. Of course, one could show that A entails P in an indirect way, by showing that A entails
B, B entails C, C entails. . . P. But eventually we will come to some proposition such that we
will have to show that it entails P, and we will face the same problem.
19. See footnote 16 just above on what I mean by “shared content.”
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without doing just the sort of historical work the puzzler wants to avoid but
that the historicist claims is necessary? How would the Puzzle Approach not
simply collapse into the Historical Approach?
Here is another way to see the point.
Imagine a debate between a puzzler and an anti-Trinitarian. While they
disagree about the consistency of P, they would surely agree to one thing: that
the following is an inconsistent set.
1. A is consistent.
2. There is some relation R such that
(a) R is a consistency transferring relation from A to P, and such that
(b) A bears R to P.
3. Yet P is inconsistent.
Although the puzzler ultimately wants to say that P is consistent, surely the
puzzler grants that the anti-Trinitarian is right in thinking that, prima facie, P
at least appears to be inconsistent. (If the puzzler thought P didn’t even appear
to be inconsistent, why bother writing a more-than-Gettier-sized paper about
it?)
So, the anti-Trinitarian will simply say that, since 3 is prima facie true, the
more the puzzler does to back up 1, in the absence of saying anything about 2,
the more reason he has to deny 2.
And that, in turn, means that, the more the puzzler does to back up 2a, in
the absence of backing up 2b, (or vice-versa), the more reason he has to deny
2b (or 2a). And that means that the puzzler must find some way to argue for
both parts of 2.
But puzzlers have typically simply assumed that 2 is true, or, as in Peter
Forrest’s case, explicitly disavowed the need for it altogether(!) This is unten-
able. In order both to have a valid argument in the first place, and not to simply
beg the question against the anti-Trinitarian, the puzzler must back up 2.
Yet, so far, puzzlers have not so much as even made the attempt to do
so. Indeed, most puzzlers either spend little to no time even explaining what
relation they believe their account bears to the doctrine of the Trinity, or, like
Forrest, go so far as to explicitly deny they need to say anything at all about
what relation their accounts might bear to the doctrine of the Trinity.
True, many puzzlers make passing uses of phrases like “model of,” “version
of,” “form of,” etc., saying that their accounts bear one or more of these relations
the doctrine of the Trinity. But so far none, to my knowledge, have ever stopped
to explain the nature of these relations in any detail, and certainly not in enough
detail to ensure us that they both (A) are consistency transferring relations, and
(B) actually hold between their accounts of the Trinity and the doctrine of the
Trinity itself.
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So, as it stands, all the anti-Trinitarian needs to say is, “I don’t know precisely
what the ‘model of’ relation is, but if it is some kind of consistency transferring
relation, then it appears that A doesn’t bear it to P (because it appears that no
consistent proposition does, because it appears that P isn’t consistent).” Or “I
don’t know precisely what the ‘form of’ relation is, but if A bears it to P, then
it appears that it must not be a consistency transferring relation (because it
appears that no relation any consistent proposition bears to P is a consistency
transferring relation, because it appears that P isn’t consistent).” In other
words, the anti-Trinitarian, quite reasonably, will simply challenge the puzzler
to explain what exactly R is, in such a way that it’s clear both that A bears R
to P and that R is a consistency transferring relation (at least from A to P).
On the other hand, suppose that, rather than appealing to undefined rela-
tions like “form of,” the puzzler chooses a well-defined relation that is clearly
a consistency transferring relation, for example, identity or logical entailment.
Or, suppose he gives a definition of “version of” such that a “version” of a doc-
trine is a superset of the doctrine or in any case it can be shown that when P
is a version of Q, P logically entails Q or bears some other well-defined logical
relation to Q. Certainly the anti-Trinitarian will then have to agree that we are
dealing with a consistency transferring relation. But of course, now he will just
say that, in the absence of any support for the claim that A really is identical
to P, or that A really does logically entail P, or that A really is a version of P
(in this more well-defined sense), it would appear that A in fact does not bear
this relation to P. So once again the Puzzler Argument relies on an unsupported
premise that, admittedly, it ought to appear, at least prima facie, must be false.
Finally, suppose the puzzler wants to take up the challenge of actually de-
fending the claim that A bears some well-defined logical relation R, like identity,
entailment or isomorphism to P. Then to show A actually bears R to P it clearly
isn’t sufficient merely to say, “I speculate that A is, or could be, the case” or “My
speculation has X, Y and Z theoretical virtues,” and conclude that, “Therefore,
it bears logical relation R to P.” For the anti-Trinitarian – quite correctly – will
respond, “I agree that A could be the case. But it appears that P couldn’t be.
Therefore, it appears that A does not bear any consistency transferring relation
to P.”
So how could the puzzler argue that A does in fact bear R to P? Just as
before, it would seem that the puzzler would need to explicate both the logical
form of A and that of P, and the content on which they overlap.20 But in doing
so, he likely will end up showing enough of the logical form of P that he could
have just determined that it was logically consistent without reference to A. In
which case, the whole business of providing an “account” of the Trinity and
going through the Puzzler Argument was superfluous.
And likewise, once again, if he relies on identity or entailment, how would he
explicate enough of the content shared by A and P to show they are identical,
or that A entails P, without doing just the sort of historical work the historicist
would advocate and that the puzzler seeks to avoid? How would the Puzzle
20. See footnote 16, p. 64 above.
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Approach not simply collapse into the Historical Approach?
Note also that if we want to introduce other theoretical virtues besides con-
sistency – “Biblical fit,” “intelligibility,” and so on – we will need to sort through
the same sorts of considerations for “Biblicality transferring relations,” “intel-
ligibility transferring relations,” and so on. Identity would seem to work as a
“transferring relation” for any theoretical virtue that doesn’t somehow involve
intensional contexts, and it may be that logical entailment would as well. But as
we’ve seen, it’s difficult to see how either of those relations wouldn’t ultimately
collapse the Puzzle Approach into the Historical Approach or at least render
the giving of accounts in the Puzzle Approach superfluous. (And it is these
accounts that are really the heart of the Puzzle Approach.)
(Before leaving this point I will simply note that, in some unpublished ma-
terial I have chosen not to incorporate due to limitations of space, I argue that
there may be a further problem on the assumption that “version of” and other
puzzler relations are something like logical entailment, or at least that versions
of doctrines logically entail those doctrines. For most puzzlers seem to want
to say not only that their own accounts of the Trinity are versions of the doc-
trine of the Trinity. They want to admit that rival accounts in the literature
are as well. E.g., most Social Trinitarians want to admit that Relative Identity
accounts are “versions of” the doctrine of the Trinity, and and most Relative
Identity Trinitarians want to admit that Social Trinitarian accounts are “ver-
sions of” the doctrine of the Trinity. They only want to claim their own versions
are superior. Yet, since logical entailment is monotonic, when P entails Q the
information “contained in” Q must be a subset of that in P. Thus, if the re-
lation the puzzler posits between A and P just is logical entailment (or if A’s
bearing it to P entails that A entails P), then this spirit of tolerance is fitting
only if the doctrine of the Trinity is, or is a subset of, the intersection of the
information contained in all of the competing puzzler accounts. But, arguably,
there are accounts of the Trinity on-offer that have no overlap at all, in which
case the doctrine of the Trinity must be the empty set of information, i.e., a
tautology. Even if my arguments on that point are wrong, there are certainly
puzzler accounts A1, A2 . . . An such that it is by no means obvious that the
small amount of information that might be contained in A1 ∩ A2 . . . ∩ An (if it
is not indeed the empty set after all) would be enough information to plausibly
count as the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. Unfortunately, however, I won’t
have space to develop that argument here.)
A Note on van Inwagen
As noted above, it’s hard to place van Inwagen’s methodological approach
neatly. But, although on a cursory reading he may seem to fall into the Puzzle
Approach camp, upon examination it seems that he accepts something like the
main thrust of the historicist’s position. Especially in his second paper on the
subject, “Three Persons in One Being: On Attempts to Show that the Doctrine
of the Trinity is Self-Contradictory.”
In the abstract of the paper, he says:
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Enemies of the Church have frequently contended that the doctrine
of the Holy Trinity is not only false, but violates various elementary
logical principles. In this essay, I show that, on one understanding
of the doctrine, this charge is unfounded.21
The talk of “one understanding of” the doctrine might initially bring to
mind something like the puzzler’s accounts, and their un- (or under-)defined
relation. Furthermore, he goes on with what might initially appear to be a
Puzzle Approach methodology:
I shall proceed as follows. I shall try to imagine a way of stating
the doctrine of the Trinity that has the following feature: when
the doctrine is stated in this way, it can be shown not to be self-
contradictory.22
Again, talk about merely “imagining” a “way of stating” the doctrine might
call to mind Peter Forrest’s “speculating.” So, one might initially think that he
falls squarely within the Puzzle Approach. This diagnosis might even seem to
be confirmed by the fact that the vast majority of both of his papers on the
Trinity are taken up with discussions of logic and relative identity, with almost
nothing said about the views of any church fathers or how his discussion relates
to those views.
But that appearance, I think, is ultimately misleading. For he immediately
follows with:
I shall leave the following question to theologians (for I am a philoso-
pher, not a theologian): Is what I describe as ‘a way of stating the
doctrine of the Trinity’ properly so described – or should it be called
a way of misstating the doctrine of the Trinity? I claim only this:
a strong case can be made for the thesis that the formulation of
the doctrine of the Trinity I shall propose does succeed in being a
statement of what has historically been called ‘the doctrine of the
Trinity’; and an even stronger case can be made for the thesis that
this formulation is consistent with historical orthodoxy. Even if these
theses are false, they are, in my view, plausible enough to be worthy
of a considered refutation.23
Thus, van Inwagen seems to acknowledge that merely providing a consistent
account of the Trinity is not sufficient to show the doctrine of the Trinity itself to
be consistent. He seems to acknowledge that some further premise is necessary,
and that what is necessary is to show a certain kind of logical relation between
one’s account of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Trinity itself. That any given
attempt at a restatement of the doctrine of the Trinity might simply end up
being a misstatement of the doctrine of the Trinity. Furthermore, he seems to
21. (van Inwagen 2003), p. 83
22. (van Inwagen 2003), p. 83.
23. (van Inwagen 2003), p. 83.
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admit that whether one’s account of the Trinity bears the appropriate relation
to the doctrine of the Trinity itself is a matter of historical facts about what
the doctrine of the Trinity actually is. He goes on:
Whether my attempt at apologetic in fact distorts Christian belief
is a point on which I humbly (and sensibly) defer to trained theolo-
gians. In matters of speculative theology – and particularly when
the question at issue is whether certain theological speculations are
in accord with historical orthodoxy – theologians must sit in judg-
ment over mere philosophers. (Just as, in my view, bishops and
councils must sit in judgment over theologians.) I claim only one
kind of authority that is denied to theologians: I am the ultimate
arbiter of what my own words mean. If a theologian tells me that my
proposed way of stating the doctrine of the Trinity is wrong (that
is, that what I have proposed as a way of stating “the doctrine of
the Trinity” has implications inconsistent with what the Church has
always understood by “the doctrine of the Trinity”), I allow myself
only one defense: “If I had said what you think I’ve said, you’d be
right; but I didn’t say what you think I said.”24
Last but not least, the fact that he does not go into any substantial discussion
of history might lead one to think he is only paying lip service to history. But
that again, I think, would be a mistake. For besides discussing an essentially
historical methodological principle in the abstract, he seems to make substantive
use of some such principle in evaluating Swinburne’s account of the Trinity:
But there is a modern attempt at a demonstrably consistent state-
ment of the doctrine of the Trinity – at least I should be willing to
say that its consistency was demonstrable – according to which there
are three Gods, and its author’s defense of its historical orthodoxy
is well thought out and not simply to be dismissed. (I have in mind
Professor Swinburne’s important essay on the Trinity, “Could There
Be More Than One God?”) But whether Professor Swinburne’s ac-
count of the Trinity is, or is consistent with, historical orthodoxy is
a subtle question, and one that is not in the end, to be answered by
a philosopher.25
Here again, he seems to claim that he is only competent to rule on whether
Swinburne’s account is consistent, but acknowledges that it must also bear the
appropriate relation to the doctrine of the Trinity itself. One might object that
he nowhere attempts to discredit the views of other philosophers on the basis of
historical arguments. But as he states, the historical question is “not. . . to be
answered by a philosopher,”26 but by “trained theologians.”27 That is, while it is
24. (van Inwagen 2003), pp. 83-84.
25. (van Inwagen 2003), p. 88.
26. (van Inwagen 2003), p. 88
27. (van Inwagen 2003), p. 84
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true that van Inwagen says almost nothing substantive about the history of the
doctrine of the Trinity, it does not seem as though he avoids historical questions
because he thinks they are inessential (as puzzlers such as Tuggy and Forrest
seem to think), but because he simply doesn’t claim to be competent in the field.
In short, he seems to have the good sense (as the historicist sees things) to at
least assert his belief that his account is appropriately related to the historical
doctrine of the Trinity itself, showing, it seems to me, that he agrees with the
historicist that such a premise is required. He merely doesn’t attempt to defend
that premise, leaving the question to others whom he regards as more competent
than himself to determine whether this one particular premise is actually true.
Thus although, as we’ll see, van Inwagen doesn’t neatly fall into the histori-
cist camp, nor does he even fall neatly into the mysterian camp, it seems we can
certainly place him safely outside the puzzler camp. Even if he doesn’t want
to enter into debate about the relation between his account and the historical
doctrine of the Trinity, he, like the historicist, and unlike the puzzler, at least
acknowledges that the relation must be there.
An Objection Based on An Analogy to
Metaphysical Puzzles
Here is an objection the puzzler might reasonably bring up. The LPT looks and
feels, so to speak, very much like a lot of puzzles dealt with by metaphysicians –
we have an apparently inconsistent set of propositions that one wants to argue
isn’t really inconsistent after all. And it seems as though the puzzler is just
doing the same sort of thing that metaphysicians normally do in such cases
– offering various competing ways of restating things in an attempt to show
how the propositions in that set could all turn out to be true after all. So,
unless the historicist is prepared to argue that the methodology metaphysicians
ordinarily employ in these puzzles is flawed (invalidating an enormous amount
of literature in metaphysics), why shouldn’t the puzzler be able to use the same
sort of methodology for the same sort of problem or puzzle?
Let us work with a specific example of a standard metaphysical “puzzle” or
“problem” of this very recognizable type, one that might seem parallel to the
“puzzle” or “problem” with the doctrine of the Trinity. Namely, the Problem of
Temporary Intrinsics (PTI).28
Here is a very simple way of putting PTI.29 Consider the set of propositions
(P-TI) expressed by the following set of sentences (S-TI):
S-TI-1. Mr. Stick at t1 is bent.
S-TI-2. Mr. Stick at t2 is not bent.
S-TI-3. Mr. Stick at t1 is the same stick as Mr. Stick at t2.
28. (D. Lewis 1986), pp. 203-204 and ff. for one of the most important contemporary
discussions of the problem.
29. Overly simple if one wanted to discuss it for its own sake. But sufficient for the purpose
of analogy.
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Here is one formalization of TI, call it Φ-TI:
Φ-TI-1. Bst1
Φ-TI-2. ¬Bst2
Φ-TI-3. st1 = st2
The anti-change-itarian says that Φ-TI is the most straight-forward way of
reading the logical forms of P-TI. But Φ-TI is inconsistent. So, if Φ-TI is a
formally adequate regimentation of P-TI, then P-TI is inconsistent.
But of course, to conclude that P-TI is inconsistent would be absurd. And so
metaphysicians offer various philosophical paraphrases of claims about change,
paraphrases with very different (and consistent) logical forms. And if one of
those paraphrases seems to preserve the relevant content of the original claims,
then this would show the set of claims to be consistent after all.
We could say, then, that just as the LPT is the question how, if at all, P
could be consistent, the “Problem of Temporary Intrinsics” (PTI) is the question
how, if at all, P-TI could be consistent.
And in cases of metaphysical puzzles such as these, metaphysicians carry
on in much the same way puzzlers do. When offering paraphrases for P-TI,
most metaphysicians would agree that, as Forrest says about his Trinitarian
account, “it suffices to provide a speculative metaphysics which is no worse than
its rivals. . . ”30
In the case of PTI, there are various accounts of the metaphysics of change,
and various corresponding proposed solutions to PTI.
On one account, Mr. Stick is really a four-dimensional object with some
“temporal parts” that are bent and some that are not. So, in much the same way
that Social Trinitarians say there is a single God and that the three hypostases
are not identical to God, but that they are all “parts” of the one God, four-
dimensionalists say that there is a single, four-dimensional Mr. Stick, and that
Mr. Stick at t1 and Mr. Stick at t2 are not identical to Mr. Stick, but that they
are both temporal “parts” of Mr. Stick.
Thus, the logical forms of P-PTI are implicitly being claimed to be:
4D-TI-1. Bst1
4D-TI-2. ¬Bst2
4D-TI-3. st1 R st2
where “R” is some relation that does not entail classical identity (specifically,
it is the “is a temporal part of the same four-dimensional object as” relation, or
what Quine would call “being stick-kindred”).31
Another proposed solution is that properties are “time-indexed,” so that,
while the stick we refer to at t1 is in fact classically identical to the stick we
refer to at t2 (both are just Mr. Stick itself), the properties we are affirming
and denying of Mr. Stick are not the same.
30. (Forrest 1998), p. 293.
31. E.g., (Quine 1950), p. 622, ff.
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Thus, the logical forms of P-PTI are implicitly being claimed to be:
TIP-TI-1. Bt1s
TIP-TI-2. ¬Bt2s
TIP-TI-3. s(t1)= s(t2)
And of course there are other proposed solutions. But one gets the gist.
With various proposed solutions on-offer, the game is more or less to argue that
one account is superior to its rivals, and whichever is superior to (or at least
no worse than) its rivals, wins. (What counts as a superior-making property
of an account? Things like not conflicting with common sense, not conflicting
with science, being simpler, not positing too many entities or too many types
of entities, and so on.)
I am of course presenting the methodology summarily. One could argue
that I’m presenting the methodology in too simplistic a light. And one might
be right, if my task were to argue either for or against it. But my task here
is neither to praise nor to bury this kind of methodology, at least as it is em-
ployed by metaphysicians dealing with metaphysical puzzles. Rather, my task
is simply to show how such metaphysical puzzles are importantly disanalogous
to allegedly parallel “theological puzzles” such as the LPT. So that, even given
the appropriateness of this kind of methodology in the realm of metaphysics,
it is still not appropriate in philosophical theology. (And for the record, I do
accept that this sort of approach makes sense within the context of metaphysics,
but again, I am not here either defending or attacking a Puzzle Approach in
metaphysics.)
Φ-TI, of course, parallels LPT1 and LPT2, the regimentations the anti-
Trinitarian offers of P. And the metaphysics of four-dimensional objects with
temporal parts or of time-indexed properties parallel proposed solutions to the
LPT such as Social Trinitarianism and Relative Identity Trinitarianism.32 And
so this may seem to parallel the way in which the Trinitarian puzzler offers
different accounts, with different logical forms, of the propositions in P.
What, then, is the difference between taking a Puzzle Approach in meta-
physics and a Puzzle Approach in theology?
Although there is a certain parallel in their logical structures, PTI and LPT
have importantly different epistemic structures. For it is a Moorean fact that
P-TI is consistent. But it is certainly not a Moorean fact that the doctrine of
the Trinity (P) is consistent.33 Indeed, in general, any set of apparently contra-
dictory propositions dealt with in the puzzles of metaphysics (and philosophy
32. In fact, four-dimensional objects with temporal parts seem very parallel to Social Trini-
tarianism, while time-indexed properties seem more parallel to Arianism. But one sees the
point
33. Anyone who has read John Keller’s dissertation on paraphrase, (Keller 2010), will see
how very much influenced I have been by it. What I will present here as my view on how
the Puzzle Approach methodology applies to philosophical puzzles is essentially just Keller’s
view about how philosophical paraphrase works. Thus, I don’t take any credit for originality
here. Nor will I try to defend it, as I have nothing to say to improve on Keller’s own defense
of this view. I merely present it as what I take to be the most plausible explanation of how
this sort of methodology works in philosophy generally, along with my explanation of why
72
more generally) will be such that it is a Moorean fact that it is consistent, while
the same cannot be said for those dealt with in philosophical theology. And this
is the crucial difference, as I see it, between the application of this methodology
in philosophy versus philosophical theology.
What then creates a “puzzle” is that we sometimes find that the most
straight-forward reading of the logical forms of each of the propositions indi-
vidually is such that they would turn out not to form a consistent set. This
creates a scenario in which it really is the case that almost any alternative
reading of their logical forms would do.
One might think it counter-intuitive that, strictly speaking, a stick is not a
three-dimensional object, but a four-dimensional object, and that when I say
Mr. stick is bent, I really am only saying that a certain temporal part of Mr.
Stick is bent, and when I say the stick from t1 is the same stick as the stick
from t2, I really am only saying that they are “stick kindred,” i.e., that both are
temporal parts of the same four-dimensional Mr. Stick. But even as counter-
intuitive as it may be, it’s not nearly so counter-intuitive as saying that change
is logically impossible. Though my four-dimensional account of Mr. Stick may
be merely a “speculation,” unless and until some better theory is proposed, the
theory of temporal parts gains at least a modicum of credibility due to the fact
that the alternative is simply intolerable. Thus, one can truly say that, in a
case like this, “it suffices to provide a speculative metaphysics which is no worse
than its rivals. . . ”34
But then if yet another alternative to the anti-change-itarian reading can be
given that is less counter-intuitive than four-dimensionalism, say time-indexed
properties (supposing for argument’s sake that time-indexed properties are less
counter-intuitive than temporal parts), then it would seem that this new theory
must inherit at least all the benefits of the first (namely, that it allows us to
avoid saying that change is impossible – which was intolerable) but with less of
the costs (in terms of being inherently counter-intuitive), and thus becomes the
new winner.
Thus, what drives the Puzzle Approach methodology in metaphysics, as
it seems to me, is a certain epistemic structure. There is a premise (whether
explicit or implicit) that the set of propositions we are attempting to paraphrase
has some kind of significant prima facie warrant such that giving up the game
and admitting that it is inconsistent should only be a last resort.
But the same epistemic structure is simply not there in the LPT, nor gen-
erally in philosophical theology.
it wouldn’t apply in philosophical theology. The puzzler, of course, is free to substitute his
own alternative explanation of how this methodology works, to evade my criticisms. But that
must be left to the puzzler himself to do.
I should note that, although I have essentially lifted wholesale the story about how philo-
sophical paraphrase works, and the assertion that this is what is going on in metaphysical
puzzles, from Keller, I believe from conversations about the topic that he entirely disagrees
with me about most of my methodological views in the realm of philosophical theology. Any
shortcomings one might attribute to my own views should not be attributed to him.
34. (Forrest 1998), p. 293.
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Indeed, not only is it not a Moorean fact that the doctrine of the Trinity
is logically consistent – an intellectually honest Trinitarian must admit that, at
least prima facie, the doctrine of the Trinity appears to be inconsistent. While
anti-change-itarianism is so intolerable that any decent alternative really would
do, it simply is not the case that anti-Trinitarianism is so intolerable that just
any decent alternative will do. (At least, not in the same sense.)
If the anti-change-itarian asks us why a four-dimensionalist or time-indexed-
property reading of P-TI is preferable to the anti-change-itarian reading, we can
honestly say it is because that reading has a result that is downright crazy. So,
almost any reading would be better than his.
But if the anti-Trinitarian asks us why a Social Trinitarian or a Relative
Identity Trinitarian reading of P is preferable to the the anti-Trinitarian read-
ing, we can’t honestly say it is because that reading has a result that is downright
crazy. So the question still remains, why should he accept our alternative ac-
count of the Trinity over just thinking the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent?
We can make a bit more clear how the argument that generates the puzzle
(call it “the PTI Puzzle Argument”) works by reconstructing it as follows:
1. Φ-TI in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI.
2. Φ-TI in PLI is logically inconsistent.
3. Therefore (by the definition of “formally adequate”) P-TI is logically in-
consistent.
The change-itarian of course denies the conclusion, and so denies the sound-
ness of the argument. But the argument is clearly valid, and the second premise
is clearly true. So for the change-itarian to deny the conclusion, he must deny
the first premise, the formal adequacy of Φ-TI in PLI. And, given that Φ-TI
in PLI is not a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI (and similarly for any
regimentation of P-TI on which P-TI is logically inconsistent), if we want to
know what the logical form of P-TI really is, we only have to argue about which
of various consistent alternatives of P-TI seems the most plausible.
And since the validity of the PTI Puzzle Argument and the truth of premise
2 are not in question, the debate becomes a straight-forward tug-of-war between
the alleged truth of premise 1 and the alleged falsehood of the conclusion. Any-
thing that counts as warrant for one counts as warrant against the other, and
vice-versa.
Yet premise 1 simply says that Φ-TI in PLI is a formally adequate regimen-
tation of P-TI.35 And indeed, Φ-TI in PLI attributes a logical form to P-TI that
is in some sense a “default.” It is the most straight-forward way of reading P-TI,
reading the logical form of P-TI off of the grammatical form of the sentences
we ordinarily use to express it (S-TI). So, it seems to be incumbent upon those
of us who reject the PTI Puzzle Argument to at least say something about the
logical form of P-TI.
35. Or, a “logically perspicuous” regimentation.
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The proponent of the PTI Puzzle Argument is within his rights to ask, “If
Φ-TI in PLI is not formally adequate for P-TI, then why not? And what is the
logical form of P-TI, if not what Φ-TI in PLI attributes to it?
That is, for any given alternative, consistent regimentation, Φ-TI*, of P-TI
for the plausibility that:
1*. Φ-TI* in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI.
to be greater than or equal to the plausibility that:
1. Φ-TI in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-TI.
the plausibility of 1* only has to be greater than or equal to the plausibility
that:
3. P-TI is logically inconsistent.
But since 3 is so massively implausible, it’s incredibly easy for 1* to be as
or more plausible than 3. So, (almost) any alternative regimentation will do.36
Indeed, even if, say, belief in time-indexed properties were the only possible
way to get around the problem of temporary intrinsics, and even if a belief in
time-indexed properties was massively implausible, that would be preferable to
simply accepting the logical impossibility of change of intrinsic properties.
Once one decent proposed solution has been given, our view of the “problem”
will likely shift. Further disagreement will no longer center on whether there
exists any solution to the problem, but simply on which proposed solution is
the best, or right, solution. And this will (quite rightly) involve just the sorts
of theoretical virtues that followers of the Puzzle Approach tend to focus on
in philosophical discussions. Since the occurrence of change is a Moorean fact,
any paraphrase of P-TI that is formally adequate should be consistent, and any
paraphrase that expresses the same content should be plausible, metaphysically
possible, etc.
So, if the view I’ve taken about metaphysical puzzles here is roughly cor-
rect,37 a proposed solution to a philosophical puzzle is essentially a proposed
philosophical paraphrase, another way of stating the same content, but one
that is more logically perspicuous, and which shows us how the original claim
could be logically consistent after all, despite the perhaps misleading way it was
originally expressed.
The puzzle will seem puzzling precisely because each proposition of the set,
taken individually, initially seems to have been given a formally adequate anal-
ysis (its most straight-forward reading, based on the grammatical form of the
36. I say almost. Why? Suppose I regiment S-TI-1 as a biconditional between a singular
proposition and an existential quantification, S-TI-2 as a universally quantified conjunction,
and S-TI-3 as the predication of a 5-place relation involving 3 different terms. That is so
bizarre a way to read the logical forms of these claims that its absurdity at least rivals the
absurdity of the claim that change is logically impossible, if it doesn’t beat it. So, there may
be some consistent alternatives that still wouldn’t do.
37. Again, correct, but not original. See (Keller 2010).
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sentences in which it was expressed). That is, there is a certain amount of
warrant behind each of the individual analyses of each element of the set. Yet,
collectively, the set seems not to have been given a formally adequate analysis.
That is, there is a massive amount of warrant for rejecting the conjunction of
the analyses of logical form taken together. This epistemic structure is why
almost any alternative reading will do, even if it is just something made up
(a “speculative metaphysics”) – because any consistent analysis automatically
begins with a certain level of plausibility or warrant, as compared to the puzzle-
generating analysis, simply in virtue of the fact that it allows us to maintain the
consistency of what, prima facie, seems to be a consistent set of propositions.
But if what I am saying here about standard philosophical puzzles is correct,
then to maintain that the same epistemic structure exists in the LPT would be
to assume at the very outset that there is a massive amount of warrant for
rejecting the view that P is logically inconsistent. That is, the very adoption
of a Puzzle Approach methodology itself constitutes a begging of the question
against the anti-Trinitarian.
As an analogy, consider what I’ll call the “problem” of Socrateic Immortality
(PSI). Consider the set P-SI of propositions expressed by the following natural
language sentences (S-SI):
S-SI-1. All humans are mortal.
S-SI-2. Socrates is a human.
S-SI-3. Socrates is immortal.
Here is one regimentation, Φ-SI in PLI, of P-SI:
Φ-SI-1. (∀x) (Hx → Mx)
Φ-SI-2. Hs
Φ-SI-3. ¬Ms
But Φ-SI is inconsistent. So, if Φ-SI in PLI is a formally adequate regi-
mentation of P-SI, then P-SI is inconsistent. Again, the argument goes like
this:
1. Φ-SI in PLI is a formally adequate regimentation of P-SI.
2. Φ-SI in PLI is logically inconsistent.
3. Therefore (by the definition of “formally adequate”) P-SI is logically in-
consistent.
It doesn’t seem tempting to think of this as a “puzzle” at all. Suppose I
want to defend, for some reason, the view that P-SI is consistent. I propose the
following alternative regimentation of P-SI, Φ-SI*:
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Φ-SI*-1. (∀x)(Hx → Mx)
Φ-SI*-2. Hs
Φ-SI*-3. Is
That is, I propose to take the predicate “immortal” as basic, not definable by
negating the predicate “mortal,” and I deny any conditional linking the two, so
that I can consistently maintain all of the propositions in P-SI. Voila! “Problem”
solved!
This does not seem like a “solution” to a “problem.” It does not even seem
legitimate at all. And that is because the epistemic structure, the structure of
warrant, prima facie plausibility, and so on, is just the reverse of the situation
in the case of PTI. There, the very fact that a given alternative analysis Φ-TI* is
consistent just constitutes reason to think it is more logically perspicuous than
Φ-TI. But in the case of PSI, it is so prima facie implausible to think that P-SI
is not inconsistent, that the very fact that a given alternative analysis Φ-SI* is
consistent now constitutes reason to think it is not as logically perspicuous as
Φ-SI.
Obviously, the question the anti-Trinitarian will want to raise is whether
solutions to the LPT are more like solutions to PTI or more like “solutions”
to PSI. In the case of time and change, Parmenides himself would admit that
the result that P-TI is inconsistent is prima facie implausible. (That’s why
he distinguishes in his poem between “the way of appearance” and “the way of
truth.” His ideas appear to be nuts – and he knows it.) But in the case of
Socrateic Immortality, everybody would admit that it is the result that P-SI is
consistent that is prima facie implausible. (Indeed, it not only seems wrong “at
first glance,” but even “in the final analysis.”)
The problem with treating an account of the Trinity as a “solution” to a
“philosophical puzzle” (if, as I claim, a solution to a philosophical puzzle is in
essence a philosophical paraphrase for a puzzling set of claims like P-TI) is that
not just any apparently inconsistent set of propositions counts as a “puzzle.” It’s
only a philosophical puzzle if it is hard to believe that the set should turn out
to be inconsistent, and yet hard to believe that the inconsistent analysis of it
should turn out to be wrong. But the anti-Trinitarian, quite rightly, will point
out that it’s not at all hard to believe that the doctrine of the Trinity should
turn out to be inconsistent. Indeed, he might point out that in abandoning the
doctrine we would be making things easier on ourselves.
To relate this to the earlier point about consistency transferring relations,
with a metaphysical puzzle like the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics, nobody is
claiming that there is any consistency transferring relation between their spec-
ulative metaphysics about the nature of time and change and a description of
an object changing over time. Rather, as I’ve argued, in standard philosophical
puzzles, it is simply assumed that the target doctrine (set of propositions) is
consistent. Thus, if I am right about how Puzzle Approach methodology works
in the context of metaphysical and other philosophical puzzles, then the very
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assumption that the Puzzle Approach methodology is appropriate in the first
place simply begs the question against the anti-Trinitarian.
Before concluding, as a side note, even if we did have excellent reason to
simply assume at the outset that P must be consistent, an argument of the
Puzzle Approach type would not automatically give us reason to suppose that
any particular puzzler’s account is more likely than any other to have the same
content as P, substantially similar content to P, etc. Nor would it automatically
give us reason to suppose that any particular puzzler’s account of the Trinity
even shares the same, or a substantially similar, logical form as P.
For all we can validly deduce from the assumption that P is consistent and a
demonstration that A is consistent is that, barring any other information, A at
least epistemically could be the same or substantially similar (in content, or in
form) to P, while any interpretation of S that is not consistent certainly could
not be. Thus, a consistent account A is more likely to be, or be substantially
similar to, P than any account in the LPT Family (since the probability that
any such account has things right is, by hypothesis, zero). But the same can be
said for any proposed account of the Trinity that is not inconsistent.
Typically, of course, puzzlers want to argue in favor of their own account
over those of others on the basis of various theoretical virtues that their account
has. Some of these are just general theoretical virtues (like being “consistent”
and “intelligible” – e.g., (Tuggy 2003), p. 166); others are the sorts of things
that would be nice for a bit of specifically Christian theology to have (like being
“scripturally kosher” – also at (Tuggy 2003), p. 166.)
But none of these qualities automatically makes a particular account A of
the Trinity any more likely to be the same as or substantially similar to P than
any other account. Unless, of course, one simply assumes at the outset that the
doctrine of the Trinity (or at least P) also has all of these theoretical virtues,
and has them to the highest, or at least a very high, degree (for any virtue that
comes in degrees).
Indeed, unless we assume that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P, has
a given theoretical virtue that admits of degrees to the highest (or at least a
very high) degree (rather than, say, only to a mediocre degree) – then showing
that one’s account has more of that virtue than another account could actually
show one’s account to be less likely to be the same as or substantially similar to
the doctrine of the Trinity, or to P. Thus, to make sense of the Puzzle Approach
in such an instance, we really need to assume that the doctrine of the Trinity,
or at least P, is not only consistent, but has whatever other theoretical virtues
we are judging accounts by, and that it has any of those virtues that come in
degrees to the highest (or at least a very high) degree.
The question of course is, is it right (and is it not begging the question
against the anti-Trinitarian) to assume a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity,
or at least P, must not only turn out to be consistent, but to have all of the
relevant theoretical virtues and have them to a very high degree?
Of course, one might argue that the truth is more likely to have these the-
oretical virtues, and to a high degree, and thus that these all follow from the
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assumption that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P, is true. But then
the question is, is it right – and is it not begging the question against the anti-
Trinitarian – to assume a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity, or at least P,
is the truth?
There are no doubt cases in which similar assumptions are fine, epistemically
speaking. I, for example, don’t know as much as one probably should about
the history of the holocaust. But I do think that, were I to do a study of it,
there would be nothing wrong in more or less ignoring the possibility that it
never happened. And, whatever theoretical worries might be brought up in an
epistemology classroom, I probably wouldn’t worry myself too much about the
possibility that the holocaust wasn’t real.
However, it’s one thing to say that, in doing history for myself, I don’t need
to worry too much about conspiracy theories and crazy scenarios that deny the
reality of the holocaust. But it’s another thing altogether to say that this counts
as a defense of the point of view that the holocaust happened. It of course is
not a defense. It is precisely the denial that there needs to be any defense.
(We’ll see in the next section the similarities between this kind of position and
mysterianism.)
To conclude, then, one might disagree with me on my assumptions about
how and why a Puzzle Approach methodology works for standard philosophical
puzzles. But without saying anything more about how one thinks it does work,
we are just back to the problem of answering what the relation is, then, between
a puzzler’s speculative account of the Trinity and the doctrine of the Trinity
itself. Without saying more, we seem to either have an invalid argument in
defense of the doctrine of the Trinity, or one that begs the question against the
anti-Trinitarian.
Furthermore, I strongly suspect that the foregoing two general ways of flesh-
ing out the Puzzle Approach (i.e., one that involves some kind of consistency
transferring relation, and one that is question-begging) are exhaustive. For
the definition of “consistency transferring relation” is essentially just whatever
relation would make the Puzzler Argument valid. So, suppose the puzzler’s
methodology neither assumes a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity is consis-
tent and “works backwards,” as it were, from there to his account, nor involves
a valid argument “going forward,” so to speak, from his account of the Trinity
to the doctrine of the Trinity itself. In that case, what kind of reasoning pro-
cess could we have that would somehow essentially involve (1) an account of
the Trinity, (2) the doctrine of the Trinity itself, and (3) the property of logical
consistency?
Those, then, are the considerations I bring against the Puzzle Approach.
Again, I don’t claim to have given a “knock-down” argument. After all, it
might in theory be possible for a puzzler to specify some consistency transferring
relation that holds between his proposed account of the Trinity and the doctrine
of the Trinity itself (or P), allowing him to avoid the charge of invalidity. Or
again, a puzzler could argue that Puzzle Approach methodology, as it operates
in metaphysics and other areas of philosophy, in fact works differently than I
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have assumed, and that the way it in fact works is, after all, analogous to how
it would work in philosophical theology in some such way as not to be question-
begging after all. However, as it stands, unless some puzzler can come forward
and say more about how his methodology works, we would seem to be left
with quite a large amount of literature that consists either of invalid arguments,
or question-begging arguments. The next move, then, belongs to the puzzler.
Unless and until the puzzler can answer these questions about his methodology,
we must pursue our inquiry through other means.
3.2 The Mysterian Approach
In the current literature, the discussion of mysterianism mainly takes place be-
tween the once-but-no-longer-Trinitarian Dale Tuggy, and mysterian Trinitarian
James Anderson, although both are elaborating in detail on some points made
much more briefly by van Inwagen, who in turn takes a cue from some sug-
gestions of John Polkinghorne. While, as we saw, the Puzzle Approach centers
on giving an account of the Trinity (thus, implicitly, a proposed solution to
the LPT corresponding to the logical form of his account) to show P to be
consistent, the Mysterian Approach attempts to defend as rational the belief
in P, despite its being an apparent contradiction, without giving any proposed
solution or alternative account of the Trinity at all. Yet, the mysterian does
not advocate believing in contradictions or willfully ignoring arguments against
one’s views. How then can he maintain belief in P despite admitting it is an
apparent contradiction, and without proposing any alternative?
Simply put, the mysterian claims that, from the fact that something is an
apparent contradiction, we cannot always conclude that it is a real contradic-
tion. Even when P and Q appear to constitute a formal contradiction, we can
believe instead that P and Q form a “merely apparent contradiction” or “MAC,”
as James Anderson abbreviates it.38 In particular, Anderson holds that the
doctrine of the Trinity is a “merely apparent contradiction resulting from an
unarticulated equivocation,” or MACRUE.39
In other words, the mysterian claims that some formally adequate solution
to the LPT does exist, but he does not base this belief on his actually accepting
any particular account of the Trinity or any particular proposed solution to the
LPT. Indeed, according to Anderson it may be that the solution to the LPT
involves conceptual distinctions we are not even cognitively equipped to grasp.40
Thus, methodologically, while I have argued that the puzzler’s accounts, by
themselves, are not sufficient to show the doctrine of the Trinity to be consistent,
the mysterian argues they are unnecessary anyway. He may find none of the
accounts on-offer to be satisfactory, but no matter. For the mysterian’s project
– and this is the key issue for our purposes – is not to show the doctrine of
the Trinity to be consistent. Rather, it is to maintain the rationality and/or
38. (Anderson 2005), p. 148.
39. (Anderson 2005), p. 148.
40. (Anderson 2005), p. 153.
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warrant of one’s belief in the doctrine of the Trinity anyway – even though it
really appears to be contradictory.
Let us begin our exposition of Mysterianism with van Inwagen. In “And
Yet They Are Not Three Gods But One God,”41 van Inwagen gives an analogy
between the doctrine of the Trinity and quantum physics in support of a position
that looks like mysterianism.
Have we ever been promised by God that we shall understand every-
thing he tells us well enough to resolve all the intellectual difficulties
it raises? God’s concern with us – just at present, at any rate –
is not the concern of a tutor who fears that we shall fail to grasp
some nice point: God fears that we shall lose the end for which we
were made. His concern with us is entirely practical. . . As to al-
leged demonstrations of contradiction – well, our faith is: There is
some way to answer these demonstrations, whether or not we can
understand it.
The world, of course, has a handy word for this sort of thing: ‘obscu-
rantism.’ I would remind the world of certain cases that have arisen
in twentieth-century physics. An electron, we are told, is both a
wave and a particle. One can ask pointed questions about this the-
sis. A wave is a spreading, periodic disturbance; a particle is a lump
of stuff; How can something be both? I think that there are two
equally respectable answers to this question: (1) No one knows; (2)
Quantum field theory explains how something can be both a wave
and a particle. Let us suppose that the second of these answers is
correct, and that some people, those who are at home in quantum
field theory, know how something can be both a wave and a particle.
Still, there was an interval during which physicists went about saying
that electrons were both waves and particles, and had no satisfac-
tory reply to the childishly simple question, “How can something be
both a disturbance and a lump of stuff?” . . . And I do not think
that anyone should blame the physicists for this. I do not think that
anyone should have blamed them even if quantum field theory had
somehow never been discovered. There were certain undeniable but
absolutely astounding experimental data (a “revelation” from nature,
as it were); there was a theory that explained those data (a human
invention, to be sure, and an extraordinarily brilliant one at that,
but not a human invention in the way a motet or an abstract paint-
ing is – the theory purported to represent physical reality); and that
theory implied that an electron had both a mass and a wavelength.
Might it not be that the Christian who accepts the doctrine of the
Trinity, even though he is unable to answer certain pointed questions
about it, is in a position analogous to that of quantum physicists be-
fore the advent of quantum field theory? The world, of course, will
41. (van Inwagen 1988), Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Morris, ed.): pp. 241-278.
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reply that the Christian “revelation” is a fantasy, while the revela-
tion disclosed by nature in the double-slit experiment or in the phe-
nomenon of electron diffraction comprises hard facts of observation.
But may we not ask the world to consider the question hypotheti-
cally? Suppose the Christian revelation were not a fantasy. If the
Holy Spirit really existed and had led the mind of the Church to the
doctrine of the Trinity, then might not the Trinitarian be in a posi-
tion analogous to that of the physicist to whom nature had revealed
the doctrine of the Duality? The world may abuse us for believing
in God and revelation if it will, but I think the world should admit
that once we have accepted something as a revelation, it is reason-
able for us to retain it even if we cannot answer all the intellectual
difficulties it raises; or at least the world should admit this if the
subject matter of the putative revelation is one that it is plausible a
priori to suppose we should find it very difficult to understand.42
Thus, one can see how van Inwagen brings into the discussion a deeper,
epistemological contour. He raises the question, does the Trinitarian even need
to offer any solution to the LPT? Need he be able to actually demonstrate the
logical consistency of P? Is it ever OK to believe in an apparent contradiction,
even if we can’t dispel that apparent contradiction?
In “The unfinished business of Trinitarian theorizing,”43 after rejecting all of
the Trinitarian accounts currently on-offer in the literature (including van Inwa-
gen’s relative identity proposal),44 Dale Tuggy discusses van Inwagen’s analogy
above and takes up the epistemological question, saying:
. . . Can one reasonably believe an apparent contradiction?
It seems to me that one can, if two somewhat hard-to-specify condi-
tions are met. First, one must have very strong grounds for believing
the claim or claims in question. Second, one must have some reason
to suspect that the contradiction is only apparent. Unless these two
conditions are met, one ought not believe any apparent contradic-
tion[.]45
But Tuggy claims that neither condition holds. He gives a rough analogue
of P as follows:46
(1) God is divine.
42. (van Inwagen 1988), pp. 243-244.
43. (Tuggy 2003).
44. I use “proposal” here, since the things van Inwagen says about the Trinity do not con-
stitute an “account” in the specific sense in which we are using that term. (See 3.1, p. 57 ff.)
Van Inwagen offers a proposed solution (a logical form), but consciously avoids filling it in
with specific content about the metaphysical workings of the Trinity.
45. (Tuggy 2003), p. 176.
46. Why only rough? See footnote 55, p. 84.
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(2) The Father of Jesus Christ is divine.
(3) The Son, Jesus Christ, is divine.
(4) The Holy Spirit is divine.
(5) The Father is not the Son is not the Holy Spirit is not God.
That is, these four – Father, Son, Holy Spirit, God – are nu-
merically distinct individuals.
This last claim can be broken into two parts:
(5a) These three are numerically distinct: Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit.
(5b) God is numerically distinct from any of these: Father,
Son, Holy Spirit.
(6) Whatever is divine is identical to at least one of these: the
Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit.47
Then in reference to these claims, he states:
With our claims (1)–(6) above, or the inconsistent triad (1), (5),
(6), the second of these conditions is not met, for the contradiction
is crystal clear. Even if one denies that, it is doubtful that we have
strong enough grounds for (1)–(6) to swallow the apparent contra-
diction. The only way we could have strong grounds for (1)–(6) or
any version of the doctrine would be if we very reasonably believed
it had been revealed by God.48
No doubt van Inwagen would claim that he does “very reasonably believe”
the doctrine of the Trinity has been revealed by God. But, after making the
claim that the doctrine of the Trinity is not explicitly found in scripture,49
Tuggy continues:
But whether one grounds the doctrine in the Bible or in council doc-
uments, one will be hard pressed to show that we are so justified in
believing that God revealed doctrine X that we should believe X,
even though it seems as contradictory as the claim that there is a
square circle. This is why so much energy has recently been spent
by those in the ST and LT camps on coming up with a clearly con-
sistent (or at least, a not clearly inconsistent) version of Trinitarian
doctrine.50
47. p. 166
48. (Tuggy 2003), p. 176.
49. See Chapter 6.4, p. 292 ff., and esp. p. 305 on theological objections, for my deep mis-
givings about this sort of claim.
50. (Tuggy 2003), p. 177.
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That is, even if we have a great deal of warrant for accepting P, Tuggy
simply denies that this belief is highly warranted enough that it can outweigh
P’s apparent inconsistency. This question of how much antecedent warrant there
might be for the doctrine of the Trinity seems to be one of the key issues for
Tuggy.
Tuggy concludes:
. . . when we discover a contradictory, impossible, or unintelligible
claim in Trinitarian theorizing, we should consider it the product of
misguided or confused human theorizing, and not something which
dropped into our laps from above. We Christian theologians and
philosophers came up with the doctrine of the Trinity; perhaps with
God’s help we will come up with a better version of it.51,52
Next into the fray comes James Anderson, with a 2005 paper,53 and later a
2007 book on the subject.54
At the time of “Unfinished Business,” Tuggy was still a Trinitarian who
would seem to have been in the puzzler camp, and he gives some hints that the
LPT could be solved by identifying God with the Father alone.55 So Anderson
first (and rightly, in my view) argues that the doctrine of the Trinity is more
paradoxical than Tuggy’s discussion reveals, and that all parts of the paradox
are pretty firmly rooted in scripture. To Tuggy’s (1)–(6), Anderson adds the
“biblical data” that:
(7) The Father of Jesus Christ is identical to God.
And
(8) The Son, Jesus Christ, is identical to God.56
He also suggests that there is reasonable biblical support for:
(9) The Holy Spirit is identical to God.57
Finally he suggests that the following is probably a biblical datum as well:
51. (Tuggy 2003), pp. 178-179
52. Note what seems to be a puzzler presupposition – that we need to “come up with” a
better “version of” the doctrine of the Trinity, rather than simply discover what it is.
53. (Anderson 2005).
54. (Anderson 2007).
55. Note that Tuggy’s (1)–(6) is consistent with this kind of unitarianism, which Tuggy later
adopts, whereas our P is not consistent with Tuggy’s unitarianism. This is why I call them
only “rough” analogues. In my view, Tuggy’s unitarianism is misguided. Within a certain
community, the singular expression, “the philosopher,” referred specifically to Aristotle. This
did not mean that the predicate “philosopher” could not be applied to anyone else, yielding
the conclusion that there is more than one philosopher. Anderson’s criticism of Tuggy’s
formulation seems to be another way of getting at much the same issue.
56. (Anderson 2005), p. 146.
57. (Anderson 2005), p. 147.
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(10) There is one divine being.58
With these in place, he says:
. . . the biblical data which Trinitarian theorizers need to accom-
modate turn out to be rather more extensive (and awkward) than
Tuggy’s assessment would suggest. His contention that a version of
the doctrine which satisfies the triple constraints of consistency, in-
telligibility, and good fit with the Bible can be achieved by rejecting
(5b) – as well as, one assumes, (8)–(10) – is subject to considerable
doubt. Yet the logical problem that motivates Tuggy’s proposal is
not yet resolved, for, even leaving aside (5b), a seeming contradic-
tion arises simply from adding (8) to the mix. Tuggy’s arguments
against ST and LT are persuasive; I concur with his conclusion that
they fail to deliver in their promises. So what is a rational, biblical
Trinitarian to do?59,60
Before giving his positive proposal, he considers the option of just accepting
a contradiction, and agrees with Tuggy that simply accepting a contradiction
will not do. “Now, I quite agree with Tuggy that it will not do to say that the
Trinity is really contradictory. . . We should avoid, if at all possible, falling back
on the idea that the law of non-contradiction does not apply when theorizing
about God.”61
Instead, Anderson proposes that the doctrine of the Trinity may appear to
be contradictory due to being a “Merely Apparent Contradiction Resulting from
an Unarticulated Equivocation” or MACRUE.
. . . [A]n intelligible distinction may be made between apparent con-
tradiction and real contradiction; thus an intelligible distinction may
be made between apparent-and-real contradiction and apparent-but-
not-real contradiction. Let us refer to an instance of the latter as
a merely apparent contradiction (MAC). Having dismissed as un-
tenable the idea that the Trinity is genuinely contradictory, we are
left with the possibility that the theological claims suggested by the
biblical data constitute a MAC.
. . . [K]nowing that the relevant distinctions could in principle be
articulated and explicated is sufficient grounds for distinguishing a
58. (Anderson 2005), p. 147.
59. (Anderson 2005), p. 147.
60. I note, in passing, Tuggy and Anderson’s apparent shared assumption of the appropri-
ateness of a puzzle approach methodology – the search for “a version of the doctrine which
satisfies the triple constraints of consistency, intelligibility, and good fit with the Bible. . . ”
with no discussion of how to determine whether any given account of the Trinity that satisfies
those theoretical constraints genuinely counts as a “version of” the doctrine of the Trinity. As
it seems to me, mysterianism per se is free either to agree or disagree with puzzle approach
methodology, as the mysterian simply has a different goal from the puzzler. In this particular
case, Anderson seems not to challenge the general thrust of the puzzle approach. More on
which below. (3.2, esp. p. 92.)
61. (Anderson 2005), p. 148.
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MAC from a genuine contradiction. MACs of this kind are thus ac-
counted for by the presence of unarticulated equivocation among key
terms involved in the claims. For the sake of brevity, I will hereafter
refer to an instance of this phenomenon as a MACRUE (Merely Ap-
parent Contradiction Resulting from Unarticulated Equivocation).62
A few pages later, Anderson rehearses some of the ways in which the doctrine
of the Trinity might turn out to rest on equivocations and how those could be
articulated:
. . . [A] formally consistent expression of Trinitarian doctrine can be
constructed simply by explicitly articulating distinctions between
the relevant terms: distinguishing ‘is1’ and ‘is2’, say, or ‘divine1’
and ‘divine2’. Alternatively, problematic terms can be appropri-
ately qualified so as to eliminate formal inconsistency; for example,
the term ‘one’ can be redefined to accommodate the enumerative
oddities raised by the metaphysics of divine personhood (while still
applying in the usual way to non-divine persons and other mundane
entities). Whatever route is taken, however, the essential point is
this: given that we are dealing with a MACRUE, the vocabulary
used to express the doctrine can in principle be adapted so as to
eliminate any formal contradiction.63
With his account of a MACRUE in place, Anderson goes on to address
the question whether it is reasonable to believe a paradoxical doctrine. In
reference to Tuggy’s two conditions of having very strong grounds for believing
the paradoxical claim or claims in question and having some reason to suspect
that the contradiction is only apparent, Anderson says:
Now it seems to me that the second of these conditions will normally
be met, at least in part, by way of the first being met. After all, if
I have ‘very strong grounds’ for believing a set of claims that seem
contradictory, don’t I thereby have good reason to suspect that the
inconsistency is merely apparent? This principle is certainly sup-
ported by the examples of MACRUEs offered earlier. Furthermore,
it is plausible to hold that Christians can have very strong grounds
for believing those claims typically taken to constitute the orthodox
doctrine of the Trinity, namely, the fact that each of those claims
is implied by an array of scriptural data. If the Bible is indeed in-
spired by God, and if the Holy Spirit can induce in a person’s mind
a firm conviction that this is so, then Christians can be warranted in
believing both direct biblical claims and also whatever follows from
those claims ‘by good and necessary consequence’ (as the Westmin-
ster Confession puts it). In favourable circumstances, those beliefs
may be warranted to a high degree.64
62. (Anderson 2005), p. 148.
63. (Anderson 2005), p. 151.
64. (Anderson 2005), p. 154.
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Thus, Anderson seems to be basing his argument on a presupposition that
Trinitarians are (or might be) highly warranted in their belief in the doctrine
of the Trinity. He ties this into the warrant Christians have for believing in the
divine inspiration of the Bible:
There is excellent scriptural support for the individual components
of the doctrine of the Trinity, as any good systematic theology text
will document. And if the belief that the Bible is divinely inspired
(or at least that the relevant biblical data are of divine origin) can
be warranted to a high degree, as Plantinga and others have argued,
then so can the derivative Trinitarian beliefs. This in itself can
provide reasonable grounds for resisting the inference from apparent
contradiction to genuine contradiction.65
In Tuggy’s response to Anderson,66 Tuggy admits that there are scenarios
in which we are warranted in believing P and warranted in believing Q, and
warranted in believing I: that P and Q are inconsistent, but in which the rational
thing to do is maintain belief in P and Q. But this can occur, on Tuggy’s
view, only when the warrant for I is less than the warrant for P and Q.67 In
this case, although we are warranted in believing I (even, potentially, highly
warranted, possibly even so warranted it would count as knowledge, if it were
true and we believed it), it is still permissible to reject it.68 He further argues
that, while belief in an apparently contradictory pair of propositions “may be
reasonable for some people at some times,” it “is unstable or fragile, in that
new information rather easily knocks one out of one’s reasonable belief in an
apparent contradiction.”69
This is because in his view, first of all, the warrant we have for religious
beliefs will never be maximal, since firmness of belief is a necessary condition on
warrant, and “religious claims themselves will never seem true [. . . ] at the maxi-
mal level.”70 Furthermore, the warrant for believing I can be increased “through
the study of metaphysics, logic, and/or precise (philosophical) theology.”71 And
finally the strength of our beliefs in P and Q (again, a necessary condition on
warrant in his and Anderson’s views, both following Plantinga’s epistemology)
can be decreased “through the study of the Bible, biblical exegesis, and historical
and recent systematic theology.”72
Anderson, on the other hand, rejects both the claim that the only rational
course of action when warrant for I is equal to or greater than that for P or for
Q is to reject P or reject Q (by either denying or withholding)73 and the claim
65. (Anderson 2005), pp. 156-157.
66. (Tuggy 2011).
67. (Tuggy 2011), pp. 19-20 of online version.
68. (Tuggy 2011), p. 19 of online version
69. (Tuggy 2011), p. 15 of online version.
70. (Tuggy 2011), p. 16 of online version.
71. (Tuggy 2011), p. 18 of online version.
72. (Tuggy 2011), p. 18 of online version.
73. (Anderson 2011), pp. 21-23 of online version.
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that warrant for I is likely to be increased and/or the warrant for P or for Q
likely to be decreased (and argues that it is, after all, probability here that is
the question, rather than mere possibility).74
As I said, we we will not have space for a full explication and adjudication of
the dispute, and hopefully it is clear why now. However, without settling all of
the epistemological questions raised in the Tuggy-Anderson debate, we can, first,
add a novel problem for the mysterian to grapple with, and second, clarify why
mysterianism is not so much an alternative methodology to the Puzzle Approach
or the Historical Approach, as a methodology with an alternative goal (or set
of related goals). Finally, we will explore the friendly suggestion for the puzzler
we mentioned earlier – a way of combining the Puzzle Approach methodology
with the goals of the mysterian.
A Challenge for Mysterianism
First then, I believe the taxonomy we presented in the first chapter creates a
certain challenge concerning the motivation for mysterianism.
Of course there might be many reasons one would be a mysterian, but it ap-
pears that one strong motivation working in the background for mysterians like
Anderson is a certain dissatisfaction with all of the on-offer proposed solutions
to the LPT. Anderson seems to want to be able to reject all of the proposed
solutions currently on offer, but still believe that there exists some solution.
(Indeed, at the time of “Unfinished Business,” Tuggy seemed to share much in
common with this position, in the sense that he rejected all of the on-offer solu-
tions to the LPT, but still held out hope that that the “business of Trinitarian
theorizing” was simply “unfinished.” That “perhaps with God’s help we will
come up with a better version of [the doctrine of the Trinity].”75 But of course,
he already disagreed with the epistemological stand of the mysterian.)
It’s no mystery why this desire to be free to reject all on-offer accounts
of the Trinity would motivate one to take the Mysterian Approach. Both the
Puzzle Approach and the Historical approach require one to say in essence, “The
doctrine of the Trinity is consistent. . . and here’s an explanation of how it is or
could be.” On the Mysterian Approach, one also maintains that the doctrine of
the Trinity is consistent. The difference is just that the mysterian doesn’t have
to tell us how that could be. To put it in other terms, the mysterian is only
seeking to give an undercutting defeater-defeater in response to the LPT (an
alleged defeater for Trinitarian belief). While the puzzler and the historicist
seek to give a rebutting defeater-defeater. (See below, Chapter 3.2, p. 90.)
Thus, the mysterian won’t be pushed toward giving an account of the Trinity or
proposed solution to the LPT in the way that the puzzler or historicist would
be.
But then why would one be attracted to mysterianism, unless one found fault
with, and wanted to reject, all of the accounts or proposed solutions presented
in the literature?
74. (Anderson 2011), pp. 18-20 of online version.
75. (Tuggy 2003), pp. 178-179.
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And yet, it seems that the mysterian will actually not be able to reject any
of the proposed solutions in the Equivocation Family or the NCIC Family – at
least, not on the basis of certain arguments one might have assumed would have
been his motivation.
Specifically, he will not be able to reject any of the proposed solutions in
those Families based on two of the most prominent reasons usually given –
namely, that they employ an unpalatable equivocation on “is God” or an appeal
to non-classical-identity counting.76 This is because, as we saw in the previous
chapter, our taxonomy shows that if we rule out proposed solutions to the LPT
based on those purely syntactic features, we thereby rule out the entirety of
the Equivocation Family and the entirety of the NCIC Family, and therefore all
possible, non-heretical solutions to the LPT.77
Anderson hints at his motives when he states: “Tuggy contends that neither
Social Trinitarianism nor Latin Trinitarianism can offer us an interpretation of
the doctrine of the Trinity that is both logically consistent and biblically faithful.
I concur.”78
Unfortunately, Anderson himself does not give his specific reasons for re-
jecting Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trinitarianism, though he does state,
“Tuggy’s arguments against ST and LT are persuasive,”79 perhaps indicating
that he agrees with Tuggy’s arguments (which do seem to commit Tuggy to
rejecting all possible, non-heretical solutions to the LPT). In any case, it seems
unlikely to me that Anderson, or other mysterians, would only want to re-
ject specific accounts of the Trinity on a case-by-case basis or other piecemeal
fashion, rather than rejecting all Equivocation Family accounts, and all NCIC
accounts, precisely in virtue of the logical features that define those Families
of solutions. But if that is so then our taxonomy shows that Anderson would
ultimately be committed to rejecting all possible, non-heretical solutions to the
LPT.80
76. He could, for example, remain agnostic about whether there are any successful Equiv-
ocation Family solutions to the LPT but still reject all currently on-offer Social Trinitarian
solutions piecemeal. Say, by rejecting one particular version of Social Trinitarianism on the
grounds that one makes God out to be a set, another a community, another a whole, etc. (i.e.,
on the basis of some objectionable aspect of the content of the view.) But it seems more likely
he would want to reject the entire Equivocation Family due to it’s saying that God “is God”
in a different sense than the sense in which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are. Likewise, he
could remain agnostic about whether there are any successful NCIC Family solutions to the
LPT but still reject all current such solutions by rejecting each particular version of Relative
Identity Trinitarianism on the grounds of the specific relation it involves – the constitution
relation, the synergy relation we will see later, etc. (i.e., again, because of some objectionable
aspect of the content of the view). But it seems more likely he would reject the entire NCIC
Family due to its counting gods by a relation other than classical identity.
77. Since van Inwagen actually puts forward a Relative Identity account of the Trinity, clearly
he does not wish to reject such accounts. Thus, the issue I raise for motivation clearly does
not apply to his views.
78. (Anderson 2005), p. 160.
79. (Anderson 2005), p. 147.
80. The same holds for Tuggy and anyone else who rejects the standard Trinitarian accounts
on the basis of the syntactic features we’ve used to taxonomize them. Of course, now that
Tuggy has abandoned Trinitarianism altogether, he might welcome this result.
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To put the point in a very summary way, then, one might distinguish myste-
rianism into two types. One type would say, in essence, “I don’t know what the
logical form of P is, because none of the on-offer accounts of the Trinity strike
me as plausible (due to the formal features we’ve noted.)” Another type would
say, very roughly, “I don’t know what the logical for of P is, because multiple
on-offer accounts of the Trinity seem plausible enough.” It seems likely that
only the latter type would be workable, but that only the former type would
satisfy the mysterian’s real motivations.
Mysterianism’s Goal
Next, I want to argue that mysterianism is in an important sense not in com-
petition with the the Historical or Puzzle approaches. To see this, recall that in
our analysis of the Puzzle Approach, we faulted the puzzler for simply begging
the question against the anti-Trinitarian, at least on a certain way of fleshing
out the Puzzle Approach, by presupposing a great deal of warrant for belief in
the doctrine of the Trinity. Since it seems that the mysterian presupposes a
great deal of warrant for his belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, can one argue
that the mysterian is guilty of the same sort of question begging?
This turns out, I think, to be a much subtler question than may initially
appear. Again, this is the question that occupies a central role in the Tuggy-
Anderson debate, and unfortunately a complete analysis would simply take us
too far afield. However, we can certainly say the following. One reason it is
much more difficult to say whether the mysterian begs the question against the
anti-Trinitarian is that, as I said at the outset, and as we can now see much
more clearly, the mysterian simply has a different aim from either the historicist
or the puzzler. That is, he is arguing for a very different conclusion.
If we view the anti-Trinitarian’s argument as an attempt to give a rebutting
defeater for belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, it seems the puzzler and the
historicist alike want to give a rebutting defeater-defeater, whereas the myste-
rian’s project is only to give an undercutting defeater-defeater. That is, both
the puzzler and the historicist want to demonstrate that P is logically consis-
tent, showing the anti-Trinitarian’s conclusion to be false. But the mysterian
isn’t trying to do this. He only wants to show that one of the anti-Trinitarian’s
premises is either false, or simply not sufficiently well supported. He wants to
maintain that it’s possible for the Trinitarian to have a warranted belief in the
doctrine of the Trinity (or that it’s rational to believe in the doctrine of the Trin-
ity, or some such related conclusion), despite the anti-Trinitarian’s argument.
As Anderson points out, his arguments “. . . can still serve as a defeater-defeater
(or defeater-insulator) with respect to theological paradox (i.e., as an undercut-
ting defeater for the inference from D appears to be logically inconsistent to D is
false).”81 The puzzler and historicist, then, are engaged in a project analogous
to theodicy in the problem of evil, whereas the mysterian’s project is analogous
81. (Anderson 2011), p. 12 of online version.
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to a defense.82,83
If the mysterian’s project really just aims at a different conclusion, what
precisely is that conclusion? It seems to me that there are a number of related,
but importantly different, conclusions the mysterian might be aiming at. And
whether or not the mysterian project is successful depends both on precisely
what that project is (i.e., precisely what property the mysterian wants to as-
cribe to his Trinitarian beliefs) and a number of factors about one’s overarching
epistemological theory.
Anderson seems to want to argue that the Trinitarian’s belief either is or
might be warranted. Warranted enough to count as knowledge, if true. Again,
I don’t want to pronounce on the question whether that project can be made
to work (in the absence of the kind of defense attempted by historicists and
puzzlers). But Anderson does (rightly) point out that Tuggy’s criticisms of his
position at many points seem to rest on underlying internalist epistemological
assumptions, while Anderson’s epistemology, following Plantinga’s, is external-
ist.84 If the conclusion a mysterian wanted to arrive at had to do with internalist
justification of Trinitarian beliefs, the position might be more clearly problem-
atic. Given Anderson’s externalism, it’s more difficult to say.
However, in my view a clearer path is the one that appears to be taken by
van Inwagen.85 Without going into great detail, his remarks indicate that the
conclusion he wants to draw is not even as strong as saying that Trinitarian
belief is, or even that it might be, highly warranted. Recall this:
The world, of course, will reply that the Christian “revelation” is a
fantasy, while the revelation disclosed by nature in the double-slit
experiment or in the phenomenon of electron diffraction comprises
hard facts of observation. But may we not ask the world to consider
the question hypothetically? Suppose the Christian revelation were
not a fantasy. If the Holy Spirit really existed and had led the
mind of the Church to the doctrine of the Trinity, then might not
the Trinitarian be in a position analogous to that of the physicist to
whom nature had revealed the doctrine of the Duality? The world
may abuse us for believing in God and revelation if it will, but I
think the world should admit that once we have accepted something
as a revelation, it is reasonable for us to retain it even if we cannot
answer all the intellectual difficulties it raises. . . 86
The repeated use of hypothetical terms – “hypothetically,” “suppose,” “if” –
suggests that his intended conclusion is of a merely hypothetical character. If
82. (Anderson 2011), pp. 12-13 of the online version.
83. I will briefly discuss below the prospects for a Puzzle Approach that would also adopt a
more modest, defense-like goal.
84. (Anderson 2011), p. 18.
85. To the extent that van Inwagen fits into the mysterian camp, which as we’ve seen is not
totally.
86. (van Inwagen 1988), p. 244. Emphasis mine.
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a Trinitarian’s beliefs were highly warranted, would the anti-Trinitarian argu-
ment count as a defeater, or would mysterian considerations count as adequate
defeater-defeaters? That is, while Anderson’s book extends Plantinga’s Aquinas
/ Calvin model of warranted Christian belief to encompass the doctrine of the
Trinity to argue that Trinitarian belief really could be warranted,87 it seems
van Inwagen only wants to argue that if Trinitarian belief were warranted,
anti-Trinitarian arguments would not defeat it (without even committing on
whether they are or might be warranted).
Furthermore, reading a bit more deeply into the final sentence of the quote
from van Inwagen above, it may also be that van Inwagen is not only arguing for
a hypothetical conclusion that would have a consequent involving an external-
ist, Plantingian-Andersonian concept of warrant, but one involving a perhaps
related but distinct concept of reasonableness. This might be a more deontic
notion, like being “within one’s epistemic rights.” (Note van Inwagen’s use of
the term “blame” in his analogy, “I do not think that anyone should blame the
physicists for this. I do not think that anyone should have blamed them even
if quantum field theory had somehow never been discovered.”)88 Not that, if
Trinitarian belief were warranted, anti-Trinitarian arguments would not defeat
it. But that, if Trinitarian belief were at least reasonable (un-blameworthy),
then anti-Trinitarian arguments would not render it unreasonable (blamewor-
thy). Trinitarians would still be within their epistemic rights in maintaining
their belief in the doctrine of the Trinity.
This latter interpretation, in my view, might be even more easily defended,
though as always in philosophy, one might argue that the progressively more
defensible alternatives we have briefly touched upon are also progressively less
exciting. But be that as it may, the features of what seems to be van Inwagen’s
position just discussed certainly render it more easily defensible. And this is
why it turns out to be much less than clear that the mysterian is begging the
question against the anti-Trinitarian in the way the puzzler (on one fleshing out
of his view) was.
But happily, all of this also makes a refutation of the Mysterian Approach
unnecessary for the historicist. For as should now be clear, the Mysterian Ap-
proach turns out to be, not so much another methodology in competition with
the Historical Approach and the Puzzle Approach, but a methodology with a
different goal, compatible, in principle, with either. The mysterian is only seek-
ing to show something about the epistemic status of his own beliefs (that they
are reasonable, or that they are warranted, or that hypothetically they could
remain undefeated, or remain reasonable, in the face of the LPT, or something
along these lines). The historicist and the puzzler, on the other hand, are trying
to show something about the doctrine of the Trinity itself – that it is consistent.
87. See esp. Chapter 6 of (Anderson 2007).
88. (van Inwagen 1988), p. 244. Emphasis mine.
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A Suggestion for the Puzzler
This in turn raises an additional important question about the Puzzle Approach.
Namely, if it should turn out that the puzzler’s methodology is insufficient to
achieve its goal (or that the mysterian’s methodology is insufficient to achieve
its goal), would one be able to construct a sort of hybrid methodology, taking
the goal of the Mysterian Approach but employing the accounts of the Puzzle
Approach? This would be an attempt to use a speculative Trinitarian account
to show, not that P is consistent (a rebutting defeater-defeater), but that the
argument for its inconsistency is flawed (an undercutting defeater-defeater). The
accounts, then, would not be intended to reveal the actual logical form of P, but
only to demonstrate that there are logical forms that P epistemically might (for
all we know) have that would be consistent. Perhaps the theoretical virtues an
account has could be used to show it to be more charitable or for some other
reason a more plausible reading than the anti-Trinitarian’s reading(s) of P.
I think there would still be a few issues with such an approach.
First, again, without doing some historical work, the puzzler still has to ad-
mit that, for all he knows, his account may not actually turn out to be a version
of the doctrine of the Trinity at all. Indeed, without saying anything more,
puzzlers must admit that all of their accounts may just be logically consistent
heresies, since, without saying anything more, for all we know, his account may
not even be logically consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus, without
saying anything more, the Trinitarian puzzler shouldn’t actually advocate ac-
cepting his account as true – or even likely to be true – even if he does advocate
accepting the doctrine of the Trinity itself as true (indeed, precisely because
he advocates accepting the doctrine of the Trinity itself as true, and because,
without delving into the history, for all we know, his account might entail the
falsehood of the doctrine of the Trinity). So, on this proposal, without going
back and answering the questions we posed in section 1, a puzzler’s speculative
account of the Trinity should at best be put forward only as a defeater-defeater,
not as a way of understanding or conceptualizing the Trinity that it would be
actually acceptable for Christians to believe. The existence of a possible inter-
pretation of S that is consistent may defeat the prima facie warrant for thinking
P is inconsistent. But that doesn’t mean it constitutes a “version of” P itself
(nor indeed that it is even logically compatible with P).
Second, without providing any reason to think that one’s account bears any
actual logical relation to the doctrine of the Trinity itself, it’s still not clear
how strong a puzzler account would be even as a defeater-defeater. Returning
to the Problem of Socrateic Immortality,89 suppose I believe that all men are
mortal, that Socrates is a man, but that Socrates is immortal. One can easily
give me a defeater for that conjunction, showing that the logical form that
seems prima facie reasonable to attribute to it is inconsistent. On the other
hand, we know that it’s possible to give an account on which that conjunction
is consistent. But without showing that it’s reasonable to think the logical form
of my account really does reflect the logical form of that conjunction, it’s not
89. See p. 76 ff.
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clear that I’ve succeeding in defeating the defeater.
In other words, it’s still not immediately obvious whether this approach
would work, without the additional premise that the puzzler’s account either
is identical to P or logically entails P or is logically isomorphic to P, etc. And
just as before, it isn’t clear how one would show that without explicating the
logical form of P in enough detail that one might have just determined its log-
ical consistency altogether (giving a rebutting defeater-defeater), without even
making reference to the speculative account, making the speculative account,
again, superfluous.
Conclusion on the Puzzle Approach and the Mysterian
Approach
In conclusion, then, while there is much more to say about methodology, two
points should be clear.
The first is that the Mysterian Approach, regardless of whether it turns out
to be successful in its goal or not, is simply directed at a different goal from
that of the historicist or the puzzler.
The second is that, to date, puzzlers have not been clear as to what precisely
their arguments are supposed to show, so that it is unclear what role their spec-
ulative accounts of the Trinity are supposed to be playing in these arguments.
In order to evaluate puzzlers’ arguments fully, we would need to know, at a
minimum, their conclusion. (Presumably the same as the historicist’s, though
perhaps it would turn out that some would prefer to adopt a more mysterian
conclusion, were they to state their conclusion explicitly.) Next, whatever the
conclusion turns out to be, we need to know precisely what the premises of
the argument in support of it are. Once the project of stating those elements
has been completed, then, the bigger question will be, “What role (if any) does
the puzzlers’ speculative account of the Trinity play in this argument?” (What-
ever exactly the argument turns out to be.) But until the puzzler completes
the project of stating his argument explicitly, it is at best unclear whether his
accounts will ultimately play any essential role in that argument after all, or
whether the project will not ultimately just collapse into the Historical Ap-
proach.
For the reasons given in section 1, it seems unlikely to me that puzzlers
will get very far in trying to put their accounts to use in proving the conclu-
sion that P is consistent (rebutting the anti-Trinitarian argument). It seems
much more likely that they could use their accounts to make some kind of point
about about the epistemic situation of the Trinitarian, a la the Mysterian Ap-
proach (undercutting the anti-Trinitarian argument). But even there it isn’t
immediately obvious precisely how their argument will go, whether it would be
successful, or whether their accounts will actually end up playing any essential
role in those arguments after all.
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3.3 The Historical Approach
I’ve argued that the Puzzle Approach is insufficient for answering the question,
“of all of the possible logical forms we might ascribe to P, which one is right?
(Or, if more than one is right, which ones?)” And the Mysterian Approach is
not even directly concerned with that question in the first place. How, then,
does the Historical Approach recommend we answer the question?
We’ve already seen hints of this view in van Inwagen. We can also grasp
the view that some historical relation between one’s account and the doctrine
of the Trinity itself is essential simply by looking at the way in which authors
like Swinburne or Cross proceed with their discussions.90
Although complicated in its implementation, the Historical Approach is
fairly simple in its essence. Put simply, the historicist claims that the cor-
rect answer to the LPT will be whatever answer (solution or non-solution) to
the LPT is implicitly given by the accounts of the Trinity historically held by
the authors of the (orthodox) doctrine of the Trinity itself.
That is, the historicist does not attempt to find a solution to the LPT
a priori. On the Historical Approach, whether the answer to the LPT is a
solution or non-solution is to be determined by examining the doctrine of the
Trinity itself, or particular historical versions of it. Thus, the historicist admits
that, without begging the question, it cannot be determined a priori whether
that answer will be a solution or a non-solution. The historicist only claims that
his answer to the LPT will be correct, not necessarily that it will be a solution.
That is a brief statement of the methodology. But let us examine some
potential objections from puzzlers, mysterians, and anti-Trinitarians, which will
at the same time give us occasion to elaborate a bit on the view as well.
3.3.1 Objection 1: The Puzzler’s Tu Quoque
I said that one can carry out the Historical Approach by examining the orthodox
doctrine of the Trinity itself, or particular historical versions of the orthodox
doctrine of the Trinity. Does the Historical Approach, then, not fall prey to the
same problem as the Puzzle Approach – namely that it will have to navigate
between the Scylla of showing that the “version of” relation is a consistency
transferring relation and the Charybdis of showing that some historical account
of the Trinity actually is a(n orthodox) version of the doctrine?
No. This is because the accounts that the historicist advocates examining are
just those that are definitive of the Trinitarian tradition itself, rather than ones
deliberately constructed so as to be logically consistent or otherwise theoretically
virtuous. To be sure, the historicist must say something about any account he
examines being part of the Trinitarian tradition. And I will address that fact,
albeit only briefly, at the end of the chapter. But, however one thinks about
traditions and schools of thought, it seems that in practice we have perfectly
90. E.g., Swinburne’s discussions of the historicity of his account in (Swinburne 1988) and
(Swinburne 1994), or Cross’s discussions of patristic accounts of the Trinity in response to
Brian Leftow in (Cross 2012).
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good, practical ways of figuring out who lies in a certain intellectual tradition
and who doesn’t, and likewise what propositions are more central or less central
to a given school of thought. One might wonder why, then, the puzzler couldn’t
avail himself of the same sorts of arguments and considerations, and simply
give the same sorts of historical arguments to show that his theory was, in fact,
within the same tradition. And of course, he could. Indeed, I would argue he
should. Nothing wrong with it. But of course, to do so would be to no longer
treat the project merely as a puzzle, divorced, or at least largely divorced, from
historical concerns. It would be to collapse into the Historical Approach.
Think of Tuggy’s statement, “The doctrine of the Trinity has a long and
interesting history. . . In this paper I will avoid as much of this post-biblical
tradition as I can. . . ” or Forrest saying, “I grant that all this is speculative.
But in order to defend a moderate Social Trinitarianism it suffices to provide a
speculative metaphysics which is no worse than its rivals. . . ”91 Puzzlers could
indeed go back and try to back up the claim that their accounts are orthodox
version of the doctrine of the Trinity by using historical arguments. But in doing
so, they would no longer “avoid. . . post-biblical tradition” or rely on nothing
more than mere “speculation.”
Now I said that the accounts that the historicist advocates examining are
just those that are definitive of the Trinitarian tradition itself. What if one
supposes that there are no such accounts?
In the introduction to Analytic Theology: New Essays in the Philosophy
of Theology, Mike Rea gives several “prescriptions” characteristic of analytic
philosophers’ approach to theology, along with what he takes to be the ma-
jor criticisms of these features. He relates my Historical Approach to his first
prescription, labelled “P1”:
. . . P1 recommends that we operate under the assumption that po-
sitions and conclusions can be formulated in sentences that can be
formalized and logically manipulated. One might object, however,
that this prescription misconstrues the nature of philosophical and
theological positions. Consider empiricism, for example. This posi-
tion is notoriously problematic when thought of simply as a thesis
about sources of knowledge. It is significantly less so when thought
of as somehow involving attitudes, preferences, dispositions, and so
on. Though no one that I know of has said exactly this, one might
easily imagine someone claiming that empiricism simply cannot be
understood apart from extensive familiarity with the writings of var-
ious historical empiricists. Any attempt to distill the position down
to a thesis would inevitably fail; any attempt to express it proposi-
tionally and reject it on the basis of its alleged “logical consequences”
would be wholly misguided. And the problem would be that all such
attempts are objectionably “ahistorical”. They leave out the histor-
ical circumstances (whatever they might be—facts about particular
91. (Forrest 1998) p. 293 – emphasis mine.
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authors and their intellectual climates, facts about what the posi-
tion at various times is being defined in contrast with, and so on)
that help constitute the position as whatever it is, and so they set
up a mere caricature as an object of discussion or target for attack.
Nobody that I am aware of has actually accused critics of empiri-
cism of being ‘ahistorical’ in just this way; but the charge has been
leveled against (for example) analytic philosophers who treat funda-
mental doctrines of Christianity in the way prescribed by P1. Such
philosophers are often mystified by the criticism, in no small part
because many of us often comment on (and thus show awareness of)
the history of the relevant doctrines in the course of our philosophi-
cal treatments of them. But the objection lingers, I think, precisely
because we do not regard the history as in any meaningful sense
determinative of the doctrines.92
In a footnote to the final sentence, Rea states, “The first clear expression
of this idea that I encountered was in Beau Branson’s dissertation proposal
(unpublished). I do not know whether he would endorse it exactly as I have
articulated it here, however.”93
If “this idea” means that “history [is] . . . determinative of the [content of]
doctrines,” then I do endorse it. But not in any such way that “the first clear
expression of this idea” Rea ever encountered could possibly have been in my
dissertation proposal. For the idea I want to endorse is simply what anyone
with at least roughly Kripkean views about naming would normally assume
about any doctrine that has a name (e.g., empiricism, Stoicism, the doctrine of
the Trinity, the doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts, etc.). Specifically, that
it is historical facts about a name that determines its referent (in this case, a
particular bit of content). And that is not in any obvious conflict with the idea
that “positions and conclusions can be formulated in sentences that can be for-
malized and logically manipulated,” nor would it be obvious why the historicist
would be committed to the claim that formulating positions and conclusions in
logically manipulatable sentences would (necessarily) “misconstrue the nature
of philosophical and theological positions.” So, let us explore the issue a bit
further.
Rea rightly notes that “empiricism . . . is notoriously problematic when
thought of simply as a thesis about sources of knowledge. It is significantly less
so when thought of as somehow involving attitudes, preferences, dispositions,
and so on.” But this is not the point of the Historical Approach or the criticism
of the Puzzle Approach; it is simply an unfortunate feature of empiricism in
particular. Let’s substitute Stoicism instead. (Perhaps someone out there be-
lieves there are aspects of Stoicism that are similarly problematic, but I don’t
see why that should be, and in any case, for the sake of argument, let’s suppose
it isn’t. Let’s suppose the claim that “Any attempt to distill [Stoicism] down to
a thesis would inevitably fail” is false.)
92. (Crisp and Rea 2011), pp. 30-31.
93. (Crisp and Rea 2011), p. 31, footnote 34.
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Still, consider the claim that “[Stoicism] simply cannot be understood apart
from extensive familiarity with the writings of various historical [Stoics]” and
that to try to do so would “set up a mere caricature as an object of discussion
or target for attack.” Are these claims true? In a sense, clearly not. And in a
sense, clearly so.
Of course, it would be theoretically possible to come to understand the con-
tent of the body of propositions that is in fact Stoicism if, say, a billion monkeys
banged on a billion typewriters for a billion years and eventually happened to
produce a clear and concise explanation of the body of propositions in ques-
tion. Neither I nor the monkeys would then need any familiarity at all with
the writings of any Stoics at all. Indeed, I could grasp the content of these
propositions without knowing that they constituted Stoicism, indeed without
having any concept of Stoicism or the Stoics in the first place.
But it is hard to see how I would realistically come to know (much less prove)
that this is Stoicism, unless I already had a sufficient (which might be less than
“extensive”) familiarity with the writings of the Stoics, and could then compare
those Stoic writings with the product of our philosophical monkeys. (Or, instead
of reading the Stoics myself, I might rely on reputable secondary sources. But
those secondary sources had better have read the Stoics, or in their turn be
relying on others who had, or . . . etc.)
The problem, then, is not so much that there is no possible world in which
one might somehow end up understanding the content of Stoic doctrine without
doing the relevant historical inquiry. Perhaps some puzzler will even come up
with some way to prove that a certain set of propositions is Stoic, or bears a
consistency transferring relation to Stoicism, without having to engage in any
serious historical discussion of the Stoic tradition (or of any authors who them-
selves discuss the Stoic tradition, etc.). After all, philosophers are tricky. The
point is that the standard way one would attempt to get clear about the con-
tent of some difficult-to-understand Stoic doctrine would be precisely through
“familiarity with the writings of various historical [Stoics]” (or familiarity with
authors who themselves were familiar with the Stoics, etc.) In other words, the
standard way to resolve disputes about difficult-to-understand doctrines is just
through the methodological approach known as reading the primary sources.
And this is precisely because the history of a doctrine is what determines its
content. (Or, more precisely, the history of a name – the name of the doctrine –
is what determines the referent of that name.) And while I would love to claim
credit for being the first person to think of the idea of reading primary sources,
or for being the first person to express the idea clearly, this methodology has in
fact been around for as long as there has been writing.
Rea writes, “[T]he objection lingers, I think, precisely because we do not
regard the history as in any meaningful sense determinative of the doctrines.”
((Crisp and Rea 2011), p. 31.) But if the historical views of the Stoics them-
selves are not in any meaningful sense determinative of the doctrines of Stoicism,
what exactly would be?
It is difficult to take very seriously the idea that history really is not “in
any meaningful sense” determinative of the content of a doctrine. (What else
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would be?) But I suspect it would be uncharitable to take Rea’s comment
here as really intended to rule out history altogether. I suspect that what is
really going on is not that Rea has some fundamentally different view about
how the content of a doctrine (essentially, the referent of the name for the
doctrine) is defined or determined. My suspicion is that he likely shares the
same intuitions as I about how the content of a doctrine is determined, but
simply locates the particular determinative history of this particular doctrine
at a different point in history than I do. Specifically, I suspect that he conceives
of statements relevant to the Trinity that are found in the Bible as definitive of
the doctrine of the Trinity, rather than similarly relevant statements found in the
church fathers who constituted the pro-Nicene consensus (which I conceive of as
being the determinative history of the doctrine).94 If that suspicion is correct,
then Rea would quite reasonably see the Bible as containing or describing the
determinative history of the doctrine, and the pro-Nicene consensus as merely a
part of the subsequent history of the doctrine. (Subsequent to the determinative
history.)
Now if it were the case that the content of what in English is called “the
doctrine of the Trinity” (in other words, the referent of the phrase, “the doctrine
of the Trinity”) were determined by the authors of the Bible, rather than the
pro-Nicenes, then of course I would share Rea’s lack of comprehension as to
why anyone would fixate so much on the pro-Nicenes (merely another part of
the subsequent history of the doctrine). It is for just this reason that I, for
example, pay relatively less attention to St. Augustine (who comes to the party,
in my view, just a bit too late). And, though valuable, the views of folks like
Aquinas and Scotus, as I see it, are not even remotely determinative of the
content of the doctrine of the Trinity. Aquinas really is on a par with Rea or
anyone else in today’s literature (at least in the sense of being only part of the
subsequent, not the determinative, history of the doctrine.) And if “the doctrine
of the Trinity” just meant (or if we knew that its reference had been fixed to)
“what the Bible has to say about the Trinity,” then what the pro-Nicenes had
to say would be on the same level as Aquinas and Rea as well.
However, I don’t think that this is standard English usage. If it were, then
it would be a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity is biblical. But that is not
at all a priori. As I discuss below in the concluding evaluation,95 one of the
major criticisms of the doctrine of the Trinity is precisely that it isn’t biblical.
As deeply misguided as I argue those criticisms are, they are not criticisms that
can simply be ruled out a priori. The doctrine of the Trinity could turn out
to be unbiblical, because the church fathers could have been wrong about how
they interpreted the Bible (which is just the argument made by those who argue
the doctrine of the Trinity is unbiblical.)
In any case, if we wanted to, we could just disambiguate and define “the
doctrine of the TrinityBiblical” and “the doctrine of the TrinityPro-Nicene.” Now it
94. At least, I suspect this is his view, on the basis of various remarks of his in conversation
and over email; I could be entirely mistaken as to whether he would actually endorse the
claim.
95. Chapter 6.4, esp., p. 293, ff.
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is a priori that the doctrine of the TrinityBiblical is biblical. But it is not obvious,
even to someone who knows quite a bit about the history of the Trinitarian
controversy, that the doctrine of the TrinityBiblical should be incompatible with
modalism or Arianism. It is not even obvious, even to someone who knows
quite a bit about the history of the Trinitarian controversy, that the doctrine
of the TrinityBiblical might not be identical to modalism. (The modalists must
have believed this. And the Arians certainly believed that the doctrine of the
TrinityBiblical was identical to Arianism. And even if one thinks, as I do, that
the heretics were wrong on all of this, it is not a priori or just obvious that they
were wrong.)
On the other hand, it is not at all a priori that the doctrine of the
TrinityPro-Nicene is biblical. But it is obvious to anyone who knows any-
thing about the history of the Trinitarian controversy that the doctrine of the
TrinityPro-Nicene is not compatible with modalism or Arianism. Likewise, if
the pro-Nicenes believed that the hypostases are numerically three and yet ho-
moousios with one another, then the doctrine of the TrinityPro-Nicene entails
that.
The question is which of these two disambiguations the unqualified use of
“the doctrine of the Trinity” in standard English usage more likely corresponds
to. It seems to me obvious that it is the latter. That is, it seems to me that it is
not at all a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity is biblical. But it is obvious
to anyone who knows anything about the history of the Trinitarian controversy
that the doctrine of the Trinity is not compatible with modalism or Arianism.
Likewise, if the pro-Nicenes believed that the hypostases are numerically three
and yet homoousios with one another, then the doctrine of the Trinity entails
that.
But what if we took the other option? Is it really plausible to say that it is
a priori that the doctrine of the Trinity is biblical? That it is not obvious, even
to someone who knows quite a bit about the history of the Trinitarian contro-
versy, that the doctrine of the Trinity should be incompatible with modalism or
Arianism? That it is not even obvious, even to someone who knows quite a bit
about the history of the Trinitarian controversy, that the doctrine of the Trinity
might not be identical to modalism. (Or Arianism?) That certainly doesn’t
seem like standard English usage to me.
But suppose I am wrong about that. Then wherever I write “the doctrine of
the Trinity,” read instead “the doctrine of the TrinityPro-Nicene.” That is what I
am concerned with in this dissertation. (I simply view it as a separate project
to defend the view that the doctrine of the TrinityPro-Nicene is biblical, i.e, is, or
is a version of, the doctrine of the TrinityBiblical.)
3.3.2 Objection 2: The Mysterian’s Conundrum
In conversation, van Inwagen has more than once asked me the question: “In
what sense, then, is the doctrine of the Trinity a ‘mystery’?” I take the import
of the question to be this. If indeed there is some fairly explicit and coherent
account of the Trinity to be found in the church fathers, and if this is defini-
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tive of the doctrine of the Trinity, then it seems there is nothing particularly
“mysterious” about it. What we’re doing here is not obviously different from,
say, scholarship on the Stoics or the British Empiricists. Not exactly what one
would call a “mystery.” But isn’t the doctrine of the Trinity supposed to be,
in some sense, a mystery? (And on van Inwagen’s theory, it’s easy to see how
the doctrine of the Trinity is “mysterious” in a very deep sense. We can see,
perhaps, its logical form, but may understand very little of its content.)
Indeed, van Inwagen is right to think that, on the Historical Approach, there
isn’t any serious difference between investigating the doctrine of the Trinity and
investigating, say, Stoicism or Empiricism. Thus, van Inwagen’s question needs
to be answered. And doing so will help make more clear how the historicist
approaches the question of the logical form of P and why.
Let’s return to van Inwagen’s analogy between the wave-particle duality in
quantum physics and the doctrine of the Trinity. Our best theories of quantum
physics seem contradictory, particularly with respect to how we understand the
nature of light. But it’s also the case that each individual part seems well
justified. It seems, then, that while the exact nature of light is a mystery, our
theories about light are adequate (non- or extremely mildly-misleading, for most
practical purposes)96 descriptions of the behavior of light.
I think the analogy is a good one in many ways, but problematic in a few
ways.
First, we have to be clear about the kind of mystery light is (or the sense
which light is a mystery – what Tuggy dubs “positive” vs. “negative” mysteries,
explained below). Secondly, we have to be clear about the distinction between
light itself and our theories about light. Last but not least, we have to dis-
tinguish between the theories themselves and summaries of those theories that
might be created under certain logical perspicuity-destroying constraints.
Let’s take these in order.
First, the nature of light is certainly in some sense “mysterious.” But it is
mysterious in what Tuggy dubs a “positive” sense, rather than the “negative”
sense in which the pro-Nicene tradition says God, or the Trinity, is a mystery.
To say that something is what Tuggy calls a “negative” mystery is to say, so
to speak, that there is too little information there. It is a “something, I know not
what.” There is no contradiction, indeed not even an apparent contradiction,
in saying that something exists but that it isn’t similar enough to anything
else we’re acquainted with to be able to categorize it. For example, suppose
Mr. Healthy, who is normally in good health and seldom gets sick, suddenly
becomes ill. We might conclude that something made him sick. But whether
it is a bacteria, or a virus, or some kind of poisonous or nauseous substance,
or some strange auto-immune response to something, or merely psychosomatic
for that matter, we wouldn’t know. This doesn’t create the appearance of
a contradiction. It is a negative mystery, a mystery in the sense that it is
something clearly real, but about which we lack certain information.97
96. For more on the distinction between misleading and non-misleading, see below, p. 106
ff.
97. (Tuggy 2011).
101
On the other hand, to say that something is what Tuggy calls a “positive”
mystery is to say, so to speak, that there is too much information there. It is
not a “something, I know not what.” It is a “something which seems to be both
P and not-P.” Thus, there seems to be a contradiction (or at least a tension)
when we describe it. For example, I know that the phenomenon of light is
real, but it seems to fit into one category – particle – and seems to also fit into
another category – wave – and these categories seem to be mutually exclusive.
This does create the appearance of contradiction. It’s a mystery in the sense
that it is clearly real, yet apparently fits into multiple, and mutually exclusive,
categories.
Tuggy rightly notes that the tradition of the early church treats God as a
“mystery” in the negative sense.98 There is much about God that we do not
(and perhaps cannot) know. (In particular, what God is – His essence or nature,
or as the fathers sometimes put it in Aristotelian terms, His “ti esti?”). But this
in itself doesn’t create any appearance of contradiction.
Second, while light itself is a mystery, the content of our own theories about
light is no mystery at all. And this is my answer to van Inwagen. For while the
church fathers frequently claim that God in Himself (or the Trinity in itself)
is a mystery, they never claim that the content of their own beliefs about God
or the doctrine of the Trinity itself is mysterious. Indeed, to say so would be
non-sensical. A “doctrine” (doctrina in Latin, dogma in Greek) is, “that which
is taught,” and so, by definition, no dogma can, itself, be so mysterious as to be
unteachable. Of course, that is not to say that there can’t be perfectly teachable,
and non-mysterious dogmata about mysterious and unteachable things (e.g., the
proposition that God’s essence is mysterious is not, itself, any more mysterious
than the proposition that Mr. Healthy’s illness was mysterious, and thus could
be a dogma).
To continue the analogy, suppose you were teaching a course on quantum
physics and assigned several texts to the students regarding wave-particle duality
and other aspects of quantum physics, explaining to them that the nature of
light is a mystery, and that there is much about the physics of things at a
quantum level that nobody really understands, but that, nevertheless we are
going to study some of our best theories about these things. On the test, you
give several short-answer questions asking the students what Einstein’s reaction
was to the idea that probability might play an ineliminable role in describing
the movements of fundamental particles. You ask what Heisenberg said about
determining the position and velocity of photons. You ask what the thought
experiment of Schrödinger’s Cat was, and what it was supposed to show, and
about the implications of Bell’s Theorem.
Suppose one student returns his test with all of these short-answer blanks
filled in with statements to the effect that “nobody really understands this pre-
cisely,” and “quantum physics is a mystery,” and so forth.
Perhaps justifiably annoyed, you return the exam with a low grade and
98. He says, “I have found mostly negative mysterianism among the catholic church fathers
and the medieval traditions beholden to them.” (Tuggy 2011), p. 5 of online version.
102
comments to the effect that, as a matter of simple, historical fact, the student’s
answers are wrong.
Now suppose the student comes to your office hours and demands a better
grade. “After all,” he says, “you yourself stated at the very beginning of class
that quantum physics is a mystery. If there really are definite right and wrong
answers to all of these questions, then in what sense is quantum physics a
‘mystery’?”
Surely one would not say, “Good point,” and change his grade. Rather, one
would point out that the student was simply confused. It is not the theories
about quantum physics, or in other words historical facts about what people
have actually believed and written, that is “mysterious.” Rather, it is light
itself, the phenomenon the theories are about, that is mysterious. The question
of what light itself actually is is difficult, perhaps impossible, for anyone to
answer. The question what so-and-so believed about light is not.
Similarly, the Trinity itself is mysterious (although as we noted above, in a
negative, as opposed to positive sense). Still, what the church fathers believed
and wrote about the Trinity is not mysterious.
Last but definitely not least, we would do well to expand van Inwagen’s anal-
ogy by including not only well-developed theories about light, but summaries
of those theories – summaries made under certain severe constraints.99
For whatever reason, most philosophers working in this field show a predilec-
tion for choosing to deal with creedal statements and Trinitarian slogans that
were originally intended as summaries of doctrines for the benefit of an audi-
ence mostly of illiterates and slaves, rather than with the fuller explications of
those doctrines found in the catechetical lectures, sermons or other writings of
the authors of those creeds.
Besides the constraint that these summaries were intended for a largely
illiterate audience, in the early centuries of Christianity, it was forbidden to
write a creed down.100 Thus, a creed also needed to be brief enough that it
could be memorized. To get an idea of just some of the constraints the authors
of a creed would be working under, consider St. Cyril of Jerusalem’s introduction
to his creed in his Catechetical Lecture V.12 (c. 350 AD):
᾿Εpiειδὴ γὰρ οὐ piάντες δύνανται For since not all are able to learn
τὰς γραφὰς ἀναγινώσκειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς the scriptures, but lack of education
μὲν ἰδιωτεία, τοὺς δὲ ἀσχολία τις ἐμ- hinders some from knowledge, and
piοδίζει piρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν· ὑpiὲρ τοῦ, μὴ lack of free time others; so that the
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐξ ἀμαθίας ἀpiολέσθαι, ἐν soul may not be destroyed from ig-
ὀλίγοις τοῖς στίχοις τὸ piᾶν δόγμα τῆς norance, we include the whole doc-
piίστεως piεριλαμβάνομεν. trine of the Faith in a few lines.
99. To be clear, my response to van Inwagen’s question has ended. What follows is no longer
a response to that question, but a useful clarification of the Historical Approach that can be
given in light of his analogy – if we expand that analogy in the way I will say that we should.
100. On forbidding the writing of a creed, and more generally the requirement of keeping a
creed secret, see (Schaff 1919), p. 18, as well as the quote from St. Cyril below.
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῎Οpiερ καὶ ἐpi’ αὐτῆς τῆς λέξ- Which I want you both to com-
εως μνημονεῦσαι ὑμᾶς βούλομαι καὶ mit to memory and to rehearse it
piαρ’ ἑαυτοῖς μετὰ piάσης σpiουδῆς with all diligence among yourselves
ἀpiαγγεῖλαι, οὐκ εἰς χάρτας ἀpiογρα- when I recite it, not writing it out
φομένους, ἀλλ’ ἐν καρδίᾳ τῇ μνήμῃ on paper, but engraving it into your
στηλογραφοῦντας· φυλαττομένους ἐν heart through memory; taking care
τῷ μελετᾷν, μή piού τις Κατηχούμενος in the recitation that some Cate-
ἐpiακούσῃ τῶν piαραδεδομένων·. . . chumen not somehow overhear the
things which have been delivered to
you. . .
Καὶ τέως μὲν ἐpi’ αὐτῆς τῆς λέξ- So for the present listen while I
εως ἀκούων, μνημόνευσον τῆς Πί- simply say the Creed, and commit
στεως, ἐκδέχου δὲ κατὰ τὸν δέοντα it to memory; but at the proper sea-
καιρὸν τὴν ἀpiὸ τῶν θείων γραφῶν son expect the confirmation out of
piερὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἐγκειμένων σύσ- Holy Scripture of each part of the
τασιν. contents.
Οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἔδοξεν ἀνθρώpiοις For not as seemed good to men
συνετέθη τὰ τῆς Πίστεως· ἀλλ’ ἐκ were the parts of the Faith com-
piάσης γραφῆς τὰ καιριώτατα συλλε- posed; but out of all the scriptures
χθέντα, μίαν ἀναpiληροῖ τὴν τῆς Πί- the most important points were col-
στεως διδασκαλίαν. lected – one complete teaching of the
Faith.
Καὶ ὄνpiερ τρόpiον ὁ τοῦ σινάpiεως And just as the mustard seed
σpiόρος, ἐν μικρῷ κόκκῳ piολλοὺς in one small grain contains many
piεριέχει τοὺς κλάδους· οὔτω καὶ ἡ branches, so also this Faith, in a few
Πίστις αὔτη, ἐν ὀλίγοις ῥήμασι, piᾶσαν words, has embraced all the knowl-
τὴν ἐν τῇ piαλαιᾷ καὶ καινῇ τῆς εὐσε- edge of godliness in the Old and New
βείας γνῶσιν ἐγκεκόλpiισται. Testaments.
Βλέpiετε οὖν, ἀδελφοὶ, καὶ κρατεῖ- Take heed then, brethren, and
τε τὰς piαραδόσεις, ἃς νῦν piαραλαμ- hold fast the traditions which you
βάνετε, καὶ ἀpiογράψασθε αὐτὰς εἰς τὸ now receive, and write them on the
piλάτος τῆς καρδίας ὑμῶν. . . 101 tablet of your heart. . . 102
We can see that St. Cyril (as anyone of his time period would) sees the creed
(the “Faith”) as a summary of Christian dogma, constructed in such a way
that it can be memorized by those who lack either the education (illiterates)
or the time (slaves) to be able to study the scriptures directly. We do well
here to remember also that, although in the West we call it a “creed” after the
first word in Latin, credo (“I believe”), and although it was sometimes called
in Greek simply ἡ piίστις (“the Faith”), its full title in Greek was τὸ σύμβολον
τῆς piίστεως, “the symbol of the faith.” Not “the exhaustive explanation of the
faith” or “the fully logically perspicuous representation of the faith.” For much
the same reasons it would be absurd to take the pledge of allegiance to be an
exhaustive explanation of US civics, it would be absurd to take any creed to be
101. (St. Cyril of Jerusalem 1967), Catecheses ad Illuminandos, V.12.
102. (St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Gregory Nazianzen 1894), p. 32.
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an exhaustive explanation of Christian theology, or even any particular aspect
of theology.
So, let us expand our analogy.
Suppose we were charged with the task of creating a brief summary of quan-
tum physics for an audience of laymen, with, at a minimum, the the following
considerations in mind:
1. Much of our audience is illiterate.
2. Many are also slaves, and have little or no free time.
3. For whatever reason, we want to keep the summary secret from outsiders.
What sorts of constraints would this put on us?
A great many, it would seem. And quite serious.
Since it must be kept secret, it should not be written down or put into any
form that might become public. And anyway, a written creed would put literate
and illiterate audience members on a different footing, so we would likely want
to avoid that.
Thus, it likely will have to be memorizable via oral repetition.
Thus, it can only be so long and so detailed.
Thus, in all likelihood, we will only be able to discuss the most important
facts about quantum physics, not necessarily all that it embraces. (Important
for what? It turns out that our purpose will be crucial.)
Nor will we be able to give full, detailed explanations even of the things we
do discuss.
Likewise, since we will be trying to encode as much information as possible
in as few words as possible, brevity will often trump both clarity and precision.
Thus, it is not likely to be logically perspicuous.
Time constraints would likely prevent us from giving definitions of technical
terms. (That would be more appropriate in an introductory class on quantum
physics – the equivalent of a catechism.) So we would likely want to avoid
technical terminology as much as possible.
That would further limit us to either only expressing propositions that can
be stated briefly in layman’s terms, or perhaps, if there is no other option on
some absolutely critical point, in technical terms that we would have to leave
undefined in the summary itself. But of course, there would be no point for us
to include such terms unless we did have some sort of definition for them in
mind, even if we left the explanation to the context of a catechism.
This would put constraints on just what propositions we could even discuss.
Some things we might simply have to leave unsaid in the summary, even though
they are important issues in quantum physics (though, perhaps not critical for
our purposes in making the summary).
For example, there would likely be no concise way to explain, in non-technical
terms, and in a way that would not invite confusion, the idea that quantum
states can be represented as vectors in an infinitely-dimensional Hilbert space in
which the relation between the quantum state vector and any given eigenvector
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gives us the probability that the quantum system will “collapse” to the state
represented by the eigenvenctor upon observation. (Notice that, even there, I
couldn’t resist using a bit of metaphor, as well as a number of technical terms
that I did not define and that would be meaningless to most illiterates – indeed,
even to literate and educated people who happen not to have studied quantum
mechanics.)
Next, besides making it a practical impossibility to discuss certain proposi-
tions, time constraints would also prevent us from going into detail even on a
great many of those propositions we might be able to adequately get across, if
we had time. We may be forced to express certain ideas in summary ways that
would be, strictly speaking, false, since what would be more important would
be to give the expression that was least misleading given our intended audience
and purpose, rather than what was most literally accurate.
To explain what I mean here by misleading, let me give a different analogy. In
the context of the popular Atkins diet, it is technically true that “it is possible to
gorge oneself on bacon and fried chicken, covered in cheese, to drink coffee with
butter instead of cream, and still to lose weight.” However, while technically
true, without adding the further caveat that one must not eat any carbohydrates
(or only very few), the statement could be devastatingly misleading. People
might alter their current diet in no other way than by adding in heaps of calorie-
dense foods of the types mentioned, which would lead to the exact opposite
results of those intended.
On the other hand, a false but non-misleading summary of the principles
of the Paleo diet would be that it advocates eliminating any food from one’s
diet that wouldn’t have been eaten in the paleolithic era. This is not strictly
true. Most people in the “paleo” community drink coffee and praise its health
benefits, for example, despite coffee being unavailable in the paleolithic era.
Likewise, there is some controversy about dairy, potatoes and other foods. Still,
although the simplistic summary of the Paleo diet is not strictly speaking true,
it is much less misleading than the proposition about the Atkins diet which is
strictly speaking true.
When constructing a summary of any view, it is often more important to
go with statements that are less misleading than ones that are more accurate.
As St. Cyril states, the purpose of the creed is “that the soul not be destroyed.”
Thus, when creating a summary, the primary goal will be to lead the hearer into
taking the right course(s) of action, and to not mislead the hearer into taking
any soul-destroying course of action. And there is no reason to suppose this will
be likely to lead to precise and logically perspicuous expressions of propositions
that are all strictly true, rather than to statements that are simply the least
misleading in terms of the hearer’s salvation.103
The point is that constraints of the sort we are imagining will almost in-
103. To foreshadow, the distinction being made here between the pairs true / false and mis-
leading / non-misleading (really, more misleading vs. less misleading) will arise again when
discussing Gregory of Nyssa’s response to the LPT in the next section. Some misunderstand-
ing of Gregory’s view in Ad Ablabium has resulted from failing to understand when he is
attempting to say something true as opposed to something merely less misleading.
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evitably create substantial distortions when we have a different interest from
the authors of the summary (logical perspicuity as opposed to salvation). But
this isn’t really problematic – unless you forget the fact that what you are
dealing with is only a summary, and a summary created for a very different
purpose.
The deeper point, of course, is that it would be absurd to try to evaluate the
body of beliefs known as “quantum physics” by discussing nothing other than
our summary of it. This is equally true whether one is attacking or defending
quantum physics.
Would it make sense for the anti-quantum-physicist to think he could dis-
credit quantum physics by doing nothing more than discrediting our summary
of it? And that based on what seems to be the most “straight-forward” way
of understanding it – without regard to whether the “straight-forward” way of
understanding the summary was as expressing what the author(s) of the sum-
mary intended it to summarize? (Again, the constraints involved in creating
the summary make it highly unlikely that it would turn out to be entirely logi-
cally perspicuous – logical perspicuity would almost inevitably have had to be
sacrificed in favor of other concerns.)
And if they did, would it make sense for a defender of quantum physics to
let them get away with such a thing, and even follow suit? Would it make
sense for a defender of quantum physics to think he could defend it by taking
the summary alone as definitive of, or containing all that is essential to, these
theories, then coming up with his own, speculative account of the workings
of quantum particles, claiming that the consistency of one’s own speculative
account suffices to defend quantum physics itself, and treating the writings of
Planck, Poincaré, Heisenberg, Born, Dirac, Schrödinger, Bell and so forth as on
a par with one’s own speculations – just so many different “versions of,” “models
of,” “interpretations of” or “ways of understanding” the summary? Almost as
though the summary had come first – before the very views it was intended to
summarize?
The Historical Approach says no to these questions. According to the His-
torical Approach, regardless of whether one wants to attack or defend quantum
physics, what must be done is to go further back than the summary, to the ac-
tual body of beliefs called “quantum physics,” which the summary is supposed
to be a summary of.
The right logical forms to ascribe to the beliefs being summarized in the
summary will not (necessarily) be reflected by the grammatical forms of the
sentences used in the summary, nor will they (necessarily) be those attributed
to the statements in the summary by the most “straight-forward” way of un-
derstanding those statements. Nor will they (necessarily) be the logical forms
found in some “speculation” based on the summary, even if that speculation dis-
plays various theoretical virtues and would seem to be a not unreasonable way
of making sense of the summary. Rather, the right logical forms to ascribe to
the beliefs being summarized in the summary will be the logical forms actually
had by the beliefs that the authors of the summary were actually summarizing
(whatever those turn out to be).
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Likewise, according to the Historical Approach, the right logical form to
ascribe to the beliefs summarized in a creed will not (necessarily) be reflected
by the grammatical forms of the sentences used in the creed, nor will they
(necessarily) be those attributed to the statements in that creed by the most
“straight-forward” way of understanding those statements. Nor will they (nec-
essarily) be the logical forms found in some “speculation” based on that creed,
even if that speculation displays various theoretical virtues and would seem to
be a not unreasonable way of making sense of the creed in question. Rather,
the right logical forms to ascribe to the beliefs summarized in a creed will be
the logical forms actually had by the beliefs that the authors of that creed were
actually summarizing (whatever those turn out to be).
And in light of the fact that the statements in S are drawn from creeds
authored by figures from what has come to be called the “pro-Nicene consensus,”
this means that, on the Historical Approach, the right logical form to ascribe
to P (the propositions expressed by S) will be the logical form actually had by
the content that the pro-Nicenes historically were actually summarizing in these
creeds.
Thus, the methods and reasoning processes we will use will be no different
from those we would ordinarily use in attempting to determine the content of
any body of propositions defined by the beliefs of some group of individuals, e.g.,
the bodies of beliefs called “Stoicism,” or “Empiricism,” or “Quantum Physics.”
And, like proverbial pornography, while it would certainly be hard to spell out
the nature of this process in an abstract, general theory, it is fairly easy to
recognize and duplicate it in practice.
Central to the pro-Nicene consensus were the Cappadocians – St. Basil the
Great, Basil’s friend, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and Basil’s younger brother, St.
Gregory of Nyssa. And both Gregory’s were important figures in the second ec-
umenical council, which produced the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. (Gre-
gory Nazianzen acted as president of the council for some time, and Gregory
of Nyssa was soon afterwards mentioned by name in Roman law as someone
whom it was necessary to be in agreement with in order to count officially as a
catholic church.)104
In what follows, I will focus on the account of the Trinity found in the
writings of St. Gregory of Nyssa – and examine it in some detail. Of course, we
could do the same with St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, or any of a number of
other figures from the pro-Nicene consensus, such as St. Athanasius, St. Jerome,
St. Hilary, or others. But I think Gregory is simply more clear in his writings
about a particular point that I think is critical to understanding the way the
pro-Nicene consensus responds to the LPT, and that is still misunderstood –
namely, the metaphysics of synergy – which will make my task easier.
104. See p. 271.
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3.3.3 Objection 3: The Anti-Trinitarian’s Challenge
Finally, suppose an anti-Trinitarian adopts a hyper-critical approach here, chal-
lenging us to demonstrate that Gregory’s (or whatever particular church fa-
ther’s) view is orthodox or that he lies in the tradition definitive of Trinitarian
belief.
If he has any interest in attacking the doctrine of the Trinity, presumably
the anti-Trinitarian must have some grasp on what the doctrine of the Trinity
is. Presumably the Trinitarian accounts of the figures who constituted the pro-
Nicene consensus in the fourth century count as versions of the orthodox doctrine
of the Trinity. Now perhaps one would argue that our standards of what counts
as orthodox here should be loose enough to count certain other, importantly
different accounts as well. But if he is willing to say that the Trinitarian theories
of the figures who constituted the pro-Nicene consensus – indeed the Trinitarian
theories of the very authors of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed itself – might
not count as versions of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, then it would seem
to be incumbent on the anti-Trinitarian to say what would count. For, to return
to a question I asked of the puzzler, if the Trinitarian theories of these men don’t
count as orthodox, whose would?
Without any answer to that question, we face the question, “why should we
any longer think that the doctrine of the Trinity even includes any of the propo-
sitions in P in the first place?” Because they are expressed by the statements in
S, and those are contained in or implied by a certain creed or creeds? But why
we should be concerned about the statements contained in what is intended to
be a summary of a larger theory held by a group of persons (a creed), while not
being concerned about the actual theory (or related theories) of any of those
actual persons?
In short, the anti-Trinitarian would have to argue that we can somehow know
that P – the set of propositions expressed by S – is a subset of the doctrine of
the Trinity (so that if we show it to be inconsistent, we show the doctrine of
the Trinity itself to be inconsistent), while we cannot know that any particular
Trinitarian account of any of the church fathers involved in authoring the creeds
from which S is drawn, is a superset of the doctrine of the Trinity (so that even
if we show one of their Trinitarian accounts to be consistent, we haven’t shown
the doctrine of the Trinity itself to be consistent). But if one says that we have
no reason to take the Trinitarian accounts of the very authors of the Nicene-
Constantinopolitan creed themselves as versions of the orthodox doctrine of the
Trinity, then what reason would we have to take any creed that they composed
as summarizing the doctrine of the Trinity?
To be sure, we should allow anyone to present a case as to why a certain
view should or shouldn’t be considered an orthodox version of the doctrine of
the Trinity. But any such arguments will have to be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis. And it seems that at least some people will simply obviously fall
within the pale of orthodoxy. In particular, the very authors of the creeds or
other writings from which the anti-Trinitarian draws the sets of claims he is
attacking. And if Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory does not count as a
109
version of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, then I no longer have any idea
what the doctrine of the Trinity even is, nor do I any longer see why it would
be important.105
Conclusion
We’ve seen that, regardless of what difficulties there may or may not be for the
Mysterian Approach, it simply has a different goal from the Historical Approach.
And whether it is ultimately a sound methodology for its more epistemological
goals or not, it certainly will not be for our goals. The Puzzle Approach, on the
other hand, may have the same goal as the Historical Approach, but if it does,
it faces serious questions as to how it could achieve that goal. And although,
again, the problems I raise for the Puzzle Approach might be answerable, I, in
any case, don’t have any good answers to the questions I have raised, so until
puzzlers themselves answer them, I can see no other way of proceeding than by
taking the Historical Approach.
But what’s more, if the mysterian’s goal is just to provide a defeater-defeater
to the anti-Trinitarian’s alleged defeater, it seems that a successful carrying out
of the Historical Approach would also accomplish the mysterian’s goal, insofar
as proving P to be consistent provides a defeater-defeater as well. On the other
hand, accomplishing the goal of the Mysterian Approach does not necessarily
accomplish the goal of the Historical Approach as just providing any defeater-
defeater would not necessarily show P to be consistent. So, there is no reason the
mysterian should complain if the historicist attempts to prove the consistency
of P, even if the mysterian considers it “overkill.”
Additionally, it seems that if a satisfactory solution to the LPT can be found
on the basis of the Historical Approach, that solution would satisfy the concerns
of the Puzzle Approach as well, whereas the reverse is not necessarily so. That
is, even if a puzzler comes up with a thoroughly satisfying account of the Trinity,
according to the historicist it won’t automatically be clear that this should count
as a defense of the doctrine of the Trinity itself.106
On the other hand, if a historicist finds, through a historical investigation,
that the church fathers who used certain creedal formulae to summarize their
beliefs, in fact had a consistent account of the Trinity (or, say, a family of
related accounts, at least some of which are consistent), then any such account
that is consistent (and has whatever other theoretical virtues the puzzler wants)
ought to count as a successful defense of P by the puzzler’s lights as well. That
is, if the puzzler can answer the questions I’ve raised for his methodology, at
105. For more on this, see below, Chapter 6.1, on the formal adequacy of Gregory’s account,
p. 266 ff.
106. Nor, for that matter, is it automatically clear that the anti-Trinitarian’s attack on the
logical form of P counts as any reason to think that P is inconsistent. Just as there is no
reason to assume that a puzzler’s account of the Trinity is logically related to P in the right
way to defend it, there is no reason to assume that S itself is a logically perspicuous expression
of the content summarized by P. Indeed, as we’ve seen, there is ample reason to doubt that it
would be. (See p. 103 ff.)
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best he will show that the arguments of the Puzzle Approach are sufficient for
proving the consistency of P, not that the arguments of the Historical Approach
are insufficient. (An account of the Trinity should not be judged worse by the
puzzler for the fact that it was actually held by someone instrumental in the
development of his favorite creed!)
And again, I take it that, by anyone’s account, whatever the (orthodox)
doctrine of the Trinity is, and whatever the “version of” relation is, Gregory
of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity either is identical to the (orthodox) doctrine
of the Trinity, or else is a “version of” the (orthodox) doctrine of the Trinity.
Thus, if Gregory’s account of the Trinity can be shown to be logically consistent,
then it would seem to follow, on both the Historical Approach and the Puzzle
Approach alike, that the doctrine of the Trinity is consistent.
But if any solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity to come out of a
successful application of the Historical Approach methodology will also count
as a successful solution by the lights of the Puzzle Approach, and achieving
the goal of the Historical Approach will also achieve the goal of the Mysterian
Approach, then we have nothing to lose, and much to gain, in seeking a solution
to the Logical Problem of the Trinity through the Historical Approach. And I
have given my reasons for preferring to focus on St. Gregory of Nyssa’s account
of the Trinity in particular.
So then, what was St. Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity?
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Chapter 4
St. Gregory of Nyssa’s
Account of the Trinity
We have frequently said, however, that the operations of the Trinity
are inseparable; but the Persons needed to be set forth one by one,
that . . . we may have a right understanding both of Their Unity and
Trinity.
–St. Augustine, Commentary on the Gospel of John, Tractate 95.1
We ended the last section with the question, “What is Gregory of Nyssa’s account
of the Trinity?”
In that section, we saw that there are deep questions as to whether the Puzzle
Approach could yield a valid argument concluding in a formally adequate answer
to the LPT, and that the Mysterian Approach does not even attempt to answer
the LPT in the first place. But we saw that the Historical Approach can provide
at least a valid argument concluding with a formally adequate answer to the
LPT, and that it is capable of satisfying the concerns of the Puzzle Approach
and the Mysterian Approach anyway.
We chose to focus on the views of St. Gregory of Nyssa as one version of the
orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.1
1. I would be prepared to argue that almost all of the features of Gregory’s account of
the Trinity that are actually essential to his solution to the LPT were common throughout
the entire pro-Nicene consensus. One glaring exception is the question whether “is God”
predicates the divine nature (ousia), or whether instead it predicates engagement in a certain
type of activity (energeia). Here there was indeed something of a divide (though not complete
or consistent) between East and West. As a rough generalization (that has a number of
exceptions), “Western” fathers tended to say only that “God” either signifies the divine nature
or an energeia (Lat. operatio), whereas “Eastern” fathers tended to come down decisively on
the side of “God” signifying an energeia and not the divine nature or ousia – as we will see
St. Gregory does (4.2.3, p. 134 ff. below). St. Augustine is the only church father of the time
period I know of who says decisively of the word “God” that it is predicated according to the
category of substance. As we will see, St. Gregory not only doubted it, but vehemently denied
it, and for very good reasons. See p. 134 below.
115
The conclusion of our discussion on methodology was that, since Gregory’s
Trinitarian theology clearly counts as being a version of the orthodox doctrine of
the Trinity on anyone’s view, then if Gregory’s Trinitarian account is consistent,
the Doctrine of the Trinity itself (or at least P) is consistent. Since nobody
seriously denies that Gregory’s Trinitarian theology at least counts as a “version”
of the Doctrine of the Trinity or a “form of” orthodox Trinitarianism, all that
remains to be seen is whether the answer to the LPT provided by Gregory’s
account of the Trinity is a solution or non-solution to the LPT. That is, whether
Gregory’s account of the Trinity is consistent. Let’s turn, then, to his view.
4.1 Ad Ablabium: Its Structure and Purpose
Of course we neither need to, nor would have the time to, explore every aspect of
Gregory’s Trinitarian theology. We will focus only on those aspects of his view
that are relevant to the LPT. The locus classicus for this is his letter To Ablabius
– On Not Thinking to Say “Three Gods,” (hereafter Ad Ablabium) which deals
specifically with the issue of whether his account of the Trinity commits him to
saying that, at least in some sense, there are “three gods.” We will therefore
focus on this short work, bringing in other writings for additional background
information when needed.
4.1.1 One Question, Three Answers
In Ad Ablabium, Gregory has been asked to respond to the question why it
would be forbidden to say there are “three gods,” given that there are three
hypostases (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) with the same nature or ousia, and
given that, in the (apparently) parallel case of Peter, James and John, it is not
forbidden to call them “three men.”2 He writes the following in response:
τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον piαρὰ σοῦ τοιοῦ-
τόν ἐστιν·
The argument which you state is
something like this:
Πέτρος καὶ v᾿Ιάκωβος καὶ v᾿Ιωάννης,
ἐν μιᾷ ὄντες τῇ ἀνθρωpiότητι, τρεῖς
Peter, James and John, being in
one human nature, are called three
ἄνθρωpiοι λέγονται· καὶ οὐδὲν ἄτοpiον men; and there is no absurdity in
τοὺς συνημμένους κατὰ τὴν φύσιν, εἰ describing those who are united in
2. This of course raises a problem for Social Trinitarians, insofar as Social Trinitarian
accounts fall into the Equivocation Family of solutions to the LPT. All accounts of the Trinity
within the Equivocation Family face the problem that, even if there is some sense in which
it is true to say that “there is one God,” it will still be the case that there is some sense in
which it is true to say that “there are three Gods.” And this doesn’t seem to be enough for
Christians. As Ablabius points out in his question, we not only want it to be allowed to say
that “there is one God,” we want it to be forbidden to say “there are three Gods.” But as
the subtitle of the epistle to Ablabius suggests, Christians shouldn’t even think about saying
“there are three Gods.” And as we will see, Gregory’s response explains not only why it is
in some sense the case that there is one God, but why it is not in any sense the case that
there are three Gods. But Equivocation Family accounts obviously will have difficulties in
this regard.
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piλείους εἶεν, ἐκ τοῦ τῆς φύσεως ὀνό- nature, if they are more than one,
ματος piληθυντικῶς ἀριθμεῖσθαι. by the plural number of the name
derived from their nature.
εἰ οὖν ἐκεῖ τοῦτο δίδωσιν ἡ συνή-
θεια καὶ ὁ ἀpiαγορεύων οὐκ ἔστι δύο
If, then, in the above case, cus-
tom admits this, and no one forbids
λέγειν τοὺς δύο καὶ τρεῖς τοὺς ὑpiὲρ us to speak of those who are two
δύο, piῶς, ἐpiὶ τῶν μυστικῶν δογ- as two, or those who are more than
μάτων τὰς τρεῖς ὑpiοστάσεις ὁμολ- two as three, how is it that in the
ογοῦντες καὶ οὐδεμίαν ἐpi’ αὐτῶν case of our statements of the mys-
τὴν κατὰ φύσιν διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦντες, teries of the Faith, though confess-
μαχόμεθα τρόpiον τινὰ τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ, ing the Three Persons, and acknowl-
μίαν μὲν τὴν θεότητα τοῦ piατρὸς edging no difference of nature be-
καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου piνεύμα- tween them, we are in some sense at
τος λέγοντες, τρεῖς δὲ θεοὺς λέγειν variance with our confession, when
ἀpiαγορεύοντες;3 we say that the Godhead of the Fa-
ther and of the Son and of the Holy
Ghost is one, and yet forbid men to
say “there are three Gods”?4
What may strike the reader of Ad Ablabium as strange, is that Gregory gives,
on my reading, three different answers to the question, the first of which (what I
will call the “Simple-Minded Argument,” or “the SMA”) he himself immediately
and explicitly rejects as inadequate, and the other two of which (what I will
call the “Unity of Nature Argument,” or “the UNA,” and the “Unity of Action
Argument,” or the “UAA”) each employ premises that are obviously inconsistent
with those of the other. It may be tempting to accuse Gregory of sophistry
for putting forward an argument he himself rejects, and of inconsistency or
confusion for putting forward two arguments that could not both have true
premises. As we will see, both of these criticisms would be misguided.
In one of the more recent explorations of the structure of Ad Ablabium, Lewis
Ayres counts two arguments, which he simply labels “A” and “B,” where his “A”
is what I am calling the UNA and his “B” is what I am calling the UAA (he
essentially ignores the SMA).5
Ayres is correct in distinguishing the two arguments as “fundamentally dis-
tinct.”6 Also in thinking that Gregory assigns more weight to the second (Ayres’
B, my UAA), which he says (rightly), “we should treat as fundamental in his
Trinitarian theology.”7 I think he is unclear, though, on precisely what the role
of the UNA is for Gregory, seeing the two arguments as more closely related
than they actually are. That, or simply not understanding the logic of Gregory’s
arguments. We will see that, in a different way, Richard Cross also seems to
3. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 38.
4. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 331.
5. I will be referring to the version that appears as (Ayres 2003) in (Coakley 2003). The
same essay originally appeared as (Ayres 2002), and essentially the same material appears
as Chapter 14 of (Ayres 2004).
6. (Ayres 2003), p. 23.
7. (Ayres 2003) p. 23.
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want to see the two arguments as one, or at least as more closely related than
they in fact are. Indeed, this seems to be a common confusion.
In Ayres, I think the confusion may stem from (as I understand Ayres), a
failure to distinguish between what I will call energeia types and energeia tokens
below. (See 4.4.2, p. 178 ff., and 4.4.4, p. 184 ff. on this distinction.) In Cross,
a desire to see the UNA and UAA as forming a single, more or less cohesive
argument or viewpoint. (Perhaps also as seeing St. Gregory and St. Augustine
as having more in common than, perhaps, they actually do.)8
In Ayres’ case, this leads to an attempt to tie the UAA into Gregory’s
discussion of the individuation of natures in a confused way. For example, on
pp. 22-23, he says that Gregory in B / the UAA is arguing that “Natures. . . are
known by the operations of those powers, and the divine operation is always
observed to be one. Therefore the divine power and nature is indivisibly one.”
As we will see below, this way of trying to understand Gregory confuses energeia
types and tokens as well as confusing the two different arguments themselves.
Oddly, Ayres later makes a perfectly good statement of the identity of the
divine energeia tokens: p. 31 “his account. . . present[s] the three not as pos-
sessing distinct actions towards a common goal, but as together constituting
just one distinct action. . . ” but then he goes on to seem not to understand the
role that this view of Gregory’s plays in his argument, due, again, to wanting
to conflate energeia types and tokens, a distinction I’ll explain in more detail
below (p. 178 ff.)
I think clarity on Gregory’s views can be achieved when we take into account
Gregory’s purpose and audience(s). But before we can get clear on the UNA
and the UAA, we need to ask ourselves what the point of the SMA is, and this,
as we shall see, provides the clue to unlock the structure of Gregory’s thought
here. I will argue throughout the remainder of the chapter that the distinc-
tion I mentioned between energeia types and tokens is the under-appreciated
key to understanding Gregory’s solution to the LPT. But to understand that
distinction and how it is operating in the context of Gregory’s two arguments
here, and thus to understand why I think the UNA and the UAA are even more
distinct than Ayres and others have supposed, we’ll need to go through the
Ad Ablabium in some detail, bringing in further detail from other related texts
when necessary.
Let us start, as Gregory does, with the Simple-Minded Argument (SMA).
4.1.2 The “Simple-Minded” Argument (SMA)
Gregory’s first response, the SMA is brief enough to quote in full:
v῎Εστι μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ piρόχε-
ιρον τοῦτο τοῖς ἁpiλουστέροις εἰpiόντα
Perhaps one might seem to touch
the point if he were to say (speak-
δόξαι τι λέγειν, ὄτι φεύγων ὁ λό- ing offhand to straight-forward [or
8. Although contrast Augustine’s Unity of Nature Argument in the earlier De Trinitate
with the quote at the beginning of this chapter, from the later Commentary on the Gospel of
John.
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γος τῆς v῾Ελληνικῆς piολυθεΐας τὴν “simple-minded”] people), that the
ὁμοιότητα θεοὺς ἐν piλήθει ἀριθμεῖν definition refused to reckon Gods
piαρῃτήσατο, ὡς ἂν μή τις καὶ τῶν in any number to avoid any resem-
δογμάτων νομισθείη κοινότης, εἰ μὴ blance to the polytheism of the hea-
μοναδικῶς ἀλλὰ piληθυντικῶς καὶ then, lest, if we too were to enumer-
piαρ’ ἡμῶν ἀριθμοῖτο τὸ θεῖον καθ’ ate the Deity, not in the singular,
ὁμοιότητα τῆς piαρ’ αὐτοῖς συνηθείας. but in the plural, as they are ac-
customed to do, there might be sup-
posed to be also some community of
doctrine.
τοῦτο δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀκεραιοτέροις
λεγόμενον ἴσως ἄν τι δόξειε λέγεσ-
This answer, I say, if made to
people of a more guileless spirit,
θαι, ἐpiὶ δέ γε τῶν τὸ ἔτερον αὐ- might seem to be of some weight:
τοῖς τῆς piροτάσεως στῆναι ζητούν- but in the case of the others who
των ἢ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ἐpiὶ τῶν τριῶν require that one of the alternatives
τὴν θεότητα ἢ τρεῖς piάντως ὀνομάζειν they propose should be established
τοὺς τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνοῦντας θεότη- (either that we should not acknowl-
τος, οὔpiω τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ εἰρημένον, edge the Godhead in Three Persons,
οἷον ἐμpiοιῆσαι λύσιν τινὰ τοῦ ζητήμα- or that, if we do, we should speak of
τος. those who share in the same God-
head as three), this answer is not
such as to furnish any solution of
the difficulty.
οὐκοῦν ἐpiάναγκες διὰ piλειόνων
piοιήσασθαι τὴν ἀpiόκρισιν, ὄpiως ἂν
And hence we must needs make
our reply at greater length, tracing
οἷόν τε ᾖ, τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀνιχνεύοντας· οὐ out the truth as best we may; for the
γὰρ piερὶ τῶν τυχόντων ὁ λόγος.9 question is no ordinary one.10
Gregory frankly admits that this response merely “seems” to be adequate,
but acknowledges that it is, in reality, not an adequate response at all. More
precisely, he admits that it would only even seem to be adequate to “simple-
minded people,” but that to others it “is not such as to furnish any solution of
the difficulty.”
But this raises an interpretive question that is by no means insignificant.
Why bother telling someone who has given a solid enough formulation of the
Logical Problem of the Trinity, or something close to it, and who has asked for
the solution to it, in essence, “Here’s something one might say that doesn’t really
answer the question”? And why go on to point out to an apparently intelligent
enough man that, in essence, “It’s something that might satisfy you – if you
aren’t very intelligent”?
One might suppose this is “just rhetoric.” That the point is for Gregory to
show that he’s no dummy, that he gets that it’s a problem. Or perhaps the
point is to build up the opposing argument before knocking it down – all the
more impressive. Or perhaps it is a bit of flattery to Ablabius, “The simple folk
9. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 39-40.
10. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 331.
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might be content with this sophistry, but astute men of learning like us – we’re
above all that.” Dale Tuggy describes it simply as a “flippant” answer.11
But none of these explanations for Gregory’s brief discussion of the SMA are
satisfactory. I doubt Gregory was trying to show off. He usually presents himself
as simply explicating things that St. Basil has already said, and doesn’t like to
draw attention to his own unique insights (even when he certainly had them)
nor to point out that he in some ways alters or corrects St. Basil. One gets
the impression from reading St. Gregory that, so far from bragging or seeking
praise, he would have more likely been uncomfortable with it. And anyway,
even if he did like showing off, spotting the fact that the SMA is flawed is not
that impressive of a feat. Gregory surely could have picked something better, if
that had been his aim.
Further, the quote above does not really do anything to build up the apparent
force of the LPT. The LPT is already an apparently strong arguments. And
Gregory’s comments here aren’t even directly about the LPT. they’re only about
a particularly bad answer to the LPT.
As for flattery, Gregory does not put the distinction in terms of “us and
them” (we get that this doesn’t make sense – but those idiots won’t) or even
of “you and them” (of course you’re smarter than this – but you can fool those
idiots with it). Rather, he puts it in terms of a part of “them” and a different
part of “them” (some people will accept this argument, but other people won’t).
Finally, it’s unlikely that Gregory was simply being “flippant,” if for no other
reason than the fact that the means of writing was more expensive and scarce
in that world than in ours.
But I think there is a deeper, or at least better, explanation for what is going
on with the SMA that also gives us a clue as to how to interpret the rest of the
letter.
I spoke in the chapter on methodology (Chapter 3.3.2, p. 106 ff.) about the
distinction between true and false vs. misleading and non-misleading. We saw
one example in which this distinction is important – specifically, in constructing
a summary (the creed) that must be suitable for a very wide audience. I gave the
example of the Atkins diet, and how it would be true but misleading to say one
can eat as much fried chicken as one wants and still lose weight, while it would
be false but non-misleading to describe the Paleo diet as being a diet in which
one eats only those foods that would have been eaten in the paleolithic era. And
we saw that a statement can be misleading or non-misleading depending both
on who one’s audience is, and what one’s purpose is.
Gregory gives his own examples of this distinction in his Contra Eunomium
when responding to the fact that Eunomius calls Gregory’s older brother, St.
Basil, “a liar” because “he called me a Galatian, though I am a Cappadocian.”
After drawing attention to the pettiness of the statement, Gregory makes a few
interesting further points:
11. In the supplementary document to (Tuggy 2013) on “History of Trinitarian Doctrines”
at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trinity/trinity-history.html Section 3.3.1, last retrieved
02-15-2014.
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οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἁμαρτάνει Παῦλος Paul telling a falsehood and pu-
ψευδόμενος καὶ ᾿Ιουδαϊκῶς ἁγνιζό- rifying himself after the manner of
μενος ἐpiὶ καιροῦ τῶν χρησίμως the Jews to meet the needs of those
ἀpiατωμένων, καὶ ᾿Ιούδας ἐν τῷ τῆς whom he usefully deceived did not
piροδοσίας καιρῷ φίλον καὶ piροσή- sin the same as Judas for the re-
γορον σχῆμα ὑpiοδυόμενος. quirement of his treachery putting
on a kind and affable look.
ἐψεύσατο καὶ ᾿Ιωσὴφ ἐν φιλαν- By a falsehood Joseph in love
θρωpiίᾳ τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς διαpiαίζων, to his brethren deceived them; and
καὶ ταῦτα τὴν ὑγείαν τοῦ Φαραὼ that too while swearing “by the life
ἐpiομνύμενος· ἀλλ’ ἐψεύσαντο καὶ οἱ of Pharaoh;” but his brethren had
ἀδελφοὶ κατ’ αὐτοῦ piρότερον μὲν θά- really lied to him, in their envy plot-
νατον, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ δουλείαν διὰ τὸν ting his death and then his enslave-
φθόνον βουλεύσαντες, ment.
καὶ piολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἔστιν εἰpiεῖν· There are many such cases:
ψεύδεται Σάρρα ἐpiερυθριῶσα τῷ Sarah lied, because she was ashamed
γέλωτι· ψεύδεται καὶ ὁ ὄφις εἰς θείαν of laughing: the serpent lied, tempt-
μεταβαίνειν φύσιν τὸν ἄνθρωpiον ἐκ ing man to disobey and change to a
τῆς piαρακοῆς εἰσηγούμενος. divine existence.
piολλὴ ῾μὲν οὖν᾿ τοῦ ψεύδους ἡ Falsehoods differ widely accord-
piρὸς τὰς ὑpiοθέσεις διαφορά, ing to their motives.
καὶ οὐδὲ ἔστιν εἰpiεῖν ὄση, εἴτε Accordingly, we accept that gen-
ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων διηγημάτων εἴτε ἐκ eral statement about man which the
τοῦ νῦν βίου δοκιμάζοις τὸν λόγον. Holy Spirit uttered by the Prophet,
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡμεῖς δεξώμεθα, ὄτι κατὰ “Every man is a liar.”
τὴν κοινὴν piερὶ τῶν ἀνθρώpiων ἀpiό-
φασιν, ἣν διὰ τοῦ piροφήτου τὸ piνεῦμα
τὸ ἅγιον ἀpiεφήνατο ὄτι Πᾶς ἄνθρω-
piος ψεύστης.
καὶ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ἄνθρωpiος And this man of God [St. Basil],
συνηνέχθη τῷ ψεύδει, τὴν ὄμορόν too, has not kept clear of false-
τινι χώραν ἀγνοίᾳ ἢ ὑpiεροψίᾳ τῆς τοῦ hood, having chanced to give a place
τόpiου piροσηγορίας κατὰ τὸ συμβὰν the name of a neighbouring district,
ἐpiιφημίσας. through oversight or ignorance of its
real name.
ἀλλ’ ἐψεύσατο καὶ Εὐνόμιος, καὶ But Eunomius also has told a
τί τὸ ψεῦδος; falsehood, and what is it?
αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας piαραγραφή. Nothing less than a misstate-
ment of Truth itself.
τὸν ἀεὶ ὄντα piοτὲ μὴ εἶναι λέγει He asserts that One who always
. . . is once was not. . .
ἆρα μικρὰ τοῦ ψεύδους ἡ διαφορὰ Is the difference between false-
καὶ τοσαύτη, ὡς ἀντ’ οὐδενὸς οἴεσ- hoods so very trifling, that one can
θαί τινα τὸ οὔτως ἢ ἑτέρως ἐψεῦσθαι think it matters nothing whether the
δοκεῖν;12 falsehood is palpable in this way or
in that?13
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We all say false things from time to time. But there is a difference between
saying something false with an intent to harm someone through deception (like
Judas, Joseph’s brothers, or the serpent itself), and saying something false with
an intent to benefit someone through the deception (like St. Paul or Joseph), or
at least with no intent to harm anyone (like Sarah), or perhaps with no intent
to deceive at all (like St. Basil).
What I want to suggest is that in Ad Ablabium the distinction between true
v. false and misleading v. non-misleading may also come into play, and that we
need to ask ourselves the questions, “What is Gregory’s purpose?” and “Who is
Gregory’s audience?”
As to the first question, I suggest that Gregory, as a pastor, does not have
the same purpose as we, as philosophers. Although he is in some sense always
concerned with the truth, he is primarily concerned with people’s salvation.
Recall van Inwagen:
God’s concern with us – just at present, at any rate – is not the
concern of a tutor who fears that we shall fail to grasp some nice
point: God fears that we shall lose the end for which we were made.
His concern with us is entirely practical.14
I suggest that Gregory’s concern here is the same. And this is why he does
not confine himself to what is strictly true or accurate, but to what is the least
misleading response he can give to a particular audience. And that brings us to
the question who his audience is – or who his audiences are.
And as for the second question, I suggest that Gregory gives three different
arguments because he has in mind three importantly different audiences:
1. The illiterate, uneducated or philosophically unsophisticated (the “simple-
minded”)
2. Educated pagans (and certain heretics)
3. Educated (orthodox) Christians
And the three arguments he gives – the SMA, UNA and UAA – are the least
misleading responses he can give to each of these three groups, respectively,
given that his concern is primarily for their salvation.
One can see a similar distinction between audiences, and an attempt to
direct communication to multiple audiences, in some of St. Basil’s sermons. For
example, in Basil’s 9th homily, “That God is Not the Cause of Evils.” Here
Basil wants to give a philosophically sophisticated and rigorous response to the
problem of evil, but he clearly wants the illiterate, uneducated masses to be
able to understand it as well. The sermon has a structure in which nearly
every other sentence is stated in a philosophically precise way, and nearly every
other sentence is a restatement of the preceding sentence in layman’s terms.
12. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1960), Book I, Chapter 10, sections 108-110.
13. Translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 46.
14. (van Inwagen 1988), pp. 243-244.
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For example, Basil explores the sense in which evil “exists” and points out that
this cannot be visible, hypostatic existence (or “subsistence”). He follows by
saying “For evil is not subsistent (ὑφεστὼς), as though it were an animal.”15
The uneducated masses may not understand the more philosophically precise
denial of evil’s hypostatic existence. But they can surely understand that there
isn’t literally a little animal named “evil” that runs around the world making
mischief.
It seems to me that Gregory, as so often, follows in his brother’s footsteps
here. But this time he not only makes a distinction between the educated and
uneducated. He makes a distinction between educated (orthodox) Christians
(with whom he will have more common ground, who will be more willing to
accept his basic premises) and educated pagans and heretics (who have no rea-
son to grant Gregory certain controversial assumptions). His initial response,
directed at the uneducated, is not flippant. It is simply the best answer that
an illiterate audience without any background in logic, metaphysics, and so on,
would be able to understand. “We refuse to say there are ‘three Gods’, because
we don’t want people to confuse our doctrine with pagan doctrine.” It’s true,
after all, at least on Gregory’s view, that Trinitarianism is not like pagan poly-
theism. This response doesn’t adequately explain why that is, but on Gregory’s
view it’s probably the best you can do for anyone without the relevant educa-
tion. (It should be clear by the end of the chapter why. See esp. 3.3.2, p. 106
ff.)
We’ll see also that the response he gives for educated pagans, and some
heretics, is not one that he actually accepts, but it’s also the best Gregory
thinks he can do for people who don’t accept certain key assumptions of his
– assumptions that are only presented in the UAA, for the benefit of other
orthodox Christians who share Gregory’s basic presuppositions.
Let us look, then, at the responses he gives for the educated.
4.2 The Unity of Nature Argument (UNA)
Next Gregory gives the “Unity of Nature Argument” (UNA). The UNA is the
only argument presented in Gregory’s only other work directly about the LPT,
namely “To the Greeks, From Common Concepts,” (hereafter, Ad Graecos)
where it is presented in much more detail (and where Gregory – critically –
only has a single audience in mind: educated pagans, or “the Greeks” as he
calls them).16 But here in the Ad Ablabium, Gregory gives only an extremely
abbreviated version. He begins:
15. PG 31, p. 341. Translation mine.
16. By this time, ῎Ελληνες has acquired the meaning “pagan.” See, e.g., (Kahlos 2007),
p. 20, “Another term, the Greek Hellenes, became commonly used as the synonym for non-
Christians. Christian apologists applied the term in the sense of pagan . . . Hellenes became
the standard overall term for pagans — it replaced the word ethne by the beginning of the
fourth century. . . ” and ff. Gregory would have thought of himself and other Christians as
“Romans” (Ρ῾ωμαῖοι).
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Φαμὲν τοίνυν piρῶτον μὲν κατά-
χρησίν τινα συνηθείας εἶναι τὸ τοὺς
Now, we first claim that it is
a certain misuse of convention to
μὴ διῃρημένους τῇ φύσει κατ’ αὐτὸ name men, who are not distin-
τὸ τῆς φύσεως ὄνομα piληθυντικῶς guished by nature, in the plural ac-
ὀνομάζειν καὶ λέγειν ὄτι piολλοὶ ἄν- cording to the very name of the na-
θρωpiοι, ὄpiερ ὄμοιόν ἐστι τῷ λέγειν ture, and to say that there are many
ὄτι piολλαὶ φύσεις ἀνθρώpiιναι.’17 men, which is like saying that there
are many human natures.”18
This is the crux of the UNA, the claim that, strictly speaking, we should
only say that Peter, James and John are “one man.”
He argues:
καὶ ὄτι ταῦτα οὔτως ἔχει, δῆλον ἂν That this is so may become clear
ἡμῖν ἐντεῦθεν γένοιτο· piροσκαλού- to us from the following: when we
μενοι γάρ τινα, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως summon someone, we do not name
αὐτὸν ὀνομάζομεν, ὡς ἂν μή τινα him from the nature in order that
piλάνην ἡ κοινότης τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐμ- the community of the name not pro-
piοιήσειεν, ἑκάστου τῶν ἀκουόντων duce any error, each listener think-
ἑαυτὸν εἶναι τὸν piροσκληθέντα νομί- ing that the person being called is
ζοντος, ὄτι μὴ τῇ ἰδιαζούσῃ piροση- himself, because it is not by the
γορίᾳ ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς φύσεως [peculiarizing] appellation (piροση-
ὀνόματος ἡ κλῆσις γίνεται· γορίᾳ), but from the common name
of the nature that the calling occurs.
ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰδίως ἐpiικειμένην αὐτῷ But when we utter the sound
(τὴν σημαντικὴν λέγω τοῦ ὑpiοκειμέ- [word, φωνὴν] that is [peculiarly]
νου) φωνὴν εἰpiόντες, οὔτως αὐτὸν laid down for him (I mean the sound
τῶν piολλῶν ἀpiοκρίνομεν,’19 that signifies the subject (ὑpiοκειμέ-
νου)), we thus distinguish him from
the many,20
This may seem obvious. We call people by their proper names (Bob, Frank),
rather than by one of their common names (man, animal). We use a word
peculiar to the particular subject we are addressing.
Up to this point, we have not seen much technical vocabulary. We have the
term “nature” in Ablabius’ original question, and no additional technical terms
are added by Gregory in the SMA (for obvious reasons). Now in the UNA we’ve
seen “commonality” (κοινότης), “individualizing” (ἰδιαζούσῃ), and “appellation”
(piροσηγορίᾳ).
Next, Gregory suddenly gives us an onslaught of technical philosophical ver-
biage from the time period, including: “participation” (μετεσχηκότας), “the sin-
gular” (καθ’ ἔκαστον), “the common” (τοῦ κοινοῦ), “definition” (λόγος), “hy-
17. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 40.
18. Translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), p. 3.
19. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 40.
20. Translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), p. 3, adapted.
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postasis” (ὑpiοστάσεων), “particularization” (διαμερισμὸν), “peculiarity” (ἰδιότη-
τας), “synthesis” (σύνθεσιν), “in number” (ἐν ἀριθμῷ), “itself to itself” (αὐτὴ
piρὸς ἑαυτὴν), “strictly indivisible monad” (ἀδιάτμητος ἀκριβῶς μονάς), “not in-
creased through addition, not decreased through subtraction” (οὐκ αὐξανομένη
διὰ piροσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δι’ ὑφαιρέσεως), “indivisible” (ἄσχιστος), “contin-
uous” (συνεχὴς), “whole” (ὁλόκληρος), “not divided together with those par-
ticulars participating in it” (τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς τοῖς καθ’ ἔκαστον οὐ συνδι-
αιρουμένη) and talk of being “in” a nature (ἐν τῇ φύσει) and a nature being “in”
its instances when he says “the man in all is one” (ἔνα δὲ ἐν piᾶσι τὸν ἄνθρωpiον).
Clearly, there is far too much technical terminology here to go into detail
on every term. But we can at least take a look at the passage and try to get a
basic idea of what is going on. Gregory gives his argument thus:
ὤστε piολλοὺς μὲν εἶναι τοὺς Thus it is that the many, hav-
μετεσχηκότας τῆς φύσεως, φέρε ing participated in (μετεσχηκότας)
εἰpiεῖν μαθητὰς ἢ ἀpiοστόλους ἢ μάρ- the nature, come to be called “dis-
τυρας, ἔνα δὲ ἐν piᾶσι τὸν ἄνθρω- ciples,” or “apostles,” or “martyrs,”
piον, εἴpiερ, καθὼς εἴρηται, οὐχὶ τοῦ but the man in all is one; since, as
καθ’ ἔκαστον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς was said, “man” is not [predicated]
φύσεώς ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωpiος· of the singular, but of the common
nature;
ἄνθρωpiος γὰρ ὁ Λουκᾶς ἢ ὁ Στέ- For Luke is a man, or Stephen is,
φανος, οὐ μήν, εἴ τις ἄνθρωpiος, piάν- but it is not the case that if someone
τως καὶ Λουκᾶς ἐστιν ἢ Στέφανος. is a man, he is also wholly Luke or
Stephen.
v᾿Αλλ’ ὁ μὲν τῶν ὑpiοστάσεων λό- But the logos of the hy-
γος διὰ τὰς ἐνθεωρουμένας ἰδιότη- postases admits the particulariza-
τας ἑκάστῳ τὸν διαμερισμὸν ἐpiιδέχε- tion through the peculiarities seen
ται καὶ κατὰ σύνθεσιν ἐν ἀριθμῷ θεω- in them and is considered according
ρεῖται· to the synthesis in number;
ἡ δὲ φύσις μία ἐστίν, αὐτὴ yet the nature is one, having
piρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένη καὶ ἀδιάτμη- been united itself to itself, and a
τος ἀκριβῶς μονάς, οὐκ αὐξανομένη strictly indivisible monad, not in-
διὰ piροσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δι’ creased through addition, not de-
ὑφαιρέσεως, ἀλλ’ ὄpiερ ἐστὶν ἓν οὖσα creased through subtraction, but es-
καὶ ἓν διαμένουσα κἂν ἐν piλήθει sentially being one and remaining
φαίνηται, ἄσχιστος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ one, even when it manifests in a
ὁλόκληρος καὶ τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς plurality, indivisible and continuous
τοῖς καθ’ ἔκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη. and whole and not divided together
with those particulars participating
in it.
καὶ ὤσpiερ λέγεται λαὸς καὶ δῆ- And in just the way that “a peo-
μος καὶ στράτευμα καὶ ἐκκλησία μον- ple,” or “a deme,” or “an army,” or
αχῶς piάντα, ἔκαστον δὲ τούτων “a church” is said in the singular in
ἐν piλήθει νοεῖται· οὔτω κατὰ τὸν every case, yet each of these is con-
ἀκριβέστερον λόγον καὶ ἄνθρωpiος ceived to be in plurality, so accord-
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εἷς κυρίως ἂν ῥηθείη, κἂν οἱ ἐν τῇ φύ- ing to the more precise account (λό-
σει τῇ αὐτῇ δεικνύμενοι piλῆθος ὦσιν, γος), “man” would be said strictly
ὡς piολὺ μᾶλλον καλῶς ἔχειν τὴν [speaking] to be one, despite those
ἐσφαλμένην ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἐpiανορθοῦσ- displayed in the same nature be-
θαι συνήθειαν εἰς τὸ μηκέτι τὸ τῆς ing a plurality. Thus it would be
φύσεως ὄνομα piρὸς piλῆθος ἐκτείνειν much better to correct our erroneous
ἢ ταύτῃ δουλεύοντας τὴν ὧδε piλάνην habit, so as no longer to extend to
καὶ ἐpiὶ τὸ θεῖον δόγμα μεταβιβάζειν.21 a plurality the name of the nature,
than by our bondage to habit to
transfer to our statements concern-
ing God the error which exists in the
above case.22
This argument has received a fair bit of criticism for its conclusion – Richard
Cartwright, for example, describes Gregory as “desperately suggesting” that
there is only one man;23 Christopher Stead says Gregory’s argument, “resem-
bles an accomplished conjuring trick more nearly than a valid theological demon-
stration”24 – but criticism is not usually based on a serious examination of its
premises.25
Perhaps this is partly because the argument is so highly condensed in Ad
Ablabium, and makes use of so much technical terminology. But despite the
counter-intuitive conclusion, it is not obvious to me that Gregory’s actual argu-
ment is as problematic as its critics have assumed. It seems to me that Gregory
is simply trying to draw out the logical consequences of a number of related se-
mantic and metaphysical theses widely presupposed in the philosophical milieu
of his time.
Again, the argument is too dense to explore fully, and as we will see, I hold
that Gregory himself doesn’t actually accept it as fully adequate anyway. But
it will be helpful as background to the UAA, and we can certainly get, I think,
a good enough grasp to make some sense out of it.
4.2.1 Ousiai and Hypostases
In “Gregory of Nyssa on Universals,”26 Richard Cross argues, persuasively in
my view, that St. Gregory and St. Basil both use the term ousia synonymously
21. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 40-41.
22. Translation mine.
23. (Cartwright 1987), p. 171, “It seems to have been left to Gregory of Nyssa, Basil’s
younger brother, to notice that, thus understood, consubstantiality of the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit appears to license saying that there are three Gods. Gregory himself
rather desperately suggested that strictly speaking there is only one man.”
24. (C. Stead 1990), p. 149.
25. Cartwright, for example, ((Cartwright 1987)) doesn’t examine the argument at all.
Stead, of course, does, but in my estimation not well. It will become clear why I think so in
the course of this chapter. Stead himself admits that “It is tantalizingly difficult to determine
what Gregory has in mind.” ((C. Stead 1990), p. 152.) Hopefully my comments in this
chapter will shed some light.
26. (Cross 2002).
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with physis (nature), and they conceive of this as a universal. But Basil makes
a critical shift in his thinking on universals, which Gregory follows, a shift that
allows him to move from hom-oi -ousianism (the view that the three hypostases
of the Trinity are merely exactly similar in ousia) to hom-o-ousianism (the
view that the three hypostases of the Trinity are the same in ousia). Basil
starts off assuming a then-popular Neo-Platonic account of in re “universals”27
as simply collections, or mereological sums, of particulars, and therefore, quite
literally, divisible into the part-iculars that compose them (hence the etymol-
ogy of “particular”), as opposed to the monadic – but extrinsic or ante rem –
Platonic Forms. But he eventually shifts to a realist view (possibly original)
of in re universals as themselves simple, indivisible and wholly present in their
instances.28,
The reason that this shift allowed Basil to move from homoiousianism to
homoousianism, is that on the earlier view of ousiai as collections (but not
the later view of ousiai as monads) the homoousion (the proposition that the
hypostases are homoousios) would entail that God is divisible into parts – a
proposition which Basil consistently denies throughout his career.29,30
Note that in the passage above Gregory borrows a number of technical terms
applied by Neo-Platonists to the Platonic Forms (”strictly indivisible monad,”
“not increased through addition or decreased through subtraction,” and so forth)
and applies the same terms to in re universals, which looks like a very deliberate
and forceful rejection of their nominalism about in re universals.
But Cross also mentions Gregory’s sudden shift in the passage above from
talking about these simple, wholly present, and indivisible universals back to
talk about mere collections – a shift that leads Zachhuber to postulate two
different theories of universals going on in parallel in Gregory’s thought – ousia
being Gregory’s term for a monadic universal, and physis for, essentially, the
Neo-Platonic collective “universals.” But Cross notes an important distinction:
As I noted above, there is a passage in Ad Ablabium where Gregory
apparently likens a nature to a collection of particulars. And on
the face of it this is a problem for my reading. It is precisely be-
cause of the apparent equivocation here that Zachhuber believes the
Ad Ablabium account to be philosophically inferior to the earlier ac-
counts. But this is a misreading of Gregory. The collections Gregory
mentions are notable for their dissimilarity from the Neoplatonists’
27. To the extent that one can speak of a “universal,” on an essentially nominalistic theory
such as theirs.
28. (Cross 2002), pp. 381-386
29. See esp. (Cross 2002), pp. 383-385. As an example, consider Basil’s remarks in Epistle
236 ((St. Basil the Great 1930) pp. 381-383), “Does he mean that we know His substance
in part, just as we know parts of His substance? But that is absurd, for God is indivisible
into parts.” Incidentally, this seems to pose a difficulty for using Basil or Gregory to support
Social Trinitarianism as well. See 47, p. 132.
30. Cross also argues for dating the Ad Petrum around 370, roughly the same time as
Basil’s Epistles 214 and 236. If the work is Basil’s, Gregory comes to accept the view. But if
Gregory’s, either it marks his acceptance of Basil’s new view or perhaps represents Gregory’s
own input which Basil shortly thereafter comes to accept.
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collections: every man is a man, but no citizen a community, or sol-
dier an army. Boethius, for example (probably repeating Porphyry),
uses ‘flock, people, [and] army’ as examples of discontinuous wholes
that are not universals (in his collective sense). In other words, if
Gregory is using these examples to support a collective theory of
universals, he is being even more careless than commentators sup-
pose, since the examples are not even appropriate or germane. The
use of these analogies is much simpler. Gregory’s collective wholes
here are indivisible into parts of the same kind as their whole, and
the analogies are intended to show how it can be that the existence
of something indivisible (into parts of the same sort) is consistent
with its being in numerically many hypostases.31
I follow Cross here again, and want to add to his points in the next section
(4.2.2) with some semantic considerations.
But first, I note that Magee takes Boethius to have a confused classification
of wholes,32 first as:
1. continuous (Boethius gives the examples of “body, line, or anything of that
sort.”)
2. discontinuous (examples: “flock,” “population,” or “army.”)
3. universal (examples: “man,” “horse.”)
4. composed of faculties (examples: the soul – which has the potentiae of
understanding, sensing, and growth as “parts.”)
then later to subsume universal and “potential” under the heading of “discon-
tinuous.” Thus:
1. continuous
2. discontinuous
(a) universal
(b) potential
I’m not convinced that’s actually what Boethius does. He may of course be
dichotomizing between (1) continuous and (2) discontinuous wholes. And it is
certainly true that he takes universals to be a species of discontinuous whole.
But I think he clearly still thinks there is a species of merely discontinuous whole
that is neither a universal nor “composed of faculties.” He says later, “Those
wholes that are not continuous and those that are universal are to be divided
in one and the same way . . . ”33 It would be hard to make sense out of phrasing
this as a conjunctive claim if the former is just a genus and the latter one of its
species, rather than taking the former to be, implicitly, “merely” discontinuous.
It sounds as though Cross interprets Boethius in the way I do as well.
31. (Cross 2002) pp. 402-403.
32. (Boethius 1998), p. 144.
33. (Boethius 1998), p. 144. Emphasis mine.
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4.2.2 Gregory’s Semantics of Collective Nouns
Cross has explained the metaphysics involved in the UNA, but to understand
how the UNA actually functions as a solution to the LPT, we also need to con-
sider Gregory’s semantics.34 Gregory talks about collective nouns like, “a peo-
ple,” that “are said singularly . . . yet . . . are understood in plurality” (λέγεται
. . . μοναχῶς . . . ἐν piλήθει νοεῖται), and here he echoes what in his time were
the two greatest grammarians, Apollonius Dyscolus and Dionysius Thrax.
In the Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus, Apollonius mentions the phenomenon
of collective nouns several times briefly here and there, such as:
ἀλλ’ ἐpiειδὴ καί τινα ἔστι δι’ ἑνικοῦ “There are some words that im-
χαρακτῆρος piλῆθος ἐμφαίνοντα . . . 35 ply quantity, even though they are
singular in form. . . ”36
But perhaps most striking is the explanation in a passage in which he ex-
plains why Philip greeted “the senate and the people of the Athenians.” In this
passage, he describes collective nouns in nearly the same words as Gregory later
will. Also just as Gregory later will, Apollonius uses the example of “a people”
(deme) as a “collective noun.”
«βασιλεὺς Μακεδόνων Φίλιpipiος “Philip, King of the Macedo-
Α᾿θηναίων τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ nians, to the senate and the people
χαίρειν.» of the Athenians, greetings.”
ἔστι γὰρ τὸ συμφραζόμενον τοι- To paraphrase the reference, this
οῦτον, Α᾿θηναίοις χαίρειν. κἀpiειδὴ is equivalent to “Greetings to the
οὐχ ἅpiασι ταὐτὸ piαρείpiετο (ἦσαν Athenians.” And since the same at-
γὰρ οἱ μὲν δημόται, οἱ δὲ βουλευ- tributes didn’t apply to all equally
ταί), ἐδέετο δὲ τοῦ διαστέλλοντος (for some of the Athenians were “cit-
ἐpiιθέτου ἡ ἐpiισταλτικὴ σύνταξις, izens” and the rest were “senators”),
ἀpiεμέρισε τοὺς μὲν βουλευτὰς διὰ and this epistolary construction re-
τοῦ βουλῇ, τοὺς δὲ δημότας διὰ τοῦ quires a distinguishing adjective,
δήμῳ, ὤστε piᾶν τὸ συμφραζόμενον Philip divided into the senators, for
εἶναι τοῖς βουλευταῖς καὶ τοῖς δημό- whom he used the word boule “sen-
ταις. (καὶ σαφὲς ὄτι τὴν τοιαύτην ate” and the citizens, for whom he
ἄθροισιν ἀpiηνέγκατο τὰ ἀθροιστικὰ used the word demos “people,” so
ὀνόματα, ἅpiερ ἑνικῶς μὲν λέγεται, that the whole expression (“the sen-
piληθυντικῶς δὲ νοεῖται.)37 ate and the people of the Atheni-
ans”) is equivalent to “the senators
and the citizens”. (And it is clear
that collective nouns have this col-
lective function — nouns, that is,
which are said singularly but under-
34. See Chapter 5, p. 198 ff. for more on my approach here.
35. (Apollonius Dyscolus 1910), Part 2, Volume 2, p. 31.
36. (Householder 1981), p. 29.
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stood plurally (ἑνικῶς . . . λέγεται,
piληθυντικῶς . . . νοεῖται).)38
The same concept is also apparent in Dionysius Thrax’s Τέχνῃ Γραμματική
(The Art of Grammar), which also uses “deme” (people) as an example of col-
lective noun:
ἀριθμοὶ τρεῖς· ἑνικός, δυϊκός, piλ- There are three numbers – sin-
ηθυντικός· . . . εἰσὶ δέ τινες ἑνικοὶ gular, dual, plural. . . And there are
χαρακτῆρες καὶ κατὰ piολλῶν λεγό- some singular characters also said
μενοι, οἷον δῆμος χορός ὄχλος· καὶ of plural [subjects], such as “deme,”
piληθυντικοὶ κατὰ ἑνικῶν τε καὶ δυϊ- “chorus,” “crowd;” and [there are
κῶν, ἑνικῶν μὲν ὡς Α᾿θῆναι Θῆβαι, some] plural [characters said] of sin-
δυϊκῶν δὲ ὡς ἀμφότεροι.39 gular and dual [subjects]. Of singu-
lar, such as “Athens,” “Thebes.” Of
dual such as “both” (amphoteroi).40
Just a bit later on, Dionysius mentions collective nouns again, using the
same examples:
piεριληpiτικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ τῶι ἑνικῶι And a collective [noun] is one
ἀριθμῶι piλῆθος σημαῖνον, οἷον δῆμος which, in the singular number, signi-
χορός ὄχλος.41 fies a plurality, such as “deme,” “cho-
rus,” “crowd.”42
Now clearly Gregory wants to say that “God” (and for that matter “man,”
and really any common noun that express a nature)43 is just the sort of noun
Dionysius and Apollonius point out. A noun that would be syntactically singular
but semantically plural, as we might say.
But the question is why Gregory would think that “God” (or “man” or
“horse”) would have to be collective nouns like “a people” or “an army,” so that
“strictly speaking” we should always put “God,” “man,” or “horse” in the singu-
lar? After all, it seems like collective nouns are the exception rather than the
rule, and anyway common usage clearly is that we put “men” in the plural (the
point of Ablabius’ argument). So when Gregory says “in just the same way that”
collective nouns are “said singularly. . . yet . . . conceived to be in plurality,”
what exactly is “the same way” in his mind? The grammarians themselves only
note the existence of the phenomenon of collective nouns. They don’t tell us the
conditions in which a noun signifying a plurality should be used in the singular,
37. (Apollonius Dyscolus 1910), Part 2 Volume 2, p. 58.
38. (Householder 1981), p. 46.
39. (Dionysius Thrax 1883), pp. 30-31.
40. Translation mine.
41. (Dionysius Thrax 1883), p. 40-41.
42. Translation mine.
43. Although, as I will argue below, Gregory accepts the use of “God” to express the divine
nature only hypothetically, since he takes it to be “the common view.”
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rather than the plural. So we have to ask, what might Gregory be thinking the
conditions are under which a noun is “said singularly, but understood plurally?”
I suggest the answer lies precisely in Cross’s analysis above. Recall:
The collections Gregory mentions are notable for their dissimilar-
ity from the Neoplatonists’ collections: every man is a man, but
no citizen a community, or soldier an army. Boethius, for example
(probably repeating Porphyry), uses ‘flock, people, [and] army’ as
examples of discontinuous wholes that are not universals (in his col-
lective sense). . . Gregory’s collective wholes here are indivisible into
parts of the same kind as their whole. . . 44
A clue here lies in the examples Gregory mentions. All of them are at the
same time collective nouns of the sort discussed by the grammarians and nouns
that signify discontinuous wholes that do not constitute universals, as Cross
discusses. So it seems reasonable to conjecture that Gregory is simply drawing
the obvious connection between the metaphysics of discontinuous, non-universal
wholes, and the semantics of collective nouns.
Thus, what I want to suggest is that the semantic picture which Gregory
may have had in mind here (and which may have been, or he may have as-
sumed to have been, a commonly accepted view at the time) is that common
nouns are properly used in the plural just in case there are proper parts of the
significandum that can be called by the same noun as each other and as the
significandum itself.45 They are properly used in the singular just in case there
are no proper parts of their significandum that can be called by the same noun
as each other and as the significandum itself. This seems to fit well with the
overall discussion, and I think makes the most sense out of Gregory.
If this is right, then we can describe what Gregory takes to be the commonly
accepted viewpoint of the day as something roughly like the following:
1. Common nouns “signify” natures, which are universals.
2. These universals are merely collections of particulars, which compose them,
and which they have as literal parts.
3. Common nouns are to be used in the singular just in case there are no
proper parts of their significandum that can be called by the same noun
as each other and as the significandum itself; they are to be used in the
plural just in case there are proper parts of the significandum that can be
called by the same noun as each other and as the significandum itself.
For example (according to this view),46 if the only three men there are,
are Cicero, Cato and Vergil, then each can be called “man,” and together they
compose the universal nature, man, which is a collection or sum of the three,
44. (Cross 2002), pp. 402-403.
45. I am assuming here, as I think Gregory does, that the significandum is the universal.
46. I do not want to commit to this view myself!
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and which can also be called “man.” In this sort of scenario, Cicero, Cato and
Vergil can (together) be called “three men,” because they are three, as we might
say, man-ish parts of the one, universal man.47
On the other hand, if the only man who existed was Cato, then the collective
man, the sum of all the men, would have no proper parts called by the same
name,48 and so we would say there is “one man” (or that “man is one”) because
there are no man-ish (proper) parts of the one, universal man.
Finally, if Cicero, Cato and Vergil form an army, then that is also a collection,
but while each of Cicero, Cato and Vergil can be called “man,” they cannot each
be called “army.” So while they are three men, they are only one army, precisely
because the army cannot be divided into the relevant sorts of parts.
But now suppose it turns out, as Gregory argues, that a nature is not a
collection after all, but an indivisible monad. It follows automatically that any
and all nouns that signify natures must only be used in the singular, because
a monad will never have proper parts that can be called by the same noun as
itself, because a monad will simply never have proper parts at all.
In other words, what it seems to me that Gregory is doing is leaving points
1 and 3 of this perhaps then-common picture in place, and merely rejecting 2 –
the collective theory of universals – and replacing it, as Cross has argued, with a
theory of an in re universal that is monadic (not divisible into “parts”) and which
is “wholly present” in each of its particulars. Then he simply draws the obvious
conclusion that all nouns signifying natures (including “man”) are always to be
used in the singular (just as “army” would be in the example above).
Read in this light, Gregory’s argument seems to make much more sense. In
the first sentence below, he finishes making his metaphysical point about whe-
ther universals are indivisible monads or divisible collections. In the second sen-
tence, he goes on to point out the linguistic fact that there are collective nouns
such that, semantically they indicate a collection of individuals, but their correct
syntactic form is nevertheless singular. (Note that he uses the Neo-Platonists’
technical vocabulary against them when making the initial, metaphysical point,
but then switches over to language reminiscent of Apollonius Dyscolus when
making his second, linguistic point):
ἡ δὲ φύσις μία ἐστίν, αὐτὴ yet the nature is one, having
47. Compare this to the part-whole Social Trinitarianism of, e.g., Moreland and Craig in
(Moreland and Craig 2003). As Cross notes, it seems to be precisely this sort of “collective”
view of the Trinity that Basil wanted to avoid. See also Mike Rea’s criticism of Craig along
these lines in (Rea 2009b), esp. pp. 708-710 and pp. 718-721. Gregory wants to avoid saying
“God” is a collective. He is here saying precisely that “the one God” is not a collection of
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but something simple and indivisible. Thus, not only does
Gregory not count as patristic support for Social Trinitarianism, he seems to count as patristic
opposition to it. Also note that this anomaly with singular nouns that express a plurality
only occurs when the same noun cannot be applied both to the parts and to the whole they
compose, whereas Social Trinitarians, and anyone whose account falls into the Equivocation
Family, want to do just that – apply the same noun both to the parts (Father, Son and Holy
Spirit) and to the whole (God) that they compose. So, this would not even seem to be a
useful resource for Social Trinitarians.
48. The only proper parts would be hands, feet, and so on.
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piρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡνωμένη καὶ ἀδιάτμη- been united itself to itself, and a
τος ἀκριβῶς μονάς, οὐκ αὐξανομένη strictly indivisible monad, not in-
διὰ piροσθήκης, οὐ μειουμένη δι’ creased through addition, not de-
ὑφαιρέσεως, ἀλλ’ ὄpiερ ἐστὶν ἓν οὖσα creased through subtraction, but es-
καὶ ἓν διαμένουσα κἂν ἐν piλήθει sentially being one and remaining
φαίνηται, ἄσχιστος καὶ συνεχὴς καὶ one, even when it manifests in a
ὁλόκληρος καὶ τοῖς μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς plurality, indivisible and continuous
τοῖς καθ’ ἔκαστον οὐ συνδιαιρουμένη. and whole and not divided together
with those particulars participating
in it.
καὶ ὤσpiερ λέγεται λαὸς καὶ δῆμος And in just the way that “a peo-
καὶ στράτευμα καὶ ἐκκλησία μοναχῶς ple,” or “a deme,” or “an army,” or
piάντα, ἔκαστον δὲ τούτων ἐν piλήθει “a church” is said in the singular in
νοεῖται· οὔτω κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβέστερον every case, yet each of these is un-
λόγον καὶ ἄνθρωpiος εἷς κυρίως ἂν derstood in plurality, so according
ῥηθείη, κἂν οἱ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτῇ to the more precise account (λόγος),
δεικνύμενοι piλῆθος ὦσιν.49 “man” would be said strictly [speak-
ing], to be one, despite those dis-
played in the same nature being a
plurality.50
Thus, on my reading, what Cartwright describes as Gregory “desperately
suggesting” that strictly speaking there is only one man turns out not to be
nearly so dramatic. It turns out to be Gregory simply drawing out the obvious
logical consequences of accepting what he takes to be a superior metaphysical
theory of universal natures, while leaving the typical semantic assumptions of
his interlocutors unchanged.
That, in my view, is how the UNA works. It has been seen as sophistry
(Stead), or as Gregory simply biting the bullet (Cartwright) and shamefully
accepting the ridiculous view that there is only one man, since he is unwilling
to deny the analogy between Peter, James and John, on the one hand and the
Father, Son and Holy Spirit on the other, given the rest of his views. But in
fact, on my reading, Gregory is essentially just showing good form in offering
a defeater-defeater. He gives a response primarily on his opponents’ own terms
(from “Common Concepts” as Ad Graecos is subtitled).51 That is, he has re-
sponded by leaving intact the common semantic picture for the time period,
49. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 41.
50. Translation mine.
51. Compare also his statement concerning the UNA in the Ad Graecos ((St. Gregory of
Nyssa 1958), p. 29; translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1994), unpublished):
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ὡς εἴpiομεν, ἐκεῖνοι λέ- This, as we have said, is what our part-
γουσιν· ἡμεῖς δὲ δείξομεν σόφισμα τὸ piᾶν ners in the discussion argue; but we will
εἶναι καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτερον τὸ λελεγμένον, οὐ- show that all of what they are saying is
δαμῶς ἄλλως piεριγινόμενοι ἀλλ’ ἢ αὐτοῖς sophistry and nothing else, and we will pre-
τοῖς εἰρημένοις κεχρημένοι καὶ δεικνύντες vail by no other means than by using the
μὴ δεῖν τὸν τοιόνδε θεὸν καὶ τοιόνδε θεὸν statements made themselves and showing
ἢ τοιόνδε ἄνθρωpiον καὶ τοιόνδε λέγειν· that one ought not speak of “such-and-such
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and only insisting on his own metaphysics (a bit of metaphysics that is, after
all, probably essential to making any sense at all out of his theology in the first
place).
4.2.3 Did Gregory Really Believe in the UNA?
We can now see how the UNA is supposed to work. But although it has utility for
Gregory as a defeater for the anti-Trinitarian argument presented by Ablabius
(and others), I don’t think he actually accepts the picture he presents. And here
is where I have to part ways with Cross.
For Cross continues:
Gregory’s teaching, then, is that substance-sortals, such as ‘God’
and ‘man’, properly refer to natures: it is the unity of nature that
entails that there is just one God, and just one man.52
Does “Is God” Really Predicate the Divine Nature?
I take issue with Cross here, because, while Gregory of course does not take
“God” to signify a particular hypostasis, critically Gregory does not take “God”
to signify a nature, or ousia, either. Thus, unlike “man,” the word “God” is not
a substance-sortal at all.
While Gregory may seem to make that connection, both in Ad Graecos and
in Ad Petrum, and again in this argument in Ad Ablabium (the UNA), this is
definitely a case in which appearances are deceiving.
Consider that, in Ad Eustathium, Gregory goes to some pains to argue that
“God” is not any sort of special predicate expressing the divine nature itself,
but only another predicate among many expressing another attribute among
many that we apply to the hypostases – not in principle different from “good”
or “mighty” or “righteous” or any other predicates that are applicable even to
non-divine beings. (Indeed, some of these other predicates are actually more
appropriate to God than “God!”)
Τεκμήριον δὲ ὄτι τούτῳ μὲν τῷ And a proof of this [that “God”
ὀνόματι piολλὰ καὶ τῶν καταδεεστ- does not signify the divine nature] is
έρων ἐpiονομάζεται, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ that many even of the inferior exis-
φείδεται ἡ θεία Γραφὴ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας tences are called by this very name
ταύτης οὐδὲ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἀpiεμφαινόντων [“God”]. Further, the Divine Scrip-
piραγμάτων, ὄταν τὰ εἴδωλα τῇ τοῦ ture is not sparing in this use of the
Θεοῦ piροσηγορίᾳ κατονομάζῃ. name even in the case of things in-
congruous, as when it names idols
by the appellation of “God.”
a God” and “such-and-such a God” or even
“such-and-such a human being” at all . . .
52. (Cross 2002), p. 404.
134
«Θεοὶ γάρ, φησίν, οἳ οὐκ ἐpiοίησαν For it says, “Let the gods that
τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν ἀρθήτωσαν have not made the heavens and the
καὶ ὑpiοκάτω τῆς γῆς βληθήτωσαν». earth perish, and be cast down be-
neath the earth” ;
Καὶ «Πάντες, φησίν, οἱ θεοὶ τῶν and, “all the gods of the heathen
ἐθνῶν δαιμόνια». are devils” ;
Καὶ ἡ ἐγγαστρίμυθος ἐν ταῖς and the witch in her incanta-
μαγγανείαις αὐτῆς ψυχαγωγοῦσα τῷ tions, when she brings up for Saul
Σαοὺλ τὰς ἐpiιζητουμένας ψυχὰς θε- the spirits that he sought for, says
οὺς ἑωρακέναι φησίν. that she saw gods. (1 Samuel 28:13)
v᾿Αλλὰ καὶ ὁ Βαλαὰμ οἰωνιστής τις And again Balaam, being an au-
ὢν καὶ μάντις καὶ διὰ χειρὸς τὰ μαν- gur and a seer, and engaging in
τεῖα φέρων, καθώς φησιν ἡ Γραφή, divination, and having obtained for
καὶ τὴν ἐκ δαιμόνων διδασκαλίαν διὰ himself the instruction of devils and
τῆς οἰωνιστικῆς piεριεργίας ἑαυτῷ κα- magical augury, is said in Scripture
τορθώσας piαρὰ θεοῦ συμβουλεύεσ- to receive counsel from God. (Num-
θαι ὑpiὸ τῆς Γραφῆς ἱστορεῖται. bers 22)
Καὶ piολλὰ τοιαῦτά ἐστι συλλεξά- One may show by collecting
μενον ἐκ τῶν θείων piαραθέσθαι many instances of the same kind
Γραφῶν, ὄτι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτο οὐδὲν from the Divine Scripture, that this
ὑpiὲρ τὰς λοιpiὰς τὰς θεοpiρεpiεῖς attribute has no supremacy over the
piροσηγορίας piρωτεύει, ὄτε, καθὼς other attributes which are proper to
εἴρηται, καὶ ἐpiὶ τῶν ἀpiεμφαινόντων God, seeing that, as has been said,
ὁμωνύμως λεγόμενον εὑρίσκομεν. we find it predicated, in an equivocal
sense, even of things incongruous;
Τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἁγίου ὄνομα καὶ τοῦ but we are nowhere taught in
ἀφθάρτου καὶ τοῦ εὐθέος καὶ τοῦ Scripture that the names of the
ἀγαθοῦ οὐδαμοῦ κοινοpiοιούμενον Holy, the Incorruptible, the Righ-
piρὸς τὰ μὴ δέοντα piαρὰ τῆς Γραφῆς teous, the Good, are made common
ἐδιδάχθημεν. to things unworthy.
Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἐν τοῖς ἐξαιρέτως ἐpiὶ If, then, they do not deny that
μόνης τῆς θείας φύσεως εὐσεβῶς the Holy Spirit has community with
λεγομένοις ὀνόμασι κοινωνεῖν τὸ the Father and the Son in those
v῎Αγιον Πνεῦμα piρὸς τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ τὸν attributes which, in their sense of
Πατέρα οὐκ ἀντιλέγουσι, τίς ὁ λόγος special excellence, are piously pred-
μόνῳ τούτῳ κατασκευάζειν ἀκοινών- icated only of the Divine nature,
ητον εἶναι οὗ μετέχειν ἐδείχθη, κατὰ what reason is there to pretend that
τινὰ ὁμώνυμον χρῆσιν, καὶ τὰ δαιμό- He is excluded from community in
νια καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα;53 this only, wherein it was shown that,
by an equivocal use, even devils and
idols share?54
Thus, Gregory makes it quite clear here that, in his view, “God” is in no way a
special term for predicating the divine ousia, since it can be applied to obviously
53. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 9-10.
54. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 328.
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non-divine beings. Rather, this is a claim he attributes to his opponents. He
goes on:
v᾿Αλλὰ λέγουσι φύσεως ἐνδεικ- But they [his opponents] say
τικὴν εἶναι τὴν piροσηγορίαν ταύτην, that this appellation (piροσηγορία)
ἀκοινώνητον δὲ εἶναι piρὸς Πατέρα καὶ [“God”] is indicative of nature (φύσις),
Υἱὸν τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος φύσιν, καὶ and that, as the nature (φύσις) of
διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα the Spirit is not common to the
τοῦτο κοινωνίας μετέχειν.55 Father and the Son, for this rea-
son neither does he partake [partic-
ipate, μετέχειν] in the community of
this attribute [name, (ὄνομα) – i.e.,
“God”].56
Critically, Gregory does not go on to admit that “God” signifies the nature
(φύσις) here. Rather, he simply brings in at this point an argument that natures,
or ousiai, are individuated by energeiai and that the Spirit shares all the same
energeiai as the Father and Son, so that He must have the same nature anyway
(more on which below, 4.4.4, p. 186). Thus, even if “God” did signify the divine
nature (which it doesn’t), it would still follow that “God” can be predicated of
the Holy Spirit (the main question under discussion in Ad Eustathium).
. . . κἂν φύσιν σημαίνῃ τὸ τῆς . . . even if the name of Godhead
θεότητος ὄνομα, κυρίως καὶ τῷ v῾Αγίῳ does indicate nature, the community
Πνεύματι τὴν piροσηγορίαν ἐφαρ- of substance [essence, οὐσία] shows
μόζεσθαι ταύτην ἡ τῆς οὐσίας κοι- that this appellation [piροσηγορία] is
νότης συντίθεται.57 properly applied also to the Holy
Spirit.58
We’ll explore this claim about the individuation of ousiai below (p. 184 ff.),
as well as what I will call “the Cappadocian Assertion” – that the hypostases
share all the same energeiai (p. 187 ff.). The point for now is that Gregory does
not accept the semantic claim that “God” signifies the nature. In fact, he goes on
to argue vehemently against the claim that “God” signifies the divine nature, but
only considers what would follow, hypothetically, on his opponents’ assumption.
In Gregory’s own view, it signifies a certain kind of activity (energeia). And
Gregory, at least, seems to believe that this has been his consistent teaching:
Α᾿λλ’ οὐκ οἶδα piῶς ἐpiὶ τὴν But I know not how these ma-
τῆς φύσεως ἔνδειξιν τὴν piροση- kers-up of all sorts of arguments
γορίαν τῆς θεότητος φέρουσιν οἱ bring the appellation of Godhead to
piάντα κατασκευάζοντες, ὤσpiερ οὐκ be an indication of nature, as though
55. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 10.
56. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 328.
57. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 13.
58. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 329.
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ἀκηκοότες piαρὰ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ὄτι they had not heard from the Scrip-
χειροτονητὴ φύσις οὐ γίνεται· ture that it is a matter of appoint-
ment, in which way nature does not
arise.
Μωυσῆς δὲ τῶν Αἰγυpiτίων ἐχει-
ροτονήθη θεός, οὔτω piρὸς αὐτὸν For Moses was appointed as a
εἰpiόντος τοῦ χρηματίζοντος ὄτι Θεόν god of the Egyptians, since He Who
σε δέδωκα τῷ Φαραώ. gave him the oracles, etc., spoke
thus to him, “I have given you as a
god to Pharaoh.” (Exodus 7:1)
οὐκοῦν ἐξουσίας τινὸς εἴτε ἐpiοpi- Thus the force of the appellation
τικῆς εἴτε ἐνεργητικῆς ἔνδειξιν ἡ [this piροσηγορία, i.e., “God”] is the
piροσηγορία φέρει, indication of some power, either of
oversight or of operation [energeia].
ἡ δὲ θεία φύσις ἐν piᾶσι τοῖς But the Divine nature itself, as
ἐpiινοουμένοις ὀνόμασι, καθό ἐστι, it is, remains unexpressed by all the
μένει ἀσήμαντος, ὡς ὁ ἡμέτερος λό- names that are conceived for it, as
γος. our doctrine declares.
εὐεργέτην γὰρ καὶ κριτήν, ἀγα- For in learning that He is benef-
θόν τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ὄσα ἄλλα icent, and a judge, good, and just,
τοιαῦτα μαθόντες ἐνεργειῶν διαφορὰς and all else of the same kind, we
ἐδιδάχθημεν, learn diversities of His operations
[energeiai ].
τοῦ δὲ ἐνεργοῦντος τὴν φύσιν but we are none the more able to
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν learn by our knowledge of His oper-
κατανοήσεως ἐpiιγνῶναι δυνάμεθα. ations [energeiai ] the nature of Him
Who works [‘ ‘energizes”].
ὄταν γὰρ ἀpiοδιδῷ τις λόγον ἑκάσ- For when one gives a definition of
του τε τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ any one of these attributes, and of
αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως piερὶ ἣν τὰ ὀνόματα, the nature to which the names are
οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀμφοτέρων ἀpiοδίδωσι applied, he will not give the same
λόγον· definition of both:
ὧν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔτερος, τούτων καὶ and of things of which the defi-
ἡ φύσις διάφορος. nition is different, the nature also is
distinct.
οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μέν τί ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία Indeed the substance [οὐσία] is
ἧς οὔpiω λόγος μηνυτὴς ἐξευρέθη, one thing which no definition has
ἑτέρα δὲ τῶν piερὶ αὐτὴν ὀνομάτων been found to express, and the sig-
ἡ σημασία ἐξ ἐνεργείας τινὸς ἢ ἀξίας nificance of the names employed
ὀνομαζομένων.59 concerning it varies, as the names
are given from some operation [en-
ergeia, ἐνέργεια] or accident.60
59. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 13-14.
60. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 329.
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Thus, not only does “God” not signify the divine nature in particular, as
Gregory argued above (because it is applicable even to things of a non-divine
nature, like demons), here Gregory argues that “God” cannot signify any nature
at all (because natures can’t be had accidentally or “by institution and appoint-
ment,” and Moses was exactly that – a god accidentally, by being made a god
over Pharaoh.)
Gregory makes quite clear that his own view as to why the Holy Spirit counts
as “God” is that “God” signifies a certain types of energeia:
Οὐκοῦν ἐξουσίας τινὸς εἴτε ἐpiοpi- Thus the force of the appellation
τικῆς εἴτε ἐνεργητικῆς ἔνδειξιν ἡ [this piροσηγορία, i.e., “God”] is the
piροσηγορία φέρει.61 indication of some power, either of
oversight or of operation [energeia,
ἐνέργεια] .62
He only gives the argument about the individuation of natures for the sake of
having a “back-up” argument, since, he believes, most people believe the semantic
claim that “God” signifies the divine nature:
εἴτε οὖν ἐνεργείας ὄνομα ἡ θεό- If, then, “Godhead” is a name
της, ὡς μίαν ἐνέργειαν piατρὸς καὶ derived from operation [energeia,
υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου piνεύματος, οὔτω μίαν ἐνέργεια] , as we say that the op-
φαμὲν εἶναι τὴν θεότητα· eration [energeia, ἐνέργεια] of the
Father, and the Son, and the Holy
Spirit is one, so we say that the God-
head is one:
εἴτε κατὰ τὰς τῶν piολλῶν δόξας or if, according to the view of the
φύσεως ἐνδεικτικόν ἐστι τὸ τῆς θεό- majority, “Godhead” is indicative of
τητος ὄνομα, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν εὑρί- nature, since we cannot find any di-
σκειν ἐν τῇ φύσει piαραλλαγὴν ἐκ versity in their nature, we not un-
τῆς τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ταυτότητος οὐκ reasonably define the Holy Trinity
ἀpiεικότως μιᾶς θεότητος τὴν ἁγίαν to be of one Godhead.64
τριάδα διοριζόμεθα.63
He then goes on to mention yet another commonly held semantic view, one
which he again rejects, but provides a counter-argument for anyway:
εἰ δέ τις ἀξίας ἐνδεικτικὴν εἶναι But if any one were to call this
τὴν piροσηγορίαν ταύτην ὁρίζοιτο, appellation [piροσηγορία] indicative
οὐκ οἶδα μὲν τίνι λόγῳ piρὸς τὴν of dignity, I cannot tell by what rea-
τοιαύτην σημασίαν ἔλκει τὸ ὄνομα· soning he drags the word to this sig-
nificance.
61. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 14.
62. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 329.
63. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 15.
64. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 329.
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piλὴν ἐpiειδὴ piολλῶν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦ- Since however one may hear
τον λεγόντων ἀκούειν, ὡς ἂν μηδαμό- many saying things of this kind, in
θεν χώραν κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ τῶν order that the zeal of its opponents
ἀντικειμένων εὑρίσκοι σpiουδή, καὶ may not find a ground for attack-
piρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ὑpiόληψιν συμpiε- ing the truth, we go out of our way
ριενεχθέντες τοῖς οὔτω δοξάζουσι with those who take this view, to
φαμὲν ὄτι, κἂν ἀξίαν σημαίνῃ τὸ consider such an opinion, and say
ὄνομα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κυρίως τῷ that, even if the name does denote
ἁγίῳ piνεύματι ἡ piροσηγορία ἐφαρ- dignity, in this case too the appel-
μοσθήσεται.65 lation will properly befit the Holy
Spirit.66
Similar statements can be found in his anti-Eunomian writings as well.67
It should be clear, then, that while Gregory spends time to consider the view
that “God” signifies the divine nature (a view which he takes to be the majority
opinion), he does not endorse the claim himself. For Gregory himself, “God”
does not have the divine nature as its semantic value. He only considers it so
as to respond to his interlocutors on their own terms.
The Real Role of the UNA in Gregory’s Response
The confusion about Gregory’s real view about the semantics of the word “God”
naturally arises when we don’t see that Gregory is offering distinct arguments
(SMA, UNA, UAA) directed at distinct audiences (the uneducated, educated
pagans and certain heretics, educated orthodox Christians), for a purpose other
than philosophical accuracy and logical perspicuity (namely, salvation). Not
making that distinction, although we can easily separate out the SMA, we nat-
urally want to run the UNA and the UAA together and try to reconcile them
in some way (even though, as we’ll see, Gregory explicitly disavows the UNA in
the Ad Ablabium, immediately after giving it).
65. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 15.
66. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 329.
67. E.g., his Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii (pp. 518-519 in (St. Gregory of Nyssa
1893)):
He is named, by those who call upon Him, not what He is essentially (for the
nature of Him Who alone is unspeakable), but He receives His appellations from
what are believed to be His operations [energeiai ] in regard to our life. To take
an instance ready to our hand; when we speak of Him as God, we so call Him
from regarding Him as overlooking and surveying all things, and seeing through
the things that are hidden. . .
And that this is so, we are clearly taught by Holy Scripture, by the mouth of
great David, when, as by certain peculiar and appropriate names, derived from
his contemplation of the works of God, he thus speaks of the Divine nature: “The
Lord is full of compassion and mercy, long-suffering, and of great goodness.” Now
what do these words tell us? Do they indicate His operations [energeiai ], or His
nature? No one will say that they indicate aught but His operations [energeiai].
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Cross himself – quite correctly – notes, “Gregory in effect claims that the
abstract noun ‘deity’ names the unified divine activity. . . ”68 which is indeed
precisely what Gregory says in the latter part of Ad Ablabium, as well as in
Ad Eustathium. (Both of which, of course, are directed to fellow orthodox
Christians.) But Cross then immediately returns, incorrectly in my view, to the
claim that “God” signifies the ousia:
The point, however, is that, just as in the case of created natures,
what underlies our use of the singular concrete noun (‘God’, ‘man’,
etc.) is the unity of substance/nature in each case. . . 69
We will see below (4.4, pp. 174 ff.) why I take it that what underlies the
use of “God” in the singular for Gregory is not the unity of nature at all, but
the unity of activity, and why these two kinds of unity turn out to be impor-
tantly different for the purposes of defending the doctrine of the Trinity today.
For now, though, we’ve seen that for Gregory “God” is not a kind term, but
an agent noun. Thus, although Gregory can and does enter into debates that
assume “God” is a kind term like “man,” his actual view is that it is more like
“rhetorician” or “shoemaker” (on Gregory’s view, as we will see, p. 175, it prob-
ably means something like the “beholder” of hidden things). Cross continues,
“the (additional) unity of activity in the case of God means that it is never
legitimate to refer to many Gods.”70
Where Cross speaks of being “legitimate” or illegitimate here, I am claiming
what we have is being misleading or non-misleading (see above, p. 106 ff.). And
as we will see below (p. 191), for Gregory it is indeed the unity of activity (not
of nature) that makes it importantly misleading (and in fact, on his view, false)
to speak of “three Gods,” in a way such that it would at least not be misleading
to speak of “three men” or three “three shoemakers,” and indeed possibly even
true to say there are “three shoemakers” in the relevant cases. This is also
what allows Gregory, in fact, to admit that the metaphysics of the Trinity is
not strictly analogous to the metaphysics of humans and other creatures after
all – contrary to how he has typically been read. That is, as we will see, while
men do have the same kind of unity of nature as the Trinity, it would simply
be impossible for there to be three men who have the sort of unity of activity
the Trinity has, though if per impossibile such a state of affairs came about, it
would be, on Gregory’s view, false, and as I will argue also certainly misleading,
to speak of the three men as three shoemakers instead of one shoemaker. (See
p. 191 below). As Gregory states:
ἀλλ’ ἐpiειδὴ ἀμήχανος τῆς συν- But since the correction of the
ηθείας ἡ ἐpiανόρθωσις (piῶς γὰρ ἄν habit is impracticable (for how could
τις piεισθείη μὴ piολλοὺς λέγειν ἀν- you persuade any one not to speak of
θρώpiους τοὺς ἐν τῇ φύσει τῇ αὐτῇ those who are exhibited in the same
68. (Cross 2002), p. 404, footnote 99.
69. (Cross 2002)
70. (Cross 2002)
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δεικνυμένους· δυσμετάθετον γὰρ ἐpiὶ nature as “many men”? – indeed, in
piαντὸς ἡ συνήθεια), ἐpiὶ μὲν τῆς every case habit is a thing hard to
κάτω φύσεως τῇ κρατούσῃ συνηθείᾳ change), we are not so far wrong in
μὴ ἀντιβαίνοντες οὐδὲν ἂν τοσοῦτον not going contrary to the prevailing
ἁμάρτοιμεν, μηδεμιᾶς οὔσης ζημίας habit in the case of the lower nature,
ἐκ τῆς ἡμαρτημένης τῶν ὀνομάτων since no harm results from the mis-
χρήσεως·71 taken use of the name:72
In other words, in the case of humans (or really any created things), Gregory
is arguing that it is strictly speaking false (given the semantic picture sketched
above, p. 129), but not misleading, to talk about “many men” (or many of
whatever species of created thing).
ἐpiὶ δὲ τοῦ θείου δόγματος οὐκέτι but in the case of the statement
ὁμοίως ἀκίνδυνος ἡ ἀδιάφορος χρῆσις concerning the Divine nature the
τῶν ὀνομάτων· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν ἐν- various use of terms is no longer so
ταῦθα τὸ piαρὰ μικρόν.73 free from danger: for that which is
of small account is in these subjects
no longer a small matter.74
So when it comes to God, Gregory holds that it is not only false, but no
longer non-misleading, to speak of “many gods.”
But Cross seems to want to run the UNA and UAA together into a single,
coherent argument – incorrectly on my reading.
He says:
But Gregory is prepared to concede that we can, improperly, refer
to men, whereas we cannot, even improperly, refer to Gods in the
context of the Trinity. The reason for the impossibility of referring
to three Gods, as the main bulk of Ad Ablabium makes clear, is that
the divine persons share in unified activity in a way that different
men do not. For Gregory, then, the homoousion does not in itself
show how the case of the Trinity is relevantly different from the case
of human beings.75
He goes on:
analogies to three human beings are perfectly serious: the type of
universal is the same in the case of both divine and human hy-
postases. (It is worth noting too that the reason why ‘God’ properly
names activity is that the essence is unknowable and therefore un-
nameable; unity of activity is a further point over and above this.)76
71. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 41-42.
72. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 332, emphasis mine.
73. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 42.
74. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 332.
75. (Cross 2002), p. 404.
76. (Cross 2002), p. 405.
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I don’t think this is quite right. Although of course I agree with all of the
metaphysical points: The analogy to three human being is “perfectly serious,”
and the type of universal is the same, and thus “the homoousion does not in
itself show how the case of the Trinity is relevantly different from the case of
human beings” (that is, for Gregory, human beings are homoousios in just the
same way that the divine hypostases are). But it sounds as though Cross wants
to see Gregory as actually endorsing the semantic view that “God” signifies the
divine nature, and that the unity of activity is only a sort of additional point
within the same argument, that somehow shows why it would be illegitimate
to speak of “gods,” even loosely. As should be obvious, my reading is not that
the unity of activity is an additional point within the same argument, but that
it is a separate argument altogether – and the only one that Gregory actually
endorses.
One thing that does confuse matters is the sheer amount of time Gregory
takes up talking about the UNA. It takes up the entirety of Ad Graecos (directed
entirely towards a pagan audience), and the first part of Ad Ablabium (which
I am arguing is again for the benefit of educated pagans, and some heretics).
That naturally leads one to think it is in some sense more significant. And, in
some sense, it is. Namely, in the sense that it is the argument directed at what
Gregory clearly takes to be a wider audience than the one that would accept his
semantic claims. Nevertheless, he makes it quite clear that he only gives this
response for the sake of those who accept this common, but in Gregory’s view
false, semantic assumption (i.e., most pagans and some heretics).
Still, the issue of Gregory’s treatment of the name “God” in Ad Graecos
might seem to pose a problem for my interpretation. For in this work, Gregory
really does look very much as though he accepts the view that “God” signifies
the nature.
Cross points this out:
The opening of Ad Graecos likewise makes clear that ‘God’ is a name
of an ousia, and not of a person, and that it is for this reason that
we worship one God. ‘God’ thus names not the collection of divine
persons, but the immanent universal exemplified by each person:
viz. the divine substance. Equally, although each divine person is
(a) God, there is only one God since there is only one substance.
Three Gods would entail three substances. The crucial indivisibility
claim is again made explicitly:
The substance is not divided (διαιρουμένης) into each of
the persons, such that there are three substances for the
respective persons. It is evident that the term ‘God’ is not
so divided, since it signifies the substance; such a distinc-
tion would result in three Gods.
‘God’ signifies the divine substance; the divine substance is not di-
visible; there is thus only one God. Note again that the substance
is not divided into persons–and this is precisely the opposite of the
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Neoplatonic claim that a universal whole is divided in particulars.
As I noted above, on those occasions where Ad Ablabium uses the
term ousia, it is clearly synonymous with phusis. I take it that
ousia in Ad Graecos is likewise synonymous with the phusis of Ad
Ablabium,and that neither should be given a collective account.77
The passage Cross refers to from Ad Graecos is:
Εἰ τὸ θεὸς ὄνομα piροσώpiου If the word “God” refers to a per-
δηλωτικὸν ὑpiῆρχεν, τρία piρόσωpiα son, when we say “three persons” we
λέγοντες ἐξ ἀνάγκης τρεῖς ἂν ἐλέ- necessarily would be saying “three
γομεν θεούς· Gods”;
εἰ δὲ τὸ θεὸς ὄνομα οὐσίας σημαν- but if the word “God” signifies an
τικόν ἐστιν, μίαν οὐσίαν ὁμολογοῦν- ousia, then in confessing one ousia
τες τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος ἔνα θεὸν of the holy Trinity we can properly
εἰκότως δογματίζομεν, ἐpiειδὴ μιᾶς be understood as teaching one God,
οὐσίας ἓν ὄνομα τὸ θεός ἐστιν. since there is one name for that one
ousia: God.
διὸ καὶ ἀκολούθως τῇ τε οὐσίᾳ So it follows that in ousia and in
καὶ τῷ ὀνόματι εἷς ἐστι θεὸς καὶ οὐ name God is one and not three.79
τρεῖς.78
It must be admitted that, all throughout Ad Graecos, Gregory makes state-
ments to the effect that “God” signifies the divine nature or ousia. One might
wonder, then, even if Gregory is fairly clear in Ad Eustathium and Ad Ablabium
(as well as his anti-Eunomian works) that he doesn’t endorse this claim, but
only considers it by way of responding to an objection, why Gregory sounds, in
the Ad Graecos, as though he does accept it after all.
There are a couple of ways to respond to this. First, probably the easiest
way, and I suppose the way “of the many,” would be to simply say that Gregory’s
views developed over time. Second, one can respond based on my proposal that
Gregory gives different arguments for different audiences.
Let’s consider first the easy way out.
It’s notoriously difficult to pin down very firm dates for Gregory’s writings.
It’s clear that Ad Ablabium was written very late, in Gregory’s old age, but in
that work, he’s also quite clear about the semantics of “God.” As for the other
triadological works we would want to take into consideration, we’re left with Ad
Eustathium, Ad Petrum and Ad Graecos, as well as his anti-Eunomian writings.
The uncertainty of the dates of these works, and the fact that by all accounts
they were likely written in at least roughly the same time period, makes it at
least easier than usual to challenge the usually suggested dates. One could argue
that, if Gregory ends up saying that “God” signifies an energeia in Ad Ablabium,
77. (Cross 2002), p. 405.
78. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 19.
79. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1994). I have simply substituted “ousia” for Daley’s “sub-
stance.”
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but in the Ad Graecos says “God” signifies the ousia, then that’s reason to put
Ad Graecos earlier. If Ad Petrum seems to say the same thing, one can argue
it should be dated earlier as well (Cross dates it in the late 370’s anyway). So,
if we date Ad Eustathium to some time after that (later in the 370’s or early
380’s, say) along with Contra Eunomium, then we can easily tell a story about
development. In Ad Petrum, Gregory (or Basil) is just working out this new
theory of universals, allowing him to accept the homoousion without having to
admit that God is “divisible” or a “collection.” In Ad Graecos, Gregory connects
“God” with ousia so as to use it in a response to what amounts to the Logical
Problem of the Trinity, but perhaps has a few misgivings, based on his view of
the mysteriousness of the divine nature. Later, in Contra Eunomium and Ad
Eustathium, Gregory thoroughly disavows the use of “God” to signify the ousia.
Then in Ad Ablabium, he mentions the view again only because it is a majority
opinion.
So, at least, is the story that one might tell. And if there was no other way
to explain the statements in Ad Graecos, that would be the story I in fact would
tell.
But I’m not actually convinced that such a story has to be told, or should
be.
First of all, if we can date any of these works first, it would likely be the Ad
Petrum. And it certainly looks initially as though Ad Petrum would support
the reading of Gregory as using “God” to signify the ousia. After all, he barely
talks about energeia in Ad Petrum (he uses the term, or inflections of it, only
5 times, never in any very technical use, and never to say it is the signification
of “God.”)
But it’s interesting to note that, even in Ad Petrum, although Gregory dis-
cusses the metaphysical distinction between ousia and hypostasis, and his the-
ology of three divine hypostases and one divine ousia, he never once asserts the
semantic claim that the word “God” signifies the divine ousia. The example he
gives for a noun that signifies an ousia is not “God,” but “man.”
Πάντων τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἐpiὶ Of all nouns, the sense of some,
piλειόνων καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ διαφερόντων which are predicated of subjects plu-
λεγόμενα piραγμάτων καθολικωτέραν ral and numerically various, is more
τινὰ τὴν σημασίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἄνθρω- general; as for instance “man.”81
piος.80
So, in fact, although Ad Petrum makes it quite clear what Gregory thinks
the metaphysics of ousia and hypostasis is, the evidence from Ad Petrum is
simply inconclusive as to what Gregory thinks the semantics of “God” is.
Obviously the suggestion I want to make is that Gregory is simply fitting his
argument to different audiences. And not in a disingenuous way. He is simply
taking into account the presuppositions of his interlocutors. It’s true that, given
80. (St. Basil the Great 1957-1966), vol. 1, epistle 38, section 2.
81. (St. Basil the Great 1895), p. 137.
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my interpretation, even in Ad Graecos one might expect him to keep talk about
“God” signifying the nature always in the hypothetical, and yet that we don’t
find him doing that. (He seems to simply say that “God” does in fact signify
the nature). But for one thing, it may simply be that Gregory doesn’t mind
affirming a non-misleading falsehood here. Or that putting a large number of the
sentences of this work into a subjunctive mood would simply read too awkwardly
for Gregory’s inner rhetorician to feel good about. More importantly, though,
consider this passage from the Ad Graecos itself:
εἰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν μονὰς τῆς And if the Holy Trinity comprise
ἁγίας τριάδος, δῆλον ὄτι καὶ κατὰ τὸ a monad with respect to ousia, it is
θεὸς ὄνομα. clear that this is also true with re-
spect to the name “God”.
δηλωτικὸν γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οὐσίας For this [the name “God”] signi-
οὐ τὸ τί αὐτῆς piαριστῶν (δῆλον ὄτι fies the ousia, not in that it repre-
ἐpiείpiερ ἀpiερινόητον καὶ ἀκατάληpi- sents what the ousia *is* (that is ob-
τον τὸ τῆς θείας οὐσίας), ἀλλ’ ἀpiό vious, since the “what” of the divine
τινος ἰδιώματος piροσόντος αὐτῇ λαμ- ousia is beyond our understanding
βανόμενον piαραδηλοῖ αὐτήν, καθάpiερ and mental grasp), but in that it
τὸ χρεμετιστικὸν καὶ τὸ γελαστικὸν hints at the appropriate idioma by
ἰδιώματα ὄντα φύσεων λεγόμενα which we can lay hold of it - just as
σημαίνει τὰς φύσεις, ὧνpiέρ ἐστιν ἰδιώ- being able to neigh or to laugh, be-
ματα. ing what we all “natural idiomata,”
signify the natures of which they are
idiomata.
ἔστι τοίνυν ἰδίωμα τῆς ἀϊδίου Now it is an idioma of the eter-
οὐσίας, ἧς ἐστι piατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς καὶ nal ousia to which Father and Son
ἅγιον piνεῦμα, τὸ piάντα ἐpiοpiτεύειν and Holy Spirit belong to survey and
καὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ γινώσκειν, οὐ μόνον understand and know all things: not
τὰ ἔργῳ γινόμενα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν just what takes place in action (*ta
νῷ λαμβανόμενα, ὄpiερ μόνης ἐστὶν ergo ginomena*), but even what is
ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας, ἅτε δὴ καὶ αἰτίας grasped in the mind. This [activ-
piάντων ὑpiαρχούσης τῆς τὰ piάντα ity] is proper to that ousia alone,
piοιησάσης καὶ piάντων ὡς ἰδίων piοιη- since it is the cause of all things,
μάτων δεσpiοζούσης, τὰ ῾δὲ᾿ κατ’ ἀν- has made all things, and reigns over
θρώpiους ἅpiαντα συμφέροντί τινι καὶ all things as its own productions,
ἀρρήτῳ λόγῳ piρυτανευούσης. presiding over all human affairs by
some appropriate but ineffable word
of command.
ἐντεῦθεν εἰλημμένον τὸ θεὸς Understood on this basis, the
ὄνομα κυρίως λεγόμενον σημαίνει τὴν noun “God” signifies, properly speak-
οὐσίαν ἐκείνην, ἤτις ἀληθῶς δεσpiόζει ing, that ousia which truly rules all
τῶν ἁpiάντων ὡς piάντων δημιουργός. things as creator of all.
μιᾶς τοιγαροῦν ὑpiαρχούσης τῆς Since, therefore, the ousia to
οὐσίας, ἧς ἐστι piατὴρ καὶ υἱὸς which Father, Son and Holy Spirit
καὶ ἅγιον piνεῦμα, καὶ ἑνὸς τοῦ belong is one, and since the name
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piαραδηλοῦντος αὐτὴν ὀνόματος (φημὶ that expresses it is one (i.e., the
δή, τοῦ θεός) εἷς θεὸς ἔσται name “God”), God will be one in the
κυρίως καὶ ἀκολούθως τῷ λόγῳ τῆς proper sense, according to the struc-
οὐσίας, μηδενὸς λόγου καταναγκά- ture of his ousia; no rationale will
ζοντος ἡμᾶς τρεῖς λέγειν θεούς, force us to speak of “three Gods,”
ὤσpiερ οὖν οὐδὲ τρεῖς οὐσίας.82 just as there are not three ousiai.83
Note that what Gregory calls “the natural idiomata” – being able to neigh or
laugh – are energeiai (or dynameis). And that, in the case of the divine nature,
the relevant idioma of the nature is the energeia of “beholding” or “knowing all
things.” (More on this energeia just below; more on idiomata below, section
4.4.1, p. 175 ff.).
So, even here, although he goes along with the idea that “God” signifies the
ousia, he allows that it does so only by way of signifying that ousia’s “natural
idioma” – the energeia of “beholding” – and in turn the energeia itself “signifies”
the ousia. Now, whatever the nature of this “signification” going on between an
energeia and an ousia (presumably something like the way in which smoke –
naturally – “means” fire), it seems clear that, even in Ad Graecos, Gregory takes
it that the primary signification of “God” is actually the energeia of “beholding.”
And this is really what we ought to antecedently expect anyway, as it turns
out to be a very clear trend in the tradition leading up to Gregory. The following
are just a few examples from the ante-Nicene fathers, to illustrate that these
views are taken from an earlier tradition.
St. Justin Martyr (c. 150 AD), Apologia Secunda:
῎Ονομα δὲ τῷ piάντων piατρὶ θετόν, But to the Father of all, being
ἀγεννήτῳ ὄντι, οὐκ ἔστιν· ᾧ γὰρ ἂν unbegotten, there is no name given.
καὶ ὄνομά τι piροσαγορεύηται, piρεσ- For by whatever name He be called,
βύτερον ἔχει τὸν θέμενον τὸ ὄνομα. He has as His elder the one who gives
Him the name.
τὸ δὲ piατὴρ καὶ θεὸς καὶ κτίστης But “Father,” and “God,” and
καὶ κύριος καὶ δεσpiότης οὐκ ὀνόματά “Creator,” and “Lord,” and “master,”
ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν εὐpiοιϊῶν καὶ τῶν are not names (ὀνόματα), but attri-
ἔργων piροσρήσεις.84 butions (piροσρήσεις)85derived from
His well-doing and works (ἔργα).”86
Theophilus of Antioch (c. 180 AD), Ad Autolycum:
θεὸς δὲ λέγεται διὰ τὸ τεθεικέναι And he is called God (θεός)
τὰ piάντα ἐpiὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείᾳ, on account of His having placed
82. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 21-22.
83. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1994). I have substituted “ousia” for Daley’s “substance” and
“idioma” for Daley’s “characteristic.”
84. (St. Justin Martyr 1915), pp. 78-89
85. Or “modes of attribution,” cf. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Book I, Ch.2.
86. (St. Justin Martyr et al. 1885), p. 190. Emphasis mine.
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(τεθεικέναι, from τίθημι) all things
on security afforded by Himself;
καὶ διὰ τὸ θέειν· τὸ δὲ θέειν ἐστὶν and on account of θέειν (from
τὸ τρέχειν καὶ κινεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν καὶ θέω). For θέειν is running, andmov-
τρέφειν καὶ piρονοεῖν καὶ κυβερνᾶν καὶ ing, and energizing, and nourishing,
ζωοpiοιεῖν τὰ piάντα.87 and foreseeing, and governing, and
making all things alive.88
Origen (c. 215 AD), De Principiis
Quaecunque ergo diximus de Whatever, therefore, we have
sapientia Dei, haec convenienter predicated of the wisdom of God,
aptabuntur et intelligentur etiam will be appropriately applied and
pro eo quod Filius Dei vita est, et understood of the Son of God, in
pro eo quod verbum est, et pro eo virtue of His being the Life, and the
quod veritas est, et pro eo quod res- Word, and the Truth and the Res-
urrectio est: urrection:
Quia hae omnes appellationes ex For all these titles are derived
operibus eius ac virtutibus nomi- from His power and operations [Lat.
natae sunt . . . 89 operibus, = energeia] . . . 90
Other examples can be given from within the pro-Nicene consensus itself. I
will give just a couple of examples from St. Ambrose’s De Fide (Ad Gratianum)
here.
Ambrose, De Fide Ad Gratianum Augustum Libri Quinque:
Deus enim et Dominus nomen For ‘God’ and ‘Lord’ is a name
magnificentiae, nomen est potes- of majesty, a name of power, even
tatis, sicut ipse dicit: Dominus as God Himself saith: ‘The Lord is
nomen est mihi. Et sicut alibi My name,’ and as in another place
Propheta asserit: Dominus om- the prophet declareth: ‘The Lord
nipotens nomen est ei [Esai. xlii, Almighty is His name.’ [Isaiah 42:8]
8]. Dominus ergo et Deus vel God is He, therefore, and Lord, ei-
quod dominetur omnibus, vel quod ther because His rule is over all,
spectet omnia, et timeatur a cunc- or because He beholdeth all things,
tis. . . 91 and is feared by all, without differ-
ence. . . 92
Et hic ergo cum dicitur: Pluit So again, when you read, ‘The
Dominus a Domino, unitatem di- Lord rained from the Lord,’ ac-
vinitatis agnosce. Operationis enim knowledge the unity of Godhead,
unitas non facit pluralem divini- for unity in operation [operatio, =
87. (Theophilus of Antioch 1970).
88. (Theophilus of Antioch et al. 1905), p. 90.
89. (Origen 1836), p. 110.
90. (Tertullian et al. 1885), p. 247.
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tatem, sicut ipse Dominus ostendit, energeia] doth not allow of more
dicens: Credite mihi, quia ego in than one individual God, even as
Patre, et Pater in me: alioquin vel the Lord Himself has shown, saying:
propter opera ipsa credite [Ioan. x, ‘Believe Me, that I am in the Father,
38]. Et hic advertimus quod uni- and the Father in Me: or believe
tatem divinitatis per unitatem ope- Me for the very works’ sake.’ [John
rum designaverit.93 10:38] Here, too, we see that unity
of Godhead is signified by unity in
operation [operatio, = energeia].94
Thus, we really should come to read Gregory expecting to find him holding
the view that “God” signifies, not the divine nature, but some kind of divine
activity, i.e., energeia (Lat. operatio). And that if he has any specific view on
what that energeia is, it will probably be “beholding.” So, I wouldn’t actually
subscribe to a developmental story on this particular question. I find it more
likely that Gregory’s view on this semantic issue probably really was consistent
over time, just as he claims in Ad Eustathium.
Thus, although Ad Graecos may be a bit of a rough patch in my interpreta-
tion, I think that, on the whole, it looks more like Gregory had a consistent view
that “God” signifies an energeia. Only that he also adapts his arguments to a
particular audience’s presuppositions (to the extent that he can), rather than
resting his argument on more controversial premises than he needs to (which
seems like just good common sense – and in a certain sense, just good manners).
And in either case, whether we accept the view that Gregory is simply ac-
commodating the presuppositions of different audiences, or we tell some kind
of developmental story, in either case, certainly within the Ad Ablabium (al-
most certainly the latest of his triadological writings), it seems clear enough
that Gregory does not actually accept the presupposition of the UNA, that
“God” signifies the ousia, but he rather holds that “God” signifies an energeia
(specifically, “beholding.”)
Thus (happily) when Gregory claims that it would be strictly speaking false,
even if not misleading, to claim that there are “many men,” due to their monadic
nature, it turns out that deciding the question of whether this claim of Gregory’s
is correct or not is unnecessary for our purposes. That is, although he does seem
to think that, strictly speaking, there is only one man, because there is only one
human nature, this (nowadays controversial) view turns out to be inessential to
the response to Ablabius’ argument that Gregory himself actually accepts.
If one needs any further evidence of this, let us return to the Ad Ablabium
and consider Gregory’s conclusion to the section on the UNA, which may seem
perplexing on a first reading:
Οὐκοῦν εἷς ἡμῖν ὁμολογητέος Therefore we must confess one
91. PL 16, p. 530.
92. (St. Ambrose of Milan 1896), p. 202.
93. PL 16, p. 534.
94. (St. Ambrose of Milan 1896), p. 205.
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θεὸς κατὰ τὴν γραφικὴν μαρτυρίαν God, according to the testimony
v῎Ακουε, v᾿Ισραήλ· κύριος ὁ θεός σου of Scripture, “Hear, O Israel, the
κύριος εἷς ἐστι, κἂν ἡ φωνὴ τῆς Lord thy God is one Lord,” even
θεότητος διήκῃ διὰ τῆς ἁγίας τριά- though the name of Godhead ex-
δος. tends through the Holy Trinity.
ταῦτα δὲ λέγω κατὰ τὸν ἀpiοδο- This I say according to the ac-
θέντα ἡμῖν ἐpiὶ τῆς ἀνθρωpiίνης φύσε- count we have given in the case of
ως λόγον, ἐν ᾧ μεμαθήκαμεν μὴ δεῖν human nature, in which we have
piληθυντικῷ χαρακτῆρι τὴν piροση- learnt that it is improper to extend
γορίαν piλατύνειν τῆς φύσεως. the name of the nature by the mark
of plurality.
ἀκριβέστερον δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτὸ τὸ We must, however, more care-
ὄνομα τῆς θεότητος ἐξεταστέον, fully examine the name of “God-
ὄpiως ἂν διὰ τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῇ φωνῇ head,” in order to obtain, by means
σημασίας γένοιτό τις συνεργία piρὸς of the significance involved in the
τὴν τοῦ piροκειμένου σαφήνειαν.95 word, some help towards clearing up
the question before us.96
If Gregory actually accepted the UNA, he ought to have ended with the first
sentence above. He has given a response to the LPT: pluralizing the “name”
(noun) derived from a nature on the basis of there being a plurality of individuals
with that nature is merely a common abuse of language, even in the case of
created things such as men. Now, whether or not one agrees with Gregory that
this is true, surely Gregory thinks it is. And if Gregory thinks it is true, we must
ask why Gregory does not think his task is finished. Why would Gregory think
there was still a need for obtaining any “help towards clearing up the question”
if he thought the UNA, which he has just presented, is already an adequate
answer to that question? Clearly, the fact is that Gregory does not in fact think
the UNA is an adequate answer to the LPT.
And as expected in light of our discussion to this point, in examining “the
name of ‘Godhead’. . . ” and “the significance involved in the word,” Gregory
points out that the UNA presupposes that “God” is the name of the divine
nature, in just the same way as “man” is the name of the human nature, and he
points out his denial of that view, again pointing out that he focuses on it only
because he takes it to be the common viewpoint (not his own). Notice that,
much as he did in Ad Eustathium (above, pp. 136–139.), he couches the UNA
within the following two crucial “even if” clauses.
First, Gregory argues, even if “God” did not signify an energeia (beholding),
it still could not denote the divine essence (as his opponents claim), because
the divine essence is “above all names,” and “God” is a name. He says:
μάχεσθαι δὲ piρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλέ- It does not seem to me abso-
γοντας μὴ δεῖν ἐνέργειαν νοεῖν τὴν lutely necessary, with a view to the
θεότητα οὐ piάνυ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων present proof of our argument, to
95. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 42.
96. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 332.
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μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς piρὸς τὴν piαροῦσαν τοῦ contend against those who oppose us
λόγου κατασκευήν. with the assertion that we are not to
conceive “Godhead” as an operation
[energeia].
ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον καὶ For we, believing the Divine na-
ἀpiερίληpiτον τὴν θείαν φύσιν εἶναι ture to be unlimited and incompre-
piιστεύοντες οὐδεμίαν αὐτῆς ἐpiινοοῦ- hensible, conceive no comprehension
μεν piερίληψιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ piάντα of it, but declare that the nature is
τρόpiον ἐν ἀpiειρίᾳ νοεῖσθαι τὴν φύσιν to be conceived in all respects as in-
διοριζόμεθα. τὸ δὲ καθόλου ἄpiειρον finite: and that which is absolutely
οὐ τινὶ μὲν ὁρίζεται, τινὶ δὲ οὐχί ἀλλὰ infinite is not limited in one respect
κατὰ piάντα λόγον ἐκφεύγει τὸν ὄρον while it is left unlimited in another,
ἡ ἀpiειρία. οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐκτὸς ὄρου οὐδὲ but infinity is free from limitation
ὀνόματι piάντως ὁρίζεται. altogether. That therefore which is
without limit is surely not limited
even by name.
ὡς ἂν οὖν διαμένοι ἐpiὶ τῆς θείας In order then to mark the con-
φύσεως τοῦ ἀορίστου ἡ ἔννοια, ὑpiὲρ stancy of our conception of infin-
piᾶν ὄνομά φαμεν εἶναι τὸ θεῖον, ἡ ity in the case of the Divine na-
δὲ θεότης ἓν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐστίν. ture, we say that the Deity, is above
οὐκοῦν οὐ δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ every name: and “Godhead” is a
ὄνομα εἶναι καὶ ὑpiὲρ piᾶν ὄνομα εἶναι name. Now it cannot be that the
νομίζεσθαι.. . . 97 same thing should at once be a name
and be accounted as above every
name.. . . 98
Thus, Gregory argues that, if he is wrong about “God” signifying an energeia,
it does not automatically follow that “God” signifies the divine nature. In fact,
it must signify neither an energeia, nor the divine nature, but something else
entirely.
The second “even if” clause is that, even if he is wrong about the first “even
if” clause, and “God” did signify the divine nature after all, there would still
only be one God on his view, because there is only one divine nature. That is,
because the UNA would be there as a “back-up” argument. He says:
Πλὴν εἰ τοῦτο τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἀρέ- But if it pleases our adversaries
σκοι, τὸ μὴ ἐνεργείας ἀλλὰ φύσεως to say that the significance of the
εἶναι τὴν σημασίαν, ἐpiαναδραμούμεθα term [“Godhead”] is not [energeia],
piρὸς τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον. . . 99 but [is] nature, we shall fall back
upon our original argument [the
UNA].100
97. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 52.
98. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 335.
99. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 53.
100. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 335.
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This was exactly the same move Gregory made in Ad Eustathium (See above,
pp. 136–139). Thus, although UNA is the first substantive response given by
Gregory in “To Albabius,” he cannot actually accept it as a sound argument, as
he denies one of its premises.
So we see that it is not the UNA, but the UAA, that is the only response
Gregory actually regards as adequate. That is, SMA does not even give us the
resources to determine any answer Ablabius’ question at all, and UNA gives us
a solution, but one that Gregory himself regards as relying on false semantic
premises. He only gives the UNA for the sake of those who accept this common,
but in Gregory’s view false, semantic assumption (i.e., most pagans and some
heretics). Just as the SMA is the least misleading response it is possible for
the uneducated to comprehend, UNA is the least misleading response one could
give to the educated who labor under this false, but apparently widespread,
semantic presupposition.
We’ve seen that Gregory himself does not regard the UNA as adequate. And
the semantics of collective nouns it relies on seems implausible today. So the
UNA has little to recommend it. But if this is so, the question is, what is the
solution to the LPT provided by the UAA?
4.3 Idiomata
Now we’ve already seen what the concepts of ousia and hypostasis amount to
above, or at least what they amount to on my reading, following Cross. Namely,
that ousia and hypostasis are, respectively, a kind of universal or common qual-
ity (specifically, a nature, conceived of as a monadic in re universal, wholly
present in its instances) and a particular or individual (minus the connotations
of being a literal “part” of something, or the result of a process of “division”).
But before I can explain exactly what I think is going on in the UAA, we need
to understand one final concept – that of the idioma,101 which will turn out
to be important for understanding an under appreciated feature of Gregory’s
thinking about energeiai.
I will argue that Gregory takes the idiomata to be what individuates the
hypostases, although there is some ambiguity in Gregory’s account of idiomata,
so that we will have to consider both a “strong” and a “weak” version of the
identity conditions for hypostases. We will later see that the idiomata are in a
certain sense inessential for our own purposes in formulating a formal account
of Gregory’s views. However, the fact that Gregory attributes idiomata not
only to hypostases, but later to energeiai (as well as the fact that energeiai
are said to be the “idiomata of ousiai ”) turns out to have a critical implication
about Gregory’s understanding of the metaphysics of energeiai that is useful in
understanding his solution to the LPT (even if not critical to stating it later,
after we understand what it is).
101. Although, in the passage I will point to in Ad Ablabium, the term used is “idiotropon,”
but the meaning is the same.
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First, I want to look at some of the background to Gregory’s theory of
universals that Cross mentions. Specifically, a passage from Basil’s Epistle 214
and another from his Epistle 236, since Basil’s thinking on this matter is clearly
influential on Gregory (or at least reflective of Gregory’s views, if the influence
went the other way around). Then we’ll look at Gregory’s Ad Petrum for a
fuller discussion.
4.3.1 Basil’s Epistles 214 and 236
In Epistle 214, Basil says:
. . . ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν piρὸς
τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία piρὸς τὴν
. . . [O]usia has the same rela-
tion to hypostasis as the common
ὑpiόστασιν. ῎Εκαστος γὰρ ἡμῶν καὶ has to the peculiar (idion). For each
τῷ κοινῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τοῦ εἶναι of us both participates in existence
μετέχει καὶ τοῖς piερὶ αὐτὸν ἰδιώμασιν by the common logos of the ousia,
ὁ δεῖνά ἐστι καὶ ὁ δεῖνα. Οὔτω κἀκεῖ and, by the idiomata around him,
ὁ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας λόγος κοινός, οἷον is so-and-so and so-and-so. In the
ἡ ἀγαθότης, ἡ θεότης, ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο same way, in this case [the case of
νοοῖτο· ἡ δὲ ὑpiόστασις ἐν τῷ ἰδιώματι the Trinity], the logos of the ousia is
τῆς piατρότητος ἢ τῆς υἱότητος ἢ τῆς common, such as goodness, or God-
ἁγιαστικῆς δυνάμεως θεωρεῖται.102 hood, or if something else were un-
derstood; but the hypostasis is con-
templated in the idioma of father-
hood, or of sonship, or of the power
of sanctifying.103
Cross notes that τὸ κοινὸν, which I’ve translated “common,” is the normal
word for a universal in these texts.104 So, Basil here claims that ousia is a
universal and hypostasis a particular.105
But note also the role of idiomata here. We are told that each of us individ-
uals “participates in existence by the common logos of the ousia,” i.e., we exist
only in virtue of instantiating our essence or nature. Thus, on Basil’s view, and
Gregory would certainly follow him here, there cannot be any hypostasis that
does not have an ousia or nature. But of course, while the instantiation of a
nature is sufficient for the existence of some-or-another hypostasis (that man-
hood is instantiated entails that there exists some man), for the existence of a
certain, definite hypostasis, this is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition
(the existence of Mark Twain entails that man-hood is instantiated, but that
102. (St. Basil the Great 1957-1966), vol. 2, epistle 214, section 4.
103. Translation mine.
104. (Cross 2002), p. 386, “the preferred term for universal is ‘common’ (κοινὸν) though
‘universal’ (καθόλου) crops up occasionally. (Note, however,that there is no philosophical
precedent for distinguishing the senses of ‘common’ and ‘universal’, so in the lack of any
counterevidence we can reasonably accept their synonymity in the theological context too.)”
105. Or as I’ve rendered it here, somewhat better, even if more awkward, “peculiar,” that is
τὸ ἴδιον. Not particular in the sense of μερικὴ οὐσία.
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man-hood is instantiated does not entail the existence of Mark Twain in particu-
lar). He goes on to discuss the particularity of each individual as involving what
he calls an idioma. “[each of us . . . ] by the idiomata around him is so-and-so
and so-and-so. . . the hypostasis is contemplated in the idioma. . . ” Thus, it is a
“peculiar quality” or qualities (idioma or idiomata) in virtue of which we count
as this or that particular individual, and it is the instantiation of those idiomata
(or co-instantiation of them with a nature) in virtue of which a given definite
individual exists. Thus, just as a hypostasis could not exist without an ousia
or nature, it could also not exist without an idioma.
In Epistle 236, Basil makes the same points:
Οὐσία δὲ καὶ ὑpiόστασις ταύτην Οὐσία and ὑpiόστασις have the
ἔχει τὴν διαφορὰν ἣν ἔχει τὸ κοινὸν same difference which the common
piρὸς τὸ καθ’ ἔκαστον, οἷον ὡς ἔχει has to the particular (kath hekas-
τὸ ζῷον piρὸς τὸν δεῖνα ἄνθρωpiον. ton); such as animal has to a certain
man.
Διὰ τοῦτο οὐσίαν μὲν μίαν ἐpiὶ Wherefore, in the case of the
τῆς θεότητος ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὤστε τὸν Godhead, we confess one ousia so
τοῦ εἶναι λόγον μὴ διαφόρως ἀpiο- as not to give a variant logos of ex-
διδόναι· ὑpiόστασιν δὲ ἰδιάζουσαν, istence, but we confess a particular
ἴν’ ἀσύγχυτος ἡμῖν καὶ τετρανωμένη hypostasis, in order that our concep-
ἡ piερὶ Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ Α῾γίου tion of Father, Son and Holy Spirit
Πνεύματος ἔννοια ἐνυpiάρχῃ. may be without confusion and clear.
Μὴ γὰρ νοούντων ἡμῶν τοὺς If we have no distinct perception
ἀφωρισμένους piερὶ ἔκαστον χαρακ- of the separate characters (charak-
τῆρας, οἷον piατρότητα καὶ υἱότητα tera, χαρακτῆρα), namely, father-
καὶ ἁγιασμόν, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς ἐν- hood, sonship, and sanctification,
νοίας τοῦ εἶναι ὁμολογούντων Θεόν, but form our conception of God
ἀμήχανον ὑγιῶς τὸν λόγον τῆς piίστε- from the general idea of existence,
ως ἀpiοδίδοσθαι. we cannot possibly give a sound ac-
count of our faith.
Χρὴ οὖν τῷ κοινῷ τὸ ἰδιάζον We must, therefore, confess the
piροστιθέντας, οὔτω τὴν piίστιν ὁμο- faith by adding the particular to the
λογεῖν· common.
κοινὸν ἡ θεότης, ἴδιον ἡ piατρότης· Godhood is common; fatherhood
particular (idion, ἴδιον).
συνάpiτοντας λέγειν· piιστεύω εἰς We must therefore combine the
Θεὸν Πατέρα. two and say, “I believe in God the
Father.”
Καὶ piάλιν ἐν τῇ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ὁμο- The like course must be pursued
λογίᾳ τὸ piαραpiλήσιον piοιεῖν, τῷ in the confession of the Son; we
κοινῷ συνάpiτειν τὸ ἴδιον καὶ λέγειν· must combine the particular with
εἰς Θεὸν Υἱόν. ῾Ομοίως καὶ ἐpiὶ the common and say, “I believe in
τοῦ Πνεύματος τοῦ Α῾γίου κατὰ τὸ God the Son,” so in the case of the
ἀκόλουθον τῆς ἐκφωνήσεως τὴν piρο- Holy Spirit we must make our utter-
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φορὰν σχηματίζοντας λέγειν· piισ- ance conform to the appellation and
τεύω καὶ εἰς τὸ θεῖον Πνεῦμα τὸ say “in God the Holy Spirit.”
῎Αγιον,
ὤστε δι’ ὄλου καὶ τὴν ἑνότητα Hence it results that there is
σῴζεσθαι ἐν τῇ τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος a satisfactory preservation of the
ὁμολογίᾳ, καὶ τὸ τῶν piροσώpiων ἰδιά- unity by the confession of the one
ζον ὁμολογεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ ἀφορισμῷ Godhead, while in the distinction of
τῶν piερὶ ἔκαστον νοουμένων ἰδι- the individual properties (τῶν ἰδι-
ωμάτων.106 ωμάτων) regarded in each there is
the confession of the peculiarity (τὸ
ἰδιάζον) of the Persons.107
Here he uses the phrase καθ’ ἔκαστον instead of τὸ ἴδιον to describe the hy-
postases as what we would call particulars or individuals (minus the nominalist
connotations of those terms in his time), and initially uses χαρακτήρ instead of
ἰδιώμα to speak of fatherhood, sonship and sanctification (“the power of sanc-
tifying” in Epistle 214), but clearly the use is synonymous, or closely related.
That is, he uses “character” (charaktera, χαρακτήρ) to describe “fatherhood, son-
ship and sanctification,” which are also the idiomata. Thus, either the concepts
of χαρακτήρ and ἰδιώμα are simply identical, or closely enough related as to
be used interchangeably in this context. (I’ll discuss a possible objection from
DelCogliano on this point below, p. 169.)
4.3.2 Ad Petrum
For the locus classicus of Gregory’s view on the distinction between hypostasis
and ousia – also the locus classicus for this distinction in the entire Trinitarian
controversy – we turn to his Ad Petrum. This is essentially the same work as
what has come down to us traditionally as St. Basil’s Epistle 38, addressed to
St. Gregory of Nyssa, but it appears also among Gregory of Nyssa’s works as
an epistle to his brother Peter of Sebaste. Although there is still some scholarly
debate as to which is the correct attribution, the majority opinion is now that
this was in fact written by Gregory of Nyssa to Peter of Sebaste. Thus, given
the current general consensus of Gregorian authorship, it has come to be known
as the “Ad Petrum,” on the assumption that it is actually to Peter of Sebaste.
I will also assume Gregorian authorship here, but even if written by St. Basil,
there is no doubt that Gregory accepts the ideas expressed in it, regardless of
whether it was he or Basil that authored it.
In the Ad Petrum, we will see that hypostases are semantically connected
to proper nouns, and ousiai are semantically connected to common nouns.108
This is important, since the entire discussion is reminiscent of Stoic discussions
of proper and common nouns, and the Stoics defined proper nouns in terms of
106. (St. Basil the Great 1957-1966), vol. 3, epistle 236, section 6.
107. Translation adapted from (St. Basil the Great 1895), p. 278.
108. It will become clear why I hesitate to say more than “semantically connected” in the
course of the discussion.
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idiomata. The views of the Stoics were taken up later by the ancient grammar-
ians, some of whom (like Dionysius Thrax) rejected the Stoic view, but some
of whom (like Apollonius Dyscolus) accepted it. If the Stoics, either directly
or mediated through the grammarians, are the source for Gregory’s discussion
here, then we could reasonably expect his theory of idiomata to reflect theirs as
well. On the other hand, we will see that there are parallels to Neo-Platonism
in Gregory’s discussion of idiomata as well. And this will make a difference as
to how we understand Gregory, since there is a case to be made that the Stoic
theory of idiomata is in a certain sense much stronger than the Neo-Platonist.
But first, Gregory.
After an introduction on the theological importance of the distinction be-
tween hypostasis and ousia, Gregory says:
v῎Εστι τοίνυν, ὡς ἐν ὀλίγῳ piαρα- The meaning of the words, to put
στῆσαι, τοιαύτη τῶν λεγομένων ἡ ἔν- it shortly, is as follows:
νοια.
Πάντων τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἐpiὶ Of all nouns, some, which are
piλειόνων καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ διαφερόντων predicated of subjects plural and
λεγόμενα piραγμάτων καθολικωτέραν numerically distinct, have a certain
τινὰ τὴν σημασίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἄνθρω- more general signification; such as
piος. “man.”
v῾Ο γὰρ τοῦτο εἰpiών, τὴν κοινὴν When we so say, we indicate the
φύσιν διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος δείξας, οὐ common nature through the noun,
piεριέγραψε τῇ φωνῇ τὸν τινὰ ἄνθρω- and do not determine by the word
piον, τὸν ἰδίως ὑpiὸ (5) τοῦ ὀνόματος a certain man, who is peculiarly
γνωριζόμενον. known by that name.
Οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον Πέτρος ἄνθρωpiός Peter, for instance is no more
ἐστιν ἢ καὶ v᾿Ανδρέας καὶ v᾿Ιωάννης καὶ man than Andrew, John, or James.
v᾿Ιάκωβος.
The signification therefore be-
v῾Η οὖν κοινότης τοῦ σημαινομέ- ing common, and extending to all
νου, ὁμοίως ἐpiὶ piάντας τοὺς ὑpiὸ τὸ the individuals ranked under the
αὐτὸ ὄνομα τεταγμένους χωροῦσα, same name, has need of a distinction
χρείαν ἔχει τῆς ὑpiοδιαστολῆς δι’ ἧς through which we may understand,
οὐ τὸν καθόλου ἄνθρωpiον, ἀλλὰ τὸν not the universal man, but Peter or
Πέτρον ἢ τὸν v᾿Ιωάννην ἐpiιγνωσόμεθα. John.
Τὰ δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἰδικωτέραν Other nouns, on the other hand,
ἔχει τὴν ἔνδειξιν δι’ ἧς οὐχ ἡ κοινότης have a more peculiar denotation,
τῆς φύσεως ἐνθεωρεῖται τῷ σημαιν- through the signification of which
ομένῳ, ἀλλὰ piράγματός τινος piερι- is contemplated not the commonal-
γραφὴ μηδεμίαν ἔχουσα piρὸς τὸ ὁμο- ity of the nature, but the outline of
γενές, κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον, τὴν κοιν- a certain thing, having no common-
ωνίαν, οἷον ὁ Παῦλος ἢ ὁ Τιμόθεος. ality, according to that which pe-
culiarizes, with what is of the same
kind, such as “Paul” or “Timothy.”
Οὐκέτι γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη φωνὴ ἐpiὶ For, in a word of this kind there
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τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως φέρεται, ἀλλὰ is no extension to what is common
χωρίσασα τῆς piεριληpiτικῆς σημασίας in the nature; there is a separation
piεριγεγραμμένων τινῶν piραγμάτων of certain outlined conceptions from
ἔμφασιν διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων piαρίστη- the general idea, and expression of
σιν. them by means of their names.
Suppose then that two or more
v῎Οταν οὖν δύο ἢ καὶ piλειόνων are set together, as, for instance,
κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄντων, οἷον Παύλου Paul, Silvanus, and Timothy, and
καὶ Σιλουανοῦ καὶ Τιμοθέου, piερὶ that an enquiry is made into the ou-
τῆς οὐσίας τῶν ἀνθρώpiων ζητεῖται sia of the men; no one will give one
λόγος, οὐκ ἄλλον τις ἀpiοδώσει τῆς logos of the ousia in the case of Paul,
οὐσίας ἐpiὶ τοῦ Παύλου λόγον, ἔτερον a different one in that of Silvanus,
δὲ ἐpiὶ τοῦ Σιλουανοῦ καὶ ἄλλον ἐpiὶ and another in the case of Timothy;
τοῦ Τιμοθέου, ἀλλὰ δι’ ὧν ἂν λόγων but the words through which the ou-
ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Παύλου δειχθῇ οὗτοι καὶ sia of Paul was made known, these
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐφαρμόσουσι, καί εἰσιν same also will fit the others, and
ἀλλήλοις ὁμοούσιοι οἱ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ they are homoousios with one an-
τῆς οὐσίας ὑpiογραφόμενοι. other, those described by the same
logos of the ousia.
v᾿Εpiειδὰν δέ τις τὸ κοινὸν μαθὼν And when the enquirer has
ἐpiὶ τὰ ἰδιάζοντα τρέψῃ τὴν θεωρίαν δι’ learned what is common, and turns
ὧν χωρίζεται τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ ἔτερον, his attention to the peculiarizing
οὐκέτι ὁ ἑκάστου γνωριστικὸς λό- properties through which one is sep-
γος τῷ piερὶ τοῦ ἄλλου διὰ piάντων arated from another, the defini-
συνενεχθήσεται, κἂν ἔν τισιν εὑρεθῇ tion by which each is known will
τὸ κοινὸν ἔχων. no longer tally in all particulars
with the definition of another, even
though in some points it be found to
agree.
Τοῦτο τοίνυν φαμέν· τὸ ἰδίως My statement, then, is this.
λεγόμενον τῷ τῆς ὑpiοστάσεως δη- That which is spoken of peculiarly is
λοῦσθαι ῥήματι. indicated (δηλοῦσθαι) by the name
of the hypostasis.
v῾Ο γὰρ ἄνθρωpiον εἰpiὼν, ἐσκεδασ- Suppose we say “man.” The in-
μένην τινὰ διάνοιαν τῷ ἀορίστῳ τῆς definite meaning of the word strikes
σημασίας τῇ ἀκοῇ ἐνεpiοίησεν, ὤστε a certain vague sense upon the ears.
τὴν μὲν φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος δη- The nature is indicated, but what
λωθῆναι, τὸ δὲ ὑφεστὸς καὶ δηλού- subsists and is specially and pecu-
μενον ἰδίως ὑpiὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος piρᾶγμα liarly indicated by the name is not
μὴ σημανθῆναι. made plain.
v῾Ο δὲ Παῦλον εἰpiὼν, ἔδειξεν ἐν τῷ But suppose we say “Paul.” We
δηλουμένῳ ὑpiὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος piράγ- set forth, by what is indicated by the
ματι ὑφεστῶσαν τὴν φύσιν. name, the nature subsisting.
Τοῦτο οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ὑpiόστασις, This then is the hypostasis, or
οὐχ ἡ ἀόριστος τῆς οὐσίας ἔννοια “standing under;” not the indefinite
μηδεμίαν ἐκ τῆς κοινότητος τοῦ ση- conception of the ousia, which, be-
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μαινομένου στάσιν εὑρίσκουσα, ἀλλ’ cause what is signified is general,
ἡ τὸ κοινόν τε καὶ ἀpiερίγραpiτον ἐν τῷ finds no “standing,” but the con-
τινὶ piράγματι διὰ τῶν ἐpiιφαινομένων ception which by means of the ex-
ἰδιωμάτων piαριστῶσα καὶ piεριγρά- pressed idiomata gives standing and
φουσα, ὡς καὶ τῇ Γραφῇ σύνηθες τὸ circumscription to the common and
τοιοῦτο piοιεῖν ἐν ἄλλοις τε piολλοῖς uncircumscribed. It is customary in
καὶ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὸν v᾿Ιὼβ ἱστορίᾳ. Scripture to make a distinction of
this kind, as well in many other pas-
sages as in the History of Job.
v᾿Εpiειδὴ γὰρ ἔμελλε τὰ piερὶ αὐ- When purposing to narrate the
τοῦ διηγεῖσθαι, piρότερον τοῦ κοινοῦ events of his life, Job first men-
μνημονεύσασα καὶ εἰpiοῦσα ἄνθρωpiος tions the common, and says “a man;”
εὐθὺς ἀpiοτέμνει τῷ ἰδιάζοντι ἐν τῇ then he straightway particularizes
piροσθήκῃ τοῦ τίς. by adding “a certain.”
v᾿Αλλὰ τῆς μὲν οὐσίας τὴν ὑpiογρα- For when it was about to nar-
φὴν ὡς οὐδὲν φέρουσαν κέρδος piρὸς rate the affairs about him, after first
τὸν piροκείμενον τοῦ λόγου σκοpiὸν mentioning the common property
ἐσιώpiησε, τὸν δὲ τινὰ διὰ τῶν οἰκείων and having said “man”, it immedi-
γνωρισμάτων χαρακτηρίζει καὶ τόpiον ately distinguishes it by the specific
λέγουσα καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἤθους γνωρίσ- property in the addition of “a cer-
ματα καὶ ὄσα τῶν ἔξωθεν συμpiαραλ- tain.” It silenced the description
ηφθέντα χωρίζειν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀφιστᾶν of the ousia, because this brings no
ἤμελλε τῆς κοινῆς σημασίας, ὤστε benefit to the present aim of the def-
διὰ piάντων ἐναργῆ τοῦ ἱστορουμέ- inition. Rather, it characterizes the
νου γενέσθαι τὴν ὑpiογραφὴν ἐκ τοῦ “certain” person through the gnoris-
ὀνόματος, ἐκ τοῦ τόpiου, ἐκ τῶν τῆς mata, since it states both location
ψυχῆς ἰδιωμάτων, ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν piερὶ and the gnorismata of the character
αὐτὸν θεωρουμένων. . . and all the external contingencies
that would distinguish and set him
apart from the common significa-
tion. As a result, the description of
that which is narrated becomes clear
in all ways : from the name, from
the location, from the idiomata of
the soul, from the external contin-
gencies theoretically observed about
him. . .
v᾿Εpiεὶ δὲ χρὴ διὰ τῶν ἰδιαζόντων And since it is necessary, by
σημείων ἀσύγχυτον ἐpiὶ τῆς Τριάδος means of the peculiarizing signs, in
τὴν διάκρισιν ἔχειν, τὸ μὲν κοινῶς ἐpiι- the case of the Trinity, to keep the
θεωρούμενον, οἷον τὸ ἄκτιστον λέγω, distinction unconfounded, we shall
ἢ τὸ ὑpiὲρ piᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἢ εἴ τι not take into consideration, in or-
τοιοῦτο οὐ συμpiαραληψόμεθα εἰς τὴν der to estimate that which differ-
τοῦ ἰδιάζοντος κρίσιν, ἐpiιζητήσομεν entiates, what is contemplated in
δὲ μόνον δι’ ὧν ἡ piερὶ ἑκάστου ἔν- common, I mean for example “un-
νοια τηλαυγῶς καὶ ἀμίκτως τῆς συν- created,” or “beyond all comprehen-
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θεωρουμένης ἀφορισθήσεται.109 sion,” or any quality of this kind;
we shall only direct our attention
to the enquiry by what means each
particular conception will be lucidly
and distinctly separated from that
which is conceived of in common.110
A few things are obvious here. First, Gregory makes a distinction between
common and proper nouns and connects common nouns (or at least some of
them) to ousiai, while he connects proper nouns to hypostases.
Second, ousiai either are, or have, a logos or definition, which will be the
same for various individuals of the same ousia (those who are homoousios).
But third, individuals themselves have a logos or definition as well. Gregory
later says a hypostasis is “a bundle of idiomata about each thing” – ἡ συνδρομή
τῶν piερὶ ἔκαστον ἰδιωμάτων.
Finally, where individuals differ in their individual definitions, Gregory
speaks of their differing with respect to idiomata, which seem to be either
qualities or bundles of qualities that individuate an individual (more on this
ambiguity below).
Now we said that the Stoics defined proper nouns by way of idiomata. For
the Stoics, a common noun “signifies” a common quality, and a proper noun
“indicates,” not, as we might expect, an individual, but a peculiar quality (ἰδία
piοιότης). In Diogenes Laertius’ Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers
(7.57-58), he discusses the Stoic view, possibly even quoting a Stoic without
attribution:
῎Εστι δὲ piροσηγορία μὲν κατὰ And an appellation (piροσηγορία)
τὸν Διογένην μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον is, according to Diogenes, a part of
κοινὴν piοιότητα, οἷον ῎Ανθρωpiος, speech signifying (σημαῖνον) a com-
῎Ιpipiος· mon quality (κοινή piοιότης), such as
“Man,” “Horse.”
ὄνομα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου But a [proper] noun (ὄνομα) is
δηλοῦν ἰδίαν piοιότητα, οἷον Διο- a part of speech indicating (δηλοῦν)
γένης, Σωκράτης·111 a unique quality (ἰδία piοιότης), such
as “Diogenes,” “Socrates.”112
The ancient Greek grammarians took over Stoic philosophy of language,
modifying it here and there. Some rejected the Stoic definition of the proper
noun, but others retained it. Of the two greatest grammarians in antiquity,
Dionysius Thrax seems to have rejected the view, replacing the definitions as
follows:
109. (St. Basil the Great 1957-1966), vol. 1, epistle 38, sections 2-3.
110. This translation is an adaption of both (St. Basil the Great 1895), pp. 137-138 and
(St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008b), pp. 1-3, along with my own modifications.
111. (Diogenes Laertius, 1964 (repr. 1966)), 7.57-58.
112. Translation mine.
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κύριον μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ τὴν ἰδίαν And so, on the one hand there
οὐσίαν σημαῖνον, οἷον ῎Ομηρος Σω- is the proper [noun] (κύριον) sig-
κράτης. nifying (σημαῖνον) a peculiar ou-
sia (ἰδίαν οὐσίαν), such as “Homer,”
“Socrates.”
piροσηγορικὸν δέ ἐστι τὸ τὴν And on the other hand, there
κοινὴν οὐσίαν σημαῖνον, οἷον ἄνθρ- is the appellative [noun] (piροση-
ωpiος ἴpipiος.113 γορικὸν) signifying (σημαῖνον) a
common ousia (κοινὴν οὐσίαν), such
as “man,” “horse.”114
Notice that in the discussion of the Stoic theory above, there was a distinction
made (common among the Stoics) between “signifying” (σημαῖνον) (the preferred
term for the semantic relation between common nouns and common qualities),
and “indicating” (δηλοῦν) (the preferred term for the semantic relation between
proper nouns and peculiar qualities). But Dionysius here switches to using
the same term (σημαῖνον) for both cases. Apollonius Dyscolus, on the other
hand, uses both terms, but uses them interchangeably (as does Gregory). But
Apollonius also goes back to the Stoic theory of idiomata in his definition of
proper nouns. There are several examples of this. We will give just a few:
῾Η τῶν ὀνομάτων θέσις ἐpiενοήθη Nouns (names) were devised for
εἰς piοιότητας κοινὰς ἢ ἰδίας, ὡς ἄνθρ- the indication of certain qualities,
ωpiος, Πλάτων . . . 115 general or particular, as anthropos
(“man” – indicates the quality of be-
ing a man), Platon (“Plato” – indi-
cates the quality of being Plato).116
καὶ γὰρ δυνάμει κύριον ὄνομα The pronoun conveys the force of
νοεῖται διὰ τῆς ἀντωνυμίας, οὔ φημι a proper name – I don’t mean the
τὸ τῆς φωνῆς ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς name considered as a phonological
δεικνύμενον, τουτέστιν ἡ ἰδία piοιότης shape, but its meaning, that is the
τοῦ ὑpiοκειμένου.117 unique character (ἡ ἰδία piοιότης) of
the referent (τοῦ ὑpiοκειμένου).”118
οὗτος δ’ Αἴας ἐστὶ piελώριος, . . . ‘And that man is Ajax the gigan-
ἔνεκα γὰρ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι τὸν Αἴαντα ἡ tic’ . . . the deixis is required be-
δεῖξις piαρείληpiται, ἔνεκα δὲ τῆς ἰδίας cause of Ajax’s being seen, but the
piοιότητος, ὑpiὲρ ἧς καὶ ἠρώτησεν, τὸ name Ajax is required because of the
Αἴας.119 individual quality (ἡ ἴδια piοιότης)
about which [Priam] had asked.120
τὸ δὲ Αἴας μετὰ ἰδίας piοιότητος Aias [Ajax] conveys the notion of
piαρυφιστάμενον ἔχει τὸ εἷς.121 singularity in addition to its own in-
113. (Dionysius Thrax 1883), part 1, volume 1, pp. 33-34.
114. Translation mine.
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dividual quality (ἴδια piοιότης).122
The “peculiar quality” (idioma) is a feature of Stoic metaphysics that does
quite a bit of work for them – metaphysical, epistemological, and even ethical
(insofar as Stoic ethics postulates at least the possibility of a Stoic sage, who
needs to have infallible knowledge so as never to mistakenly perform the wrong
actions). What is important for our purposes is that idiomata are part of
the Stoic criterion of individuation for particulars. There is some scholarly
debate as to whether the Stoic idiomata are simple, non-shareable qualities
(like Socrateity), or whether they are only unique combinations of in-principle
shareable qualities (like the combination of whiteness, snub-nosedness, and so
forth, that is only exhibited by Socrates, even though any of these qualities
taken by itself might be exhibited by other individuals). (Sorabji, for example,
maintains the stronger view, that for the Stoics each distinguishing mark is
unique to the individual.)123 I will not enter into the details of that debate
here. I only want to note that there is a case to be made that the Stoics take
this stronger view of idiomata. And to the extent that Gregory’s discussion
seems influenced by the Stoics, or by the grammarians (particularly Apollonius,
in my opinion), we might reasonably conjecture that he would hold this stronger
view.
On the other hand, his description of hypostases as “bundles” of qualities
is reminiscent of the bundle theory we find in the Neo-Platonism of the time,
perhaps most well known from a passage in Porphyry’s Isagoge:
ἄτομα οὖν λέγεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὄτι Such things are therefore called
ἐξ ἰδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν ἔκαστον, ὧν “individuals,” because each con-
τὸ ἄθροισμα οὐκ ἂν ἐpi’ ἄλλου piοτὲ sists (συνέστηκεν) of peculiarities
τὸ αὐτὸ γένοιτο· αἱ γὰρ Σωκράτους (ἰδιοτήτων) of which the combina-
ἰδιότητες οὐκ ἂν ἐpi’ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν tion (τὸ ἄθροισμα) can never be the
κατὰ μέρος γένοιντο ἂν αἱ αὐταί, αἱ same in any other, for the peculiar-
μέντοι τοῦ ἀνθρώpiου, λέγω δὴ τοῦ ities of Socrates can never be the
κοινοῦ, ἰδιότητες γένοιντ’ ἂν αἱ αὐταὶ same in any other particular per-
ἐpiὶ piλειόνων, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐpiὶ piάντων son; the peculiarities of man indeed
τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώpiων, καθὸ ἄν- (I mean of the universal) may be
θρωpiοι.124 the same in many, or rather in all
particular men, so far as they are
men.125
115. (Apollonius Dyscolus 1910), part 2, volume 2, p. 142.
116. Translation from (Householder 1981), II.VII.22., p. 93.
117. (Apollonius Dyscolus 1910), part 2, volume 2, p. 155.
118. Translation from (Householder 1981), II.IX.41., p. 99.
119. (Apollonius Dyscolus 1910), part 2, volume 2, p. 159.
120. Translation from (Householder 1981), II.X.45., p. 101.
121. (Apollonius Dyscolus 1910), part 2, volume 2, p. 352.
122. Translation from (Householder 1981), III.XXIII.96, p. 189.
123. (Sorabji 2005), pp. 164-203, but particularly pp. 169-173.
124. (Porphyry 1887), (volume 4.1), p. 7.
125. Translation from (Porphyry 1975), p. 41, adapted.
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We’ve already seen that Gregory uses quite a bit of Neo-Platonic technical
terminology, and Cross argues that Gregory is specifically responding to Por-
phyry in certain cases. Thus, it’s easy to suppose that this might have been
Gregory’s source for his bundle theory (or Basil’s, if Gregory is just following
Basil here).
What’s more, DelCogliano notes that Porphyry’s usage of “idioma” is incon-
sistent in just a certain way in which Gregory’s is as well:
Though Porphyry adopts both the Platonic term ‘assemblage’ and
the Carneadean term ‘concurrence’, and uses them with the term
‘distinctive feature’ (ἰδιότης), his terminology is inconsistent. In the
shorter commentary, he implies that the “concurrence of qualities”
is the “distinctive feature” whereby individuals in the same species
are differentiated. In the Isagoge, it is the “assemblage” of the “dis-
tinctive features” that constitute each individual which accounts for
the individual’s uniqueness. The term ‘distinctive feature’ is used
for both the resultant concurrence of properties and the properties
that constitute the assemblage.126
We will see that Gregory’s usage is also inconsistent in about the same way,
which further corroborates Porphyry as a source.
On the other hand, DelCogliano argues that Basil’s proximate source for
his philosophy of language is a uniquely homoiousian philosophy of language
already largely developed, but which St. Basil soaks up during his homoiou-
sian phase, and refines and further develops for application to his newfound
homoousianism.127 This leaves us with a big question as to how to understand
Gregory’s talk about idiomata. . .
4.3.3 How “Peculiar” is an Idioma?
Does Gregory have a theory of idiomata as simple, unshareable properties, as
unique bundles of in-principle shareable qualities, or as the shareable qualities
that constitute unique bundles?
I want to take a bit of space to explore this issue for two reasons. First,
the precise role of the idiomata here has significant implications for the filioque
controversy. It seems to me that at the bottom of much of St. Photios’ argu-
ment against the filioque, is the assumption that the idiomata are absolutely
unshareable.128 Second, although much less consequential, the issue also has
some implications for precisely how we will formulate Gregory’s views formally
126. (DelCogliano 2010), p. 199.
127. (DelCogliano 2010), pp. 176-187.
128. See for example, (Photius 1983), p. 73, “If the Spirit, Who proceeds from the Father,
proceeds also from the Son . . . the idioma which characterizes Him [the Father] would now
be common [with the Son], and the two hypostases [sic, the Greek is “δύο . . . θεαρχικῶν
ὑpiοστάσεων,” “two of the divine hypostases”] of the God-head would coalesce into one person.
And thus Sabellios, or rather some other semi-Sabellian monster, would again sprout up
among us.”
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in the next chapter (5.1.4, p. 208). So we will look into it a bit further, if only to
note that, and why, all we can do in the end is give two competing formulations
and not come to a definitive conclusion for or against either of them.
As we saw above, this question comes up within Gregory’s discussion of the
semantics of proper and common nouns. DelCogliano notes that Basil’s usage
of technical terms like ὄνομα (“noun” or “name”) and piροσηγορία (“appellation”)
doesn’t correspond either to Stoic or grammarian usage.129 For considerations
of space, I won’t go into detail, but the same holds true for Gregory as well. In
Ad Ablabium, he uses piροσηγορία 6 times, 5 times for common names, as one
would expect from either the Stoics or the grammarians, but once clearly for
a proper name. Onoma and related terms (e.g. onomazein) are used 31 times
in Ad Ablabium, either for common or proper nouns, indiscriminately. (Stoics
tended to use onoma only for proper nouns and prosegoria for common nouns,
with no generic term for nouns. Some grammarians used onoma as a generic
term for noun, specifying the proper noun as the kyrion onoma. So Gregory’s
usage of onoma doesn’t correspond to either tradition.) Thus, since his usage
doesn’t seem to correspond closely either to the Stoics’ or the grammarians’, it’s
hard to make any assumptions as to how closely his theory of idiomata follows
the Stoics just on the basis of his discussing common and proper nouns, despite
some obvious similarities in what he says to Stoic and grammarian discussions
of the same issues.
On the other hand, in Ad Petrum, Gregory says quite explicitly that the
idiomata of the Trinity are neither shareable nor even compossible (i.e., not co-
instantiable), so that the relation between hypostases and idiomata is neither
one-to-many nor many-to-one, but one-to-one. This seems similar to Stoicism.
For the Stoics, for an idioma to be shared by two material substrata would
simply be for numerically one qualified individual to subsist in two different
material substrata at the same time, i.e., to be bi-located – which they regarded
as absurd. Conversely, for two distinct idiomata to be instantiated in the same
material substratum would just be for two distinct qualified individuals to be
co-located – also an absurdity in the Stoics’ view.130 This might be taken as
good evidence that Gregory has in mind the stronger view of idiomata after all.
The problem is that he makes this explicit claim about idiomata immediately
after giving a number of examples that are hard to reconcile with the explicit
statement. He states:
v᾿Εpiειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ v῎Αγιον Πνεῦμα, Since, then, the Holy Spirit,
ἀφ’ οὗ piᾶσα ἐpiὶ τὴν κτίσιν ἡ τῶν from Whom all the supply of good
ἀγαθῶν χορηγία piηγάζει, τοῦ Υἱοῦ things for creation has its source, is
μὲν ἤρτηται ᾧ ἀδιαστάτως συγκατα- attached to the Son, and with Him
λαμβάνεται, τῆς δὲ τοῦ Πατρὸς (25) is inseparably apprehended, and has
αἰτίας ἐξημμένον ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὄθεν His being attached to the Father, as
καὶ ἐκpiορεύεται, τοῦτο γνωριστικὸν cause, fromWhom also He proceeds;
129. (DelCogliano 2010), pp. 204-211, but esp. p. 206 and p. 210.
130. (E. Lewis 1995), p. 91.
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τῆς κατὰ τὴν ὑpiόστασιν ἰδιότητος He has this note of His peculiarity
σημεῖον ἔχει, τὸ μετὰ τὸν Υἱὸν καὶ according to hypostasis, that He is
σὺν αὐτῷ γνωρίζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ known after the Son and together
Πατρὸς ὑφεστάναι. with the Son, and that He has His
subsistence of the Father.
v῾Ο δὲ Υἱὸς ὁ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐκ- The Son, who through Himself
piορευόμενον Πνεῦμα δι’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ and with Himself reveals the Spirit
μεθ’ ἑαυτοῦ γνωρίζων, μόνος μονο- proceeding from the Father, who
γενῶς ἐκ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου φωτὸς ἐκ- alone shines forth only-begottenly
λάμψας, οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὸ ἰδιάζον τῶν from the unbegotten light, has no
γνωρισμάτων τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει piρὸς commonality according to the indi-
τὸν Πατέρα ἢ piρὸς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ viduating gnorismata either to the
v῎Αγιον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς εἰρημένοις σημείοις Father or to the Holy Spirit, but
μόνος γνωρίζεται. alone is known by these mentioned
signs.
v῾Ο δὲ ἐpiὶ piάντων Θεὸς ἐξαίρετόν And the God over all [the Fa-
τι γνώρισμα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ὑpiοστάσεως ther] alone has a certain singular
τὸ Πατὴρ εἶναι καὶ ἐκ μηδεμιᾶς αἰτίας gnorisma of His own hypostasis, to
ὑpiοστῆναι μόνος ἔχει, καὶ διὰ τούτου be the Father, and to hypostasize
piάλιν τοῦ σημείου καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδιαζόν- from no cause, and by this sign again
τως ἐpiιγινώσκεται. He is also individually recognized.
Τούτου ἔνεκεν ἐν τῇ τῆς οὐσίας For this reason within the com-
κοινότητι ἀσύμβατά φαμεν εἶναι καὶ monality of the ousia we say that
ἀκοινώνητα τὰ ἐpiιθεωρούμενα τῇ the gnorismata observed in the
Τριάδι γνωρίσματα δι’ ὧν ἡ ἰδιότης Triad, through which is conveyed
piαρίσταται τῶν ἐν τῇ piίστει piα- in the creed the peculiarity of the
ραδεδομένων piροσώpiων, ἑκάστου persons that have been taught, are
τοῖς ἰδίοις γνωρίσμασι διακεκριμένως both non-compossible (ἀσύμβατα)
καταλαμβανομένου, ὤστε διὰ τῶν and unshareable (ἀκοινώνητα), since
εἰρημένων σημείων τὸ κεχωρισμένον each [person] is grasped separately
τῶν ὑpiοστάσεων ἐξευρεθῆναι·131 by the individual gnorismata, so
that through the signs mentioned
what has been divided among the
hypostases is discovered.132
Gregory here first speaks in the singular of what one would think to be two
distinct features of the Holy Spirit, saying He has “this recognizable sign” (τοῦτο
γνωριστικὸν σημεῖον) of His “peculiarity according to hypostasis,” (τῆς κατὰ τὴν
ὑpiόστασιν ἰδιότητος) and “this” sign gets described as:
(1) that He is known after the Son and together with the Son, and
(2) that He hypostasizes from the Father.
which certainly sounds like, not one, but two very different features.
131. (St. Basil the Great 1957-1966), epistle 38, section 4.
132. Adapted from (St. Basil the Great 1895), pp. 138-139.
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Then he immediately turns around and speaks in the plural of the signs
(σημεία) by which the Son is known. And these are:
(1) His revealing the Holy Spirit through Himself and with Himself, and
(2) “shining forth” only-begottenly from the unbegotten light (i.e., the Father).
These again sound like two quite distinct features, and Gregory speaks of them in
the plural. So it sounds like we have two co-instantiated (and thus compossible)
idiomata after all. Gregory here explicitly states that the Son “has nothing in
common” with the other two hypostases as far as the idiomata go. Of course,
failing to share idiomata with the other two does not conflict with apparently
having two distinct co-instantiated idiomata in one hypostasis. The problem
comes later.
Finally, he turns around and once again speaks in the singular, of the Father
having “a certain singular gnorisma,” which he elaborates as:
(1) being the Father, and
(2) hypostasizing from no cause,
which again sound like quite distinct features (one relation and one lack of
relation). And yet Gregory uses the singular here, as though these were a single
idioma.
Last of all, Gregory makes it quite explicit that, with respect to the idiomata,
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit share nothing at all in common, and indeed
that their idiomata are both unshareable (ἀκοινώνητα) and non-compossible
(ἀσύμβατα). And while nothing in his discussion of the idiomata here counts
against his saying that they are unshareable, it’s hard to see how the Father
and the Holy Spirit each have only a single idioma, rather than two each (in
which case, within each pair of idiomata, the one must be compossible with
the other). And even if the Father and Holy Spirit do somehow have only a
single idioma each, the non-compossibility claim is still hard to reconcile with
the Son’s explicitly having, apparently, a plurality of (i.e., two) idiomata.
One point of interest here is Gregory’s usage of terms like “participation”
and “communion.” Now when we think of the Platonic notion of “participa-
tion” today, we often have in mind primarily the fact that it is supposed to be
the metaphysical correlate of the linguistic predication relation. And Gregory
frequently adverts to this relation for just this purpose, either using its Pla-
tonic name “μέθεξις” (usually translated “participation”) or the more churchy-
sounding “κοινωνία” (sometimes translated as “communion” or “fellowship,”).
However, both the Platonic concept of participation (μέθεξις) and the Chris-
tian concept of communion (κοινωνία) imply a sense of “sharing” on the part of
those involved.133 Μέθεξις has some roots in Greek theater (and ritual) in
which multiple agents are “participating” in a larger theatrical (or ritualistic)
133. In my own translations, I am often simply rendering κοινωνία as “sharing.”
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event (from which we derive the term “methectics” in theater). And κοινωνία
has the connotations in a Christian context of multiple persons having some
kind of fellowship or a sharing of something. For example, the early Christians
selling all of their property and holding everything in common.134,135 Or sharing
a meal distributed from a single cup of wine and a single loaf of bread.136 More
relevant, of course, for our concerns, is the connotation in a philosophical con-
text of qualities or features that are had “in common.” Whatever the specifics,
there is some implication of a “one” somehow related to a “many.” Thus, by
definition, participation, or communion, is a “many-to-one” relation.
Interestingly, not only does Gregory explicitly state in the Ad Petrum that
the idiomata are unshareable (ἀκοινώνητα), but while he describes the hy-
postases as “participating in” and “sharing” the divine ousia, he never describes
any of the hypostases as “participating in” or “sharing” any of the idiomata.137
4.3.4 Two Views of the Individuation of Hypostases
So Gregory explicitly states that the idiomata are unshareable. And he eschews
speaking of the hypostases as “participating” or having “communion” in the id-
iomata. So it might seem we could easily rule out the view that idiomata are
shareable (even if it’s hard to understand how they are non-compossible). But
134. E.g., Acts 2:44.
piάντες δὲ οἱ piιστεύοντες ἦσαν ἐpiὶ τὸ αὐτὸ And all those believing were at the same
καὶ εἶχον ἅpiαντα κοινά. place, and had all things common (κοινά).
((Nestle et al. 2006)) (Translation mine.)
135. E.g., Acts 4:32.
Τοῦ δὲ piλήθους τῶν piιστευσάντων ἦν And of the plurality of those who be-
καρδία καὶ ψυχὴ μία, καὶ οὐδὲ εἷς τι τῶν lieved, the heart and the soul was single.
ὑpiαρχόντων αὐτῷ ἔλεγεν ἴδιον εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἦν And not one was saying that anything of
αὐτοῖς ἅpiαντα κοινά. the things existing for him was his own
((Nestle et al. 2006)) (ἴδιον), but to them all things were in com-
mon (κοινά).
(Translation mine.)
136. E.g., 1 Corinthians 10:16-17, where Paul uses both “communion” and then “participa-
tion,” making apparent reference to issue of “the One and the Many” here:
τὸ piοτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας ὃ εὐλογοῦμεν, The cup of blessing which we bless – is it
οὐχὶ κοινωνία ἐστὶν τοῦ αἴματος τοῦ Χρισ- not the communion (κοινωνία) of the blood
τοῦ; τὸν ἄρτον ὃν κλῶμεν, οὐχὶ κοινωνία τοῦ of Christ? The loaf which we break – is it
σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστιν; ὄτι εἷς ἄρτος, not the communion (κοινωνία) of the body
ἓν σῶμα οἱ piολλοί ἐσμεν, οἱ γὰρ piάντες ἐκ of Christ? Because it is one loaf, we, the
τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν. many, are one body, because we all partic-
((Nestle et al. 2006)) ipate in (μετέχομεν) a single loaf.
(Translation mine.)
137. I have verified this “manually” in all of the minor triadological works I discuss in the
dissertation. For his anti-Eunomian works, I performed TLG searches for various forms and
cognates of μέθεξις and κοινωνία within a few lines of proximity to Gregory’s terms for the
idiomata.
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in fact these considerations aren’t quite enough to decide whether for Gregory
idiomata are shareable or not, or whether hypostases are individuated by sim-
ple, unshareable qualities, or by unique combinations of in-principle shareable
qualities, because his usage doesn’t seem consistent, and that makes it hard
to say even whether his theory is consistent. Consider how Gregory speaks
elsewhere in the Ad Petrum:
Εἰ γὰρ ὑpiόστασιν ἀpiοδεδώκαμεν
εἶναι τὴν συνδρομὴν τῶν piερὶ ἔκασ-
For if we have taught hypostasis
to be the bundle (συνδρομή) of the
τον ἰδιωμάτων, ὁμολογεῖται δὲ ὤσpiερ idiomata around each; and if it is
ἐpiὶ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἶναί τι τὸ ἰδιαζόν- confessed that, as in the case of the
τως ἐpiιθεωρούμενον δι’ οὗ μόνος Father something is contemplated
ἐpiιγινώσκεται, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ as proper and peculiar, whereby He
τρόpiον καὶ piερὶ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὸ alone is known, so in the same way is
ἴσον piιστεύεται, piῶς ἐνταῦθα τὸ τῆς it believed about the Only-begotten;
ὑpiοστάσεως ὄνομα τῷ Πατρὶ μόνῳ how then does Scripture in this place
piροσμαρτυρεῖ ἡ Γραφή, τὸν δὲ Υἱὸν ascribe the name of the hypostasis
μορφὴν λέγει τῆς ὑpiοστάσεως, οὐκ to the Father alone, and describes
ἐν ἰδίοις, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς τοῦ Πατρὸς the Son as “the form of” the hyposta-
γνωρίσμασι χαρακτηριζόμενον; sis, characterized not by His own
gnorismata but by those of the Fa-
ther?
Εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὑpiόστασις τὸ ἰδιάζον
τῆς ἑκάστου ὑpiάρξεως σημεῖόν ἐστι,
For if the hypostasis is the pecu-
liarizing sign (τὸ ἰδιάζον σημεῖόν) of
τοῦ δὲ Πατρὸς ἴδιον τὸ ἀγεννήτως each reality, and being unbegotten is
εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται, μεμόρφωται δὲ ὁ confessed to be the peculiar feature
Υἱὸς τοῖς τοῦ Πατρὸς ἰδιώμασιν, ἄρα (ἴδιον) of the Father, and the Son is
οὐκέτι διαμένει τῷ Πατρὶ κατ’ ἐξαίρε- fashioned according to the Father’s
τον ἐpi’ αὐτοῦ μόνου τὸ ἀγέννητον idiomata, then the term “unbegot-
λέγεσθαι, εἴpiερ τῷ ἰδιάζοντι τοῦ Πα- ten” can no longer be predicated ex-
τρὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς χαρακ- clusively of the Father, the existence
τηρίζεται ὔpiαρξις.138 of the Only-begotten being charac-
terized by the peculiarizing feature
(τῷ ἰδιάζοντι) of the Father.139
Here he first describes a hypostasis as a bundle (συνδρομή). But it is a bundle
of idiomata. So it sounds like an idioma is only one (presumably shareable) item
within an unshareable bundle called a “hypostasis.” So it looks as though what
is doing the individuating is the bundle, but rather than calling the bundle an
idioma, he is calling the parts of the bundle the idiomata.
Then in the very next paragraph he defines hypostasis as “the peculiarizing
(individuating) sign of each reality” and goes on to give the Father’s individ-
uating sign as an apparently simple property, “being unbegotten.” So here it
doesn’t sound like the hypostasis is being identified with an individuating bundle
138. (St. Basil the Great 1957-1966), epistle 38, section 6.
139. Adapted from (St. Basil the Great 1895), p. 140.
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of shareable qualities, but with a simple, individuating (and thus unshareable)
property.
So it sounds as though he is either saying inconsistent things, or using idioma
in an inconsistent way.
We saw that Porphyry has a consistent theory – that individuals are just
bundles of (and therefore individuated by) in-principle shareable qualities – but
that he sometimes uses idioma to mean the bundle and sometimes to mean the
shareable qualities. So while the first of Gregory’s statements we looked at seem
more reminiscent of the Stoics, these passages seem to count as evidence that
Gregory is influenced by Porphyry. Of course, it’s also possible he was influenced
by all of the above, and either didn’t see that their theories were incompatible,
or didn’t care. He may not have cared, in this context, since if the hypostases
of the Trinity only have a single idioma each, then the distinction between a
simple property and a bundle doesn’t come into play. If the “bundle” is, in this
case, a “bundle” of one, then if the bundle is unshareable, the simple property
that constitutes it must be too.
Gregory’s statements, then, are difficult to reconcile, and raise a couple of
questions, namely:
1. Is an idioma an element of a bundle, so that the bundle really is a bundle
of idiomata, or is an idioma itself a bundle of qualities?
2. Is a hypostasis literally individuated by an idioma, or is it only individu-
ated by a bundle of idiomata?140
The answers to these questions yield different theories, none of which does
a very good job of explaining all of Gregory’s statements about hypostases and
idiomata. Specifically:
1. An idioma is an element of a bundle, and each idioma in the bundle is,
by itself, sufficient to individuate a hypostasis.
2. An idioma is an element of a bundle, but only the bundle as a whole is
sufficient to individuate a hypostasis. (Idiomata themselves, individually,
are actually in-principle shareable qualities.)
3. An idioma just is a bundle, and each idioma ( = bundle) is, by itself,
sufficient to individuate a hypostasis.
4. An idioma just is a bundle, but only the bundle as a whole is sufficient to
individuate a hypostasis. (Idiomata themselves, individually, are actually
in-principle shareable qualities.)
Since (4) is obviously contradictory, to interpret Gregory at all charitably
we need only concern ourselves with the first three theories. But note that (2)
140. Obviously if we take literally the claim that a hypostasis is a bundle of idiomata, then
a hypostasis will at least be individuated by a bundle of idiomata – the bundle of idiomata
that it is.
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and (3) are essentially the same view, only labelled differently, and correspond
to Porphyry’s equivocal way of expressing his theory. That is, in both (2) and
(3), what we have is a hypostasis being individuated by a unique bundle of
in-principle shareable qualities. Only in (2) we are using “idioma” to refer to
an in-principle shareable quality within the bundle, and in (3) we are using
“idioma” to refer to the bundle itself. Only (1) is importantly different, with a
“strong” view about idiomata that would be closer to that of the Stoics (on one
interpretation of the Stoics).
Thus, we are left with (1) a “strong” view of the individuation of hypostases,
on which a hypostasis may have more than one idioma, but no two hypostases
could share any idiomata at all, and (2) a “weak” view of the individuation of
hypostases, on which two hypostases can share idiomata (if we use that term
for the shareable qualities), but cannot share all of their idiomata.
(1) does fine with the view that a hypostasis is, or is at least individuated
by, “a bundle of idiomata,” but it’s difficult to reconcile with the examples
Gregory gives in the case of Job, and also with his claim that the idiomata of the
Trinity are (not just unshareable, but) non-compossible. Gregory says that the
Bible picks out Job by way of “name, place, idiomata of the soul, and outside
circumstances,” all of which seem accidental, other than perhaps idiomata of
the soul, so that this is problematic for the view that each particular idioma
is sufficient to individuate a hypostasis. It could be, of course, that Gregory
makes a distinction between idiomata, which would play a metaphysical role
and be strongly individuating as in the Stoics, versus gnorismata, which would
only be playing an epistemological role and a role in determining the reference
of names, in some such way that gnorismata would only need to pick out a
unique referent in the actual world and could be accidental, shareable and so
forth. But this view still has problems with the fact that Gregory describes the
idiomata as non-compossible.
(2) also does well with the view that a hypostasis is, or is at least individ-
uated by, “a bundle of idiomata,” as well as with the examples of Job’s gnoris-
mata, but on this view idiomata don’t literally individuate hypostases, and it
seems difficult to reconcile with Gregory’s explicit claim that the idiomata are
“unshareable” (ἀκοινώνητα).141
Finally, (3) makes better sense than (2) out of why Gregory would think an
idioma to be unshareable, and possibly even why he might think idiomata to be
non-compossible, but it doesn’t sit very well with the description of a hypostasis
as “a bundle of idiomata,” since in fact there are no bundles of idiomata, the
idiomata are themselves the bundles.142
141. Of course, since some of Job’s gnorismata are clearly accidental, any theory will either
have a problem making sense of those example gnorismata or else have a problem with the
claim that the idiomata are unshareable. Unless, that is, one either equivocates on idioma
in the way Porphyry does, or one thinks there is a distinction in Gregory’s mind between
idiomata, which individuate a thing and are therefore unshareable, and gnorismata, which
are only “that by which a thing can be known,” and only need to be accidental qualities by
which one can pick an item out from among others in the actual world.
142. Unless one supposes that a hypostasis is a bundle of bundles of qualities, so that we
start with shareable qualities, bundle them into idiomata, then bundle the idiomata into a
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All of these interpretations of Gregory have their problems, and for this rea-
son, in the next chapter, I will consider both a “strong” and “weak” formulation
of the identity conditions of hypostases, corresponding to (1) and (2)/(3), re-
spectively. (And for the “weak” version, it will be more convenient to follow the
usage of (2).)
4.3.5 Do Idiomata Really Individuate?
DelCogliano seems to think that, at least for St. Basil, the idiomata serve a
merely identifying and not constitutive role. That is, insofar as a property
corresponds to a description, the idiomata correspond to what happen to be
(but perhaps only accidentally) unique descriptions of things, so that they are
the sorts of things Basil can put to use in his description theory of proper
names, but a thing is not literally constituted by these properties. In this case,
the idiomata play a role in securing the reference of proper names, and can
play an epistemological role in our being able to recognize and have knowledge
about individuals, but they needn’t be the sorts of things that would identify
those individuals across time or possible worlds. DelCogliano also casts doubt
on Basil taking either the Stoics or the ancient grammarians directly as sources
for his theory of proper names.
Therefore, the Platonist and Stoic traditions viewed individuals as
assemblages of distinctive features, though there were significant dif-
ferences among them. These distinctive features were sometimes
thought to be constitutive of the individual, sometimes identifica-
tory, sometimes both. Basil is indebted to the tradition of viewing
the bundled distinctive characteristics of individuals as identifica-
tory, not constitutive. . . Accordingly, I suggest that he has more
in common with the Platonists than with the Stoics, and at the
same time more in common with the Platonist tradition of viewing
individuals as bundles of distinctive characteristics that are solely
identificatory and not in any way constitutive.
Basil is clear that a bundle of distinguishing marks does not consti-
tute an individual but only serves an identificatory purpose. None
of the distinguishing marks that he lists for Peter and Paul define
what they are essentially or who they are as individual persons, but
allow one to distinguish them from each other and from other human
beings, and recognize them for who they are as individuals.143
Given Basil’s massive influence on Gregory, this might seem to count against
my interpretation that Gregory takes the idiomata even to be playing a role in
the individuation of hypostases at all.
But first, consider the fact that, on DelCogliano’s own account, Basil is tak-
ing his views about philosophy of language over from the homoiousians. But the
hypostasis. But that seems too much of a stretch.
143. (DelCogliano 2010), p. 201.
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homoiousians don’t really have the need to rely on the distinguishing features
of the hypostases to individuate them in the way that homoousians do, given
that, on the homoiousian view, the persons of the Trinity have distinct natures
anyway, and so there is no mystery about how they might be individuated.
Thus, there is no reason to expect a discussion of the reference of proper names
to include any talk about the individuation of the hypostases, if the material for
that discussion is coming primarily from the homoiousians. But in the context
of the homoousian view, which says there is only one ousia, and which wants
to maintain at least some kind of doctrine of divine simplicity (even if not an
extreme one), and especially in the context of Basil’s denial that the ousia is
something that can be “divided” into particulars, a need will eventually arise to
explain how or in what sense the hypostases can even be distinct in the first
place. So, although it might not occur immediately, it would seem like a fairly
natural and obvious development, to put the idiomata into service for that pur-
pose. So, if DelCogliano’s thesis about the proximate sources of Basil’s theory
of proper names is correct (and I don’t doubt that), what we should expect to
find is that discussions of the idiomata in earlier works (like Basil’s Contra Eu-
nomium – probably not later than 364) or in passages primarily about reference
(e.g., again, the passages in Contra Eunomium DelCogliano focuses on) will
tend to focus on the sorts of semantic issues DelCogliano discusses, but that the
idiomata will start to be put to metaphysical use in later works by Basil (e.g.,
Epistle 214 above – probably about 375), or in Gregory’s later works where he
is defending or explicating Basil’s views (e.g., Ad Petrum – usually dated 370,
though Cross argues for 375;144 and Ad Ablabium – usually dated around 387),
and in contexts in which issues of individuation are the primary focus (e.g.,
parts of Ad Petrum, and, as we will see, certainly parts of Ad Ablabium).145
Second, we seem to see just what I’ve described. Despite Basil’s emphasis
on semantic and epistemological issues in his early arguments against Eunomius
(which is the topic under discussion in the passages DelCogliano focuses on), in
the later Epistle 214 Basil himself certainly sounds as if he employs the idiomata
in a metaphysical way. They are not merely that by which we are known or
recognized as the individuals we are, nor merely that by which reference to us
is secured – they are that by which we are so-and-so and so-and-so, i.e., it is in
virtue of the idiomata that we are the particular individuals that we are.
Third, these points about the emphasis and focus of Basil don’t seem to
me to be similarly true of Gregory (whose relevant works are later as well).
DelCogliano himself shies away from attributing his claims about Basil here to
Gregory. What’s more, in a footnote, he says:
G. Christopher Stead . . . makes the comment that Basil (and Gre-
gory of Nyssa) failed to distinguish between “how individuals are rec-
ognized and what being an individual involves.” Though this may
be the case for Gregory, who is taken to be representative of the
144. (Cross 2002), p. 387.
145. See below 4.4.2, p. 178 ff. on the individuation of token energeiai.
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“Cappadocian” view on the issue, I see Basil’s remarks concerned
solely with the identification, not the definition, of individuals.146
I think DelCogliano makes this qualification for good reason. Gregory seems per-
fectly comfortable talking about the idiomata as “individuating” the hypostases,
a claim seen frequently in the Ad Petrum. What’s more, as we will soon see
(4.4.2, p. 180), he deploys the idiomata again in the Ad Ablabium in reference
to the energeiai precisely for the purpose of giving them a separate criterion
of individuation from the hypostases that perform them, which is critical to
articulating his solution to the LPT.
I conclude that it’s not unlikely that Basil himself comes, eventually, to use
the idiomata for the role of individuating the hypostases, and that even if he
didn’t, it still seems that Gregory does, and that this is a fairly natural result
of the trajectory along which the views of Basil had been developing anyway.
4.3.6 Do Idiomata Really Exist?
Finally, I will say something about a possible objection stemming from Richard
Cross’s views on the ontological status of the idiomata in Gregory.
Cross holds that Gregory is essentially a nominalist about the idiomata.147
To put his case briefly, in Contra Eunomium, Gregory says that the idiomata are
epinoiai, and Cross argues that for Gregory epinoiai are mere concepts. Thus,
Gregory is a nominalist (conceptualist) about the divine idiomata. (Although,
as we’ve seen, Cross holds Gregory is a realist about the divine ousia).
Cross describes a nominalist view about relations in general by reference to
Leftow:
Leftow goes on to make the point that the Latin view involves ac-
cepting that the only real constituent of a divine person is the di-
vine essence, though he does so in a way that does not bring out
the distinctive claim, made by the Western theologians, that what
underlies this is the fact that relations, which somehow explain the
distinctions between the persons, are not themselves things with
some kind of extramental existence. The point is made explicitly,
later, by Aquinas, but something like it can be found in Augustine
too – if not so clearly – if we link together various relevant texts.148
After a quote from Augustine on the point, he says:
And it turns out that these relations are merely ways in which we
can talk about the three persons – and not, I take it, items somehow
distinct from the divine essence:149
146. (DelCogliano 2010), p. 201, fn. 4. The paper he cites is (G. C. Stead 1981), p. 172.
147. (Cross 2012).
148. (Cross 2012), p. 55. Emphasis mine.
149. (Cross 2012), p. 55.
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Cross goes on to claim that Gregory holds essentially the same view:
I take it that all of this provides us with a strong account of divine
simplicity in the context of the Trinity. I shall argue that Gregory
explicitly takes exactly this line, at least in Contra Eunomium 2,
which I take to be a clear exposition of Trinitarian doctrine espoused
by Gregory at least in his most refined anti-Eunomian argument
(whatever he may be committed to elsewhere).150
He goes on to contrast his thesis with Radde-Gallwitz’s view that Gregory
wants a sort of via media between a nominalist and “hyper-realist” view of
relations:
Basically, it seems to me that Gregory explicitly defends what
Radde-Gallwitz labels the nominalist account of the epinoiai, and
hence of divine propria. And it should be clear enough from what
I have already said that this nominalist account would be a close
cousin – perhaps even a sibling or twin – of Augustine’s account of
the divine attributes. 151
This might seem problematic, since, in the next chapter, I will put the
idiomata into Gregory’s ontology (his domain of discourse) as things that can be
quantified over, be the subjects of predication, and be put into various relations
with other items in Gregory’s ontology. But I will give three considerations as
to why this is appropriate.
First, I simply note that the debate about epinoiai between Eunomius and
Basil, and later between Eunomius and Gregory, is notoriously difficult, and
Cross’ view here is by no means uncontroversial. Now, I am extremely optimistic
about the project of finding common ground between the so-called “Eastern” and
“Western” fathers. However, I’m quite skeptical in particular about a few key
issues, and the semantics of various predications concerning God in different of
the church fathers is one of them. However, I do not want to take the time to
enter into that debate here, as it takes us too far afield from the LPT itself.
The second, and more important consideration, is that even if it turns out
that Cross’s interpretation here is correct, I would argue that it’s still appropri-
ate to translate Gregory’s view into predicate logic in the way that I do.
Consider as an analogy how the Stoics make an essentially Meinongian dis-
tinction between things that “exist” (only physical bodies, or “corporeals,” for
the Stoics) and just “somethings.” That is, there are things such that they “are
something,” but don’t exist (or “subsist,” if one prefers to use that term instead).
In particular, the “incorporeals” of place, time, void, and lekta (“things said”),
lekta being more or less equivalent to propositions. (They are the meanings of
sentences – what are “said,” or asserted, by sentences. Although, on the Stoic
view, their truth-values can change over time.)
150. (Cross 2012), p. 56.
151. (Cross 2012), p. 57.
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But consider the Stoic treatment of lekta. The Stoics claim that “there
are” lekta. And that there are multiple lekta. And that it is true that lekta
are incorporeals. And that they can be possible or impossible, necessary or
non-necessary. And that they can be true or false, in virtue of their relations
to things that do exist. And that they can bear or fail to bear various logical
relations to one another. It seems, then, that lekta are the sort of thing that can
be quantified over, that can be individuated, that can have various predicates
be true of them, and that can enter into relations with one another and even
with things that actually “exist” (or “subsist”).
Thus, it sounds very much as though the Stoic realm of the “something”
is just the domain of quantification for the Stoics. And that corporeals and
incorporeals simply form two proper subsets of the domain of quantification.
Only the corporeal subset is said to “exist” (or “subsist.”)
So, it seems perfectly appropriate, if one were to reconstruct Stoicism in
predicate logic, to include lekta and other non-existent somethings in the domain
of discourse over which one would quantify, and to treat them in the same way
as any other item in one’s ontology.
After all, the Stoics had not read Quine.152 They did not take the rules
of the game to be that, “to be is to be the value of a bound variable,” or, to
translate it into Stoic terms, “to exist (subsist) just is to be ‘a something’.”
Indeed, that is precisely what they deny.
Now, whether making this kind of distinction is a sensible thing to do or not
is a separate question entirely. Likely, the difficulty in deciding how to recast
this kind of view in predicate logic is just a symptom of a deeper problem with
trying to deal with any Meinongian view within standard predicate logic. And
in my view, that is just a symptom of a deeper problem with trying to deal with
any Meinongian view period.
My point is simply that, even if someone wants in some sense to be a nom-
inalist about X, or to deny the existence of X, even though they seem to make
reference to X in their theory, it isn’t automatically clear that it will be illegiti-
mate to put X into their domain of discourse when reconstructing their theory
in a formal language. But I am not so much arguing that Quine was wrong, as
that it is possible for people to be confused.
Third and finally, although I think the idiomata are very much an important
contextual element in coming to understand Gregory’s view of the metaphysics
of the Trinity, they will turn out in the end to be dispensable, at least for our
rather limited, formal purposes.153 That is, while we need to get a certain
amount of clarity on how the idiomata work so as to understand other aspects
of Gregory’s solution to the LPT,154 his solution to the strictly formal issue we
have in mind can be stated without reference to them.155
152. (Quine 1961).
153. See “GNTLite” 5.5.1, p. 258 ff. for more.
154. Specifically, as will become clear below, it sheds some light on the distinction he will
make between the way in which the Trinity share energeiai and the way in which creatures
could “share” energeiai.
155. See “GNTLite” 5.5.1, p. 258 ff. for more.
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4.4 The Unity of Action Argument (UAA)
Finally, then, let’s look at the argument Gregory himself actually endorses – the
“Unity of Action Argument” (UAA).
4.4.1 Gregory’s Semantics for “is God”
In this response, St. Gregory follows a very long tradition (as we saw above)
holding that “God” does not signify the divine essence, and that, in fact, there
simply isn’t any word for the divine essence. Rather, he argues, all our words for
God (including the word “God”) signify, not the divine essence, but some action
or activity (energeia) engaged in by God (or perhaps the power or dynamis to
engage in one of those energeiai). So, Gregory actually thinks that, whereas
“man” can be defined in terms of human nature, “God” is defined not in terms
of the divine nature, but as a doer of a certain kind of energeia. In other words,
“God,” like “shoemaker” or “rhetorician,” is an agent noun.
He states:
ταῦτα δὲ λέγω κατὰ τὸν ἀpiοδο- This [The UNA] I say according
θέντα ἡμῖν ἐpiὶ τῆς ἀνθρωpiίνης φύσε- to the account we have given in the
ως λόγον, ἐν ᾧ μεμαθήκαμεν μὴ δεῖν case of human nature, in which we
piληθυντικῷ χαρακτῆρι τὴν piροση- have learnt that it is improper to ex-
γορίαν piλατύνειν τῆς φύσεως. tend the name of the nature by the
mark of plurality.
ἀκριβέστερον δὲ ἡμῖν αὐτὸ τὸ We must, however, more care-
ὄνομα τῆς θεότητος ἐξεταστέον, fully examine the name of “God-
ὄpiως ἂν διὰ τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῇ φωνῇ head,” in order to obtain, by means
σημασίας γένοιτό τις συνεργία piρὸς of the significance involved in the
τὴν τοῦ piροκειμένου σαφήνειαν. word, some help towards clearing up
the question before us.
Δοκεῖ μὲν οὖν τοῖς piολλοῖς ἰδι- The word “Godhead” seems to
αζόντως κατὰ τῆς φύσεως ἡ φωνὴ the many to be given peculiarly ac-
τῆς θεότητος κεῖσθαι καὶ ὤσpiερ ὁ cording to nature: and just as the
οὐρανὸς ἢ ὁ ἤλιος ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν heaven, or the sun, or some other
τοῦ κόσμου στοιχείων ἰδίαις φωναῖς of the elements of the cosmos are
διασημαίνεται ταῖς τῶν ὑpiοκειμένων marked by peculiar words significant
σημαντικαῖς, οὔτω φασὶ καὶ ἐpiὶ τῆς of the subjects, so they say also in
ἀνωτάτω καὶ θείας φύσεως ὤσpiερ τι the case of the supreme and divine
κύριον ὄνομα piροσφυῶς ἐφηρμόσθαι nature the word “Godhead” is fitly
τῷ δηλουμένῳ τὴν φωνὴν τῆς θεότη- adapted to that which it represents,
τος. as if it were some proper name.
ἡμεῖς δὲ ταῖς τῆς γραφῆς ὑpiο- We, on the other hand, following
θήκαις ἑpiόμενοι ἀκατονόμαστόν τε the suggestions of Scripture, have
καὶ ἄφραστον αὐτὴν μεμαθήκαμεν· learnt that that nature is unname-
able and unspeakable,
καὶ piᾶν ὄνομα, εἴτε piαρὰ τῆς ἀν- and we say that every term ei-
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θρωpiίνης συνηθείας ἐξηύρηται εἴτε ther invented by the custom of men,
piαρὰ τῶν γραφῶν piαραδέδοται, τῶν or handed down to us by the Scrip-
piερὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν νοουμένων ἑρμη- tures, is indeed explanatory of our
νευτικὸν εἶναι λέγομεν, οὐκ αὐτῆς conceptions of the divine nature, but
τῆς φύσεως piεριέχειν τὴν σημασί- does not include the signification of
αν.156 that nature itself.157
Gregory argues in detail for the point that “God” cannot name the divine
nature. But naturally this raises the question, what does “God” signify. His
answer, a certain kind of energeia. Namely, our good friend “beholding”:
v᾿Εpiεὶ τοίνυν τὰς piοικίλας τῆς Since, then, as we perceive the
ὑpiερκειμένης δυνάμεως ἐνεργείας varied energeiai of the power above
κατανοοῦντες ἀφ’ ἑκάστης τῶν ἡμῖν us, we fashion our appellations from
γνωρίμων ἐνεργειῶν τὰς piροσηγορίας the several energeiai that are known
ἁρμόζομεν, μίαν δὲ καὶ ταύτην εἶναι to us, and as we recognize as one of
῾λέγομεν τοῦ θεοῦ᾿ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, these that energeia of surveying and
τὴν ἐpiοpiτικὴν καὶ ὁρατικὴν καὶ ὡς inspection, or, as one might call it,
ἄν τις εἴpiοι θεατικήν, καθ’ ἣν τὰ beholding, whereby He surveys all
piάντα ἐφορᾷ καὶ piάντα ἐpiισκοpiεῖ, things and overlooks them all, dis-
τὰς ἐνθυμήσεις βλέpiων καὶ ἐpiὶ τὰ cerning our thoughts, and even en-
ἀθέατα τῇ θεωρητικῇ δυνάμει διαδυό- tering by His power of contempla-
μενος, ὑpiειλήφαμεν ἐκ τῆς θέας τὴν tion into those things which are not
θεότητα piαρωνομάσθαι καὶ τὸν θεω- visible, we suppose that Godhead
ρὸν ἡμῶν θεὸν ὑpiό τε τῆς συνηθείας (θεότης) is so called from θέα, or
καὶ τῆς τῶν γραφῶν διδασκαλίας beholding, and that He who is our
piροσαγορεύεσθαι. θεατής or beholder, by customary
use and by the instruction of the
Scriptures, is called θεός, or God.
Εἰ δὲ συγχωρεῖ τις ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ Now if any one admits that to
θεᾶσθαι τῷ βλέpiειν καὶ τὸν ἐφορῶντα behold and to discern are the same
piάντα θεὸν ἔφορον τοῦ piαντὸς καὶ thing, and that the God Who su-
εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι, λογισάσθω τὴν perintends all things, both is and
ἐνέργειαν ταύτην, piότερον ἑνὶ piρόσ- is called the superintender of the
εστι τῶν ἐν τῇ ἁγίᾳ τριάδι piεpiισ- universe, let him consider this en-
τευμένων piροσώpiων ἢ διὰ τῶν τριῶν ergeia, and judge whether it belongs
διήκει ἡ δύναμις. to one of the Persons whom we be-
lieve in the Holy Trinity, or whether
the power extends throughout the
Three Persons.
εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ἡ τῆς θεότητος For if our interpretation of the
ἑρμηνεία καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα θεατὰ καὶ term Godhead (θεότης) is a true
τὸ θεώμενον θεὸς λέγεται, οὐκέτι one, and the things which are seen
ἂν εὐλόγως ἀpiοκριθείη τι τῶν ἐν τῇ are said to be beheld (θεατά), and
156. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 42-43.
157. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 332.
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τριάδι piροσώpiων τῆς τοιαύτης piροση- that which beholds them is called
γορίας διὰ τὴν ἐγκειμένην τῇ φωνῇ θεός or God, no one of the Persons
σημασίαν. in the Trinity could reasonably be
excluded from such an appellation
on the ground of the sense involved
in the word.
τὸ γὰρ βλέpiειν ἐpiίσης μαρτυρεῖ For Scripture attributes the act
ἡ γραφὴ καὶ piατρὶ καὶ υἱῷ καὶ ἁγίῳ of seeing equally to Father, Son, and
piνεύματι. Holy Spirit.
v῾Υpiερασpiιστὰ ἡμῶν, ἴδε, ὁ θεός, David says, “Behold, O God our
φησὶν ὁ Δαβίδ· defender”:
ἐκ δὲ τούτου μανθάνομεν ἰδίαν and from this we learn that sight
θεοῦ, καθὸ θεὸς νοεῖται, ἐνέργειαν τὸ is a proper energeia of the idea of
ὁρᾶν, ἐκ τοῦ εἰpiεῖν v῎Ιδε, ὁ θεός. God, so far as God is conceived,
since he says, “Behold, O God.”
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ v᾿Ιησοῦς ὁρᾷ τὰς ἐν- But Jesus also beholds the
θυμήσεις τῶν καταγινωσκόντων, δι- thoughts of those who condemn
ότι συγχωρεῖ τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἐξ αὐθεν- Him, and questions why by His own
τίας [τῶν ἀνθρώpiων]. power He pardons the sins of men?
v᾿Ιδὼν γάρ, φησίν, ὁ v᾿Ιησοῦς τὰς ἐν- for it says, “Jesus, beholding their
θυμήσεις αὐτῶν. thoughts.”
καὶ piερὶ τοῦ piνεύματος λέγει And of the Holy Spirit also, Pe-
piρὸς τὸν v᾿Ανανίαν ὁ Πέτρος v῎Ινα τί ter says to Ananias, “Why hath Sa-
ἐpiλήρωσεν ὁ σατανᾶς τὴν καρδίαν tan filled thine heart, to lie to the
σου ψεύσασθαί σε τὸ piνεῦμα τὸ Holy Spirit?” showing that the Holy
ἅγιον; δεικνὺς ὄτι τῶν ἐν κρυpiτῷ Spirit was a true witness, aware of
τολμωμένων piαρὰ τοῦ v᾿Ανανίου μάρ- what Ananias had dared to do in se-
τυς ἦν ἀψευδὴς καὶ ἐpiιΐστωρ τὸ cret, and by Whom the manifesta-
piνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, δι’ οὗ καὶ τῷ Πέτρῳ tion of the secret was made to Peter.
τῶν λανθανόντων ἡ φανέρωσις ἦν.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐγένετο κλέpiτης αὐτὸς For Ananias became a thief of his
ἑαυτοῦ λανθάνων, ὡς ᾤετο, piάντας own goods, secretly, as he thought,
καὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐpiικρυpiτόμενος· from all men, and concealing his sin:
τὸ δὲ piνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὁμοῦ but the Holy Spirit at the same
τε ἐν Πέτρῳ ἦν καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου moment was in Peter, and detected
διάνοιαν piρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν his intent, dragged down as it was
κατασυρεῖσαν ἐφώρασε καὶ δι’ ἑαυ- to avarice, and gave to Peter from
τοῦ δίδωσι τῷ Πέτρῳ διιδεῖν τὰ λαν- Himself the power of seeing the se-
θάνοντα· cret,
οὐκ ἂν δηλονότι τοῦτο piοιοῦν, while it is clear that He could not
εἴpiερ ἦν τῶν κρυφίων ἀθέατον.158 have done this had He not been able
to behold hidden things.159
Thus, on Gregory’s actual view, “God” is not a kind-term like “man” or
158. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 44-46.
159. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 333, adapted.
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“horse,” but an agent noun like “philosopher” or “rhetorician.” (Specifically, in
Gregory’s view, to be a god is to have the power to “behold” hidden things.)
But now the question is whether a response to the anti-Trinitarian argument
here along the same lines as the UNA would still work, given Gregory’s actual
view about the semantics of “is God.” Gregory admits that it would not. He
writes:
v᾿Αλλ’ οὔpiω τις ἐρεῖ piρὸς τὸ ζη- But some one will say that the
τούμενον βλέpiειν τὴν κατασκευὴν τοῦ proof of our argument does not yet
λόγου. regard the question.
οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ δοθείη κοινὴ τῆς For if the name of “Godhead”
φύσεως ἡ κλῆσις τῆς θεότητος εἶ- were granted to be common of the
ναι, ἤδη τὸ μὴ δεῖν λέγειν θεοὺς διὰ nature, it would be established that
τούτου κατεσκευάσθη. we should not speak of “Gods”:
τοὐναντίον μὲν οὖν ἐκ τούτων but by these arguments [these
ἀναγκαζόμεθα μᾶλλον λέγειν θεούς. now being given, in the UAA], on
the contrary, we are compelled to
speak of “Gods”:160
εὑρίσκομεν γὰρ ἐpiὶ τῆς ἀνθρ- for we find in the custom of
ωpiίνης συνηθείας οὐ μόνον τοὺς mankind that not only those who
τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως κοινωνοὺς ἀλλά, are partakers in the same nature,
κἄν τινες τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὦσιν ἐpiιτηδεύ- but even any who may be of the
ματος, οὐχ ἑνικῶς τοὺς piολλοὺς same business, are not, when they
μνημονευομένους καθό φαμεν ῥή- are many, spoken of in the singular;
τοράς τε piολλοὺς καὶ γεωμέτρας as we speak of “many orators,” or
γεωργούς τε καὶ σκυτοτόμους καὶ τὰ “surveyors,” or “farmers,” or “shoe-
ἄλλα piάντα ὡσαύτως. makers,” and so in all other cases.
καὶ εἰ μὲν φύσεως ἦν ἡ τῆς θεότη- If, indeed, Godhead were an ap-
τος piροσηγορία, μᾶλλον ἂν εἶχε pellation of nature, it would be more
καιρὸν κατὰ τὸν piροαpiοδοθέντα λό- proper, according to the argument
γον ἑνικῶς τὰς τρεῖς ὑpiοστάσεις piερ- laid down [i.e., the UNA], to include
ιλαμβάνειν καὶ ἔνα θεὸν λέγειν διὰ τὸ the Three Persons in the singular
τῆς φύσεως ἄτμητόν τε καὶ ἀδιαίρε- number, and to speak of “One God,”
τον· by reason of the inseparability and
indivisibility of the nature [the point
of the UNA]:
ἐpiεὶ δὲ κατεσκευάσθη διὰ τῶν but since it has been established
εἰρημένων ἐνέργειαν σημαίνειν καὶ by what has been said, that the term
οὐχὶ φύσιν τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα, “Godhead” is significant of energeia,
piεριτρέpiεταί piως piρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐκ and not of nature, the argument
τῶν κατασκευαζομένων ὁ λόγος, ὡς from what has been advanced seems
δεῖν ταύτῃ μᾶλλον λέγειν τρεῖς θεοὺς to turn to the contrary conclusion,
τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἐνεργείᾳ θεωρουμέ- that we ought therefore all the more
νους· to call those “three Gods” who are
contemplated in the same energeia;
ὤς φασι τρεῖς λέγεσθαι φιλοσό- as they say that one would speak
177
φους ἢ ῥήτορας ἢ εἴ τί ἐστιν ἔτερον of “three philosophers” or “orators,”
ἐξ ἐpiιτηδεύματος ὄνομα, ὄταν piλείους or any other name derived from a
ὦσιν οἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συμμετέχοντες. business [i.e., any agent noun] when
those who take part in the same
business are more than one.
ταῦτα φιλοpiονώτερον ἐξειργασά- I have taken some pains, in set-
μην, τὸν τῶν ὑpiεναντίων ἀνθυpiοφέρ- ting forth this view, to bring forward
ων λόγον, ὡς ἂν βεβαιότερον ἡμῖν the reasoning on behalf of the adver-
piαγείη τὸ δόγμα ταῖς εὐτονωτέραις saries, that our decision may be the
τῶν ἀντιθέσεων κρατυνόμενον. more firmly fixed, being strength-
ened by the more elaborate contra-
dictions.
οὐκοῦν ἐpiαναληpiτέος piάλιν ὁ λό- Let us now resume our argu-
γος.161 ment.162
Gregory is here rehearsing what an opponent would say. Namely, that it
would have been better for him to stop at the UNA, since there he had an
answer to why we put “God” in the singular. But now that he has claimed
“God” is not really a kind-term at all, but an agent noun, it follows that the
points made in the UNA regarding collective nouns no longer apply, since they
presupposed that “God” was a kind-term. And once more, common usage is to
put agent nouns in the plural when there is more than one hypostasis engaged
in the same kind of activity.
4.4.2 Gregory’s Metaphysics of Energeiai
Gregory now explicitly admits that the semantic points about collective nouns
made in the UNA (4.2.2, p. 129 ff.) no longer apply, given his actual view
about the semantics of “is God,” precisely because the metaphysical point about
natures being indivisible monads above, does not have any parallel in the case
of energeiai. That is, there is no simple, monadic universal uniting particular
energeiai “of the same name.” Rather, it would appear that, for Gregory, en-
ergeiai just form something like the Neo-Platonic collective universals he has
denied in the case of hypostases and ousiai after all. He re-introduces the tech-
nical term “divided” here, saying that the energeiai of men are in fact “divided”
(διακεκριμένη) into particular energeiai after all. Thus it follows that, although
it is not strictly speaking true to say there are “many men,” he admits that it
is strictly speaking true that there are “many philosophers,” or “many rhetori-
cians,” etc.:
160. In contrast to the UNA, in which he’s argued that, strictly speaking, there would be only
one God.
161. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 46-47.
162. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 333.
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v᾿Εpiειδὴ μετρίως ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς
κατασκευῆς ἀpiεδείχθη οὐ φύσεως
Since we demonstrated in due
measure from the logical proof that
ἀλλ’ ἐνεργείας εἶναι τὴν φωνὴν the word of “God-hood” is not of a
τῆς θεότητος, τάχα ταύτην ἄν τις nature but of an energeia, one per-
αἰτίαν εὐλόγως εἴpiοι τοῦ piληθυν- haps would reasonably say that this
τικῶς μὲν ἐpi’ ἀνθρώpiων τοὺς τῶν is a reason that, in the case of men,
αὐτῶν ἐpiιτηδευμάτων κοινωνοῦντας those who share the same occupa-
ἀλλήλοις ἀριθμεῖσθαι καὶ ὀνομάζεσ- tions with each other are numbered
θαι, μοναδικῶς δὲ τὸ θεῖον ὡς ἔνα and named in the plural, but that
θεὸν καὶ μίαν θεότητα λέγεσθαι, κἂν the divine is stated in the singu-
αἱ τρεῖς ὑpiοστάσεις τῆς ἐμφαινομένης lar as one God and one God-hood,
τῇ θεότητι σημασίας μὴ ἀpiοκρίνοιντο, even if the three hypostases should
ὄτι ἄνθρωpiοι μέν, κἂν μιᾶς ὦσιν not be distinguished by the signif-
ἐνεργείας οἱ piλείονες, καθ’ ἑαυτὸν icance manifest in the divinity, be-
ἔκαστος ἀpiοτεταγμένως ἐνεργεῖ τὸ cause men, even if several are of
piροκείμενον, οὐδὲν ἐpiικοινωνῶν ἐν one energeia, each by himself exclu-
τῇ καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐνεργείᾳ piρὸς τοὺς τὸ sively energizes what lies before him,
ἴσον ἐpiιτηδεύοντας· since he shares nothing in the par-
ticular energeia with those pursuing
an equivalent [energeia].
εἰ γὰρ καὶ piλείονες εἶεν οἱ ῥήτο-
ρες, τὸ μὲν ἐpiιτήδευμα ἓν ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ
Indeed, if the orators should be
several, while the pursuit, being one,
ἐν τοῖς piλείοσιν ὄνομα ἔχει, οἱ δὲ με- has the same name among the sev-
τιόντες καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἔκαστον ἐνερ- eral, those who pursue it each by
γοῦσιν ἰδίως ῥητορεύων ὁ δεῖνα καὶ himself energize individually, since
ἰδίως ὁ ἔτερος· the one speaks powerfully and the
other simply.
οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώpiοις,
ἐpiειδὴ διακεκριμένη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐν τοῖς
So, among men, since the en-
ergeia of each in the same occupa-
αὐτοῖς ἐpiιτηδεύμασιν ἑκάστου ἐν- tions is divided (διακεκριμένη), they
έργεια, κυρίως piολλοὶ ὀνομάζονται, are legitimately named many, since
ἑκάστου αὐτῶν εἰς ἰδίαν piεριγραφὴν each of them is separated from the
κατὰ τὸ ἰδιότροpiον τῆς ἐνεργείας others into his own circumscribed
ἀpiοτεμνομένου τῶν ἄλλων·163 domain according to the idiotropon
of the energeia.164
Thus, Gregory draws a distinction between particular, individual energeiai,
and “the one energeia” which they constitute as a Neo-Platonic collective uni-
versal. Gregory himself doesn’t seem to have any very good vocabulary to make
this distinction succinctly, or if he does he doesn’t use it, and isn’t always ex-
plicit as to when he is talking about the one or the other. So I will introduce
the words “type” and “token,” to mark this distinction, with the caveat that
I mean to use these terms only as a convenient way to mark the distinction
Gregory wants to make here, and not to import any connotations extraneous to
163. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 47.
164. Adapted from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), pp. 8-9.
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his thought. With that said, a few things should be fairly clear.
First, the token (καθ’ ἑαυτὸν) energeiai of different rhetoricians are distinct
and not shared by the different rhetoricians.
Second, the rhetoricians are still said to be “of one energeia” (despite having
multiple token energeiai) because the token energeiai are all “equivalent” (ἴσος).
That is, since the “one energeia” (or energeia type as I am calling it) is “divisible”
into the token energeiai, it seems to be simply a collection of token energeiai
that form some sort of equivalence class, i.e., a Neo-Platonic collective universal.
But third, and most crucially, the token energeiai of distinct rhetoricians
seem to be individuated, not by their relations to the individual rhetoricians
that perform them, but by their own idiomata (here ἰδιότροpiον). – This in fact
is the critical aspect of Gregory’s solution to the LPT. – What individuates the
token energeiai in Gregory’s example is not simply that they belong to distinct
hypostases. Rather, he constructs his example so that what individuate the
token acts of orating are qualities intrinsic to the particular acts themselves
(namely, that they exhibit different rhetorical styles).165,166
The picture that emerges, then, looks roughly like a Davidsonian view of
events (actions) and their individuation.167 These energeiai are particular,
individual events, with their own criterion or criteria for individuation. The
rhetoricians have their own idiomata, and the acts of orating have their own
idiomata. But of course, in the case of the three rhetoricians, despite the hy-
postases and their (token) energeiai being individuated by different factors, they
will all ultimately be individuated.
This is why the semantics of collective nouns no longer applies, and the
previous problem comes back again. If, unlike natures, energeiai (types) are
“divided” into their particulars (token energeiai), and the energeia “has the same
name among the several” (the token energeiai have the same name as each other
and as the collective, or energeia type, they compose) then not only is it the case
that the token energeiai in fact form precisely the kind of discontinuous whole
that is a Neo-Platonic universal – they also form precisely the kind of collection
that, given the semantic view sketched above,168 is not named with a (singular)
collective noun, but is named in the plural after all. We can see, then, that this
is not some sort of additional point added onto the UNA, as though it were
still strictly speaking false to say there are “many rhetoricians,” but somehow
a legitimate misuse of language. Rather, this is an entirely separate argument
from the UNA (and incompatible with it), on which it now is strictly speaking
true after all that there are three rhetoricians.
165. The so-called “powerful” versus “simple,” rhetorical styles – see (St. Gregory of Nyssa
2008a), p. 9, footnotes 35 and 36, in which he references Demetrius’ De Elocutione 240, on
the “powerful” style.
166. This is not to say that token energeiai can only be individuated by intrinsic qualities,
instead of relations (like spatio-temporal relations). Only that they can be individuated by
intrinsic features, and are not individuated merely by being performed by distinct hypostases.
167. For Davidson’s views on the individuation of actions and events, see (Davidson 1963),
(Davidson 1966), (Davidson 1969b), and (Davidson 1970) all reprinted in (Davidson 2001),
as well as (Davidson 1969a).
168. 4.2.2, p. 129 ff.
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So, if this is the case, if it is strictly speaking true that there are three
rhetoricians in Gregory’s analogy, why is it not strictly speaking true to say
that there are three gods?
4.4.3 Gregory’s Theology of Synergy
Gregory’s answer is that, unlike the case with men, the energeiai of the Trinity
are not divided. This does not mean that, somehow, necessary metaphysical
truths simply work differently for the Trinity, so that when we are talking about
God we will have a theory of energeiai types (universals) as indivisible monads,
but when talking about men we will switch over to a collective theory of energeia
types. Nor does it mean that theological language is somehow different, so that
when we speak about God our words follow a different set of rules. It is rather
that in the case of men there are factors which actually do individuate the token
actions, but in the case of the Trinity, while the hypostases are individuated by
the idiomata of paternity, filiation and spiration, there simply are no idiomata
that could individuate their token energeiai.
ἐpiὶ δὲ τῆς θείας φύσεως οὐχ
οὔτως ἐμάθομεν ὄτι ὁ piατὴρ piοιεῖ
But in the case of the divine na-
ture we did not learn thus that the
τι καθ’ ἑαυτόν, οὗ μὴ συνεφάpiτε- Father does something by himself,
ται ὁ υἱός, ἢ piάλιν ὁ υἱὸς ἰδιαζόν- that the Son does not engage in with
τως ἐνεργεῖ τι χωρὶς τοῦ piνεύμα- him, or again that the Son ener-
τος, ἀλλὰ piᾶσα ἐνέργεια ἡ θεόθεν ἐpiὶ gizes something separate from the
τὴν κτίσιν διήκουσα καὶ κατὰ τὰς piο- Spirit, but every energeia that has
λυτρόpiους ἐννοίας ὀνομαζομένη ἐκ extended from God to the creation
piατρὸς ἀφορμᾶται καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ and is named according to various
piρόεισι καὶ ἐν τῷ piνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ conceptions, emerges from Father,
τελειοῦται. proceeds through the Son and is per-
fected by the Holy Spirit.
διὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὸ piλῆθος τῶν ἐν-
εργούντων τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ἐνεργείας
Because of this, the noun for the
energeia is not divided into the plu-
οὐ διασχίζεται, ὄτι οὐκ ἀpiοτεταγμένη rality of energizers, because the ef-
ἑκάστου καὶ ἰδιάζουσά ἐστιν ἡ piερί τι fort concerning anything is not sepa-
σpiουδή· rated by each one and individuated.
ἀλλ’ ὄpiερ ἂν γίνηται τῶν εἴτε εἰς
τὴν ἡμετέραν piρόνοιαν φθανόντων
But whatever comes to be, whe-
ther of the things that first occur in
εἴτε piρὸς τὴν τοῦ piαντὸς οἰκονομίαν forethought for us or for the man-
καὶ σύστασιν, διὰ τῶν τριῶν μὲν γίνε- agement and support of the totality,
ται, οὐ μὴν τρία ἐστὶ τὰ γινόμενα.169 comes to be through the three, but
surely it is not three [things] that
come to be.170
Gregory gives the example of the life that has been given to each of us by the
169. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 47-48.
170. Adapted from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), p. 9.
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Trinity. I have been given life by the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. But
I have not been given three numerically distinct lives. (Nor, presumably, would
Gregory want to say that only a “part” of my life has been given by the Father,
a part by the Son and a part by the Holy Spirit.) Gregory takes this to show
that there is, then, only one token act of life-giving, and it is the same token act
of life-giving that is performed by all three hypostases simultaneously. (If there
had been three distinct token acts of life-giving, all of which were completed,
and if these were not merely the givings of parts of a life, then it would seem
to follow that I should end up with three whole, distinct, token lives, which is
unfortunately not the case. Thus, on Gregory’s view, we can only make sense of
attributing a token act or activity of life-giving to all three hypostases by saying
it is the same token life-giving that is performed by all three hypostases.)
I will call the phenomenon of multiple distinct hypostases performing numer-
ically one token energeia “synergy” and say that when two distinct hypostases
x and y perform a single token energeia e, they “synergize on” the token en-
ergeia e, and when e is of type e*, that x and y “synergize on” energeia type e*.
Later on, Gregory gives another example, the energeia of salvation, to stave off
objections to the possibility of synergy:
Καὶ ὤσpiερ εἷς ὁ piατὴρ σωτὴρ piάν- Just as the one Father has been
των ἀνθρώpiων μάλιστα piιστῶν ὑpiὸ named “Savior of all men, and espe-
τοῦ ἀpiοστόλου ὠνόμασται καὶ οὐδεὶς cially of those who believe” by the
ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης ἢ τὸν υἱὸν λέγει apostle [1 Tim. 4:10], and no one
μὴ σῴζειν τοὺς piιστεύοντας ἢ δίχα says, based on this statement, either
τοῦ piνεύματος τὴν σωτηρίαν τοῖς that the Son does not save the faith-
μετέχουσι γίνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γίνεται piάν- ful or that salvation belongs to the
των σωτὴρ ὁ ἐpiὶ piάντων θεὸς ἐνερ- participants apart from the Spirit,
γοῦντος τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν σωτηρίαν ἐν τῇ but the God over all [=the Father]
τοῦ piνεύματος χάριτι καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλ- becomes the savior of all because the
λον διὰ τοῦτο τρεῖς σωτῆρες ὑpiὸ τῆς Son energizes salvation, in the grace
γραφῆς ὀνομάζονται, εἰ καὶ ὁμολογεῖ- of the Spirit, and no more does the
ται piαρὰ τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος ἡ σωτηρία Scripture therefore name three sav-
. . . 171 iors if salvation is also confessed [to
be] from the Holy Triad . . . 172
Here Gregory is giving a biblical argument to stave off objections to his
metaphysics of synergy (i.e., the possibility of synergy). For although it does
not logically follow from Gregory’s metaphysics of action individuation that
token energeiai must be individuated by, or along with, the hypostases that
perform them, someone might simply want to assume that they would, as an in-
dependently plausible metaphysical principle. But since Gregory’s audience, at
this point, is other orthodox Christian, he points out that such an exclusionary
principle would rule out synergistic attributions that are apparently committed
171. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 52.
172. Adapted from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2008a), p. 12.
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to by the Bible.173
For example, that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit all engage in the energeia
of salvation. The assumption that:
for any hypostases, x and y, if x 6= y, and if x does token energeia e of
type e*, then y does not do e
would entail that, if the Father saves me, either the Son and the Holy Spirit do
not save me at all, or that, if either of them do, then I am being saved multiple
times in multiple token acts of salvation – neither of which seems consistent
with what the Bible says or how the Bible says it.
Finally, Gregory generalizes from the example of life-giving, and claims that
the hypostases of the Trinity synergize on every token energeia they perform.
(I will call this “The Universal Synergy Claim” or “US.”)
v᾿Εpiειδὴ τοίνυν καθ’ ὁμοιότητα Since then the Holy Trinity ful-
τοῦ εἰρημένου piᾶσαν ἐνέργειαν οὐ fills every energeia in a manner sim-
διῃρημένως ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὸν τῶν ilar to that of which I have spoken,
ὑpiοστάσεων ἀριθμὸν ἡ ἁγία τριάς, not energizing dividedly, according
ἀλλὰ μία τις γίνεται τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ to the number of the hypostases, but
θελήματος κίνησίς τε καὶ διάδοσις, a single motion and disposition of
ἐκ τοῦ piατρὸς διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ piρὸς the good will comes to be, communi-
τὸ piνεῦμα διεξαγομένη, ὡς οὐ λέ- cated from the Father, through the
γομεν τρεῖς ζωοpiοιοὺς τοὺς τὴν μίαν Son, to the Spirit, for as we do not
ἐνεργοῦντας ζωὴν οὐδὲ τρεῖς ἀγα- call “three givers of life” those who
θοὺς τοὺς ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀγαθότητι energize a single life, neither do we
θεωρουμένους οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα piάντα call “three good ones” those contem-
piληθυντικῶς ἐξαγγέλλομεν, οὔτως plated in the same goodness, nor do
οὐδὲ τρεῖς ὀνομάζειν δυνάμεθα τοὺς we express any of the others plu-
τὴν θεϊκὴν ταύτην ἤτοι ἐpiοpiτικὴν δύ- rally, so neither can we call “three”
ναμίν τε καὶ ἐνέργειαν συνημμένως those conjointly and inseparably en-
καὶ ἀδιακρίτως δι’ ἀλλήλων ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ergizing the same divine and super-
τε καὶ piάσης τῆς κτίσεως ἐνεργοῦν- intending power and energeia to us
τας. . . 174 and to all of creation. . . 175
And again just a bit later:
λέγει γὰρ Εἰ δὲ ἐγὼ ἐν piνεύ- For He says, “If I by the Spirit of
ματι θεοῦ ἐκβάλλω τὰ δαιμόνια· ἀpiὸ God cast out devils”; where He in-
μέρους piᾶν εἶδος εὐεργεσίας piεριλ- cludes every form of doing good in a
αμβάνων διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν partial description, by reason of the
ἑνότητος· οἷς γὰρ δι’ ἀλλήλων ἐν- unity of energeia: for the name de-
173. See 6.4, p. 298 ff. below for other cases in which synergy may be useful for understanding
similar claims made in the Bible.
174. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 48-49.
175. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 334, adapted.
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εργεῖται τὸ ἔν, εἰς piολλοὺς καταμε- rived from the energeia cannot be
μερίσθαι τὸ ὄνομα τῆς ἐνεργείας οὐ divided among many where [only]
δύναται.176 one thing is energized mutually.177
Gregory concludes this part of Ad Ablabium with a longer argument and
additional considerations to the effect that the hypostases synergize on every
token energeia they perform. This is the heart of the UAA, and is the only
response to the LPT that Gregory indicates he actually accepts. There is one
God because there is only one token power and there is only one token action
(energeia) shared among the Triad.
What emerges, then, from a close reading of the Ad Ablabium, is that Gre-
gory takes the metaphysical position that it is possible for one and the same
token energeia to be performed or engaged in by more than one hypostasis. This
is what I have called his “metaphysics of synergy,” and is the under-appreciated
key to his solution to the LPT. It might be thought a peculiar metaphysics,
but it is neither unintelligible, nor obviously false, nor – certainly – is it simply
formally contradictory.178
4.4.4 The Individuation of Ousiai
I think the above evidence from within the Ad Ablabium makes it clear enough
that Gregory does in fact distinguish between energeia types and tokens. But
we can also see the need for Gregory to make such a distinction between en-
ergeia types and energeia tokens when we note Gregory’s view that ousiai are
individuated by energeiai.
This claim should hardly be controversial to anyone familiar with the Cap-
padocians. The closely related point that ousiai are individuated by dynameis
(powers) has been examined in great detail by Michel Rene Barnes,179 noting
the origins of the thesis in pre-Socratic medical authors, the influence of those
writings on Plato, and the trajectory of the view up into the pro-Nicene con-
sensus and its use by Gregory of Nyssa in his debates with the Eunomians.
And insofar as there would seem to be a one-to-one correspondence between
dynameis and energeiai, it should be obvious enough that Gregory would also
accept the thesis that ousiai are individuated by energeiai. However, I’ll quote
a few important texts in which we can see Gregory himself present the view
that energeiai individuate ousiai, as well as the further premise I will call “The
Cappadocian Assertion,” (or “CA”) which says that the hypostases of the Trin-
ity engage in all the same energeiai. Together, these claims constitute probably
Gregory’s most powerful argument for the homoousion, and so are central to his
triadology. As we will see, the Cappadocian Assertion cannot be understood as
saying the same thing as the Universal Synergy Claim. And this is further ev-
idence that Gregory distinguishes between two different concepts of “energeia”
176. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 50.
177. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 334, adapted.
178. I explore the plausibility just a bit more in Chapter 6.3, p. 287, and 6.4, p. 298.
179. (Barnes 2001).
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(although he does not always mark when he is speaking of one or the other).
But first, what Gregory says about the individuation of ousiai. We’ll start with
Ad Xenodorum, then look at Ad Eustathium again.
The Individuation of Ousiai in Ad Xenodorum
Only a small fragment remains from Gregory’s epistle to Xenodorus, a fragment
preserved by St. Maximus the Confessor in a florilegium from Gregory about the
concept of energeiai.180 But the fragment Maximus preserves will give us a sense
for the meaning of energeia, and, more importantly, its role in the individuation
of ousiai :
᾿Ενέργειαν γὰρ ἡμεῖς εἶναί φαμεν
τὴν φυσικὴν ἑκάστης οὐσίας δύναμίν
For we say that energeia is the
natural (φυσικός) power (dynamis)
τε καὶ κίνησιν, ἧς χωρὶς οὔτε ἐστὶν and movement of each ousia without
οὔτε γινώσκεται φύσις. which a nature (φύσις) neither exists
nor is known.
νοερῶν γάρ ἐστι νόησις, αἰσθη-
τικῶν αἴσθησις (καθ’ ἣν αὗταί τε
For intelligence is [the energeia]
of intellectual beings, sensation of
τῶν ἐκτὸς ἐφάpiτονται φυσικῶς καὶ sensate beings—by which the same
τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑpiοpiίpiτουσι), piτηνῶν lay hold of things outside them
piτῆσις, νηκτῶν νῆξις, ἑρpiηστικῶν and are subject to things outside
ἔρψις, βαδιστικῶν βάδισις, βλαστῶν them—flight of that which flies,
βλάστησις. swimming of that which swims,
crawling of that which crawls, walk-
ing of that which walks, sprouting
of that which sprouts.
καὶ piεριληpiτικῶς εἰpiεῖν, τὸ σημαν-
τικὸν ἑκάστης ἰδίωμα φύσεως ἐνέρ-
To speak comprehensively, the
idioma significant (σημαντικὸν) of
γειαν λέγομεν φυσικήν· ἧς μόνον each nature we call its natural en-
ἐστέρηται τὸ μὴ ὄν. ergeia; of which only that which
does not exist is deprived.
τὸ γὰρ οὐσίας τινὸς μετέχον καὶ
τῆς δηλούσης αὐτὴν φυσικῶς μεθέξει
For that which participates in
a certain ousia will also partici-
piάντως δυνάμεως. ὄρους γὰρ τῶν pate naturally and completely in the
οὐσιῶν τὰς φυσικὰς αὐτῶν ἐνεργείας power (dynamis) manifesting it. For
ὁ ἀληθὴς ἐpiίσταται λόγος.181 the true Logos presides over the nat-
ural limits of ousiai.182
First, we can already see here that Gregory takes energeia to individuate
ousiai (although that will be even more clear in Ad Eustathium). He says, “that
which shares in any ousia, will also share . . . in the power that manifests it.
We can also see that energeiai are that by which an ousia “is known,” but
that Gregory then goes on to describe the natural energeia as the idioma of the
180. See (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2007), pp. 245-246.
181. (St. Gregory of Nyssa, 1938, reprinted 1962), pp. 14-15.
182. Translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 2007), pp. 246-247. Adapted.
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nature. And I have argued that idioma for Gregory means something which indi-
viduates. Thus, there is a certain parallel here to Sydney Shoemaker’s “Causal
Theory of Properties,” moving from the epistemological and semantic claims
that dynameis (powers) and energeiai (activities) are that by which a nature
“is known” to the metaphysical claim that they are that by which a nature is
individuated.183
Finally, we also see here the view that no ousia can exist without some
natural energeia. energeia is something “without which a nature neither exists
nor is known,” and “only that which does not exist is deprived” of natural
energeiai.
The Individuation of Ousiai in Ad Eustathium
Ad Eustathium contains further elaboration on the role of energeiai as individ-
uating ousiai. Gregory writes:
v᾿Αλλὰ λέγουσι φύσεως ἐνδεικ-
τικὴν εἶναι τὴν piροσηγορίαν ταύτην,
But they say that this appella-
tion (piροσηγορία) [“God”] is indica-
ἀκοινώνητον δὲ εἶναι piρὸς Πατέρα καὶ tive of nature, and that, as the na-
Υἱὸν τὴν τοῦ Πνεύματος φύσιν, καὶ ture of the Spirit is not common to
διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα the Father and the Son, for this rea-
τοῦτο κοινωνίας μετέχειν. son neither does he partake in the
community of this attribute (ὄνομα)
[name].
Οὐκοῦν δειξάτωσαν διὰ τίνων τὸ
τῆς φύσεως piαρηλλαγμένον ἐpiέγν-
Let them show, then, whereby
they discern this diversity of nature.
ωσαν.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὴν ἐφ’
ἑαυτῆς τὴν θείαν φύσιν θεωρηθῆναι
For if it were possible that the
Divine nature should be contem-
καὶ τό τε οἰκείως ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἀλ- plated in its absolute essence, and
λοτρίως διὰ τῶν φαινομένων εὑρεῖν, that we should find by appearances
οὐκ ἂν piάντως ἐδεήθημεν λόγων ἢ what is and what is not proper to
τεκμηρίων ἑτέρων piρὸς τὴν τοῦ ζη- it, we should surely have no need of
τουμένου κατάληψιν. other arguments or evidence for the
comprehension of the question.
v᾿Εpiεὶ δὲ ἡ μὲν ὑψηλοτέρα τῆς τῶν
ζητουμένων ἐστὶ κατανοήσεως, ἐκ δὲ
But since it is exalted above the
understanding of the questioners,
τεκμηρίων τινῶν piερὶ τῶν διαφευγόν- and we have to argue from some par-
των τὴν γνῶσιν ἡμῶν λογιζόμεθα, ticular evidence about those things
ἀνάγκη piᾶσα διὰ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἡμᾶς which evade our knowledge, it is
χειραγωγεῖσθαι piρὸς τὴν τῆς θείας absolutely necessary for us to be
183. Although of course not just any property counts as an ousia. Still, Shoemaker’s view (or
something like it) would seem to entail Gregory’s view here (or something like it). For details
of Shoemaker’s view, see esp. (Shoemaker 1980a), and also (Shoemaker 1979), (Shoe-
maker 1980b), (Shoemaker 1984), (Shoemaker 1998), (Shoemaker 2003), and (Shoe-
maker 2011).
186
φύσεως ἔρευναν. guided to the investigation of the
Divine nature by its energeiai.
Οὐκοῦν, ἐὰν ἴδωμεν διαφερούσας
ἀλλήλων τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς piαρὰ τοῦ
If, then, we see that the energeiai
which are wrought by the Father
Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ v῾Αγίου and the Son and the Holy Spirit
Πνεύματος ἐνεργουμένας, διαφόρους differ one from the other, we shall
εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἐνεργούσας φύσεις ἐκ conjecture from the different charac-
τῆς ἑτερότητος τῶν ἐνεργειῶν στο- ter of the energeiai that the natures
χαζόμεθα. which energize are also different.
Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὰ διεστῶτα
κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον piρὸς
For it cannot be that things
which differ in their very nature
τὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν εἶδος ἀλλήλοις should agree in the form (εἶδος) of
συνενεχθῆναι· οὔτε ψύχει τὸ piῦρ their energeiai : fire does not chill,
οὔτε θερμαίνει ὁ κρύσταλλος, ἀλλὰ nor ice give warmth, but their en-
τῇ τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾷ συνδιαχωρί- ergeiai are distinguished together
ζονται ἀpi’ ἀλλήλων καὶ αἱ piαρὰ with the difference between their na-
τούτων ἐνέργειαι. tures.
v᾿Εὰν δὲ μίαν νοήσωμεν τὴν ἐνέργ-
ειαν Πατρός τε καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύ-
If, on the other hand, we under-
stand that the energeia of the Fa-
ματος v῾Αγίου, ἐν μηδενὶ διαφέρουσάν ther, the Son, and the Holy Spirit
τι ἢ piαραλλάσσουσαν, ἀνάγκη τῇ is one, differing or varying in noth-
ταὐτότητι τῆς ἐνεργείας τὸ ἡνωμένον ing, the oneness of their nature must
τῆς φύσεως συλλογίζεσθαι.184 needs be inferred from the identity
of their energeia.185
Here Gregory makes it quite clear that natures are individuated by energeiai.
In the next quote from Ad Eustathium, Gregory makes the claim that the hy-
postases all engage in the same energeiai, i.e., what I call “the Cappadocian
Assertion.” From the Cappadocian Assertion and the criteria of individuation
for natures, it follows, Gregory argues, that the persons of the Trinity have a
single ousia.
ἁγιάζει καὶ ζωοpiοιεῖ καὶ piαρακα- The Father, the Son, and the
λεῖ καὶ piάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως ὁ Holy Spirit alike give sanctification,
piατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ τὸ piνεῦμα τὸ and life, and light, and comfort, and
ἅγιον all similar graces.
καὶ μηδεὶς κατ’ ἐξαίρετον ἀpiονε- And let no one attribute the en-
μέτω τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ piνεύματος τὴν ergeia of sanctification in a special
ἁγιαστικὴν ἐξουσίαν ἀκούσας τοῦ sense to the Spirit, when he hears
σωτῆρος ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ piερὶ τῶν the Saviour in the Gospel saying to
μαθητῶν piρὸς τὸν piατέρα λέγοντος· the Father concerning His disciples,
Πάτερ, ἁγίασον αὐτοὺς ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί Father, sanctify them in Your name.
σου.
184. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 10-11.
185. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 328, adapted.
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ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα piάντα So too all the other gifts are en-
κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐνεργεῖται τοῖς ἀξίοις ergized in those who are worthy alike
piαρὰ τοῦ piατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ by the Father, the Son, and the Holy
ἁγίου piνεύματος, Spirit:
. . . . . .
οὐκοῦν ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας ταυτότης Thus the identity of energeia in
ἐpiὶ piατρός τε καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου piνεύ- Father, Son, and Holy Spirit shows
ματος δείκνυσι σαφῶς τὸ τῆς φύσεως plainly the undistinguishable char-
ἀpiαράλλακτον· acter of their nature.
ὤστε, κἂν φύσιν σημαίνῃ τὸ τῆς So that even if the name of God-
θεότητος ὄνομα, κυρίως καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ head does indicate nature, the com-
piνεύματι τὴν piροσηγορίαν ἐφαρμόζ- munity of ousia shows that this ap-
εσθαι ταύτην ἡ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης pellation is properly applied also to
συνθήσεται.186 the Holy Spirit.187
I will let this quote suffice to show that Gregory holds the view that the
hypostases have all the same energeiai. It is well known, and not controversial,
that he did. We see here the same point as before, that Gregory does not accept
the view that “God” expresses a nature. But now we can see how he argues that,
even if it did, the Holy Spirit would still properly be called “God” anyway, since
the identity of energeia between the Father, Son and Spirit entails the identity of
their nature. (Although as we’ve seen, Gregory’s own view is that the Holy Spirit
is properly called “God” because He participates in the appropriate energeia.)
Now I’ve said that the Cappadocian Assertion and the Universal Synergy
Claim must be understood as two distinct claims. Of course, Gregory takes it
to be the case that the hypostases of the Trinity not only engage in the same
types of energeiai, but all the same tokens as well. Now if we grant that, then
it won’t make any difference to Gregory’s argument in the case of the Trinity
whether he takes ousiai to be individuated by token energeia or energeiai types.
However, since as we saw above, Gregory claims that all the token energeiai of
men are distinct, if Gregory took ousiai to be individuated by energeia tokens,
it would lead to the conclusion that human beings don’t (indeed couldn’t) have
the same ousia after all – whereas Gregory clearly thinks they do.188
The obvious solution here, of course, is that when Gregory speak of natures
being individuated by energeiai, he means that it is the energeia type, or as he
sometimes puts it, the “form” (εἶδος) of energeiai that individuates ousiai.189
186. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), pp. 11-14.
187. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), pp. 328-329, adapted.
188. Of course, it would be hard to overstate the absurdity of the idea that natures would
somehow be individuated by token actions, or even to catalogue all the ways in which it would
lead to absurdity.
189. Radde-Gallwitz touches on the same distinction I am making in (Radde-Gallwitz
2009), p. 133, in noting the distinction between “peculiar features that distinguish individual
members of a common species individuate” and “features peculiar to a common nature that
distinguish that nature or shared substance from others.” What I am pointing out is that the
latter, at least in Ad Xenodorum just are energeiai (types), but that the former are had, not
only by hypostases, but by energeiai (tokens).
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Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὰ διεστῶτα For it cannot be that things
κατὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως λόγον piρὸς which differ in their very nature
τὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν εἶδος ἀλλήλοις should agree in the form (εἶδος) of
συνενεχθῆναι·190 their energeiai ;191
Given that we have to understand his claim about the individuation of ousiai
in terms of energeia types, instead of tokens, it’s best to understand the Cap-
padocian Assertion as the weaker claim that the hypostases of the Trinity merely
engage in (some or another tokens of) all the same energeia types, rather than
the stronger claim that they engage in all the same energeia tokens (i.e., the
Universal Synergy Claim). The weaker claim (CA, as I read it), together with
his view on the individuation of ousiai, is sufficient to get him the homoousion.
US of course entails CA, but US would be a much more controversial assump-
tion than CA. On the other hand, while CA does not entail US, what would
entail US would be the conjunction of CA, plus Gregory’s views about the indi-
viduation of energeia tokens, plus the assumption that no idiomata individuate
the token energeiai of the hypostases of the Trinity.
4.4.5 Conclusion
To round out our discussion of Ad Ablabium, Gregory concludes by considering
two possible objections – first to the UAA, then to the UNA. First, he considers
an objection to the controversial semantic presupposition of the UAA – that
“God” signifies an energeia. We already discussed this above and saw that
he ultimately will fall back on the UNA as a back-up argument. Second, he
considers an objection to the controversial metaphysical presupposition of the
UNA – that universals are indivisible monads. The objection here is that, if
true, it would seem to entail that all the hypostases of a given nature would be
identical. Gregory reiterates that hypostases are individuated by their idiomata.
Interestingly, as I see it, Gregory’s actual view (the UAA) is much more plau-
sible than his supposedly more defensible argument constructed for the benefit
of interlocutors who deny his semantics of “is God” (the UNA). Although I
think that when we place Gregory in the framework of the common philosoph-
ical viewpoints of the time, we can see that his argument that there is “strictly
speaking only one man” is not nearly so bizarre as it might initially strike us
today.
Nevertheless, it is one thing to say that Gregory’s response was plausible
for the time; it is another thing to say that it is useful for us today. Most
of us would not accept the semantics of counting in which we number the X’s
by the number of parts of the whole they compose, when the whole and all of
the parts have a common predicate. One might have thought the UNA would
be amenable to Social Trinitarianism, but I think that would be a mistake on
multiple levels. First, at the level of semantics, the peculiar semantic / syntactic
disconnect of collective nouns only comes into play, it would seem, when we
190. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1958), p. 11.
191. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), p. 328.
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have a whole that is not called by the same name as its parts, whereas any
account within the Equivocation Family will work by saying just the opposite.
Second, at the level of metaphysics, Gregory, like Basil before him, wants to say
that God is not just the collection of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, which is at
least roughly what Social Trinitarian accounts do in fact say. And so it would
seem that, on closer examination, there are few or no resources in the UNA,
or indeed in Gregory’s Trinitarian theology generally, for Social Trinitarians to
take advantage of. Indeed, there is probably not much to be salvaged from
the UNA for anyone today, relying as it does on a semantics for counting that
nobody today would accept.
On the other hand, a nice feature of the UAA is precisely the fact that,
on this response, there is a significant metaphysical difference between the hy-
postases of the Trinity and three rhetoricians. And this opens up the possibility
of incorporating the metaphysics and theology of the UAA into some kind of
semantics of counting that might be more acceptable as well.
That is, although Gregory still couches his discussion in terms of a semantics
that seems to center on counting parts of a whole, it would be easy enough to
transpose his Trinitarian account into a semantics for counting that is more
amenable to us today. Gregory’s fundamental idea here seems to be just that
E-ers are to be numbered by counting token actions of the same (E-ish) form,
performed by some individual(s), as opposed to counting individuals performing
token actions of the same (E-ish) form. Thus, in the case of, say, Peter, James
and John orating, they would be counted as three rhetoricians – not because
they are three individuals, each such that he performs some token act of the
orating type, but rather because there are three numerically distinct token acts
of orating, each being performed by some individual.
We will go into more detail on how to represent the view formally in Chapter
5, and we will explore possible criticisms of this idea more in Chapter 6. But
for now, here are a few considerations.
First, here is an argument in favor of Gregory’s view. Let’s switch from
orating to an energeia that has a tangible result – shoemaking. Now suppose we
say that three shoemakers all do that which only a shoemaker can do. Suppose
all three shoemakers perfect, or bring to a completion, their doing of their act.
We would expect there to be three shoes as a result. On Gregory’s view (the view
that “three shoemakers” means three token acts of shoemaking being done) this
is, necessarily, the case, while on the competing view (that “three shoemakers”
means only three individuals doing some or another act of shoemaking), it is
not. (This ties into the fact, discussed just below, that speaking of “three gods”
would be misleading, even if technically true.)
On the other hand, here is an argument against Gregory’s view: Suppose I
am typing up one book with my left hand and typing up another book with my
right hand. Given Gregory’s view, it would seem that, not only am I an author
– I am two authors. (Which seems false.)
But here is a response Gregory could give to the above that would salvage
his response to the LPT without, I think, doing any violence to the spirit of his
triadology: Perhaps we count E-ers both by the number of token E-ings and by
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the number of hypostases E-ing. That is, if one hypostasis does one E-ing, we
count one E-er, and if one hypostasis does two E-ings, we also count one E-er
(so I am only one author in the above example); only if two hypostases do two
E-ings do we count two E-ers (and any time there are two created hypostases
doing any E-ings, there will automatically be at leasttwo E-ings, because the
same spatio-temporal relations that individuate the hypostases will also happen
to individuate all of their actions). That is, as we normally speak, both the
hypostases and their E-ings must be individuated for us to move the count up
another number. But it is only in the case of the Trinity that we find more than
one hypostasis doing a single E-ing, and in such a case, we ought to count only
one E-er, since it is not the case that both the hypostases and the energeiai are
distinct.
Finally, if any and all considerations in favor of Gregory’s counting principle
seem ultimately unpersuasive, so long as there are no decisive considerations
against it, one could simply argue that, since our ordinary linguistic practices
are suited to mundane scenarios, that is, to counting creatures and creaturely
phenomena, and since (one can argue) in the case of created hypostases and their
actions, the actions and the hypostases are always individuated together (since
both the hypostases and their token energeiai will always be individuated by the
same spatio-temporal relations), there’s no reason to suspect that our ordinary
linguistic practices would determine an answer as to whether we should describe
the Trinity as one creator or three creators, one Lord or three Lords, and so on
for any other agent noun we use – including, on Gregory’s view, “God.” That is,
there may simply be no fact of the matter as to whether the Trinity count as one
God or three. Not in the sense that there are no extra-mental facts as to what
things exist and how they are individuated and so forth, but in the sense that
our ordinary counting practices simply don’t determine any particular answer
to certain questions. (As an analogy, there is no answer to the question what
some number divided by zero is – not because of some metaphysical fact that
reality itself is somehow indeterminate in certain scenarios, but because of the
semantic fact that we have only a partial definition for the division function.)
Now suppose even that consideration is found wanting. Suppose that we
even find conclusive reasons to reject Gregory’s semantics here and to accept
some semantics on which there are strictly speaking three Gods. I think Gregory
could admit (though of course he doesn’t, and wouldn’t want to, but he could
admit) that it is strictly speaking true to say there are “three Gods” but could
still very easily argue that, even if so the truth in this case would be more
misleading than the alleged falsehood of saying there is “one God.” Consider
the following analogy.
Gregory would likely not accept the view that distinct men could be co-
located. They would have to be spatially separated, and thus their actions
would have to be spatially separated as well. But suppose per impossibile that
three men were co-located. Suppose further, though, that there is nothing
to individuate their (also co-located) actions, so that they and their actions
would indeed be perfectly analogous to the Trinity and the Trinity’s actions
on Gregory’s view. Let’s suppose these men are painters, that I am a general
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contractor whom they work for, and that you are in need of “three painters.”
You want to hire a team of three painters, because you have three different
areas in your house that need painted, each one of which will take about 8
man-hours of work (all day), and you will have to remove a lot of furniture in
order to have them painted, then move the furniture back after the painting is
done. You don’t want to be inconvenienced three days in a row, and anyway
you only have (two day) weekends during which to move furniture in and out
of the rooms. You explain the situation to me and say you therefore want to
move all of the furniture out the night before, have “three painters” come in the
next morning, and get all of the painting done in a single day, so that you can
move the furniture back in that night and be done with the project in a day.
I tell you – quite truthfully, mind you – that I have exactly “three painters” I
can send out, and that we charge $50 per man-hour of work, a man-hour being,
of course, determined by the number of men (which is to say, the number of
painters) painting and the number of hours each painter (viz. man) works. You
calculate that, since the job should require about 24 man-hours of work, you will
be charged about $1,200 – just about what you have budgeted. So you agree
to the deal, whereupon, instead of sending an ordinary team of three painters,
I send out my Trinitarian team of “three” (co-located) painters.
Of course, your plans are now ruined. The whole point of hiring “three
painters” was to be able to squeeze 24 man-hours of work into an 8-hour day.
And this can only be accomplished when the “three” painters are engaged, at
any given time, in three distinct token acts of painting (individuated by the
fact that they are going on in different, spatially separated areas of the house
simultaneously). My Trinitarian painting crew, however, being co-located, can
only be engaged in a single token act of painting at any given time. Thus,
instead of being done with the project in a single 8-hour day, they have to
return over the course of three days after all – precisely the scenario you had
specifically explained you wanted to avoid.
But what’s worse, after coming to terms with being inconvenienced in this
way, you receive your bill. I have charged you, not $1,200, but $3,600 – three
times what you had budgeted for! Irate, you call to complain about the bill,
whereupon I calmly explain to you that you agreed to pay $50 per man-hour of
work. I then go through the math with you, explaining that there were, after
all, three men, and thus three painters, each one of which really did engage in
a total of 24 hours of work. And 3 men (3 painters), times 24 hours, times $50
= $3,600. I say that, of course, I realize the situation is highly unusual, but I
really did do my best to represent to you only that which is true in the most
strict and literal sense possible, and that, on my view of things, there were,
strictly speaking, three painters, and they did all work for 24 hours, and you
are, after all, a man of your word, aren’t you?
Now suppose we grant, for the sake of argument, that in the above scenario
it really is, strictly and literally, true that there were three painters. Even if
true, is it not nevertheless misleading (if not downright deceptive) for me to
describe them to you as such? One normally assumes that distinct E-ers can
engage in distinct acts of E-ing. But Trinitarian-ly distinct E-ers cannot. And
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for certain purposes, that fact matters very much. So, unless one can explain
the metaphysics of synergy to one’s audience, it seems entirely misleading to
refer to three hypostases that synergize on an act of E-ing as “three E-ers.”
Now if one has a Trinitarian painting crew, and one is asked “how many
painters” one can send, and if one does not have the time to explain the meta-
physics of synergy first, or if one is speaking to someone who is not well-educated
enough, or simply not smart enough, to understand the metaphysics of synergy
at all (the “simple-minded”), then one’s options are simply to say “one painter”
or “three painters.” Gregory clearly thinks that, strictly speaking, it really is
the case that there is only one painter here. But even if he is wrong about
that, it clearly is more misleading to say that there are three painters and less
misleading to say there is only one painter.
And surely Gregory would claim that it would be just as misleading – if not
far more so! – to say that there were three Gods. This would imply, for example,
at least the conceivability of their disagreeing or using their powers (plural) in
conflicting ways, something that is inconceivable on Gregory’s view.192
So, although Gregory couches his discussion in terms of a semantics that
seems to center on counting parts of a whole, it’s easy enough to see what Gre-
gory’s metaphysical and theological commitments entail when we substitute a
semantics of counting that is more amenable to us, but that retains the fun-
damental idea that E-ers are to be numbered according to token E-ings being
engaged in by some hypostasis, rather than according to hypostases engaged in
some token E-ing (or that E-ers are to be numbered according to the number
of distinct pairs of hypostasis-plus-token-energeia). And this is precisely what
we will do in the next chapter.
With the gist of Gregory’s Trinitarian theory in place, we can now construct
a Nyssen Trinitarian account, and a corresponding solution to the LPT, in a
more formal and organized way, allowing us to answer the questions . . . Is
Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity consistent or inconsistent? Does it
provide us with a solution to the LPT, or a non-solution to the LPT?
192. Swinburne’s account of the Trinity, therefore, is very close here (See (Swinburne 1994),
pp. 170-191), but he fails to appreciate that the hypostases are not only cooperating – per-
forming the same types of actions for the same purposes and so on – but synergizing – literally
performing the same token actions. Even though on Swinburne’s view it is not possible for
the hypostases to fail to co-operate, there is still on Swinburne’s account a certain kind of
sense to be made out of the idea of them not co-operating that isn’t there on Gregory’s view.
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Part IV
Logic
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Chapter 5
Formalizing Gregory’s
Account
“. . . and to those who say that the church fathers did not define all
things clearly, but that they left the greater part mysterious, unclear,
and untaught . . . ANATHEMA.”
– The Synodicon On the Holy Spirit
We ended the previous chapter with the question, “Is Gregory of Nyssa’s account
of the Trinity consistent or inconsistent? Does it provide us with a solution
to the LPT, or a non-solution to the LPT?” Now, having gotten the idea of
the content of the relevant elements of Gregory’s account of the Trinity in the
previous chapter, we are now in a position to organize and state those elements
more precisely in order to answer that question.
To reiterate, and to orient our discussion, what we have is a set of proposi-
tions (P) expressed by a set of natural language sentences (S), where the logical
forms of these propositions are under dispute, different parties attributing dif-
ferent logical forms to the propositions. But the logical form of a proposition
supervenes on its content.1 Thus, the way we are approaching the question of
what logical form Gregory (implicitly) attributes to P is as follows: First, we
specify the relevant content of Gregory’s view as clearly as possible (the project
of the preceding chapter, though here we will arrange things more systemat-
ically). Second, we make explicit the semantic principles by which Gregory
maps this content onto the natural language sentences with which he is con-
cerned (and which we can use to map that content onto the translations from
1. Of course, as Keller notes, there are different kinds of content one might want to preserve
when re-stating a given claim: propositional content, cognitive content, factual content, sci-
entific content, inferential roles, truth conditions, assertability conditions, and so forth. (See
(Keller 2010), p. 7, footnote 13 and passim. for discussion.) I take it that the current dis-
cussion centers around a set of related metaphysical issues such as number, counting, identity,
etc. and that the relevant kind of content here is the truth conditions of the propositions
involved.
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his Greek sentences to our English sentences, S). Third, we give explicit seman-
tic principles that allow us to map this content onto the expressions of a formal
language in order to show the logical forms of these propositions precisely and
unambiguously.
This means that, assuming that the logical form Gregory implicitly at-
tributes to P is consistent, an anti-Trinitarian opponent might respond to Gre-
gory’s defense of the doctrine of the Trinity either by criticizing (1) the actual
content of his view (or its presuppositions or entailments or other propositions
it in some way commits one to), or (2) the semantic mapping of that content
onto a language. In my view, though, an objection would not count as a “logical
problem” unless the content itself is not just false but formally contradictory.
We will return later (Chapter 6) to a more precise discussion of what would
be required to refute Gregory’s position. But on the other hand, one might
object, not (necessarily) to Gregory’s position itself, but to my reconstruction
of his position. That is, one might say, at the end of it all, that they have no
idea whether Gregory’s view is consistent or not, because I’ve misrepresented it
(although I don’t think I have, or will). Thus, I’ll introduce the name “GNTF”
here to denote my formal reconstruction of (certain salient parts of) Gregory
of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory. We can use “GNT” to denote the actual views of
Gregory’s that correspond to GNTF.2 If I have done my history correctly, then
GNTF = GNT. If not, not.
With that said, let me explain the above outline of the current chapter’s
project in slightly more detail before carrying it out.
Metaphysics, Theology, and Semantics
In what follows concerning the content of Gregory’s view, I want to make a
distinction between two senses of the terms “ontology” and “metaphysics” – or
two different things people might call “ontology” or might call “metaphysics.”
The distinction is not particularly critical to the logic of my argument, but will
serve as a useful way to organize the elements of Gregory’s account, as well as
the possible objections to his account we will explore in Chapter 6.
First, there is what I would call “pure” or “abstract” ontology or metaphysics,
or what I would call ontology or metaphysics “in the strict sense” or “in the
narrow sense,” and which I would prefer to reserve the unqualified term “meta-
physics” for. This concerns, among other things, such questions as (1) what
types of objects one postulates can (or must) exist,3 (2) what (types of) rela-
tions can (or must) hold between token objects of these types, (3) which types of
objects are such that their tokens can (or must) enter into which of these (types
of) relations with tokens of which other types of objects, and (4) the principles
2. Thus, GNT is not the entirety of the body of Gregory’s beliefs that relate to the Trinity,
but a certain salient subset. One might consider, for example, that Gregory’s beliefs about
epinoiai or dynameis to fall within what should be called “Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian
theory.” But they are not part of GNT, because they are not part of GNTF. See footnote 7
below for more.
3. I use the term “object” here as a most general count noun.
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(if any) by which token objects of the postulated types would be individuated
(if any actually exist).4
Second, there is what might be called a “substantive ontology,” or what I
would prefer to call a “substantive theory.” In this context, I will call it Gregory’s
“theology” (his substantive theory about God) or by its more traditional name,
“triadology” (a substantive theory about “the Triad” or Trinity). Substantive
theories concern, among other things, such questions as (1) what token objects
one postulates actually do exist, (2) what relations one postulates actually hold
between the token objects one postulates, and (3) whether, and in virtue of what,
the postulated token objects actually are individuated from one another.5
Finally, what I am calling “semantics” here concerns the systematic mapping
of tokens and types of objects and relations to the expressions of a language. In
the context of our discussion, we are dealing with two different languages – a
natural language and a formal language – since we want to do the following two
things.6 First, we want to explicate both the metaphysics and the substantive
theory as clearly and precisely as we can. Together with this, we want to map
that content onto the natural language sentences in S to show how the more
clearly and precisely expressed content is indeed being expressed by the natural
language sentences in question. We can call this mapping of content onto natural
language sentences the “N-semantics.” Second, we are giving a more precise
representation of the logical form of that content in the language of predicate
logic. Here we need semantic principles that map the relevant content onto the
expressions of a formal language in order to be able to evaluate it with the
logical tools available to us in the context of that formal language. We can call
this mapping of content onto formal language sentences the “F-semantics.”
So, to specify GNT (the relevant content of Gregory’s Trinitarian theory)
precisely, we will first specify (the relevant aspects of) his “pure” ontology or
metaphysics, and second (the relevant aspects of) his substantive theory or the-
ology.7 Third, to evaluate his theory as an answer to the LPT (that is, to deter-
4. I say “the principles (if any),” because of course one might (indeed at some point, on
pain of infinite regress, must) hold that certain objects need nothing to individuate them.
They simply “come from the factory” that way – individually wrapped, as it were, for your
ontological convenience.
5. Two points. First, of course, for tokens of a type of object that need no individuation,
there will be nothing “in virtue of which” they are distinct from one another. Or, as one might
say, they are distinct in virtue of nothing. Second, for token objects to which some criterion of
individuation does apply, whether they are distinct from other token objects will be a logical
consequence, not merely of assumptions about what all token objects exist and what relations
they bear to one another, but also of the principles of individuation involved. Thus, one’s
metaphysics can constrain parts of one’s substantive theory (in this case, theology, though the
same applies to physics or any other substantive theory). On the other hand one’s substantive
theory may force one to accept or reject certain metaphysical principles to accommodate the
theory. However, one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens, and there is no
reason in principle why one must start with metaphysics or start with substantive theory.
6. Technically two types of language – natural and formal – but three different token lan-
guages – Greek, English (both natural languages) and Predicate Logic (formal). For sim-
plicity’s sake, we will ignore the distinction between Greek and English, and pretend that
translation between Greek and English is unproblematic.
7. I say “relevant” and “relevant aspects of,” because, of course, there is more to Gregory’s
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mine whether it yields a solution or a non-solution to the LPT) we will specify
his semantics. Of course, expressing the content of Gregory’s view in a formal
language will help us in making it precise. So, we will be explicating the content
all along in predicate logic, and thus the F-semantics will be given alongside his
metaphysics and theology throughout. We will give the N-semantics separately,
after stating the content (metaphysics and theology) precisely. All of these taken
together – Gregory’s metaphysics, theology and semantics – we will see yield a
solution to the LPT. Since this is so, and since, if anybody’s Trinitarian theory
counts as “a(n orthodox) version of” the doctrine of the Trinity, Gregory’s does,
it follows that there is a(n orthodox) solution to the LPT. Since this is so, I will
argue there is no strictly logical problem with the doctrine of the Trinity.8 Any
legitimate objection to the doctrine of the Trinity will have to take the form of
an objection to (1) its metaphysical content (in the strict or abstract sense of
“metaphysics”), (2) its theological content (the “substantive” ontology), or (3)
its semantics. Again, we will discuss those options in more detail in Chapter 6.
First, we will proceed to carry out the project just proposed.
5.1 Gregory’s Metaphysics
A Note on Strict Identity
In my view, Gregory gives no indication that he would take issue with what
we would call “classical” or “strict” identity. In addition, he freely makes use of
Greek expressions like τὸ αὐτὸ and ταὐτὸν that at least apparently express strict
identity in Greek, if anything does. And he makes no attempt to explain or alter
their meanings. So I think it is safe to assume that he accepts classical identity
and that his views can be formulated in standard predicate logic with identity
(and again, we have adopted a “prejudice” in favor of standard predicate logic
with identity, such that if we can use it, we will).
I should note, however, that Richard Cross suggests that essentially nobody
from Aristotle up through the medieval period has a concept of identity as we
understand it today, or at least that it isn’t clear that they do. If he is right
about that, then of course that could pose a problem for formalizing Gregory’s
views in terms of strict identity.
I’m a bit skeptical of the thesis that Gregory lacked the concept of strict
identity. To be convinced of it, I would want to see relative identity interpreta-
tions of phrases of Gregory’s like τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα (“the same name”)9 and κατὰ τὸ
αὐτὸ ὄντων (“being in the same place”)10 and various uses of “himself,” “itself,”
overall metaphysics and triadology. For one, perhaps glaring, example, we could add “dy-
namis” as an additional object type and put in at least one dynamis per energeia in his
substantive theory (see footnote 11 below). But since we can elucidate Gregory’s solution
to the LPT without discussing dynameis, we will avoid the unnecessary complication (see
footnote 11 below).
8. At least not of the sort or for the reasons the anti-Trinitarian typically claims. See
Chapter 1.2, p. 17 above.
9. See 4.3.2, p. 155.
10. See 4.3.2, p. 156.
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and so forth, and be assured that no violence is done to the validity of his ar-
guments when these phrases are understood according to some relative identity
interpretation, rather than strict identity. That’s not to say I have any proof
that such a project couldn’t be done. But I would want to see it done (at least
partially, sketched out well enough so one could see how to extend the general
strategy throughout Gregory’s corpus). And anyway, it seems more natural to
me to take Gregory as employing the concept of strict identity in such places.
But however that discussion would go, I don’t think we need to settle it here
and now. And that is because we have already seen, in van Inwagen’s response
to the LPT, how a solution to the LPT can be provided within a framework
that rejects strict identity. In other words, granting the existence of classical
identity, and accepting PLI as the language within which a response to the LPT
must be formulated, is really a concession to the anti-Trinitarian. If Gregory
has no concept of strict identity, or simply rejects the concept, then it is obvious
that he would have a solution to the LPT, and roughly what it would be like.
If that is so, then my further discussion here could all be read as within the
scope of a hypothetical: “even if Gregory did admit, or was forced to admit,
that there was such a thing as strict identity, he would still have a solution to
the LPT as follows. . . ” However, again, I do think Gregory has a concept of
strict identity (the hypostases are not strictly identical, their token energeiai
are), but settling that issue must be done at another time and another place.
And with that said, we can turn to the project of putting Gregory’s account of
the Trinity into PLI.
5.1.1 Possible Object Types
The results of the previous chapter indicate that the following possible object
types are relevant to Gregory’s response(s) to the LPT: hypostases, idiomata,
ousiai, energeia types, and energeia tokens.11 We will abbreviate predications
of token objects as falling into these object types with the following one-place
predicates in PLI.12
“is a hypostasis” : “H”
“is an idioma” : “I”
“is an ousia” : “O”
“is an energeia type” : “E*”
“is an energeiai token” : “E”
11. Besides the concept of an energeia, the concept of a dynamis – the causal power or ability
to engage in a certain energeia – is clearly central to Gregory’s thought. A reader might have
been surprised to see that I make no mention of dynamis throughout my presentation of
Gregory’s thought. This is by no means because the concept is unimportant to Gregory or
patristic theology generally – far from it! Rather, it is that there would seem to be a straight-
forward one-to-one correspondence between dynameis and energeiai. That is, there is exactly
one dynamis for every energeia, namely, the dynamis (ability) to engage in that energeia.
Thus, in a discussion centered around questions of individuation, including explicit discussions
of these objects would introduce additional length and complexity with no apparent payoff.
12. See 5.1.2, pp. 202 ff. on the choice to represent universals with lower-case letters as well.
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5.1.2 Possible Relations Between Tokens of the Object
Types
“Metaphysical Predication” or “Having”
The most important relation, or rather group of relations, that possibly holds
between the tokens of these object types is any kind of metaphysical correlate
to predication, which for present purposes I will simply lump together as one
and call “metaphysical predication,” or more simply yet, “having.”
In many cases, the metaphysical correlate of predication in Gregory’s thought
is “participation,” the familiar relation from Platonic (and Neo-Platonic) meta-
physics. But we saw in the previous chapter (4.3.3, p. 164) that, while Gregory
frequently makes use of this relation, either under its Platonic name “μέθεξις” or
the biblical term “κοινωνία,” it doesn’t seem that Gregory always takes this to
be the metaphysical correlate to the predication relation, since he never speaks
of hypostases “sharing” or “participating in” their idiomata (however precisely
he understands the relation between hypostases and idiomata). Therefore, I will
simply speak of “metaphysical predication” or “having,” and let that subsume
both participation / communion and whatever the relation between hypostases
and their idioma(ta) is (if it is a different relation).
Now we face a choice as to how to represent “metaphysical predication”
or “having.” This is because, typically in predicate logic, lower-case letters are
correlated with individuals (they are “logical names” for individuals) and upper-
case letters are correlated with sets of individuals (the set of all individuals that
satisfy that predicate). And of course, there is an obvious sort of correlation
between universals and the sets of individuals that exhibit those universals.
Thus, to say the Father “participates in” the divine nature, we might be
tempted to give the Father the name “f” and predicate the divine nature of the
Father with the upper-case letter “D,” thus: “Df,” where “D” is read “is divine”
and the semantic value of “D” is the set of all things that are divine. (This is
Tuggy’s way of formulating his rough analogue of P in (Tuggy 2003), p. 181.)
Given a certain way of thinking about second-order logic (namely, taking “D”
as referring to a universal – called “divinity” – rather than to a set of divine
things, and generally taking upper-case letters to refer to universals rather than
sets),13 we could even say of the divine nature that it is an ousia as follows:
“OD.” (Using “O” with a line under it as a second-order predicate meaning “is an
ousia.”) In this way, we would very closely link participation with predication.
We could, if we wanted, even read “Df” as “the Father participates in divinity”
and “OD” as “divinity participates in being an ousia.”14 We could then represent
the homoousion as “ ιX(Xf & OX) = ιX(Xs & OX) = ιX(Xh & OX),” i.e., “the
X such that X is the ousia of the Father, is identical to the X such that X is
the ousia of the Son, is identical to the X such that X is the ousia of the Holy
13. If, indeed, sets are not simply a kind of universal – a debate into which I opt not to enter
here.
14. And if the relation between hypostases and idiomata is not participation, substitute
“has.”
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Spirit.”15 And we could similarly give a second-order treatment of idiomata.
On the other hand, we could instead stay within the confines of first-order
logic by representing universals (and idiomata, if idiomata are not shareable) as
lower-case letters, and participation claims (or any claims involving x bearing
a “metaphysical predication” relation to y, i.e. x “having” y) with a two-place
predicate like “P.” For instance, we could name the Father “f” and the divine
ousia “o” and represent the claim that the Father “participates in” the divine
ousia (or, more generally, that the Father bears some metaphysical predication
relation to the divine ousia) as “Pfo.”
We will take the latter course, and represent participation and other kinds of
“having” with a two-place predicate. So long as there is no need for second-order
logic (and, strictly speaking, there is never a need for second-order logic if one
allows sets or set-like objects into one’s ontology), we may as well stay within
the confines of a more well-behaved system.
Furthermore, in Gregory’s theology, there is some kind of significant rela-
tion that undergirds certain predications, such that this relation holds, not just
between individuals (e.g., hypostases) and universals (e.g., the divine ousia),
but between individuals and other individuals – specifically between hypostases
and token energeiai. And this cannot be represented in standard logic using
merely two names for individuals (lower-case letters) back-to-back (like “fe,” or
“ef,” which would be ungrammatical in the language of predicate logic). We
could, of course, simply introduce a separate relation of “doing” to hold between
hypostases and token energeiai. But it seems most convenient to me to stay
within the confines of first-order logic and represent all of the objects in Gre-
gory’s theology, whether universals or particulars, with lower-case letters, and
to simply lump together all metaphysical predication relations with a two-place
predicate, “P.” Thus, we will abbreviate claims of the form x bears some meta-
physical predication relation to y with expressions of the form Pxy. We can also
shorten the cumbersome English phrase “x bears some metaphysical predication
relation to y” to “x has y.” Thus, whether x “participates in” y, or y is an idioma
of x, or y is a token energeia performed by x or x is a token of type y (or x
bears any other sort of metaphysical predication relation to y, if there are any
other such relations), x “has” y and “Pxy” is true.
The “Natural To” Relation
Next, we saw that Gregory speaks of the “natural” energeiai of an ousia (4.4.4,
p. 185). These are energeia types that are in some sense attached to the ousia
or nature, and that individuate it. This relation seems to be definable in terms
of metaphysical predication, but it will be useful to have a separate predicate
to use as shorthand.
15. As always, immense complications are introduced by the Incarnation and the supposition
that a single hypostasis – the Son – could instantiate two distinct ousiai. In this case, one
could not refer to “the ousia” of the Son, since there is no unique ousia for the Son. We could
say, though, “the ousia that is had by the Son ’prior to creation’.” See 5.2, p. 211.
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First, though, I note that I will be marking each of Gregory’s basic, sub-
stantive assumptions with a “+” and marking propositions he affirms, but which
are either stipulative definitions, or assignments of names to arbitrarily selected
individuals, or the logical consequences of his basic, substantive assumptions,
with a “0,” and in the case of logical consequences, a footnote stating which
other assumptions or previously noted consequences it follows from.
This notation is not meant to indicate that Gregory actually saw all of
these logical entailments, or believed the entailed propositions only based on
his belief in the basic assumptions that entail them. In some cases it is clear
that he did, but in other cases he may or may not have. But the issue of how
much of Gregory’s account counts as assumption and how much simply follows
from his assumptions seems important not so much for historical reasons, but
for philosophical and theological reasons.
For one thing, when one sees just how much of Gregory’s account is just the
logical consequence of just how little substantive assumption, one can see that
it’s much more difficult to fault Gregory’s account of the Trinity than it might
seem. (More on this in Chapter 6.). It may also be of interest to theologians
once one sees how it relates to the filioque controversy, as the weaker view of
the individuation of hypostases requires Gregory to make more assumptions
in the realm of substantive theology, while the stronger view requires fewer
assumptions.
Now we will abbreviate claims of the form some energeia (type) x is natural
to some ousia y with expressions of the form Nxy, and define N as follows:
016 NDef: (∀x)(∀y){Nxy ↔ (∀z)[Pzy → (∃w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]}
i.e., for any x (an energeia type) and any y (an ousia), x (the energeia type)
is “natural to” y (the ousia) iff, necessarily, for any z (a hypostasis) that has y
(the ousia), z has some energeia token w of (energeia type) x.
(The parentheticals in this explanation are for clarity’s sake alone. For the
sake of simplicity in constructing proofs, I am not building these restrictions into
the very definition of the “N” relation, except for w’s being an energeia token.
And this one restriction is for no other reason than to make the construction of
certain proofs more convenient. It could be dispensed with, only at the cost of
simplicity and convenience.)
To state it in a more understandable way, to say that an energeia type
x is “natural to” an ousia y, is to say that any hypostasis z of that ousia y
must always exhibit some token w of that energeia type y. This does not
entail that there is any particular token energeia w such that hypostasis x must
have that token energeia (w). Nor does it entail that there are any necessarily
existent hypostases or necessarily existent token energeiai. It does not, as we’ve
stated it here, even entail that the ousia had by the hypostasis is essential to
that hypostasis (regardless of whether Gregory would endorse that claim – see
footnote 21 below.) All it says is that if x is a natural energeia of y, then there
couldn’t be a hypostasis z of y that wasn’t doing some token (w) of x.
16. Stipulative definition.
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To use a patristic example, the energeiai (types) of “heating” and “illumi-
nating” are natural to fire. This means that any particular fiery thing, say this
particular flame, must necessarily be engaged in some particular (token) act(s)
of emitting light and heat. To put it the other way around, if some particular
thing (hypostasis) isn’t emitting any light or isn’t emitting any heat, it doesn’t
really have the nature of fire.17
One important corollary (really, just a restatement) of this definition, which
Gregory makes use of in his dispute with Eunomius is the following:
018 NCorol-Eun: (∀x) (∀y){¬Nxy ↔ ♦(∃z)[Pzy & ¬(∃w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]}
i.e., a given energeia type is not natural to an ousia, if and only if it is possible
for there to be some hypostasis of that ousia that does not have any tokens of the
energeia type. Together with his criterion for the individuation of ousiai, this
forms the basis of Gregory’s challenge to Eunomius: If the Father and Son are of
different natures, then, given that natures are individuated by natural energeiai,
it would be possible that the Son fails to do something that the Father does by
nature, or vice-versa. The challenge he presents, then, is: point out something
that the Father does that the Son does not do, or vice-versa. (In other words,
prove the Cappadocian Assertion wrong.) (See 5.2.3, p. 233 ff.)
With these relations in place, we will now say what they can (and sometimes
must) hold between, in Gregory’s metaphysics.
5.1.3 Relations Possible for the Objects
Relations Possible for Hypostases
First, hypostases can have idiomata.19 Thus, it is possible for a proposition of
the form Pxy to be true where x is a hypostasis and y is an idioma.
Furthermore, a hypostasis must have some (at least one) idioma.20 Thus:
+ NHI: (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Iy & Pxy)]21
17. In the case of a natural dynamis, of course it might be that a hypostasis is not always
engaged in the exercise of that dynamis, but it will necessarily always have the dynamis. But
again, we will leave dynameis out of our discussion to avoid needless complication.
18. From NDef. Proof is trivial.
19. See Chapter 4.3.1, p. 152.
20. See again Chapter 4.3.1, p. 152.
21. Note that I am choosing to formulate this, and all of Gregory’s basic assumptions about
what relations must obtain between certain types of objects simply with a box operator taking
primary scope. Of course, Gregory seems to take these to be truths of metaphysics, and so it
would be odd for him to say any of them were contingent. Thus, the box operator out front
should be uncontroversial.
But one might wonder whether Gregory wouldn’t endorse a stronger claim, like:
(∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Iy & Pxy)]. This would say, not only that in order for something x to
be a hypostasis, it must have some idioma (as our original formulation says. But rather, that
in order for something x to be a hypostasis, there must be some particular idioma y, such
that that particular idioma y is essential to x. And similar questions can be asked about the
other relation requirements. Does Gregory merely think that a hypostasis must have some
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Second, hypostases can have ousiai.22 Thus, it is possible for a proposition
of the form Pxy to be true where x is a hypostasis and y is an ousia.
Furthermore, a hypostasis must have an ousia.23 Thus:
+ NHO: (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)]
Third, hypostases can have token energeiai.24 Thus, it is possible for a
proposition of the form Pxy to be true where x is a hypostasis and y is a token
energeia.
Although we will not make use of the principle, it also follows from NDef
that a hypostasis must have some token of every energeia type that is natural
to any ousia which the hypostasis has, thus:
025 NHE: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Pxy & Nzy)→(∃w)(Pwz & Pxw)]
I.e., if x (a hypostasis) has y (an ousia), and z (an energeia type) is natural
to y (the ousia), then there exists a w (a token energeia) of type z had by
hypostasis x.
Relations Possible for Idiomata
First, as we said just above, idiomata can be had by hypostases. Thus, it is
possible for a proposition of the form Pxy to be true where x is a hypostasis
and y is an idioma.
ousia, or does he think that the particular ousia that a hypostasis has is essential to it? Must
an ousia only have some natural energeia(i), or must it have the same natural energeia(i)
that it has in this world in every world in which it exists? Further, one might wonder whether
Gregory would assume the principle that if x is a hypostasis then x is essentially a hypostasis,
and likewise for all of our object types.
Except in the case of NDef (where it turns out to make quite a bit of difference to Gregory’s
argument for the homoousion how we formulate things) I am choosing to simply avoid these
questions. This is not because I think they are unimportant (particularly with reference to the
Incarnation and to the filioque controversy). Rather, these are deep issues that would require
much further investigation and discussion. And any of these stronger theses would entail any
of the weaker formulations I rely on in what follows. Thus, if Gregory asserts any stronger
claims, he will at least be committed to the claims we will be dealing with, and thus to all of
the logical consequences I will point out. Thus, GNTF will at least not be unorthodox.
Of course, eliding over this further detail in Gregory’s view could again be an occasion for
the anti-Trinitarian to try to find some flaw buried more deeply in Gregory’s metaphysics.
Perhaps it could be argued that Gregory really does endorse some stronger set of claims, and
that those stronger claims entail some sort of contradiction. But as noted in 1.2, p. 17 ff.,
no such problems have so far been noted by anti-Trinitarians, and it isn’t clear that, if such
a problem should exist, it would be worthy of the same name as the LPT anyway, since it
takes us away from the strictly formal issue of the logical form of P, into what I call the MPT
(“Metaphysical Problem of the Trinity”), 1.1, p. 11 ff. Finally, I will argue in 6.3 that very
little of the metaphysics here turns out actually to be essential to Gregory’s solution to the
LPT. See pp. 287 ff.
22. See again, Chapter 4.3.1, p. 152.
23. See again, Chapter 4.3.1, p. 152.
24. See Chapter 4.4.2, p. 180.
25. From NDef. Since we do not make use of the principle, we will give no proof for it.
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Second, idiomata can be had by energeia tokens.26 Thus, it is possible for
a proposition of the form Pxy to be true where x is an energeia token and y is
an idioma.
Relations Possible for Ousiai
First, as we said above, ousiai can be had by hypostases. Thus, it is possible
for a proposition of the form Pxy to be true where x is a hypostasis and y is an
ousia.
Second, ousiai can have energeia types be “natural to” them.27 Thus, it is
possible for a proposition of the form Nxy to be true where x is an energeia
type and y is an ousia.
Furthermore, Gregory rejects the idea that there could be an ousia with no
natural energeiai.28 That is, every ousia must have some natural energeia type
or types. Thus:
+ NOE*: (∀x)[Ox → (∃y)(E*y & Nyx)]
Relations Possible for Energeia Types
First, as we said above, energeia types can be natural to ousiai. Thus, it is
possible for a proposition of the form Nxy to be true where x is an energeia
type and y is an ousia.
Second, energeia types can be had by energeia tokens.29 Thus, it is possible
for a proposition of the form Pxy to be true where x is an energeia token and
y is an energeia type.
Relations Possible for Energeia Tokens
First, as we said above, energeia tokens can have energeia types. Thus, it is
possible for a proposition of the form Pxy to be true where x is an energeia
token and y is an energeia type.
Second, as we said above, energeia tokens can have idiomata. Thus, it is
possible for a proposition of the form Pxy to be true where x is an energeia
token and y is an idioma.
Third, as we said above, energeia tokens can be had by hypostases. Thus, it
is possible for a proposition of the form Pxy to be true where x is a hypostasis
and y is an energeia token.
5.1.4 Identity Conditions for the Types of Objects
We have seen in the previous chapter the conditions for identity or individuation
of the various types of objects, and we list them here more precisely in predicate
26. See again, Chapter 4.4.2, p. 180.
27. See Chapter 4.4.4, p, 185.
28. See again, Chapter 4.4.4, p, 185.
29. See again Chapter 4.4.2, p. 180.
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logic.
Identity Conditions for Hypostases
Hypostases, as I understand Gregory,30 are individuated by their idiomata. And
we have seen in the previous chapter (Chapter 4.3.4, p. 165 ff.) that there are two
ways to interpret Gregory with respect to what exactly idiomata are and how
they individuate hypostases. First is the strong view, namely that idiomata
are simple, non-shareable properties. Second is the weak view, namely that
hypostases are individuated by unique combinations of in-principle shareable
qualities. On the latter view, we might use “idioma” to refer to the unique
bundle, or to one of the in-principle shareable qualities that constitute it. For
convenience, I will eschew using idioma to talk about an unshareable bundle of
qualities, and use the term either for a simple, unshareable quality (as in the
strong theory), or for a shareable constituent of an unshareable bundle (as in
the weak theory).
Thus, we can formulate the strong version of the identity conditions for
hypostases as:
+ IDHStrong: (∀x)(∀y){[Hx & Hy] → [x=y ↔ (∃z)(Iz & [Pxz & Pyz])]}
i.e., necessarily, for any hypostases, x and y, x and y are identical if and
only if x and y (both) bear a metaphysical predication relation to any (single)
idioma.
On the other hand, we might formulate the weak version of the identity
conditions for hypostases as:
+ IDHWeak: (∀x)(∀y){[Hx & Hy] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pxz ↔ Pyz])]}
i.e., necessarily, for any hypostases, x and y, x and y are identical if and
only if x and y bear metaphysical predication relations to all and only the same
idiomata.31
Identity Conditions for Idiomata
Whether idiomata are simple, unshareable properties, or in-principle shareable
qualities that constitute unique bundles, they are presumably the sorts of things
that are simply distinct by hypothesis, not individuated by further objects. So
we give no identity conditions for them.
30. See 4.3.5, p. 169 ff.
31. Besides their idiomata, are hypostases also individuated by ousiai? Saying that they are
would raise a number of complications, or at least a high degree of complexity, when dealing
with the Incarnation. But since, prior to creation (see below, 5.2, p. 211, for an explanation
of the phrase “prior to creation”), there are only three hypostases of one ousia, it will be
irrelevant whether hypostases can, in principle, be individuated merely by having distinct
ousiai. We therefore do not include any reference to ousiai in our principle of individuation
for hypostases, for simplicity’s sake.
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Identity Conditions for Ousiai
As we saw, ousiai are individuated by the energeia types natural to them.32
Thus:
+ IDO: (∀x)(∀x)[(Ox & Oy) → (x=y ↔ (∀z)[E*z → (Nzx ↔ Nzy)])]
i.e., necessarily, for any ousiai, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if x
and y have all and only the same natural energeiai types.
Identity Conditions for Energeia Types
Energeia types would seem to be intrinsically distinct for Gregory as well, thus
we give no identity conditions for them.33
Identity Conditions for Energeia Tokens
Energeia tokens are individuated by their own idiomata (and probably by en-
ergeia types as well).34 But what is actually most important to note here for
our purposes is not so much what individuates energeia tokens as what does
not individuate them – namely, the hypostases that perform them.
32. See 4.4.4, p. 185 ff. and 4.4.4, p. 186 ff.
33. In fact, I know of no real evidence for this, except for the very fact that I know of
no evidence for it. That is, the fact that, as far as I know, Gregory does not discuss the
matter. This leads me to believe that he simply assumes it is obvious that energeia types
are inherently distinct and does not discuss their identity conditions because there is nothing
there to discuss.
But nothing much seems to ride on the question for the purpose of resolving our question
about the LPT. The main issue it would raise would be the following: Suppose energeia
types are somehow individuated by (and only by) their relations to other objects of whatever
type. Now suppose that, prior to creation (see below, 5.2, p. 211, for an explanation of
the phrase “prior to creation”), the only other objects that exist are the ousia, the three
hypostases, energeia tokens, and the idiomata, all of which idiomata are intra-trinitarian
relations. Suppose also that neither the intra-trinitarian relations nor the ousia nor the
hypostases nor the token energeiai individuate any energeia types. In that case, there could
be only a single divine energeia type. Whether that would be theologically problematic or
not may be debatable, but I think it’s more plausible to suppose (and that Gregory likely
supposed) that energeia types are intrinsically distinct. But even if not, it’s hard to see how
it would make much of a difference to the LPT. Thus, to simplify the presentation, in what
follows we will simply assume that energeia types are supposed to be intrinsically distinct.
34. I have said that Gregory takes energeia tokens to be individuated by idiomata and that
he probably takes them to be individuated by energeia types as well. But in order to give a
precise formulation, we will have to make a decision here as to whether to include energeia
types as things that individuate energeia tokens. I am choosing to formulate Gregory’s view
as having energeia tokens individuated both by their idiomata and by the energeia types they
have. This is not because Gregory explicitly says so. (We saw above that he makes it explicit
that an energeia token is individuated by its own idioma – the “ ἰδιότροpiον τῆς ἐνεργείας,”
i.e., “the peculiar property of the energeia” – but not that it would be individuated by its
energeia types or types). Rather, I take this approach because not doing so would have logical
consequences I believe Gregory would most likely not want to embrace. See the section on
the individuation of energeia tokens below (5.2.3, p. 231 ff., and esp. p. 236 ff.) for a fuller
discussion.
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This bit of metaphysics is the critical aspect of Gregory’s response to the
LPT, and is what I think has not been fully appreciated to this point.
That is, given hypostases x and y, even if x and y are themselves distinct,
x’s e-ing and y’s e-ing are distinct only if x’s e-ing and y’s e-ing are either of
different types,35 or they have different idiomata. If x’s e-ing and y’s e-ing are
of the same type, and they have the same idiomata (they occur, for example,
at the same location in space at the same time, etc.), then x’s e-ing is strictly
(classically) numerically identical to y’s e-ing – even if x and y are themselves
(strictly, classically) numerically distinct.
I will refer to this phenomenon as “synergy.”36 I will say that distinct hy-
postases x and y “synergize on” energeia token z, if and only if x and y are
distinct, and both x and y have z. That is:
037 ΣDef: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){Σxyz ↔
[Hx & Hy & Ez & x 6= y & Pxz & Pyz]}
And I will say that distinct hypostases x and y “synergize on” energeia type
z, if and only if x and y are distinct, and there exists a token energeia w of type
z such that x and y both have w (thus, synergize on w). That is:
038 Σ*Def: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){Σ*xyz ↔
[Hx & Hy & E*z & x 6= y & (∃w)(Ew & Pwz & Pxw & Pyw)]}
That is, x and y synergize on energeia type e* if and only if x and y synergize
on some energeia token e of type e*. As we will see, the phenomenon of synergy
is the key that allows Gregory to solve the LPT, but it has not been sufficiently
appreciated or articulated in the literature. We will of course return to it later.
For now, we can formulate Gregory’s view on the individuation of energeia
tokens as follows:
+ IDE: (∀x)(∀y){[Ex & Ey] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)([Iz v E*z] → [Pxz ↔ Pyz])]}
i.e., for any token energeiai, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if x
and y have all and only the same idiomata and energeiai types.39
35. If energeia types individuate energeia tokens. See footnote 34 just above, and 5.2.3, p.
236 below for more.
36. Gregory, in Ad Ablabium uses the verb “συνεφάpiτομαι,” “to lay hold of jointly,” or “engage
in with,” to describe what I am calling “synergy.” He says, “ἐpiὶ δὲ τῆς θείας φύσεως οὐχ οὔτως
ἐμάθομεν ὄτι ὁ piατὴρ piοιεῖ τι καθ’ ἑαυτόν, οὗ μὴ συνεφάpiτεται ὁ υἱός.” “But in the case of the
divine nature we did not learn thus that the Father does something by himself, that the Son
does not engage in with him.”
37. Stipulative definition.
38. Stipulative definition.
39. This of course is a “weak” version of the individuation of energeia tokens. Probably the
best way to formulate a “strong” version of the individuation of energeia tokens would be:
+ IDEStrong: (∀x)(∀y){[Ex & Ey] → [x=y ↔ (∃z)(Iz & [Pxz & Pyz])]}
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5.2 Gregory’s Theology
What I am calling Gregory’s “theology” or “triadology” involves, again, the token
objects postulated and the relations that actually hold between the postulated
token objects. In what follows, I will be using the phrase “prior to creation”
quite a bit. This might seem like a phrase that should raise deep questions
about the nature of time and the relation of God to creation. But in fact, I
mean nothing very fancy by it. Simply, given our very limited concerns about
the individuation of certain uncreated objects, and the details of Gregory’s views
about how those objects are in fact individuated (or not individuated), created
objects will not be relevant to our concerns. If one is uncomfortable with my
use of the phrase “prior to creation,” one could substitute “abstracting away
from all created objects,” or “bracketing off created objects,” or “ignoring the
complications of created objects for simplicity’s sake” or some similar phrase. I
will stick to the shorter phrase, “prior to creation.”40 With that said, we can give
the substantive theological propositions that are relevant to Gregory’s answer
to the LPT as follows.
5.2.1 Postulated Token Objects
Hypostases
There are on Gregory’s view exactly three divine (uncreated) hypostases: Fa-
ther, Son and Holy Spirit. Although, of course, modalists denied that there
were three distinct hypostases, they did not deny the existence (nor the divin-
ity) of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, only their distinction.
Nor, obviously did any variety of Arian deny their existence.41 So this is all un-
controversial in Gregory’s context. To these hypostases, we will give the logical
names:
“f,”
but there is little consequence to which criterion we use in this case, so to cut down on length
and complexity, I will only deal explicitly with the weak criterion.
40. Of course, anyone who holds that the Son and Holy Spirit are themselves created would
hold that this bracketing off of creation ipso facto brackets off the Son and Holy Spirit,
bringing in a potential disagreement as to precisely what all to bracket off. Naturally, since
I am here concerned with explaining Gregory’s view, I mean to exclude from my discussion
those objects that he holds to be created (angels, humans, animals and so forth), and to
include in my discussion those objects that he holds to be uncreated (in particular, as I
interpret Gregory, at least the three hypostases, their idiomata, their shared essence, and
their energeiai, both types and tokens). Thus, I am not employing the phrase in such a way
as to beg any questions. If one prefers, one can substitute the phrase “abstracting away from
all of those things, which, on Gregory’s view, would be created.”
41. And although, of course, the Trinitarian controversy was largely about the status of
these hypostases in terms of simplicity and uncreatedness, even Eunomians would allow the
application of the predicate “is divine” to all three hypostases as well – they would simply
adopt a different semantics for “is divine,” arguing that the predicate “is divine” is equivocal
and made true by distinct ousiai, some of which are created and hylomorphically non-simple
and so forth. We will examine below how Gregory argues that the divine hypostases all have
a single ousia (5.2.3, p. 233).
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“s,” and
“h.”42
They are hypostases, thus:
+ H(i): Hf
+ H(ii): Hs
+ H(iii): Hh
Perhaps not all of H(i)–H(iii) need to be counted as substantive theological
assumptions. This is because, as we will see below, given a certain understanding
of the relational properties that serve as idiomata for the Trinity, and a certain
view about how reference to the Father is secured, the existence of, at least, the
Son (and perhaps the Spirit) logically follows from the existence of the Father.43
However, to avoid certain complications we will discuss below,44 we will simply
count these all as substantive assumptions.
Idiomata
As we saw in the previous chapter (4.3.3, p. 161), there are, at least three (if
not four or more) idiomata that individuate the divine hypostases, and these
are the intra-trinitarian relations. We might be tempted, on a modern view of
relations to represent the intra-trinitarian relations as something like “B” for
“begets” and “S” for “spirates.” And since the Father is the only one who begets,
42. Of course, one might object to using mere logical names (“f,” “s,” and “h”) to replace the
natural language terms “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit” as the natural language terms are
not without significant semantic content, and some important arguments in the Trinitarian
controversy turn on questions involving the existence of a “Father” necessitating the existence
of a “Son,” whether the relation of begetting that holds between Father and Son could hold
between things of different natures, and so forth.
For these reasons, one might reasonably point out that representing the Father as something
like ιx[(∃y)(Bxy)] (the x that begets some y), and representing the Son as something like
ιx[(∃y)(Byx)] (the x that is begotten by some y), would more perspicuously show the logical
relationship between the existence of the Father (qua Father) and the existence of the Son
(qua Son).
While these ways of representing things might add a certain amount of clarity in the overall
context of the fourth century Trinitarian controversy, or in the context of the filioque contro-
versy, I believe they would introduce needless complexity for our limited purposes of showing
Gregory’s theology to be consistent. So we will simply represent the names for the persons, as
well as their idiomata below, with simple logical names. To be sure, an anti-Trinitarian could
claim that, perhaps, buried within that additional logical complexity, are the makings of some
contradiction or absurdity. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (1.2, p. 17), it seems unlikely
that any such hidden contradiction (if there be any) would be worthy of being included as
part of the “Logical Problem of the Trinity,” which is supposed to hinge merely on the fact
that the same predicate (“is God”) is being applied to three things (Father, Son and Holy
Spirit) which are non-identical, and yet it is being claimed that there is only one God.
43. See note 42 above, p. 212 and the discussion just below on representing the idiomata.
44. See the discussion below on having to pick between “begetting the Son” and just “beget-
ting something,” etc., p. 214 ff.
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and the Son is the only one who is begotten, rather than representing them as
“f” and “s,” we might represent them respectively as:
ιx[(∃y)(Bxy)]
and
ιy[(∃x)(Bxy)]
that is, “the x such that x begets some y” and “the y such that y is begotten by
some x.” This more clearly shows why “the Father” (qua Father) could not exist
without a “Son.” If there is no Son – no y such that y is begotten by some x –
then there can be no Father – no x such that x begets some y. And vice-versa.
Thus, it would be clear that it is logically necessary that some father exists if
and only if some son exists. And that is as it should be.
Likewise, we could represent the Holy Spirit as:
ιz[(∃x)(Sxz)]
that is, “the z such that z is spirated by some x.” Of course, we now face the
issue of how to represent the Father as spirating the Spirit, whether to represent
the Son in the same way (if one accepts the filioque) and how those descriptions
relate to one another. But we face more pressing problems.
First, while we now have a more perspicuous way to refer to the persons, we
face the question of how many relations there are. Given the formalism above,
we might be tempted to count two relations, or “polyadic” properties – begetting
and spirating. Yet, ancients and medievals seem to count the relations as either
three or four.
So, it would not be as perspicuous to represent the relations with sentences
of the form Bxy and Sxy, which makes it look as though there are just two
relations. Nor would it be most perspicuously represented as something like
P*xyb, where P* is some kind of three-place metaphysical predication relation,
showing the Father and Son both entering into the begetting relation at the
appropriate argument places (which again makes it look as though begetting is
a single “polyadic property,” into which two distinct relata “enter” at different
“places,” rather than that begetting is a single, monadic property that in some
sense makes reference to a begotten, while being begotten is a distinct monadic
property that in some sense makes reference to a begetter).
The reason for this discrepancy is that, from Aristotle through the medieval
period, there was a widespread view that there was no such thing as a polyadic
property.45 Medievals sometimes used an analogy between a dyadic relation
and a road between two cities, and routinely rejected the idea that any such
thing existed in reality. Rather, relational predicates were analyzed in various
ways such that they were, ultimately, monadic properties of individuals (or
45. See all of (Brower 2014), but esp. section 3.1.
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supervenient on the monadic properties of individuals), but monadic properties
that in some way point towards or make reference to other individuals. In fact,
a classic example from Aristotle onwards is the relation of being a father, which
would be seen as a feature of the father, but one that implies the existence of
a son, and likewise being a son is a feature of the son, but one that implies the
existence of a father.46
So one might think that, to better reflect this kind of thinking, we could
represent the Father’s “begetting the Son” as a one-place (monadic) property
that makes reference to the Son. To that end, we could borrow notation from
Bealer,47 and introduce an operation to form terms from predicates so that the
property of “being an x such that x begets some y” could be represented as a
singular term, thus:
[(∃y)(Bxy)]x.
And we could then represent the Father’s idioma in just that way, so that,
the Father’s having that property would be expressed as:
P ιx[(∃y)(Bxy)] [(∃y)(Bxy)]x
(i.e., “the x such that x begets something” has “being an x such that x begets
something”).
This would certainly make it more clear why, assuming that the hypostases
and their idiomata exist in the first place, the Father would have “begetting” as
His idioma and the Son would have “being begotten” as His idioma, and likewise
why the very existence of the Father (qua father) entails the existence of a Son
(qua son) and vice-versa. (Less would be gained in clarifying the relation of the
Holy Spirit to the other two hypostases, or whether, how, or in what sense, the
properties of begetting the Son, spirating the Spirit, and being “anarchos” or
“unoriginate” count as a single idioma – if they do.)
I have been saying “we could” represent things in the ways above (using
Bealer’s notation). However, I will be choosing not to represent them so.
As mentioned above (footnote 42, p. 212), it might be nice, in the wider
context of fourth-century theological debates, and perhaps also in the context
of the later filioque controversy, to have a greater degree of logical detail here.
But we face a few problems. First is the fact that it would needlessly complicate
our discussion and proofs, as these particular details are not directly relevant
to the discussion of the LPT. But second, and more importantly, the greater
precision of Bealer’s notation would require us to resolve certain ambiguities
that it is not clear how to resolve. Specifically, it may be that the Father’s
idioma is simply the property of “begetting” (something):
46. This is all on the assumption that a given thinker even believes in relations at all, rather
than simply relatives – the father and son themselves.
47. (Bealer 1982), pp. 43 ff.
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[(∃y)(Bxy)]x
But perhaps it is specifically, “begetting the Son,” which would be:
[Bxs]x
Or, if we represent the Son as “ ιy[(∃x)(Bxy)]”:
[B x ιy{(∃w)(Bwy)}]x
(“being an x such that x begets the y such that y is begotten by some w”)
Or again, perhaps the Father’s idioma is “begetting the Only-Begotten,”
which would be:
[B x ιy((∃w)[Bwy] & (∀z)[(∃w)(Bwz) → z=y])]x
(“being an x such that x begets the y such that y is begotten by some w and
is the only thing that is begotten by anything.”)
One can see how there will be similar ambiguities for the idiomata of the
Son and the Holy Spirit. (“Being begotten,” “being begotten by the Father,”
or “being the only-begotten of the Father?” And if the latter, in the sense
of “being the only thing that is begotten (at all), and being begotten of the
Father” or in the sense of “being the only thing that is begotten by the Father?”
Likewise, for the Holy Spirit, is the idioma“being spirated” or “being spirated by
the Father”? And for those who affirm the filioque, “being spirated by the Son”
as a distinct relational property (raising again the question whether idiomata
are really non-compossible after all)? Or is there a single property of “being
spirated by the-Father-and-the-Son”? And so on.) One can also see how adding
this level of detail causes the formalism to become (needlessly, it would seem)
cumbersome.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear to me from my reading of Gregory (or Basil,
or anyone else for that matter) how exactly to resolve these ambiguities about
the idiomata, or indeed whether Gregory or any of his peers even considered
these ambiguities at all.
But it is also not clear to me that it makes much difference. At least not
in the context of the LPT, and probably not even in the wider context of the
fourth century Trinitarian controversy (though I am more open to the possibility
it may make a difference in the filioque debate). So, we will choose instead to
suppress whatever the deeper logical structure of the idiomata might be, and
represent the Father’s idioma of begetting (or begetting the Son, or begetting
the Only-Begotten or whatever it is) simply as:
b,
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And we will represent the Son’s idioma of being begotten (or being begotten
by the Father, or whatever it is) simply as:
b*,
Likewise, we will represent the Father’s idioma of spirating (or spirating the
Holy Spirit, or whatever it is) as:
p,48
And we will represent the Holy Spirit’s idioma of proceeding (or proceeding
from the Father, or whatever it is) as:
p*.
Finally, since b, b*, p and p* are all supposed to be idiomata, we can say:
+ I(i): Ib
+ I(ii): Ip
+ I(iii): Ib*
and
+ I(iv): Ip*
As with H(i)–H(iii), perhaps not all of I(i)-I(iv) need to be counted as sub-
stantive theological assumptions. Just as we said about using “f,” “s,” and “h” to
represent the hypostases (footnote 42 above, p. 212), “begetting,” “proceeding”
and their converses have significant semantic content, and given the discussion
just above, at the very least, the existence of begetting logically follows from the
existence of being begotten and vice-versa (and likewise the fact that something
instantiates one logically follows from the fact that something instantiates the
other). Similarly for spirating and being spirated (i.e. proceeding).
We could almost certainly get away with making only the following small set
of assumptions. (1) that there exists a Son (which is, by definition, something
begotten), from which we derive the existence of the Father (along with His
instantiation of begetting). Then (2) that there exists “another comforter (John
14:16). . . who proceeds from the Father (John 15:26)” (i.e., (2a) that there exists
something that is distinct from – “another” than – the Son and such that (2b)
it proceeds from the Father). And to individuate the Father and the “Other
Comforter” (i.e., the Holy Spirit), we would either assume the metaphysical
principle (3) that the proceeding relation is irreflexive, or simply the theological
assumption (3′) that the Father does not, in fact, proceed (perhaps because He
48. This may seem confusing, but since we are already using a lower-case “s” for the Son, we
are switching to “p” for “proceeding,” although it will really be “p*” that means “proceeding.”
Still, this seems easier to remember than any alternative.
216
is “anarchos” or for whatever reason). Thus (depending on how one individuates
assumptions) we would really have only 3 or 4 theological assumptions – or 2
or 3 theological assumptions and a metaphysical assumption – rather than 7
distinct theological assumptions.
Of course, if begetting the Son and spirating the Spirit and being “anarchos”
(i.e., unbegotten and unspirated) really are somehow identical, then we only
need a single assumption – the existence of the Father qua Father, i.e., the
existence of an x that instantiates this single, but in some sense multi-faceted,
property. I would point out that there are such relational properties – or at
least prima facie it would seem so. For example, the property of being a judge
cannot be exemplified unless there are two other beings (presumably distinct
both from each other and from the judge), one of which is a plaintiff and the
other of which is a defendant, each one of whom bears a relation to the judge
that is very similar to – yet importantly different from – that which the other
bears to the judge. Thus, the very existence of a judge, qua judge, would seem
to entail the existence of a total of three distinct beings, and the instantiation
of all of their various defining relations. Further, if there is such a property as
being a “supreme” judge (a judge such that there does not exist any “higher”
judge – that is, a judge x such that there does not exist any judge y such that y
is distinct from x and y could be a judge of x), then, if being a supreme judge is
a simple property, it would seem to give us a scenario quite analogous to what
the Father’s idioma would be on the view that begetting the Son and spirating
the Spirit and being “anarchos” (neither begotten nor spirated) is all somehow
one simple property.
But again, although building the further logical details of the idiomata and
the descriptions of the hypostases into our representations of them would be
more logically perspicuous and might allow us to show how Gregory relies on
even fewer assumptions, we will simply refer to all 7 of these objects with the
simple logical names we’ve specified, and treat these as 7 distinct theological
assumptions.
Ousiai
Next, since every hypostasis must have an ousia, the existence of the three
divine (uncreated) hypostases necessitates the existence of at least one divine
ousia. What is a “divine ousia”? That is a difficult question to answer without
prejudice to the heteroousian (who believes the ousiai of the three hypostases
are different) or even the homoiousian (who believes the ousiai of the three
hypostases are as similar as possible, but still non-identical).
One could define a divine ousia as any ousia participated in by all of the
three divine hypostases (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), but this would have the
result that heteroousianism would be inconsistent with there being any divine
ousia at all (since there is, on that view, no single ousia participated in by all
three of the hypostases). Whereas in reality heteroousians and homoiousians
want to say that there are three divine ousiai, not zero. The same problem
would arise if we defined a divine ousia as any ousia had by the Father (or as
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any ousia had by the Son, or as any ousia had by the Holy Spirit), since this
would again have the result that there is only a single divine ousia.
On the other hand, one could define a divine ousia as any ousia partici-
pated in by any of the three hypostases (Father, Son or Holy Spirit). But this
would entail that the human nature is divine on the assumption that the second
hypostasis (the Son) participates in humanity.
It would likely be closer to the meaning of “divine ousia” to define it in terms
of being uncreated, or necessary, or even hylomorphically simple. But a thorough
discussion of any of these suggestions would introduce needless complexity for
our current, limited purposes. So, since we will later argue that the three divine
hypostases all share the same ousia anyway (whatever precisely its character),
we will not try to give any precise definition as to what a divine ousia is, and
we will simply try not to worry too much about this question. We will represent
the ousia(i) of the three hypostases with the logical names “o,” “n” and “m.”
More precisely, from the metaphysical assumption:
+ NHO: (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)]
it follows that:
049 (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)]
and from this and the theological assumptions:
+ H(i): Hf
+ H(ii): Hs
+ H(iii): Hh
above, and
050 (∃y)(Oy & Pfy)
051 (∃y)(Oy & Psy)
and
052 (∃y)(Oy & Phy).
49. From NHO, by the T axiom.
Note that, throughout, I treat the T axiom, AKA “M,” as though it were an inference rule.
Strictly speaking, the T axiom just says any instance of φ→ φ is true. So that, in this case,
by the T axiom, we have that (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)] → (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)].
Then, from this and NHO ((∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)]), by Modus Ponens, it follows that
(∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)]. However, since this type of inference will always be valid, that
is, since any time we have a formula of the form φ, we can always use the T axiom followed
by Modus Ponens to derive φ, for the sake of convenience, I treat the T axiom throughout as
though it were a rule of inference that says, “From φ, infer φ.”
50. From (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)] and H(i), by Universal Modus Ponens (hereafter,
∀MP).
51. From (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)] and H(ii), by ∀MP.
52. From (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)] and H(iii), by ∀MP.
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And by ∃ Elimination, we simply replace the “y”s with names, thus:
053 Oo & Pfo
054 On & Psn
and
055 Om & Phm
which we decompose into
056 O(i): Oo
057 RH(i): Pfo
058 O(ii): On
059 RH(ii): Psn
060 O(iii): Om
and
061 RH(iii): Phm
Of course, it does not follow immediately from NHO and H(i) through H(iii)
alone that the hypostases share just one ousia, that is that o=n=m.62 We will
return (5.2.3, p. 233) to the question of whether the three hypostases have a
single ousia (whether they are homoousios), and thus whether:
063 Ohomoousion : o=n=m
Energeia Types
There are whatever energeia types are natural to the divine ousia(i) and indi-
viduate it (or them). We will call these “divine energeia types,” of which there
must be at least one. This is a consequence of Gregory’s metaphysical view that
there are no ousiai without natural energeiai, plus the existence of (at least one)
divine ousia. That is:
064 O(i): Oo
53. From (∃y) (Oy & Pfy), by ∃ Elimination o/y.
54. From (∃y) (Oy & Psy), by ∃ Elimination n/y.
55. From (∃y) (Oy & Phy), by ∃ Elimination m/y.
56. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
57. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
58. From On & Psn, by & Elimination.
59. From On & Psn, by & Elimination.
60. From Om & Phm, by & Elimination.
61. From Om & Phm, by & Elimination.
62. By which, of course, I mean: (o=n) & (o=m) & (n=m).
63. From O(i)–O(iii), IDO and CA. See 5.2.3, p. 234 below, as well as Appendix A.1, p. 315.
64. See footnote 56. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
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and
+ NOE*: (∀x)[Ox → (∃y)(E*y & Nyx)]
entail:
065 (∃y)(E*y & Nyo)
i.e., that there exists at least one divine energeia type.66
We cannot say what the precise number and nature of the divine energeia
types are, because no upper limit is given by Gregory and no particular limit is
entailed by his other metaphysical or theological assumptions. But since there is
at least one divine energeia type, and since Gregory believes that the predicate
“is (a) God” predicates engagement in some energeia (specifically, in some token
energeia of a particular divine energeia type), we can arbitrarily select one divine
energeia (type) to call “god-ding,” or, in predicate logic, “g*.”67
More precisely, from:
068 (∃y)(E*y & Nyo)
above, it follows, by ∃ Elimination, that:
069 E*g* & Ng*o
(We simply name the energeia-type “g*.”) And by & Elimination, we have:
070 E*(i): E*g*
and
071 RE*(i): Ng*o
65. Despite it being redundant, I note this follows from NOE* and O(i), by the T Axiom
(See footnote 49 for my use of this axiom as an inference rule), followed by ∀MP.
66. Of course, we could say the same for n and m, but since we will later prove that n = o
and m = o, we will only show our work for o.
67. Whatever the nature of this activity actually is – “beholding” or whatever it might be
(See Chapter 4.4.1, p. 175 for more on that). The precise nature of this energeia is not relevant
for our purposes, so we will simply call it “god-ding” and not worry about what exactly it
amounts to.
68. See footnote 65. From NOE* and O(i), by the T Axiom (See footnote 49 for my use of
this axiom as an inference rule), followed by ∀MP.
69. From (∃y)(E*y & Nyo), by ∃ Elimination g*/y.
70. From E*g* & Ng*o, by & Elimination.
71. Again, from E*g* & Ng*o, by & Elimination.
220
Energeia Tokens
There is also at least one divine energeia token (I will call “token divine en-
ergeiai ” or “divine energeia tokens” all those token energeiai that “have” or are
“of” some divine energeia type.)
It follows from the definition of “natural to” that for any energeia type x
that is natural to some ousia y, if some hypostasis z has ousia y, then there
must be some token energeia w such that w has energeia type x, and such that
w is had by hypostasis z.
I.e., from:
072 NDef: (∀x)(∀y){Nxy ↔ (∀z)[Pzy → (∃w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]}
It follows that:
073 NE*E: (∀x)(∀y){(E*x&Oy&Nxy) →
(∀z)[(Hz&Pzy) → (∃w)(Ew&Pwx&Pzw)]}
And so, assuming (as we have already derived) that the divine ousia (1) is
an ousia, and (2) is had by some hypostasis, it follows that any energeia type
natural to the divine ousia will be had by at least one token energeia. That is,
from:
074 NE*E: (∀x)(∀y){(E*x&Oy&Nxy) →
(∀z)[(Hz&Pzy) → (∃w)(Ew&Pwx&Pzw)]}
075 O(i): Oo
+ H(i): Hf
and
076 RH(i): Pfo
it follows that:
077 E*Lemma: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃y)(Ey & Pyx)]
And since, by hypothesis, god-ding (g*) is a divine energeia type (an energeia
type natural to the divine ousia), there must be at least one token of that type.
That is, from E*Lemma and:
72. Stipulative definition.
73. Proof in Appendix A.2, p. 316. Note that I omit any modal operators from NE*E to
avoid certain unnecessary complications, and because, for our purposes, we will only need a
non-modal version of it.
74. See footnote 73. Proof in Appendix A.2, p. 316. Note that I omit any modal operators
from NE*E to avoid certain unnecessary complications, and because, for our purposes, we will
only need a non-modal version of it.
75. See footnote 56. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
76. See footnote 57. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
77. From NE*E, O(i), H(i) and RH(i). Proof in Appendix A.3, p. 317.
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078 E*g* & Ng*o
above, it follows that:
079 (∃y)(Ey & Pyg*)
We will discuss the precise number of divine energeia tokens below. But at
this point, we do not know the precise number of them. So, just as we did with
the divine energeia type god-ding, we will simply arbitrarily select some token
energeia that has energeia type g* and name it: “g.” In other words, from:
080 (∃y)(Ey & Pyg*)
it follows that:
081 Eg & Pgg*
082 E(i): Eg
and:
083 RE(i): Pgg*
We will see later that, not only must there be at least one divine energeia
type and at least one divine energeia token that has that type, but that, de-
pending on whether an energeia token can belong to multiple energeia types,
the number of divine energeia tokens that exist prior to creation is either ex-
actly equal to the number of divine energeia types or is equal to some whole
number from one up to the cardinality of the power set of the divine energeia
types minus one. I think, however, it is almost certain that Gregory would take
the view that there is exactly one divine energeia token of each divine energeia
type, for reasons we will discuss later (5.2.3, p. 235 ff.).
Assuming, then, that there are no other hypostases, ousiai, or idiomata prior
to creation, and ignoring whatever additional energeia types and tokens besides
g* and g there might be, the ten objects (or nine, or even six, depending on
one’s view about the idiomata)84 discussed above (o, f, s, h, b, b*, p, p*, g*, and
78. See footnote 69. From (∃y)(E*y & Nyo), by ∃ Elimination g*/y.
79. From: E*Lemma and E*g* & Ng*o, by ∀MP.
80. See footnote 79. From: E*Lemma and E*g* & Ng*o, by ∀MP.
81. From (∃y)(Ey & Pyg*) above, by ∃ Elimination (g/y).
82. From Eg & Pgg*, by & Elimination.
83. Again, from Eg & Pgg*, by & Elimination.
84. That is, depending on whether we take Gregory to hold that there are just three idiomata,
so that the Father really does have only a single idioma, in which case, b=p, so there would
really be only 9 distinct objects “prior to creation.” Further, if we take quite literally the
claim that a hypostasis just is a bundle of idiomata (or just is the “individuating sign”), then
f=b=p; s=b*; and h=p*. In that case, there would really be only 6 distinct objects “prior
to creation.” I include this remark for the sake of thoroughness, and as it may be of interest
to metaphysicians, but it does not seem to me that much hangs on it for the purposes of
establishing the logical consistency of the doctrine.
222
g)85 are the only objects Gregory postulates to exist “prior to creation,” and are
all we will need to concern ourselves with.86 Although we have mentioned in
passing some of the relations between some of these objects, in the next section
we will look at all such relations that are relevant to our purposes.
5.2.2 Relations Posited Between the Token Objects
Relations Had by the Hypostases
First, the three hypostases have the intra-trinitarian relations as their idiomata,
as follows.
The Father has “begetting the Son” (or simply, “begetting.”)
+/087 RH(vi): Pfb
The Father has “spirating the Spirit” (or simply, “spirating.”)
+/088 RH(vii): Pfp
Since the Father is “anarchos,” He does not have “being begotten by the
Father” (or being begotten by anything at all).
+ RH(viii): ¬Pfb*
Since the Father is “anarchos,” He does not have “being spirated by the
Father” (or being spirated by anything at all).
+ RH(ix): ¬Pfp*
85. Since we will later show that the ousiai of the three hypostases are all identical (see
5.2.3, p. 234), I am already counting m, n and o as a single object.
86. Strictly speaking, the only objects Gregory postulates are the hypostases and the id-
iomata (and perhaps only one or two of the hypostases and only one or two of the idiomata).
The existence of all the others follow from those, their metaphysical predication relations,
and his metaphysics. But the existence of these ten uncreated objects are what Gregory is
committed to.
87. Of course, due to the way we’ve represented the relation between hypostases and id-
iomata, this does not follow as a strictly logical consequence of RH(xii) (Psb*). However,
it is certainly part of the understanding of relatives or relative properties that Gregory was
working with, that the existence of a relative necessitates the existence of the correlative.
Aristotle does note some exceptions, but these seem to deal with issues of modality. (For
example, the existence of the perceptible does not necessitate the existence of a perceiver.)
However, “father” and “son” are paradigm cases of correlatives either of whose existence would
necessitate that of the other.
88. See footnote 87 above. Due to the way we’ve represented the relation between hypostases
and idiomata, this does not follow as a strictly logical consequence of RH(xvii) (Php*). How-
ever, it is certainly part of the understanding of relatives or relative properties that Gregory
was working with, that the existence of a relative necessitates the existence of the correlative.
It’s less clear, of course, that the Holy Spirit’s simply proceeding would entail that the Fa-
ther, in particular, spirates. On the other hand, if p* is proceeding from the Father, then it’s
obvious why this would entail that the Father spirates the Spirit (which is what Pfp would
say if we interpret p as spirating the Spirit.
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The Son does not have “begetting the Son” (or begetting anything at all).
+/089 RH(x): ¬Psb
Whether or not the Son has “spirating the Spirit” (or simply “spirating”)
is at the heart of the filioque controversy, and is obviously a matter of great
contention. We won’t attempt to settle the issue here, though we can note
that, on IDHWeak, Psp is compatible with f6=s (given RH(viii) and RH(xii)
– that the Father is unbegotten while the Son is begotten), but simply an
additional, logically contingent, assumption.90 On the other hand, on IDHStrong,
Psp is incompatible with RH(vii) (that the Father spirates) and f6=s (thus,
incompatible with RH(vii), RH(viii) and RH(xii)). See 5.2.3, p. 233 ff. for
more.
+/091 RH(xi): Psp? / ¬Psp?
The Son has “being begotten of the Father” (or simply, “being begotten.”)
+ RH(xii): Psb*
The Son does not have “being spirated by the Father” (or being spirated by
anything at all).
+/092 RH(xiii): ¬Psp*
The Spirit does not have “begetting the Son” (or begetting anything at all).
+/093 RH(xiv): ¬Phb
89. On IDHWeak, this would be an additional theological assumption or follow from an
additional metaphysical assumption that the begetting relation is irreflexive. (Assuming the
idioma here is specifically begetting the Son. If the idioma is simply begetting something,
then it would probably be best simply to add the fact that the Son is the Only-Begotten, i.e.,
Psb* & (∀x)(Pxb* → x=s).
On IDHStrong, RH(x) simply follows from RH(viii), RH(xii) and RH(vi). That is, the fact
that the Father is unbegotten while the Son is begotten individuates them, and on IDHStrong
they cannot share any other idiomata, so the fact that the Father begets and the Father and
Son are distinct, on IDHStrong, entails that the Son does not beget.
90. Of course, I don’t mean contingent in the “broadly” logical sense – that there are possible
worlds where the Spirit proceeds from the Son and possible worlds where He doesn’t. I mean, in
the “narrowly” logical sense, that neither Psp nor ¬Psp is logically entailed by any combination
of the other propositions in GNTF, if GNTF includes only IDHWeak and not IDHStrong.
91. On IDHWeak, Psp is possible, but an additional assumption. On IDHStrong, ¬Psp follows
from RH(vii) and f6=s (thus, from RH(vii), RH(viii) and RH(xii)). See 5.2.3, p. 233 ff. for
more.
92. On IDHWeak, both this and its negation would be consistent with our other assumptions
about the idiomata, and either one would have to be counted as an additional theological as-
sumption. On IDHStrong, this follows from RH(xii) (Psb*), RH(xvi) (¬Phb*) (which together
entail s6=h) and RH(xvii) (Php*).
93. On IDHWeak, this is an additional theological assumption. On IDHStrong, it follows from
RH(ix) (¬Pfp*), RH(xvii) (Php*) (which together entail f6=h) and RH(vi) (Pfb).
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The Spirit does not have “spirating the Spirit” (or spirating anything at all).
+/094 RH(xv): ¬Php
The Spirit does not have being begotten by the Father (or being begotten
by anything at all).
+95 RH(xvi): ¬Phb*
The Spirit has “being spirated by the Father” (or simply, “being spirated.”)
+ RH(xvii): Php*
We said above that the three hypostases each have an ousia, which we’ve
represented as:
94. On IDHWeak, this is an additional theological assumption (or follows from an additional
metaphysical assumption that the spirating relation is irreflexive, if p is spirating the Spirit in
particular. If p is simply spirating, then it must be an additional assumption.) On IDHStrong,
it follows from RH(ix) (¬Pfp*), RH(xvii) (Php*) (which together entail f 6=h) and RH(vii)
(Pfp).
95. I count this as an additional theological assumption necessary to individuate the Son and
Spirit. Of course, one traditional argument in favor of the filioque is that it is necessary in order
to individuate the Son and Spirit (along with, either the additional theological assumption
that the Spirit does not spirate, or if we take p to mean spirate the Spirit, the additional
metaphysical assumption that spiration is irreflexive). But, ironically, the filioque in fact
entails the opposite on IDHStrong and is simply irrelevant on IDHWeak.
Of course, on IDHStrong, the filioque entails that the Father and Son are identical, and
since the Father and Spirit are distinct, it follows that the Son and the Spirit are distinct
(since the Son is the Father). But it also entails that the Son and Spirit are identical, since
the fact that the Father is unbegotten (RH(viii)) and the Son is begotten (RH(x)) and that
they are identical is a contradiction. Thus, on IDHStrong, Psp simply yields a contradiction,
which entails everything – including that the Son and Spirit are identical (despite also being
distinct). But such is the way with contradictions.
More importantly, consider the case of IDHWeak (the only scenario in which the filioque
is really interesting, since the only scenario in which it is really possible). First, suppose we
simply assume (take it as a premise), as I suggest we do, that the Spirit is not begotten. Then,
since the Son is begotten, they two are individuated anyway, so whether the Son spirates the
Spirit or not is irrelevant to the question whether they are distinct.
Second, suppose that the Son and Spirit are individuated in any other way at all (whether
because they differ with respect to spiration, or anything else at all). So h 6=s. But the Son
is the Only-Begotten. I.e., Psb* & (∀x)(Pxb* → x=s). But those two propositions directly
entail (by Universal Modus Tollens) ¬Phb*. So any other strategy for individuating the Son
and Holy Spirit will entail that the Spirit is not begotten anyway, making any other strategy
for individuating the Son and the Spirit (whether the filioque or anything else) superfluous.
Of course, all of this assumes that the relations of begetting and proceeding are distinct
relations, which is also controversial in the context of the filioque dispute. But it shouldn’t
be. Again, any strategy for individuating the Son and Spirit will entail that the Spirit is
not begotten (since the Son is the Only-Begotten). But anyone will admit that the Spirit
does proceed. So, since by anyone’s admission, the Spirit proceeds (Psp*) but is not begotten
(¬Psb*), proceeding and being begotten cannot be the same relation (p* 6=b*).
Thus, as I said, the filioque is, ironically, irrelevant to the individuation of the Son and
the Holy Spirit, and we may as well simply count ¬Phb* as a theological assumption which
individuates the Son and Spirit.
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096 RH(i): Pfo
097 RH(ii): Psn
098 RH(iii): Phm
Of course, the Cappadocians’ argument with the Eunomians centered around
whether these were a single ousia or multiple ousiai, and we saw that the UNA
centers on these being a single ousia. That is:
099 Ohomoousion : o=n=m
As we saw in the previous chapter, Gregory argues for the homoousion
(Ohomoousion) on the basis of what I have called “the Cappadocian Assertion”
(CA).100 We will discuss this argument and give a proof of Ohomoousion from
O(i)–O(iii), IDO and CA below (See 5.2.3, p. 233, as well as Appendix A.1, p.
315.). For the moment, it is sufficient to note that from:
0101 RH(ii): Psn
0102 RH(iii): Phm
and
0103 Ohomoousion : o=n=m
it follows, respectively, that:
0104 RH(iv): Pso
and
0105 RH(v): Pho
Discussions of Gregory’s theology, and the theology of the Cappadocians
more generally, often focus on the homoousion and the Cappadocian Assertion.
But although debate about the homoousion took center stage in the 4th-century
controversy, the key to Gregory’s solution to the LPT lies not in the three divine
hypostases’ sharing all their natural energeia types (which is how I’ve interpreted
the Cappadocian Assertion, 4.4.4, p. 187), but in their actually sharing token
96. See footnote 57. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
97. See footnote 59. From On & Psn, by & Elimination.
98. See footnote 61. From Om & Phm, by & Elimination.
99. From O(i)–O(iii), IDO and CA. See 5.2.3, p. 234 below, as well as Appendix A.1, p. 315.
100. We saw this especially in Ad Eustathium. See Chapter 4.4.4, p. 187.
101. See footnote 59. From On & Psn, by & Elimination.
102. See footnote 61. From Om & Phm, by & Elimination.
103. From O(i)–O(iii), IDO and CA. See 5.2.3, p. 234 below, as well as Appendix A.1, p. 315.
104. From RH(ii) and Ohomoousion , by substitutivity of identity (hereafter, “by =”) n/o.
105. From RH(iii) and Ohomoousion , by = m/o.
226
divine energeiai. We will discuss the individuation of the token divine energeiai
below (5.2.3, p. 235 ff.). For now, we note that from:
0 NDef: (∀x)(∀y){Nxy ↔ (∀z)[Pzy → (∃w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]}
making the substitutions g*/x and o/y in NDef yields:
0106 Ng*o ↔ (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Pzw)]
which together with:
0107 RE*(i): Ng*o
entails:
0108 (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Pzw)], and thus:
0109 (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Pzw)]
and making the substitutions, f/z, and s/z, and h/z, respectively, yield:
0110 Pfo → (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Pfw)
0111 Pso → (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Psw)
0112 Pho → (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Phw)
which together with
0113 RH(i): Pfo
0114 RH(iv): Pso
and
0115 RH(v): Pho
entail, respectively:
0116 P1GNT-F. (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Pfw)
106. From NDef, by ∀ Elimination, g*/x, o/y.
107. See footnote 71. From E*g* & Ng*o, by & Elimination.
108. From Ng*o ↔ (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Pwg* & Pzw)], and RE*(i): Ng*o, above, by
↔ Elimination.
109. From (∀z)[Pzo→ (∃w)(Pwg* & Pzw)], above, by the T Axiom (See footnote 49 for my
use of this axiom as an inference rule).
110. From (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Pwg* & Pzw)], above, by ∀ Elimination, f/z.
111. From (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Pwg* & Pzw)], above, by ∀ Elimination, s/z.
112. From (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Pwg* & Pzw)], above, by ∀ Elimination, h/z.
113. See footnote 57. From Oo & Pfo, by & Elimination.
114. See footnote 104. From RH(ii) and Ohomoousion , by = o/n.
115. See footnote 105. From RH(iii) and Ohomoousion , by = o/m.
116. From RH(i) (Pfo), and Pfo → (∃w)(Ew&Pwg*&Pfw), above, MP.
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0117 P2GNT-F. (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Psw)
0118 P3GNT-F. (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Phw)
which, by three applications of ∃ Elimination (g′/w, g′′/w, then g′′′/w),
yield, respectively:
0119 Eg′ & Pg′g* & Pfg′
0120 Eg′′ & Pg′′g* & Psg′′
0121 Eg′′′ & Pg′′′g* & Phg′′′
and thus:
0122 g′Lemma: Eg′ & Pg′g*
0123 g′′Lemma: Eg′′ & Pg′′g*
0124 g′′′Lemma: Eg′′′ & Pg′′′g*
and
0125 RH(xviii): Pfg′
0126 RH(xix): Psg′′
0127 RH(xx): Phg′′′
And in 5.2.3, pp. 235–243, below, we will show that:
0128 Σg*: g = g′ = g′′ = g′′′
which, together with RH(xviii)–RH(xx), will entail:
0129 RH(xxi): Pfg
0130 RH(xxii): Psg
and
0131 RH(xxiii): Phg
117. From RH(iv) (Pso), and Pso → (∃w)(Ew&Pwg*&Psw), above, MP.
118. From RH(v) (Pho), and Pho → (∃w)(Ew&Pwg*&Phw), above, MP.
119. From P1GNT-F, by ∃ Elimination, g′/w
120. From P2GNT-F, by ∃ Elimination, g′′/w.
121. From P3GNT-F, by ∃ Elimination, g′′′/w.
122. From Eg′ & Pg′g* & Pfg′, above, by & Elimination.
123. From Eg′′ & Pg′′g* & Psg′′, above, by & Elimination.
124. From Eg′′′ & Pg′′′g* & Phg′′′, above, by & Elimination.
125. From Eg′ & Pg′g* & Pfg′, above, by & Elimination.
126. From Eg′′ & Pg′′g* & Psg′′, above, by & Elimination.
127. From Eg′′′ & Pg′′′g* & Phg′′′, above, by & Elimination.
128. See footnote 186, p. 240.
129. From RH(xviii) (Pfg′) and Σg*, by = g/g′.
130. From RH(xix) (Psg′′) and Σg*, by = g/g′′.
131. From RH(xx) (Phg′′′) and Σg*, by = g/g′′′.
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Relations Had by the Idiomata
The idiomata are had by the three hypostases in the ways described in the
section on hypostases above (RH(vi) – RH(xviii)), and we will not repeat that
discussion here.
Additionally, although within Gregory’s metaphysics they are the sorts of
things that would be candidates to be, the idiomata are not had by any of the
divine energeia tokens. Thus, prior to creation:
+ ¬EI: ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)
Relations Had by the Ousia
The divine ousia is had by all the hypostases, as discussed above (RH(i), RH(iv)
and RH(v), p. 226 ff.), a discussion we will complete below (5.2.3, p. 233 ff. and
Appendix A.1, p. 315.). It is not itself had by anything else, nor does it itself
bear metaphysical predication relations to (“have”) anything at all. Nor is it
natural to anything. Certain energeia types are natural to it, as described in
the following subsection.
Relations Had by the Divine Energeia Types
As mentioned above, certain energeia types (“divine energeia types”) are natural
to the divine ousia, thus:
0132 (∃y)(E*y & Nyo)
Again, we will not here settle the question of how many divine energeiai
types there are. But we have arbitrarily selected one such energeia type and
named it “g*,” thus:
0133 RE*(i): Ng*o
Although on Gregory’s view it is clear that there must be at least one divine
energeia type that is natural to the divine ousia, some interesting questions
remain as to whether a divine energeia type could also be natural to a created
ousia. That is, if ousiai are individuated “weakly,” whether some energeia type
could be natural both to the divine ousia and to one or more non-divine ousiai.
Likewise, regardless of the answer to that question, there is nothing in Gre-
gory’s metaphysics to say that a non-divine hypostasis could not have a token
of some divine energeia type, indeed, there is nothing in Gregory’s metaphysics
(at least this subset of his metaphysics – the metaphysics contained in GNT)
to say that a non-divine hypostasis could not synergize with a divine hypostasis
on some token energeia. But we will not further pursue those matters here.
132. See footnote 65. From NOE* and O(i), by the T Axiom (See footnote 49 for my use of
this axiom as an inference rule), followed by ∀MP.
133. See footnote 71. From E*g* & Ng*o, by & Elimination.
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Relations Had by the Divine Energeia Tokens
The divine energeia tokens are had by the three hypostases in the ways described
in the section on hypostases above (RH(xviii) – RH(xxii)). To repeat:
0134 RH(xviii): Pfg′
0135 RH(xix): Psg′′
0136 RH(xx): Phg′′′
And again, in 5.2.3, pp. 235–243, below, we will show that:
0137 Σg*: g = g′ = g′′ = g′′′
which, together with RH(xviii)–RH(xx), will entail:
0138 RH(xxi): Pfg
0139 RH(xxii): Psg
and
0140 RH(xxiii): Phg
Additionally, g / g′ / g′′ / g′′′ is a token of g*, thus:
0141 RE(i): Pgg*
Finally, although within Gregory’s metaphysics they are the sorts of things
that would be candidates to, the divine energeia tokens do not have any of the
idiomata. (None of the divine energeiai tokens beget or spirate anything, nor
are they begotten or spirated by anything.) Thus, prior to creation:
+ ¬EI: ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)
134. See footnote 125. From Eg′ & Pg′g* & Pfg′, above, by & Elimination.
135. See footnote 126. From Eg′′ & Pg′′g* & Psg′′, above, by & Elimination.
136. See footnote 127. From Eg′′′ & Pg′′′g* & Phg′′′, above, by & Elimination.
137. See footnote 186, p. 240.
138. See footnote 129. From RH(xviii) (Pfg′) and Σg*, by = g/g′.
139. See footnote 130. From RH(xix) (Psg′′) and Σg*, by = g/g′′.
140. See footnote 131. From RH(xx) (Phg′′′) and Σg*, by = g/g′′′.
141. See footnote 83. From Eg & Pgg*, by & Elimination.
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5.2.3 Individuation of the Token Objects
The Individuation of the Hypostases
The three hypostases of the Trinity are all numerically distinct, being individ-
uated by their idiomata. Recall that Gregory’s principle of individuation for
hypostases is either:
+ IDHWeak: (∀x)(∀y){[Hx & Hy] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pxz ↔ Pyz])]}
i.e., necessarily, for any hypostases, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if
x and y have all and only the same idiomata,142 or:
+ IDHStrong: (∀x)(∀y){[Hx & Hy] → [x=y ↔ (∃z)(Iz & [Pxz & Pyz])]}
i.e., necessarily, for any hypostases, x and y, x and y are identical if and only if
x and y have any idioma in common.143
First let us consider the individuation of the hypostases on IDHWeak.
The Father and the Son are individuated by b*. That is, making the sub-
stitutions f/x and s/y in IDHWeak, yields:
0144 [Hf & Hs] → [f=s ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pfz ↔ Psz])]
Since on Gregory’s theology the Father and the Son are both hypostases, it
follows that:
0145 f=s ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pfz ↔ Psz])
I.e., the Father and the Son are identical if and only if it is the case that
they have all the same idiomata.
So, suppose that the Father and Son were identical:
0146 f=s
It would follow that they have all the same idiomata:
0147 (∀z)(Iz → [Pfz ↔ Psz])
142. See footnote 31, p. 208 for a discussion of why I do not include ousiai as objects that
would individuate hypostases.
143. See footnote 31, p. 208 for a discussion of why I do not include ousiai as objects that
would individuate hypostases.
144. From IDHWeak, by the T Axiom, followed by ∀ Elimination, f/x and s/y.
145. From H(i) (Hf) and H(ii) (Hs), it follows that (Hf & Hs), by & Introduction.
Then from (Hf & Hs) and [Hf & Hs] → [f=s ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pfz ↔ Psz])], just above,
f=s ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pfz ↔ Psz]) follows by MP.
146. Assumption for reductio.
147. From f=s and f=s ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pfz ↔ Psz]), just above, by ↔ Elimination.
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But on Gregory’s theology, being begotten (or being begotten by the Father)
is an idioma that the Son has, but that the Father lacks:
0148 Ib* & (¬Pfb* & Psb*)
Which contradicts the previous statement (that they have all the same id-
iomata).149 Therefore, by reductio, the Father and Son are not identical:
0150 P4GNT-F: f 6= s
Although we will not give the proofs in details, the Father and Son would be
individuated by b as well.151 Whether they are individuated by p is at the heart
of the filioque controversy.152 They are of course not individuated by p*.153
It is obvious that parallel proofs can be given for the individuation of the
Father and the Holy Spirit, and for the individuation of the Son and the Holy
Spirit as well. So we will not give the proofs, but only note the following.
First, with respect to:
0154 P5GNT-F: f 6= h
the Father and the Holy Spirit are individuated by p*. 155 They are individuated
by p as well.156 They are also individuated by b.157 They are not individuated
by b*.158
Finally, with respect to:
0159 P6GNT-F: s 6= h
the Son and the Holy Spirit are individuated by b*.160 The two are also indi-
viduated by p*.161 Whether they are individuated by p is at the heart of the
filioque controversy.162 They are not individuated by b.163
148. From I(iii), RH(viii) and RH(xii)
149. Proof is left as an exercise for the reader.
150. From f=s ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pfz ↔ Psz]) and Ib* & ¬Pfb* & Psb*, by reductio. Proof is
trivial, and left as an exercise for the reader. In terms of substantive assumptions, then:
P4GNT-F follows from IDHWeak, H(i), H(ii), I(iii), RH(viii) and RH(xii).
151. I.e., P4GNT-F follows from IDHWeak, H(i), H(ii), I(i), RH(vi) and RH(x), assuming we
have RH(vi) and RH(x) as additional theological assumptions to appeal to.
152. I.e., P4GNT-F would follow from IDHWeak, H(i), H(ii), I(ii), RH(vii) and ¬Psp, if we
made that assumption.
P4GNT-F obviously does not follow from IDHWeak, H(i), H(ii), I(ii), RH(vii) and Psp.
153. I.e., P4GNT-F does not follow from IDHWeak, H(i), H(ii), I(iv), RH(ix) and RH(xiii).
154. From IDHWeak, H(i), H(iii), I(ii), RH(vii) and RH(xv). Proof omitted.
155. I.e., P5GNT-F follows from IDHWeak, H(i), H(iii), I(iv), RH(ix) and RH(xvii).
156. I.e., P5GNT-F follows from IDHWeak, H(i), H(iii), I(ii), RH(vii) and RH(xv).
157. I.e., P5GNT-F follows from IDHWeak, H(i), H(iii), I(i), RH(vi) and RH(xiv).
158. I.e., P5GNT-F does not follow from IDHWeak, H(i), H(iii), I(iii), RH(viii) and RH(xvi).
159. From IDHWeak, H(ii), H(iii), I(iii), RH(xii) and RH(xvi). Proof omitted.
160. I.e., P6GNT-F follows from IDHWeak, H(ii), H(iii), I(iii), RH(xii) and RH(xvi).
161. I.e., P6GNT-F follows from IDHWeak, H(ii), H(iii), I(iv), RH(xiii) and RH(xvii).
162. I.e., P6GNT-F follows from IDHWeak, H(ii), H(iii), I(ii), RH(xv) and Psp.
P6GNT-F does not follow from IDHWeak, H(ii), H(iii), I(ii), RH(xv) and ¬Psp.
163. I.e., P6GNT-F does not follow from IDHWeak, H(ii), H(iii), I(i), RH(x) and RH(xiv).
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Since IDHStrong requires that the hypostases differ with respect to all of
the idiomata, the proofs become so lengthy it seems unreasonable to include
them explicitly. But it should be obvious how they would go, given that, on the
assumption that the filioque (Psp)† is false,164,165 we have:
Pfb & ¬Psb
Pfp & ¬Psp†
¬Pfb* & Psb*
¬Pfp* & ¬Psp*
Pfb & ¬Phb
Pfp & ¬Php
¬Pfb* & ¬Phb*
¬Pfp* & Psp*
¬Psb & ¬Phb
¬Psp† & ¬Php
Psb* & ¬Phb*
¬Psp* & Psp*
And thus (assuming the falsehood of Psp), none of the hypostases shares any
idiomata with any of the others.
The Individuation of the Idiomata
We are assuming that there are either three or four idiomata (b, p, b* and p*),
and, although it is unclear whether b=p or b 6=p, it seems they are all otherwise
supposed to be distinct, and any idiomata that are distinct, are intrinsically
distinct (5.1.4, p. 208).
The Individuation of the Ousia
There is a single divine ousia, individuated by its natural energeiai. Recall our
principle of individuation for ousiai is:
+ IDO: (∀x)(∀x)[(Ox & Oy) → (x=y ↔ (∀z)[E*z → (Nzx ↔ Nzy)])]
164. Otherwise the Father and Son will be identical, since {IDHStrong, Pfp, Psp} ` f=s.
165. Technically speaking, Psp may not be the right way – certainly it is not the only way
– to interpret the filioque. It may be that one ought to interpret the word “filioque” in
an equivocal way. The Holy Spirit proceeds-1 from the Father in the sense of deriving His
hypostasis, or concrete existence, from the Father. Whereas he proceeds-2 from the Son only
in the “economic” sense of being sent into the world by the Son. Psp is simply the most
straight-forward way of reading the filioque in a metaphysically serious sort of way. Thus,
the problem of the filioque arises out of a combination of (1) assuming that IDHStrong gives
the correct identity conditions for hypostases, and (2) interpreting the word “filioque” in a
metaphysically serious way. The problem does not arise from (1) by itself.
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Also recall that the Cappadocian Assertion (CA) was the claim that the hy-
postases (or more precisely, their ousiai) share all the same natural energeiai.
I.e., Gregory asserts that:
+ CA: (∀x){E*x → (Nxo ↔ Nxn ↔ Nxm)}
From IDO, CA and O(i)–O(iii), it follows that:
0166 Ohomoousion : o=n=m
which was what was in fact at the heart of the fourth century Trinitarian con-
troversy.
He also issues what I will call “the Cappadocian Challenge” to Eunomius (or
really to any heteroousians – i.e., those who deny the homoousion). That is, in
order to disprove the Cappadocian Assertion that:
+ CA: (∀x){E*x → (Nxo ↔ Nxn ↔ Nxm)}
one must show that:
¬CA: (∃x){E*x & ¬(Nxo ↔ Nxn ↔ Nxm)}
and to show that some energeia type is not natural to some ousia, one must
show that it is possible for there to be a hypostasis of that ousia that does not
bear a metaphysical predication relation to any token of that energeia type.
Of course, there are some deep questions here as to how precisely to formulate
IDO and NDef. As I’ve formulated them, it would be open to the Eunomians
to simply assert that, although the hypostases all in fact exhibit tokens of all
the same energeiai types, some of those energeia types might be natural to
the ousia of one hypostasis while another hypostasis has some token of that
energeia type only accidentally. (Gregory, after all, admits that it is not only
possible, but actual that other hypostases, including demons and humans, have
tokens of various divine energeiai types – including “god-ding” itself, whatever
exactly that is.)167 And as I’ve formulated Gregory’s position in GNTF, this
would at least be logically possible. We then would have to interpret Gregory
as simply challenging the Eunomians to prove the distinction of ousiai between
the hypostases by showing that there is actually some energeia type that is not
shared by all three hypostases. In other words, he would be challenging them
to show:
(ChEun): (∃x) { E*x & Nxo & ¬(∃y) (Ey & Pyx & Psy) }
166. From IDO, CA & O(i)–O(iii). Proof in Appendix A.1, p. 315.
167. See above, 4.2.3, p. 134.
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to prove that the Son is not homoousios with the Father by noting some divine
energeia type, no token of which is engaged in by the Son.168
On the other hand, one might interpret Gregory as holding a stronger view
about the individuation of ousiai by energeia types such that it would be impos-
sible to “accidentally” engage in all the natural energeiai of some ousia without
being of that ousia. (“If it walks like a duck, and it quacks like a duck, it’s a
duck.”) Gregory does seem to speak this way at times. All I will say here is
that, if he does take this stronger view, then his argument is logically tighter
than if not, although he relies on a stronger and perhaps more controversial
assumption. However, here again, I will simply go with the weaker assumption,
since either way, Gregory is certainly committed to the formulations we will be
working with (even if he would also accept stronger ones) and the weaker ones
are all we need to make our points.
The Individuation of the Divine Energeia Types
As discussed above (5.1.4, p. 209), energeia types are presumably intrinsically
distinct. From the available evidence, we can show that Gregory is committed
to there being at least one divine energeia type, but we can’t say precisely how
many there are.169
The Individuation of the Divine Energeia Tokens
While we can’t say how many divine energeia types there are (See just above),
nor how many divine energeia tokens there are, we can show that there exists
exactly one divine energeia token for every divine energeia type. That is, we
can show that:
0170 EUnique: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyx)]
This, however, does not follow directly from the principle of individuation
for energeia tokens we attributed to Gregory, or even from that principle and
the fact that, prior to creation, the divine energeia tokens have no idiomata.
Recall that principle of individuation for energeia tokens is:
+ IDE: (∀x)(∀y){[Ex & Ey] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)([Iz v E*z] → [Pxz ↔ Pyz])]}
From this and the fact that, prior to creation, the divine energeia tokens have
no idiomata to individuate them, i.e.:
168. Likewise, with respect to the Pneumatomachians – those who affirmed the consubstan-
tiality of the Father and Son, but denied the Holy Spirit’s consubstantiality with either of the
former, thus “pneumatomachoi” or “fighters against the Spirit. Gregory would be challenging
them to show:
(ChPnM): (∃x) { E*x & Nxo & ¬(∃y) (Ey & Pyx & Phy) }
169. See 5.2.1, p. 219 ff.
170. See footnote 177 below. From IDE, ¬EI, E*Lemma and EE*≤1 just below. Proof in
Appendix A.4, p. 318.
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+ ¬EI: ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)
it only follows that:
0171 (∀x)(∀y){[Ex & Ey] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)(E*z → [Pxz ↔ Pyz])]}
i.e., prior to creation, energeiai tokens x and y are identical if and only if x and
y have all and only the same energeia types.
However, I said earlier (5.1.4, p. 209, footnote 34) that we face a choice as
to how to formulate Gregory’s view on the individuation of token energeiai, and
that I suspect he would want to say that they are individuated not only by their
idiomata, but by their energeia types as well. I said this was due to the logical
consequences of their not being individuated by energeia types. Now is the time
to explain why. Again, as far as I know, Gregory does not explicitly discuss the
issue. But there are good reasons to think he would want to take the view that
energeiai tokens cannot have multiple types. There are two logical possibilities
to consider here.
First, it may be that a given token energeia can have at most one energeia
type:
+ EE*≤1: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Ex & E*y & Pxy & E*z & Pxz) → y = z]
Second, it may be that, in principle, a given token energeia could have more
than one energeia type:
+ EE*+: ♦(∃x)(∃y)(∃z){(Ex & E*y & Pxy & E*z & Pxz) & y 6= z}
In the first scenario, there would be a one-to-one correspondence between
divine energeia types and tokens. But in the latter, there could be as few as one
divine energeia token, and as many as the cardinality of the power set of the
divine energeia types (i.e., where n is the number of divine energeia types, the
number of divine energeia tokens could be as high as 2n), or that minus one.172
Although these latter options following on EE*+ are logically possible, I
believe Gregory would be happier with our initial assumption – that a given
token energeia must have at most one energeia type, and thus that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between divine energeia types and tokens. And this
is not merely because it seems simpler or more intuitive from a metaphysical
point of view (although it does), but for theological reasons.173 Gregory wants
171. From IDE and ¬EI. We will not make use of this inference, so no proof will be given.
172. The first extreme would occur if there were only a single divine energeia token having
all of the divine energeia types at once. The latter would occur if we took every possible
combination of energeia types (which would correspond to the power set of the set of energeia
types, with the possible exception of the empty set – assuming we adopt an assumption that
an energeia token must have at least one energeia type) and postulated one energeia token
having each such possible combination.
173. And what follows is a good example of how theological concerns can constrain one’s
metaphysics or vice-versa.
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to say that the three divine hypostases all have numerically the same token act
of god-ding. But as we saw in the Ad Ablabium,174 he also wants to say the same
is true for all of their activities (modulo complications from the incarnation).175
Now, as we said, on the assumption that a given divine energeia token can
have at most one divine energeia type, this theological result simply follows as
a necessary consequence from his metaphysics and his other theological postu-
lates. But suppose instead that a divine energeia token can have multiple types.
Although it would still be possible for the hypostases to have all the same token
energeiai, it would then be logically contingent (in the “narrowly” logical sense)
and thus would have to be postulated as a substantive theological assumption.
For example, suppose there are three divine energeia types: 1*, 2* and
3*. If energeia tokens can have multiple energeiai types, there could be divine
energeiai tokens 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 that have these types in the following way:
P(1,1*)
P(2,2*)
P(3,3*)
P(4,2*)
P(4,3*)
P(5,1*)
P(5,3*)
P(6,1*)
and
P(6,2*)
And then the three hypostases could each have some token of each of the the
divine energeia types without any of them having any common divine energeia
tokens as follows:
P(f,1)
P(f,4)
P(s,2)
P(s,5)
P(h,3)
and
P(h,6)
174. See 4.4.3, esp. p. 183.
175. This feature of Gregory’s view allows him to fully generalize his solution to the LPT. That
is, since, for Gregory, all of the things we want to call God – Lord, Creator, Savior, Provider,
All-Knower, All-Ruler, and so on – all ultimately derive from some power or activity, and
since he holds that the hypostases share all of their powers and activities, his Unity of Action
Argument generalizes to any of the titles we want to apply to God. There will be, on Gregory’s
view, only one Lord, only one Creator, only one Savior, and so on.
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The Father’s having token 1 means He has a token of type 1*, while His
having token 4 means he has a token of type 2* and a token of type 3*. The
Son’s having token 2 means He has a token of type 2*, while His having token 5
means He has a token of type 1* and a token of type 3*. And the Holy Spirit’s
having token 3 means He has a token of type 3*, while His having token 6 means
He has a token of type 1* and a token of type 2*.
Thus, each hypostasis has some token of type 1*, some token of type 2* and
some token of type 3*. Yet there is no token x such that each hypostasis has x.
Thus, there is no synergy among the hypostases.
Gregory would not be very happy with such a possibility.
Suppose the energeia types in the example above were “god-ding,” “creating,”
and “lording,” respectively. As we will see, given Gregory’s semantics below, the
above scenario would entail that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are each “God,”
“Creator,” and “Lord,” but that there are exactly three gods, three creators, and
three Lords. For 1, 5 and 6 are all god-dings; 2, 4 and 6 are all creatings, and
3, 4 and 5 are all lordings.
Again, on EE*+, it would still be logically possible for the hypostases to
synergize as well. But it would also be logically possible for some such scenario
as the case of three god-dings, creatings and lordings above to be the case.
Thus, it would turn out to be a substantive theological assumption to say that
the hypostases share all of their energeiai and dynameis.
But Gregory does not write as though he considers this sort of thing to
be even theoretically possible. He does not seem to think that the matter is
contingent and that he is simply making an assumption. (He does not, for
example, give any kind of scriptural or other theological argument for his view
that the hypostases synergize on all of their actions.) He seems rather to think
that it would not be possible, even in theory, for the three hypostases not to
share their energeiai in common in the way he believes they do.
So, it seems more likely to me that Gregory would want to say that the
hypostases’ sharing energeia tokens is just a necessary consequence of the rest
of his metaphysics and theology. In other words, I believe he would want to say
that it is simply a truth of metaphysics that a given energeia token must bear
a metaphysical predication relation to at most one energeia type. Thus:
+ EE*≤1: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Ex & E*y & Pxy & E*z & Pxz) → y = z]
And together with:
+ IDE: (∀x)(∀y){[Ex & Ey] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)([Iz v E*z] → [Pxz ↔ Pyz])]}
+ ¬EI: ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)
and
0176 E*Lemma: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃y)(Ey & Pyx)]
176. See footnote 77. From NE*E, O(i), H(i) and RH(i). Proof in Appendix A.3, p. 317.
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it follows that:
0177 EUnique: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyx)]
i.e., for any divine energeia type, there is exactly one token energeia of that
type.
Of course, it follows from EUnique (along with NDef and Σ*Def) that the
divine hypostases synergize on every divine energeia type. That is:
0178 Σ*∀: (∀x){[E*x & Nxo]→ (∀y)(∀z)[(Hy&Hz&y 6=z&Pyo&Pzo)→ Σ*yzx]}
i.e., for any divine energeia type x, all divine hypostases synergize on x. In other
words, what we called in the previous chapter the “Universal Synergy Claim.”
Now, let us turn specifically to the case of “g*.” Σ*∀ entails that the divine
hypostases will synergize on g*. What’s more, making the substitution g*/x in
EUnique, yields:
0179 (E*g* & Ng*o) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyg*)
and from that and:
0180 E*g* & Ng*o
above, it follows that:
0181 P7Lemma: (∃!y)(Ey & Pyg*)
and since:
0182 Eg & Pgg*
0183 g′Lemma: Eg′ & Pg′g*
0184 g′′Lemma: Eg′′ & Pg′′g*
and
177. From IDE, ¬EI, E*Lemma and EE*≤1. Proof in Appendix A.4, p. 318.
178. From EUnique, NDef and Σ*Def. Proof in Appendix A.5, p. 320.
179. From EUnique, by ∀ Elimination, g*/x.
180. See footnote 69. From (∃y)(E*y & Nyo), by ∃ Elimination g*/y.
NOTE: This may seem suspect, as ∃ Elimination must always use a new term in place of
a variable, whereas just above we instantiated a universally quantified sentence with g*. But
in fact, this step – E*g* & Ng*o – was derived already, in footnote 69. Thus, the order was
actually that we first used ∃ Elimination to get g*, back at foot note 69, when as yet g* had
not been used. We later use ∀ Elimination to derive (E*g* & Ng*o) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyg*).
And ∀ Elimination does not require the use of a previously unused term.
181. From (E*g* & Ng*o) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyg*) and E*g* & Ng*o above, MP.
182. See footnote 81. From (∃y)(Ey & Pyg*), by ∃ Elimination (g/y).
183. See footnote 122. From Eg′ & Pg′g* & Pfg′, above, by & Elimination.
184. See footnote 123. From Eg′′ & Pg′′g* & Psg′′, above, by & Elimination.
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0185 g′′′Lemma: Eg′′′ & Pg′′′g*
it follows that:
0186 Σ*g* g = g′ = g′′ = g′′′
And since:
0187 RH(xviii): Pfg′
0188 RH(xix): Psg′′
and
0189 RH(xx): Phg′′′
it follows that
0190 RH(xxi): Pfg
0191 RH(xxii): Psg
and
0192 RH(xxiii): Phg
which we had promised to show at the end of the section on relations had by
the hypostases (5.2.2, p. 228).
And for our last trick, we note that from any one of
0193 RH(xxi): Pfg
0194 RH(xxii): Psg
or
0195 RH(xxiii): Phg
185. See footnote 124. From Eg′′′ & Pg′′′g* & Phg′′′, above, by & Elimination.
186. From P7Lemma, Eg & Pgg*, g′Lemma, g′′Lemma, and g′′′Lemma. Proof is left as an
exercise for the reader.
187. See footnote 125. From Eg′ & Pg′g* & Pfg′, above, by & Elimination.
188. See footnote 126. From Eg′′ & Pg′′g* & Psg′′, above, by & Elimination.
189. See footnote 127. From Eg′′′ & Pg′′′g* & Phg′′′, above, by & Elimination.
190. See footnote 129. From RH(xviii) (Pfg′) and Σg*, by = g/g′.
191. See footnote 130. From RH(xix) (Psg′′) and Σg*, by = g/g′′.
192. See footnote 131. From RH(xx) (Phg′′′) and Σg*, by = g/g′′′.
193. See footnote 129. From RH(xviii) (Pfg′) and Σg*, by = g/g′.
194. See footnote 130. From RH(xix) (Psg′′) and Σg*, by = g/g′′.
195. See footnote 131. From RH(xx) (Phg′′′) and Σg*, by = g/g′′′.
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plus
0196 P7Lemma: (∃!y)(Ey & Pyg*)
and
0197 E(i) & RE(i): Eg & Pgg*
we can derive:
0198
P7GNT-EQ. (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy])→y=x]}
which, naturally, we will discuss more in the next section (5.3.3, pp. 246 ff.).
Finally, before we leave this section, recall that in the section on the identity
conditions for energeia tokens, we simply assumed that energeia tokens can be
individuated by energeia types in addition to their own idiomata (which turn
out to be irrelevant in the case of the Trinity’s natural energeiai).
We have also seen there are reasons to suppose Gregory would want to add
that every energeia token must have exactly one energeia type (EE*≤1).
Suppose, for example, an event of lighting and heating occur at the same
time and place. Say they both emanate from the sun at exactly the same time.
On the assumptions we have been working with, these would be two distinct,
but co-located, token energeiai, each participating in its own unique energeia
type.
Now let us consider the possibility that it is only idiomata that individuate
energeia tokens, and that energeia types don’t individuate energeia tokens.
(Thus, for example, “co-located” lightings and heatings would in fact count
as a single token energeia).
Since there are no idiomata to individuate divine energeia tokens, it would
follow that, prior to creation, there would be only one, single token energeia.
In that case, suppose we still assumed that there is at most one energeia
type per energeia token (EE*≤1). Then, prior to creation, there could be only
one, single divine energeia type.
On the other hand, suppose we allowed that one energeia token could have
more than one energeia type EE*+. Since we are now assuming that tokens
are not individuated by types, we would not have the problem discussed above
in which there could be three god-dings, three creatings and three lordings.
Instead, it would follow that there could be as many energeia types as we like,
but they would all have to be realized in a single energeia token, which would
be had by all three hypostases.
196. See footnote 181. From (E*g* & Ng*o) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyg*) and E*g* & Ng*o above,
MP.
197. From E(i) and RE(i) above (see footnotes 82 and 83), by & Int.
198. From RH(xxi) or RH(xxii) or RH(xxiii) plus P7Lemma and E(i) & RE(i). Proof in
Appendix A.6, p. 322.
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I doubt Gregory would be happy with either of those results, though it
wouldn’t ultimately affect Gregory’s response to the LPT.
Gregory indicates that there are multiple distinct energeiai. (4.2.3, p. 137.
“We have . . . been taught differences of energeiai . . . .” Similar claims are made
elsewhere.) Of course, if one takes him to mean that there are multiple divine
energeia tokens, it follows immediately that he wouldn’t be happy with either
of the views we are now considering.
On the other hand, if we take him to mean only that there are multiple
divine energeia types, he could accept the second of the views we are considering
(multiples divine energeia types, all realized by a single divine energeia token),
but not the first (a single divine energeia type with a single divine energeia
token).
Such a view might appeal to one who wants to claim that God’s foreknowing
is in fact the same as His creating, and so forth. And this might also seem more
congenial to a certain kind of theory of divine simplicity. I don’t think Gregory
or the other Cappadocians held such a strong view of divine simplicity, and I
doubt very much that he would have been happy with this either, but I won’t
argue for that point here as, fortunately, deciding this issue will not be necessary
for our purposes, since, in any case EUnique will be true, as will Σ*∀. Either
because:
(1) there is only a single divine energeia type with a single token (had by all
the hypostases), or because
(2) there are n > 1 types with exactly one token instantiating all n types (that
one token being had by all the hypostases), or because
(3) there are n > 1 types and exactly n tokens with a one-to-one correspon-
dence between types and tokens, and each hypostasis has every token (as
I think Gregory would actually want to say).
But in all of these scenarios, EUnique would be true, as would Σ*∀. And so,
I will proceed on the assumption that Gregory would prefer the formulation we
have been assuming (that (3) there are n > 1 types and exactly n tokens, with a
one-to-one correspondence between types and tokens), only noting that taking
one of the other routes just discussed, though I suspect it would probably be
less true to Gregory’s actual thought, would make no difference with respect to
Gregory’s solution to the LPT.
EUnique and Σ*∀ are the keys to Gregory’s solution to the LPT (and the
keys to the generality of his position with respect to all of our predicates and
descriptions of God – not merely the predicate “God,” but “Creator,” “Savior,”
“Lord,” etc.), since Gregory holds that counting by agent nouns hinges not on
(or at least not only on) distinctions between hypostases engaged in energeiai,
but between token energeiai being engaged in by hypostases. Because of EUnique
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and Σ*∀, prior to creation, the hypostases will count as one E*-er for any en-
ergeia type E* (and similarly for any dynamis, which we are “rolling into” our
discussion of energeiai – see footnote 11, p. 201 above). They would thus not
only count as one God, but as one Lord, one Creator, one Provider, one Sav-
ior, one Pantokrator (All-Ruler), one All-Knower, etc. And it is to Gregory’s
semantics that we turn now.
5.3 Gregory’s Semantics
Now that we have stated all of the relevant aspects both of Gregory’s meta-
physics and of his substantive theology, we will explain the principles by which
he believes this content maps onto the linguistic expressions we are concerned
with. Again, we have done this implicitly all along the way for our formal lan-
guage (PLI), since it has been a useful way to make the content of Gregory’s
view more precise. Now we will make his N-semantics explicit. Then we will
be in a position to give a model for the (relevant)199 content of Gregory’s view
(via the F-semantics for P1 through P7),200 and to see how that content is sup-
posed to be expressed by the natural language sentences S1 through S7, used
to express P1 through P7 (via the N-semantics for the various expressions that
make up those sentences).
5.3.1 Gregory’s Semantics for S4 through S6
First, as it seems to me, Gregory quite clearly sees a very strong distinction
between the three hypostases.201 And as we have said before, 6= is the weakest
real distinction there is. So Gregory is committed to analyzing P4 through P6
as having the logical forms of:
0202 P4GNT-F. f 6=s
0203 P5GNT-F. f 6=h
0204 P6GNT-F. s 6=h
(or in any case, he affirms some propositions χ1–χ3 with logical forms:205
P4. χ1 such that χ1 |= f 6=s
P5. χ2 such that χ2 |= f 6=h
199. In fact, the model we will construct below, MP-GNT-F, will be a model of all of Gregory’s
metaphysics and theology that we’ve discussed in this chapter. But we will only show that it
is a model for his interpretations of P1–P7. The rest is left as an exercise for the reader.
200. In the actual, model-theoretic sense of “model,” as opposed to the looser sense of the
term “model” typically employed in defenses of the doctrine of the Trinity.
201. At least, interpreting him in what I see as the most straight-forward way. See p. 200 for
my response to the concern that Gregory may have had no concept of strict identity.
202. See footnote 150.
203. See footnote 154.
204. See footnote 159.
205. See 5.2.3, pp. 231 – 233.
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P6. χ3 such that χ3 |= s 6=h
but for simplicity’s sake, we will suppose he would simply analyze P4 through
P6 as simple non-identity claims).
As a result, Gregory’s view will not fall into the Naïve Modalism Family,
since these truth conditions are not compatible with the essential feature of
Naïve Modalism.
So, it would seem that Gregory would accept the following N-semantics for
S4–S6:
S4: “The Father is not the Son” is true, if and only if “f 6=s” is true, if and only
if the hypostasis we have named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in English (“ὁ
piατήρ” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “s” in PLI or
“the Son” in English (“ὁ ὑιός” in Greek).
S5: “The Father is not the Holy Spirit” is true, if and only if “f 6=h” is true, if
and only if the hypostasis we have named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in
English (“ὁ piατήρ” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “h”
in PLI or “the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἄγιον piνεῦμα” in Greek).
S6: “The Son is not the Holy Spirit” is true, if and only if “s6=h” is true, if and
only if the hypostasis we have named “s” in PLI or “the Son” in English
(“ὁ ὑιός” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or
“the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἄγιον piνεῦμα” in Greek).
Given Gregory’s metaphysics and theology, these truth conditions all hold
(see 5.2.3, p. 231 ff.), so S4 through S6 will express true propositions, if Gregory’s
metaphysics, theology, and semantics are true.
5.3.2 Gregory’s Semantics for S1 through S3
Next, as we’ve seen, Gregory takes statements of the form, x is God, to be
predications, not of an identity relation to some individual named “God,”206
but predication of engagement in some token action (energeia) of a certain type
we have named “g*” (“beholding” or, as we are calling it, “god-ding”). So it would
seem that Gregory is committed to analyzing P1 through P3, not as having the
logical forms of:
P1LPT-1. f=g
P2LPT-1. s=g
P3LPT-1. h=g
but as having the logical forms of:
0207 P1GNT-F. (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)
206. Nor predications of a certain natural kind, though that is not to the point just now.
207. See footnote 116.
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0208 P2GNT-F. (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Psx)
0209 P3GNT-F. (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Phx)
As a result, Gregory’s view will not fall into the LPT1 Family, since these
truth conditions are not compatible with the essential feature of all LPT1 Family
accounts. That is, the logical forms of P1GNT-F through P3GNT-F do not fit the
more general descriptions of:
P1. φf such that φα |= α = t i for any term t i such that t i 6= α
P2. φs such that φα |= α = t i for any term t i such that t i 6= α
P3. φh such that φα |= α = t i for any term t i such that t i 6= α
So, it would seem that Gregory would accept the following N-semantics for
S1–S3:
S1: “The Father is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)”
is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in
English (“ὁ piατήρ” in Greek) has some token of the divine energeia type
we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).
S2: “The Son is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Psx)” is
true, if and only if the hypostasis named “s” in PLI or “the Son” in English
(“ὁ ὑιός” in Greek) has some token of the divine energeia type we have
named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).
S3: “The Holy Spirit is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Phx)”
is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or “the Holy Spirit”
in English (“τὸ ἄγιον piνεῦμα” in Greek) has some token of the divine en-
ergeia type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or
whatever it is).
Given Gregory’s metaphysics and theology, these truth conditions all hold
(see 5.2.2, p. 227), so S1 through S3 will express true propositions, if Gregory’s
metaphysics, theology, and semantics are true.
Since we saw above that Gregory’s view does not fall into the Naïve Modalist
Family, and see here that it does not fall into the Arian Family or the LPT1
Family, it must fall into either the Equivocation Family or the NCIC Family, if
it is to avoid falling into the LPT2 Family. Both of these hinge on one’s analysis
of S7. And so let us examine the final aspect of Gregory’s view, his semantics
for S7.
208. See footnote 117.
209. See footnote 118.
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5.3.3 Gregory’s Semantics for S7
Finally, as we’ve seen, Gregory holds that we count E*-ers, not by counting the
number of distinct hypostases engaged in some token of E*, but by counting the
number of distinct tokens of E* being engaged in by some hypostasis. That is,
he seems to take it that sentences of the form there are n E*-ers, where “E*-er”
is an agent noun, to be true when the number of token E-ings is equal to n.210
So Gregory is committed to analyzing S7 not as having the logical form of:
7LPT-2-FAMILY-SCHEMA. (∃x)(∀y)(φx & (φy → y R x))
(Such that y R x |= y = x.)
fleshed out (for φ here to be univocal with P1–P3 on Gregory’s account) as:
7LPT-2-GNT-F. (∃x)(∀y){(∃z)(Ez&Pzg*&Pxz) & [(∃z)(Ez&Pzg*&Pyz)→ yRx]}
(Such that y R x |= y = x.)
(i.e., there is exactly one thing that has a token god-ding), but, perhaps, as:
P7GNT-EQ. (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy])→ y=x]}
(i.e., there is exactly one token god-ding that is had by anything).
I say “perhaps” because, while it is not hard to say, in a concrete way, what
Gregory’s view about counting amounts to, specifying its logical form precisely
and placing it within our taxonomy does bring up an interesting dilemma. This
is because there are distinct, though logically equivalent, ways of stating Gre-
gory’s view, and which we choose will determine whether the solution falls into
the Equivocation Family or the NCIC Family. This may seem confusing or sur-
prising. I’ll try to dispel that confusion below. But first let’s look at two ways
of formalizing Gregory’s view of S7, one that fits into the Equivocation Family,
and one that fits the NCIC Family. Then we will discuss what moral we should
take away from the fact, which may at first seem puzzling, that the view can be
put into either family.
Formalizing Gregory’s View as an Equivocation Account
The simplest way to express the logical form of P7 on Gregory’s view is, as we
saw just above:
P7GNT-EQ. (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy])→ y=x]}
(i.e., there is exactly one token god-ding that is had by anything).
On this reading of Gregory, he would presumably want to give the following
N-semantics for S7:
210. Or perhaps when both the number of hypostases engaged in some token act of E-ing is
at least n, and the number of token acts of E-ing being engaged in by some hypostasis is at
least n. See p. 190.
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S7: “There is exactly one God” is true, if and only if
“(∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy]) → y=x]}” is
true, if and only if there is some token energeia x of the energeia type we
have named “g*” in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we call it in
English – “θεωρεῖν,” or “θέειν,” or whatever we call it in Greek) such that
x is had by some z, and if there is any token energeia y of the energeia
type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we
call it in English – “θεωρεῖν,” or “θέειν,” or whatever we call it in Greek)
such that y is had by some w, then x and y are identical.
Given Gregory’s metaphysics and theology, these truth conditions hold (see
198, p. 241 ff.), so S7 will express a true proposition, if Gregory’s metaphysics
and theology and this N-semantics are true.
Putting this together with the logical forms that Gregory’s view implicitly
attributes to P1 through P6, gives us:
P1GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)
P2GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Psx)
P3GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Phx)
P4GNT-F. f 6= s
P5GNT-F. f 6= h
P6GNT-F. s 6= h
P7GNT-EQ. (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy])→ y=x]}
This would have the result that:
1. we count gods by the classical identity relation, but
2. in P1–P3 “x is (a) God” means “x has a token god-ding,” whereas
3. in P7 “x is (a) God” means “x is a token god-ding that is had.”
Thus, this would fall into the Equivocation Family as we’ve defined it, and
not the NCIC Family.
Formalizing Gregory’s View as an NCIC Account
On the other hand, with much more complexity, we could represent the logical
form of P7 on Gregory’s view within the NCIC Family as follows. Recall that
in this family, we count by the schema:
(7SCHEMA) (∃x)(∀y)(φx & (φy → y R x) )
(where x R y 6|= x=y.)
and that φα is supposed to be univocal not only among P1–P3, but between
P1–P3 on the one hand and P7 on the other. Thus, since in P1–P3 φα is fleshed
out with formulae of the form:
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(∃z) (Ez & Pzg* & Pαz)
yielding:
P1GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)
P2GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Psx)
P3GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Phx)
in P7 this would yield:
P7GNTSCHEMA . (∃u)(∀v) { (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Puw) &
[ (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Pvx) → u R v] }
i.e., there is a u that has some token act of god-ding, and any v that has a token
act of god-ding is such that u bears R to v. In the case of Gregory’s view, we
could then flesh out u R v as:
0211 RDef: (∀u)(∀v){ u R v ↔ (∃!y) [ Ey & Pyg* & (Puy v Pvy) ] }
or more fully:
0212 RDef: (∀u)(∀v){ u R v ↔ (∃y)(∀z)[(Ey & Pyg* & [Puy v Pvy] ) &
([Ez & Pzg* & (Puz v Pvz)]→ y = z)]}
i.e., u and v bear the relation to one another that there is exactly one token act
of godding that either one has. They are, as we might put it, “single-tokened
with respect to god-ding.”213
Thus, to put it all together:
P7GNT-NCIC. (∃u)(∀v){(∃w)[Ew & Pwg* & Puw] &
( (∃x)[Ex & Pxg* & Pvx] →
(∃!y)[Ey & Pyg* & (Puy v Pvy)] ) }
or more fully:
P7GNT-NCIC. (∃u)(∀v){(∃w)[ Ew & Pwg* & Puw ] &
( (∃x)[ Ex & Pxg* & Pvx ] →
211. Stipulative Definition.
212. Stipulative Definition.
213. Note that, by itself, u R v just says that u and v have exactly one god-ding between
them – thus, not that there is only one god-ding, but that u and v in particular have only
one god-ding between them. But of course, I think that is as Gregory would want it. See the
discussion at p. 134 ff. What will get the result that there is only one God below is assuming
that anything that gods is single-tokened with respect to god-ding with anything else that
gods. In fact, as we’ve seen, Gregory would not take this to be strictly speaking true. But he
would affirm it if we restrict our domain of quantification to those things that exist “prior to
creation,” or probably even just to those things that have “god-ding” by nature, rather than
accidentally.
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(∃y)(∀z)[(Ey & Pyg* & [Puy v Pvy] ) &
([Ez & Pzg* & (Puz v Pvz) ] → y = z)]}
i.e., there is a u that has some token act of god-ding, and, if any v has any token
act of god-ding, then there is exactly one token act of god-ding that either u
or v has. To put it another way, there is a u that gods, and any v that gods is
such that u and v are “single-tokened” with respect to “god-ding.”
So, on this reading of Gregory, he would want to give the following N-
semantics for S7:
S7: “There is exactly one God” is true, if and only if P7GNT-NCIC is true, if
and only if there is a u that has some token energeia of the energeia type
we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we call
it in English – “θεωρεῖν,” or “θέειν,” or whatever we call it in Greek) and
if any v has any token energeia of the energeia type g*, then u and v are
single-tokened with respect to g*.
Given Gregory’s metaphysics and theology, these truth conditions hold (see
198, p. 241 ff. along with refTwoFormulations, p. 250 ff. for an explanation), so
S7 will express a true proposition, if Gregory’s metaphysics and theology and
this N-semantics are true.
Putting this together with the logical forms that Gregory’s view implicitly
attributes to P1 through P6, gives us:
P1GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)
P2GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Psx)
P3GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Phx)
P4GNT-F. f 6= s
P5GNT-F. f 6= h
P6GNT-F. s 6= h
P7GNT-NCIC. (∃u)(∀v){(∃w)[ Ew & Pwg* & Puw ] &
( (∃x)[ Ex & Pxg* & Pvx ] →
(∃y)(∀z)[(Ey & Pyg* & [Puy v Pvy] ) &
([Ez & Pzg* & (Puz v Pvz) ] → y = z)]}
This would have the result that:
1. we count gods by the relation of “being singled-tokened with respect to
‘god-ding’,” not classical identity,214 but
2. in P1–P3 “x is (a) God” means “x has a god-ding,” and
3. in P7 “x is (a) God” means “x has a god-ding” as well.
Thus, this would fall into the NCIC Family as we’ve defined it, and not the
Equivocation Family.
214. Of course, this is just because, in general, when counting by agent nouns, we count X-ers
by the relation of “being single-tokened with respect to ‘X-ing’.”
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A Note on the Two Formulations
As I said, one might find it puzzling that we could formalize Gregory’s view in
two very different ways, with the result that his view could be put into either one
of two different Families that attribute two very different logical forms to P7.
First, one might think that it shouldn’t be possible, since a single proposition
can’t have more than one logical form. Or again, one might think it just means
that the difference between the two formulations is nil, so that we should be
indifferent between them. I don’t think either of these reactions is right.
First, recall that our taxonomy is exhaustive, but not exclusive, so it is
possible for certain solutions to the LPT to fall into both the Equivocation
Family and the NCIC Family.
Next, note that the two formulations are logically equivalent.
Suppose it is the case that something bears some relation R (like “having”)
to some object of type A (like token acts of “god-ding”).
Now suppose that any things that bear R to any A, bear R to at most a
single A between them all. (This is essentially what P7GNT-NCIC says.) Clearly
it will also be the case that there is only one A to which anything bears R. (This
is essentially what PGNT-EQ says.)
And likewise, suppose it is the case that there is only one A to which anything
bears R. Clearly it will also be the case that any things that bear R to any A,
bear R to at most a single A between them all.
So, the worry that this should not have been possible is misguided, because,
for any given account A, there can easily be distinct, but logically equivalent ways
of putting all of the relevant content of A. And our taxonomy was not created
for the purpose of grouping all logically equivalent accounts together, with no
overlap between Families, but for the purpose of showing that all answers to the
LPT will have to have one (or more!) of a certain set of logical properties, all of
which have seemed objectionable to some philosophers. (Thus, that there can be
no new answers to the LPT that have a novel logical form that would escape all
of those criticisms.) Of course, that’s not to say one couldn’t create a taxonomy
of answers to the LPT that would group logically equivalent accounts together
into Families that were mutually exclusive. That simply wasn’t the purpose of
the taxonomy provided. So it shouldn’t come as a surprise that some accounts
could be members of two different Families.
On the other hand, one might think this means that there is thus no impor-
tant difference between the two ways of formulating P7, so that we should be
indifferent between them. Either one essentially says the same thing.
I think this is also mistaken. All it means for these formulations to be log-
ically equivalent is merely that any time the one is true the other will be and
vice-versa (any model for one is a model for the other). But the semantic prin-
ciples (F-semantics) that we use to map Gregory’s metaphysics and substantive
theology onto these two different formal representations are quite different. As
are the parallel semantics principles (N-semantics) by which we would map his
view onto S7.
Now there is a certain sense in which I will say that semantics doesn’t matter
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much (see Chapter 6.2, p. 273 ff. below). Namely, when all that one is concerned
about is (the truth of, or consistency of) one’s substantive theory. However,
given that the substantive theory one is trying to defend is consistent, there are
certainly cases in which one semantics is preferable to another.
Putting aside any purely philosophical concerns, we have in this case an issue
that concerns the very title of the work we focused on in the previous chapter
– “On Not Thinking to Say ‘Three Gods’.” A problem with any solution to the
LPT within the Equivocation Family is that, whether or not it has the resources
to allow Trinitarians to straight-facedly claim that “there is exactly one God,”
it will always face a difficulty when it comes to finding the resources to forbid
Trinitarians to say that “there are exactly three gods.” For if the two senses
in which something can be said to be a god, or divine, are equally good, then,
even if there is some perfectly good sense in which there is one God, there is an
equally good sense in which there are three gods. And however one tries to sort
out that issue on any other Equivocation Family account, it’s difficult to see, if
we formulate GNT as an Equivocation account, how Gregory would argue that
a token action is somehow primarily what we mean by “God.”
On the other hand, on the NCIC formulation, there is no sense in which
there are three gods, because there is only one sense of “is God” and only one
way to count gods.
There are some textual reasons to prefer the NCIC formulation as well.
For example, in Contra Eunomium, after discussing various biblical passages
in which the same energeiai are attributed to all three hypostases in differ-
ent passages, Gregory says, “Those who keep repeating against us the phrase
‘three Gods,’ because we hold these views, have perhaps not yet learnt how to
count.”215 Some similar statements can be found elsewhere in Gregory, as well
as in Gregory Nazianzen.
But, although I would be prepared to argue that the NCIC formulation is
preferable, since the two are logically equivalent, the model we will construct in
the next section will be a model for either of these formulations. Therefore, both
formulations count as solutions to the LPT. Therefore, so long as at least one
of them is formally adequate, the LPT will have a formally adequate solution.
So, although I do think P7GNT-NCIC is the philosophically preferable way to
understand Gregory, for purposes of constructing a model, I will use “PGNT-F”
to denote the set {P1GNT-F–P6GNT-F, P7GNT-EQ, P7GNT-NCIC}. And I will refer
to this model as “MP-GNT-F.” We turn to the model next.
215. Contra Eunomium II,14. ((St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), pp. 129-130.)
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5.4 A Model for PGNT-F
. . . ῎Οpiερ ῎Εδει Δεῖξα
Here, then, is a model for PGNT-F (which, again, models either of the two
formulations of P7 we discussed in the previous section). We will call the model,
“MP-GNT-F.” We will name the proof I give that MP-GNT-F is a model for PGNT-F,
“Ο.Ε.Δ.”
MP-GNT-F
Domain: {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
o = 0
f = 1
s = 2
h = 3
g = 4
g* = 5
b = 6
b* = 7
p = 8
p* = 9
H: {1, 2, 3}
I: {6, 7, 8, 9}
O: {0}
E: {4}
E*:{5}
P: {<1,0>,
<2,0>,
<3,0>,
<1,6>,
<1,8>,
<2,7>,
<3,9>,
<1,4>,
<2,4>,
<3,4>,
<4,5>}
N: {<5,0>}
MP-GNT-F is a model for PGNT-F:216
216. MP-GNT-F is also a model for the entirety of GNTF. Showing that this is so is left as an
252
P1GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)
P2GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Psx)
P3GNT-F. (∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Phx)
P4GNT-F. f 6= s
P5GNT-F. f 6= h
P6GNT-F. s 6= h
P7GNT-EQ. (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy])→ y=x]}
P7GNT-NCIC. (∃u)(∀v){(∃w)[ Ew & Pwg* & Puw ] &
( (∃x)[ Ex & Pxg* & Pvx ] →
(∃y)(∀z)[(Ey & Pyg* & [Puy v Pvy] ) &
([Ez & Pzg* & (Puz v Pvz) ] → y = z)]}
To make this easier to see, replace the names “o, f, s, h, g, g*, b, b*, p, and
p*” with “0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,” respectively. Thus:
P1NUM. (∃x) (Ex & Px5 & P1x)
P2NUM. (∃x) (Ex & Px5 & P2x)
P3NUM. (∃x) (Ex & Px5 & P3x)
P4NUM. 1 6= 2
P5NUM. 1 6= 3
P6NUM. 2 6= 3
P7NUM-EQ. (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Px5&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Py5&(∃w)[Pwy])→ y=x]}
P7NUM-NCIC. (∃u)(∀v){(∃w)[ Ew & Pw5 & Puw ] &
( (∃x)[ Ex & Px5 & Pvx ] →
(∃y)(∀z)[(Ey & Py5 & [Puy v Pvy] ) &
([Ez & Pz5 & (Puz v Pvz) ] → y = z)]}
Proof:217
P1 (∃x) (Ex & Px5 & P1x)
is true on MP-GNT-F if and only if there is some number x such that:
x ∈ E, and <x,5> ∈ P and <1,x> ∈ P.
And in fact there is, since:
4 ∈ E, and <4,5> ∈ P and <1,4> ∈ P.
Thus, P1 is true on MP-GNT-F.
P2 (∃x) (Ex & Px5 & P2x)
is true on MP-GNT-F if and only if there is some number x such that:
x ∈ E, and <x,5> ∈ P and <2,x> ∈ P.
And in fact there is, since:
4 ∈ E, and <4,5> ∈ P and <2,4> ∈ P.
Thus, P2 is true on MP-GNT-F.
exercise for the reader.
217. Below I use the sentences with logical names replaced by numerals for the numbers the
logical names denote in the model. But note that the proofs given actually count as proofs
for the elements of PGNT-F themselves.
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P3 (∃x) (Ex & Px5 & P3x)
is true on MP-GNT-F if and only if there is some number x such that:
x ∈ E, and <x,5> ∈ P and <3,x> ∈ P.
And in fact there is, since:
4 ∈ E, and <4,5> ∈ P and <3,4> ∈ P.
Thus, P3 is true on MP-GNT-F.
P4 1 6= 2
is true on MP-GNT-F if and only if 1 is not identical to 2.
And in fact 1 is not identical to 2.
Thus, P4 is true on MP-GNT-F.
P5 1 6= 3
is true on MP-GNT-F if and only if 1 is not identical to 3.
And in fact 1 is not identical to 3.
Thus, P5 is true on MP-GNT-F.
P6 2 6= 3
is true on MP-GNT-F if and only if 2 is not identical to 3.
And in fact 2 is not identical to 3.
Thus, P6 is true on MP-GNT-F.
P7 (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Px5&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Py5&(∃w)[Pwy]) → y=x]}
is true on MP-GNT-F if and only if there is a number x such that for every
number y, x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and there is some number z such that <z,x>
∈ P, and if y ∈ E and <y,5> ∈ P and there is a number w such that <w,y> ∈
P, then y is identical to x.
And in fact, there is a number x such that for every number y, x ∈ E and
<x,5> ∈ P and there is some number z such that <z,x> ∈ P, and if y ∈ E and
<y,5> ∈ P and there is a number w such that <w,y> ∈ P, then y is identical
to x.
This is because 4 is such that for every number y, 4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈ P and
there is some number z such that <z,4> ∈ P, and if y ∈ E and <y,5> ∈ P and
there is a number w such that <w,y> ∈ P, then y is identical to 4.
Proof: arbitrarily select a number y.
4 ∈ E, and <4,5> ∈ P, and <1,4> ∈ P.
So 4 ∈ E, and <4,5> ∈ P, and there is some number z such that <z,4> ∈ P.
Now suppose: y ∈ E, and <y,5> ∈ P and there is some number z such that
<z,y> ∈ P.
So, <y,5> ∈ P.
But the only number y such that <y,5> ∈ P is 4.
So y is identical to 4.
So, if y ∈ E, and <y,5> ∈ P and there is some number z such that <z,y> ∈
P, then y is identical to 4.
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So, 4 ∈ E, and <4,5> ∈ P, and there is some number z such that <z,4> ∈
P and if y ∈ E, and <y,5> ∈ P and there is some number z such that <z,y> ∈
P, then y is identical to 4.
So, since y was arbitrarily selected, for any y, 4 ∈ E, and <4,5> ∈ P, and
there is some number z such that <z,4> ∈ P and if y ∈ E, and <y,5> ∈ P and
there is some number z such that <z,y> ∈ P, then y is identical to 4.
So there is a number x (namely, 4) such that for any y, x ∈ E, and <x,5> ∈
P, and there is some number z such that <z,x> ∈ P and if y ∈ E, and <y,5> ∈
P and there is some number z such that <z,y> ∈ P, then y is identical to x.
Thus, P7GNT-EQ is true on MP-GNT-F.
P7 (∃u)(∀v){(∃w)[ Ew & Pw5 & Puw ] &
( (∃x)[ Ex & Px5 & Pvx ] →
(∃y)(∀z)[(Ey & Py5 & [Puy v Pvy] ) &
([Ez & Pz5 & (Puz v Pvz) ] → y = z)]}
is true on MP-GNT-F if and only if there is a number u such that for any
number v, there is a number w such that w ∈ E and <w,5> ∈ P and <u,w>
∈ P and if there is a number x such that x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and <v,x> ∈
P, then there is a number y such that for any number z, y ∈ E and <y,5> ∈ P
and either <u,y> ∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P, and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either
<u,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then y is identical to z.
And in fact there is a number u such that for any number v, there is a
number w such that w ∈ E and <w,5> ∈ P and <u,w> ∈ P and if there is
a number x such that x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and <v,x> ∈ P, then there is a
number y such that for any number z, y ∈ E and <y,5> ∈ P and either <u,y>
∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P, and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either <u,z> ∈ P or <v,z>
∈ P, then y is identical to z.
This is because 1 is such that for any number v, there is a number w such
that w ∈ E and <w,5> ∈ P and <1,w> ∈ P and if there is a number x such
that x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and <v,x> ∈ P, then there is a number y such that
for any number z, y ∈ E and <y,5> ∈ P and either <1,y> ∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P,
and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then y is
identical to z.
Proof: Arbitrarily select a number v.
4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈ P, and <1,4> ∈ P.
So there is a number w (namely 4), such that w ∈ E and <w,5> ∈ P, and
<1,w> ∈ P.
Now suppose there is a number x such that x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and <v,x>
∈ P.
In this case, there is a number y such that for any number z, y ∈ E and
<y,5> ∈ P and either <1,y> ∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P, and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P
and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then y is identical to z.
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This is because 4 is such that for any number z, 4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈ P and
either <1,4> ∈ P or <v,4> ∈ P, and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either <1,z>
∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then 4 is identical to z.
Proof: Arbitrarily select a number z.
4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈ P and <1,4> ∈ P.
So, 4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈ P and either <1,4> ∈ P or <v,4> ∈ P.
Now suppose z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P.
So <z,5> ∈ P.
But the only z such that <z,5> ∈ P is 4.
So z is identical to 4. So 4 is identical to z.
So, if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then 4 is
identical to z.
So, 4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈ P and either <1,4> ∈ P or <v,4> ∈ P and if z ∈ E
and <z,5> ∈ P and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then 4 is identical to z.
So, since z was arbitrarily selected, for any number z, 4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈
P and either <1,4> ∈ P or <v,4> ∈ P and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either
<1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then 4 is identical to z.
So, 4 is such that for any number z, 4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈ P and either <1,4>
∈ P or <v,4> ∈ P and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z>
∈ P, then 4 is identical to z.
So, there is a number y (namely 4) such that for any number z, y ∈ E and
<y,5> ∈ P and either <1,y> ∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P
and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then y is identical to z.
So, if there is a number x such that x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and <v,x> ∈
P, then there is a number y (namely 4) such that for any number z, y ∈ E and
<y,5> ∈ P and either <1,y> ∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P
and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then y is identical to z.
And as we said above, 4 ∈ E and <4,5> ∈ P, and <1,4> ∈ P.
So there is a number w (namely 4), such that w ∈ E and <w,5> ∈ P, and
<1,w> ∈ P.
So there is a number w such that w ∈ E and <w,5> ∈ P, and <1,w> ∈ P
and if there is a number x such that x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and <v,x> ∈ P, then
there is a number y (namely 4) such that for any number z, y ∈ E and <y,5> ∈
P and either <1,y> ∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either
<1,z> ∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then y is identical to z.
So, since v was arbitrarily selected, for any number v, there is a number w
such that w ∈ E and <w,5> ∈ P, and <1,w> ∈ P and if there is a number
x such that x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and <v,x> ∈ P, then there is a number y
(namely 4) such that for any number z, y ∈ E and <y,5> ∈ P and either <1,y>
∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either <1,z> ∈ P or <v,z>
∈ P, then y is identical to z.
So, there is a number u (namely 1), such that, for any number v, there is
a number w such that w ∈ E and <w,5> ∈ P, and <u,w> ∈ P and if there is
a number x such that x ∈ E and <x,5> ∈ P and <v,x> ∈ P, then there is a
number y (namely 4) such that for any number z, y ∈ E and <y,5> ∈ P and
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either <u,y> ∈ P or <v,y> ∈ P and if z ∈ E and <z,5> ∈ P and either <u,z>
∈ P or <v,z> ∈ P, then y is identical to z.
Thus, P7GNT-NCIC is also true on MP-GNT-F.
Ο.Ε.Δ.
257
5.5 What is Essential? – GNT “Lite”
5.5.1 MP-GNT-Lite
Although in order to understand Gregory’s solution, it is useful to place it within
its broader philosophical and theological context, one might wonder how much
of Gregory’s metaphysics is truly essential to his solution to the purely logical
problem that concerns us. Note that in our proofs above, we made no reference
to 0, 6, 7, 8, or 9. Nor did we make use of the predicates “H,” “I,” “O,” or “E*,”
or the relation “N.” Thus, we could give an even smaller model for PGNT-F –
call it “MP-GNT-Lite.” And Ο.Ε.Δ. can also be used to show that MP-GNT-Lite is
a model for PGNT-F.218
MP-GNT-Lite
Domain: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
f = 1
s = 2
h = 3
g = 4
g* = 5
E: {4}
P: {<1,4>,
<2,4>,
<3,4>,
<4,5>}
If one preferred, one could even eliminate 5, eliminating all occurrences of
“g*” from PGNT-F, and simply introduce a primitive predicate (G: {4}), replacing
sentences of the form Pxg* with sentences of the form Gx, and dispensing with
sentences of the form Ex entirely.
Given only the concerns of the logician, one could construct even smaller
models of PGNT-F than MP-GNT-Lite – for example, by eliminating not only 5
but 4, and making both “g” and “g*” refer to 1 – but these would not be in the
spirit of Gregory’s overall Trinitarian theory, since he certainly would want to
affirm that f6=g and g6=g*, as well as ¬Pff, ¬Psf and ¬Phf.219
In any case, if the anti-Trinitarian wants to argue that the doctrine of the
Trinity – or the “version” of it that appears in St. Gregory’s works – is literally
a formal contradiction, he is out of luck. Our precise explication (GNTF) of
Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory (GNT) in the idiom of predicate logic
provides us with a formally adequate solution ({PLI, PGNT-F, Ο.Ε.Δ.}) to the
218. Though MP-GNT-Lite is not a model for the entirety of GNTF.
219. This isn’t to say that every other church father would want to say ¬Pff, ¬Psf or ¬Phf, or
that such views are necessarily unorthodox. Only that these aren’t views that Gregory holds.
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LPT. And since either all formally adequate answers to the LPT are solutions
(consistent) or all are non-solutions (inconsistent), it follows that all formally
adequate answers to the LPT are solutions (consistent).
Thus, we have achieved the goal we set for ourselves at the beginning of this
dissertation (Chapter 1.2, p. 18). The doctrine of the Trinity – or at least the
subset of the doctrine of the Trinity we have called P – is logically consistent.
But if the anti-Trinitarian can no longer claim that the doctrine of the Trinity,
or at least P, is inconsistent, what else, if anything, could he say against it?
Where should debate and discussion go from here?
Before answering that question, we should note that MP-GNT-Lite reveals that
we have discussed much more of Gregory’s metaphysics and theology than abso-
lutely necessary merely to provide a solution to the LPT. Whether or not these
other elements of Gregory’s metaphysics, theology and semantics are useful in
understanding his view, and whether or not they are even essential to the ortho-
dox doctrine of the Trinity or to Christian orthodoxy more generally, they are
not essential to his solution to the LPT specifically. So, if the anti-Trinitarian
wishes to continue his argument specifically that P is, for some reason, prob-
lematic (though not on the basis of an alleged logical inconsistency), it will be
instructive to ask, “What is the‘Smallest’ Gregorian Solution to LPT?” That is,
what is the simplest account of the Trinity that Gregory would need to defend
in order to defend the consistency of P along the lines we have been exploring?
Consider, then, the following “pared down” Nyssen Account of the Trinity.
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5.5.2 GNTF-Lite
“Lite” Metaphysics
Possible Object Types
1. Hypostases
(We will not need any predicate for hypostases.)
2. Energeia Types
We will represent the predicate “is an energeia type” with “E*.”
3. Energeia Tokens
We will represent the predicate “is an energeia token” with “E.”
Possible Relations
1. Performing or Being “of” a Type
We will represent the predicate “performs or is a token of type” with the
two-place predicate “P.”
The first relation (performing) can hold between hypostases and energeia
tokens. Thus, sentences of the form Pxy can be true where x is a hypostasis
and y is an energeia token.
The second relation (being of a type) can hold between energeia tokens
and energeia types. Thus, sentences of the form Pxy can be true where x
is an energeia token and y is an energeia type.
“Lite” Theology
Token Objects:
Hypostases:
The Father (f)
The Son (s)
The Holy Spirit (h)
Energeia Types:
God-ding (type) (g*)
E*(i): E*g*
Energeia Tokens:
God-ding (token) (g)
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E(i): Eg
Relations Posited Between Token Objects:
P1Lite (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)
P2Lite (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Psx)
P3Lite (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Phx)
P4Lite f 6=s
P5Lite f 6=h
P6Lite s 6=h
RE(i)Lite Pgg*
EUnique-Lite (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyx)]
“Lite” Semantics
1. S1–S3: Statements of the form x is (a) God are true if and only if x does
some token action of the God-ding type, i.e., (∃y)(Ey & Pyg* & Pxy).
2. S4–S6: Statements of the form x is not y are true if and only if x is not
identical to y (x6=y).
3. S7: Statements of the form there is exactly one x-er are true if and only
if there is exactly one token action of type x that is done
i.e., (∃!y)[Ey & Pyx & (∃z)(Pzy)].
Call this account of the Trinity GNTF-Lite and those aspects of Gregory’s
Trinitarian theory that it expresses GNTLite. It is obvious that GNTF-Lite
yields exactly the same answer to the LPT as GNTF (namely: {PLI, PGNT-F,
Ο.Ε.Δ.}). Thus, if GNTF provides a formally adequate solution to the LPT, so
does GNTF-Lite. Thus, if Gregory has a formally adequate solution to the LPT,
then whether any aspect of GNT that is not contained in GNTLite is in some
sense essential to the doctrine of the Trinity, or to orthodox Christianity, it is
not essential to Gregory’s response to the LPT. Thus, any further philosophical
criticism specifically of Gregory’s answer to the LPT should focus specifically
on GNTLite, and, assuming I have done my history correctly, on GNTF-Lite.
But if that further philosophical criticism can no longer be that P is logi-
cally inconsistent, what else, if anything, could the anti-Trinitarian say against
Gregory’s solution to the LPT? Where should debate and discussion go from
here?
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Part V
Evaluation
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Chapter 6
Defending Gregory’s Account
It looked not so much as if Christianity was bad enough to include
any vices, but rather as if any stick was good enough to beat Chris-
tianity with. – G. K. Chesterton
In the last section, we met the challenge we accepted at the beginning of this
dissertation,1 and showed that there is a formally adequate solution to the LPT.
The doctrine of the Trinity – or at least the subset of the doctrine of the Trinity
we have called P – is formally consistent. We showed this by taking an account of
the Trinity already known to be a version of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity
(namely, St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theory, or GNT), examining it to
see what logical form it implicitly attributes to P, then showing the consistency
of P on that particular attribution of logical form. We ended the last section
with the question, if the anti-Trinitarian can no longer claim that the doctrine
of the Trinity, or at least P, is inconsistent, what else, if anything, could he say
against it? Where should debate and discussion go from here?
Before giving this final evaluation and suggestions for further discussion, I
want to reiterate what the (much more narrow) scope of the dissertation is: to
show that there is a (formally adequate) solution to the LPT. And that has
been done.
What follows is thus not intended to be a complete list of every possible
further objection that could be made to Gregory’s solution or to the doctrine of
the Trinity or to Gregory’s broader theological and philosophical commitments.
It is merely what seem to me to be the most obvious ways in which one might
take the discussion from here. Nor again do I intend my responses in this
section to be taken as the final word on a particular subject. They are merely
my impressions of the prima facie value of the objections I’ll consider. But with
that said, what are the most obvious ways the anti-Trinitarian could object to
Gregory’s solution to the LPT, or to Gregory’s broader philosophical framework,
or to the doctrine of the Trinity more generally?
1. Chapter 1.2, p. 18.
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In the first section below (6.1, p. 266 ff.), I will briefly address the possibility
that GNTF-Lite (and thus GNTF) is not formally adequate for P after all.
Next, if GNTF-Lite is formally adequate for P, and if it is all that is actually
necessary to show that there is a solution to the LPT, why did we discuss other
elements of GNT that are not essential to Gregory’s solution to the LPT?
We provided these other elements of GNT to show the broader theory within
which Gregory’s solution to the LPT is situated. We did this first so that it is
easier to understand. Secondly, so it can be seen just how much of Gregory’s
theology simply follows as the logical consequences of just how few basic prin-
ciples. And finally, so that it can be made clear what precisely those premises
are, and that they may not be what one would assume.
But having explicated the broader philosophical framework within which
Gregory situates his response to the LPT, we are now in a position to discuss
how plausible this broader theory itself is, and what aspects of it may or may not
be essential to Trinitarian belief. An interesting phenomenon, though, is that
when we strip Gregory’s solution to the LPT down to its barest essentials, we can
see that there are surprisingly few basic assumptions to attack. In particular,
as far as what philosophers, as such, would be concerned with (metaphysics
and semantics), only three things jump out at me as obviously essential to his
solution to the LPT and potentially objectionable. One is his metaphysics of
synergy, discussed in the section on metaphysical objections below (6.3, p. 287
ff.). The other two are aspects of his semantics – first, treating “is God” as
predicating an energeia or act(ivity) rather than an ousia or nature; second,
counting doers by the number of token energeia done, rather than the number
of hypostases doing (both discussed in the section on semantic objections below,
6.2, p. 273 ff.).
Since there is so very little to object to here, though, the next step in the
debate must be to move away both from purely logical and even from more
generally philosophical objections to the doctrine and raise purely theological
objections to the doctrine, directly. In the section on theological objects below
(6.4, p. 291 ff.), I explain why I think that any attempt to do so would be
massively problematic.
Finally, I briefly consider the possibility of combining various concerns from
these different areas, only noting that it would be incumbent on the anti-
Trinitarian to articulate any such objections before the Trinitarian needs to
respond to them.
6.1 The Formal Adequacy of Gregory’s Account
One could attempt to argue that, of the accounts of the Trinity I discussed in
the previous chapter (GNTF and GNTF-Lite), neither yields a formally adequate
solution to the LPT.
To fail to be a “formally adequate solution to the LPT” as I’ve defined that
phrase is either:
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(a) for the regimentation of P given in the solution to fail to be formally
adequate for P, or
(b) for the regimentation of P given in the solution to fail to be logically
consistent.
But both (GNTF and GNTF-Lite) yield the same solution to the LPT, namely
{PLI, PGNT-F, Ο.Ε.Δ.}.
One cannot argue that PGNT-F is formally inconsistent, because we’ve given
a model for it.
So it would seem the only way to challenge my argument would be to say
that PGNT-F is not formally adequate for P. This could be for either of two
reasons:
First, one might claim that, although the logical form of Gregory’s over
Trinitarian theory itself (GNT) may yield a formally adequate answer to the
LPT (some subset or entailment of GNT may adequately reflect the logical
forms of the propositions in P), my formalization of Gregory’s Theory (GNTF)
is not a formally adequate representation of his actual theory (GNT). And my
regimentation (PGNT-F) of the logical form he implicitly attributes to P does
not in fact adequately represent the logical forms that he implicitly attributes
to P. That is, I have done my history wrong. Indeed, I have misunderstood the
content of Gregory’s view so much that I have attributed to his view a logical
form that is so much different from the logical form his view actually has, that
my attribution does not even “reflect the relevant aspects of the logical forms
of” his view. This would be to say that there is in fact some very serious flaw
in my historical investigation.
Second, one might claim that, although my formalization (GNTF) of Gre-
gory’s Theory may be formally adequate to his actual theory (GNT) (may ad-
equately reflect the logical forms of the propositions in GNT), Gregory’s Trini-
tarian Theory (GNT) itself yields a reading of P (PGNT, = PGNT-F) that is
not formally adequate for P. That is, although I have done my history correctly,
Gregory’s view is so unorthodox that the reading of P that it yields has a logical
form that does not even “reflect the relevant aspects of the logical form of” P.
It would be to say that, not only is Gregory’s view not partly definitive of the
orthodox doctrine of the Trinity (as I have claimed), it is not even an orthodox
form of Trinitarian doctrine at all.
(Or, of course, one might think both that Gregory’s view is not orthodox
and that my understanding of him is mistaken.)
To the first objection, I would simply respond by inviting a correction to
be given. Historical investigation, by its nature, deals in probability, and must
therefore always in principle be open to revision in light of further evidence
and argument. Although I would be surprised to find that any of the histor-
ical conclusions I’ve argued for are so wrong as to make my reconstruction of
Gregory’s view not even formally adequate, I must obviously remain open to
the possibility. However, to press this point, it would seem to be incumbent
on the anti-Trinitarian to do his own historical homework and provide reasons
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for thinking that Gregory’s view is in some relevant way different from how I
understand it.
As for the second objection, although I can comprehend the individual words
that are being said, I find this objection so far-fetched as to verge on unintelligi-
bility.2 I have already said in the section on methodology that, if Gregory’s view
does not count as a version of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, then I would
not any longer know what the doctrine of the Trinity was, or why it was impor-
tant.3 If an anti-Trinitarian seriously made this objection, at the very least we
can certainly say it would be incumbent on him to say whose views would count
as versions of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, and why Gregory’s don’t.
I do admit, though, that the thesis is (barely) intelligible. One could try to
argue for it by showing that there was some broad consensus about P among the
pro-Nicenes that Gregory’s views lie outside of. To make an understatement,
this would be a surprising result.4 Of course, in theory, one must again remain
open to the possibility. But surely it would be incumbent on anyone claiming
that Gregory’s views do not count as orthodox Trinitarianism to show that, and
not the other way around.
Furthermore, especially when we focus in on GNTLite, we can see that there
are really only three aspects of the logical form of GNT that seem directly
relevant to the LPT, and that might at all raise questions as to the orthodoxy
of Gregory’s view.
First, that he takes “is God” to express participation in a token energeia
(rather than the divine nature). We saw above (Chapter 4.2.3, p. 146 ff.) some
evidence that Gregory was by no means alone in this view, and we will not
repeat that evidence here.
Second, he holds that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit all engage, not only in
the same types of energeiai, but in the same token energeiai. Part of the reason
I chose Gregory to focus on is precisely that he is the clearest of the church
fathers that I know of on that point (even if one does have to look closely to
see the point). So, I can’t present as detailed an argument that this is precisely
the view taken by a significant group of his pro-Nicene peers. However, I do
think that, once we have grasped that distinction, and understand the role it
is playing in Gregory’s view, when we go back to other pro-Nicenes and look
at similar statements, it lends at least some credence to interpretations of their
statements on which they are making the same claim. And I think that will
come out in some of the quotes I offer below with respect to the final aspect of
the logical form of GNT the orthodoxy of which one might question.
Third, he takes it that the the logical form of the claim that there is one
God is such that the previous point (that the hypostases synergize on a single
token of god-ding) makes it true to say there is one God.
2. I am reminded of the old Miracle Ear™ hearing-aid commercials, recommended “if you
can hear people talk, but can’t understand all the words.” Sadly, there is no philosophical
version of Miracle Ear™.
3. Chapter 3.3.3, p. 109.
4. See p. 271 ff. below for just one of many reasons why such a discovery would be not only
amazing, but scarcely intelligible.
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These three features together are the reason why, although the hypostases
are numerically three,5 they count as a single God. But we’ve already seen that
Gregory is by no means alone on the first claim (4.2.3, p. 146 ff.). The following,
then, are just a few examples as evidence that he is also by no means alone in
taking it to be the case that the hypostases count as one in virtue of sharing
a single dynamis (power) or energeia (or in Latin, operatio. And I think that
a few of them lend credence to the view that these authors understand this
sharing of energeia in the way that Gregory does as well, though more could
certainly be said on the point. We can start with St. Athanasius.
Athanasius (c. 318 AD) Contra Gentes:
ἢ τίς, ὁρῶν αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν βα- Or who that sees the earth, heav-
ρυτάτην οὖσαν τῇ φύσει, ἐpiὶ τὸ iest of all things by nature, fixed
ὔδωρ ἑδρασθεῖσαν καὶ ἀκίνητον μέ- upon the waters, and remaining un-
νουσαν ἐpiὶ τὸ φύσει κινούμενον, οὐ moved upon what is by nature mo-
διανοηθήσεται εἶναί τινα τὸν ταῦτα δι- bile, will fail to understand that
αταξάμενον καὶ piοιήσαντα Θεόν· there is One that has made and or-
dered it, even God?
Τίς . . . οὐκ ἂν ἐνθυμηθείη ὄτι Who . . . can resist the inference
ἐστὶ μία δύναμις ἡ ταῦτα διακοσμη- that there is one Power which or-
σαμένη καὶ διέpiουσα, ὡς ἂν αὐτῇ ders and administers them, ordain-
δοκῇ, μένουσα καλῶς· 6 ing things well as it thinks fit?7
Too many passages from St. Ambrose could be given on these points for
me to possibly do justice to. Indeed, De Fide (Ad Gratianum) contains so
much material on the point, it would be hard to pick out a single passage and
not simply quote the work in its entirety. We have already seen some of what
Ambrose says about the semantics of “is God” and the phenomenon of synergy
above (see 4.2.3, p. 147). Here I have selected just three quotations from De
Spiritu Sancto, out of a much larger, essentially unmanageable, list of possible
passages from Ambrose to quote.
St. Ambrose (c. 381 AD), De Spiritu Sancto
Denique ne vel in tempore, vel Lastly, that one may not think
in ordine aliquam inter Patrem et that there is any difference of work
Filium putares operis esse distan- either in time or in order between
tiam, sed eiusdem operationis cred- the Father and the Son, but may be-
eres unitatem: lieve the oneness of the same opera-
tion, He says:
5. It certainly wouldn’t seem that the anti-Trinitarian would want to object to taking
“Father,” “Son” and “Holy Spirit” to be singular terms, or to object to taking P4 through P6
to be non-identity claims, since these are what make the LPT “work” in the first place. So,
what else is even left in the logical forms of PGNT for the anti-Trinitarian to object to?
6. (St. Athanasius 1971), section 36.
7. (St. Athanasius 1892), p. 23.
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Et opera, inquit, quae ego facio, “The works which I do, He do-
ipse facit. (Joan v,17) eth.” [John 5:17]
Et rursus ne discretionem ali- And again, that one may not
quam in operis distinctione sentires, think that there is any difference in
sed idem velle, idem facere, idem the distinction of the works, but may
posse Patrem et Filium iudicares, judge that the will, the working, and
dicit tibi Sapientia de Patre: the power of the Father and the Son
are the same, Wisdom says concern-
ing the Father:
Quaecumque enim ille fecerit, “For whatsoever things He do-
eadem et Filius facit similiter (Ibid., eth, the Son doeth the same like-
19). wise.” [John 5:19]
Non ergo alicui prior vel secun- So that the action of neither Per-
dus est actus, sed idem unius oper- son is before or after that of the
ationis effectus. Other, but the same result of one op-
eration.
Et ideo nihil a se posse facere Fil- And for this reason the Son says
ius dicitur; quia a Patre non potest that He can do nothing “of Himself,”
eius operatio separari. because His operation cannot be sep-
arated from that of the Father.
Similiter et Spiritus sancti oper- In like manner the operation of
atio non secernitur. the Holy Spirit is not separated.
Unde etiam ea quae loquitur. Whence also the things which He
audire a Patre dicitur.8 speaks, He is said to “hear” from the
Father.9
–Book II, Ch. 12.
Si ergo homo amicum ita defini- If, then, a man so defined a
vit, ut alterum se esse diceret, per friend as to say, he was “a second
unitatem videlicet amoris et gratiae; self,” that is to say, through a one-
quanto magis in Patre et Filio et ness of love and good-will, how much
Spiritu sancto unitatem maiestatis more ought we to esteem the one-
aestimare debemus, ness of Majesty, in the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit,
cum per eamdem operationem when by the same operation and
ac divinitatem vel unitas, vel certe divine power, either the unity, or
id quod amplius est, ταυτότης sicut certainly that which is more [than
Graece dicitur, exprimatur? unity], the ταυτότης, as it is called
in Greek, is expressed,10
ταυτὸ enim idem significat; eo for “ταυτὸ” signifies “the same,”
quod idem habeat et Pater et Fil- so that the Father, the Son, and the
ius et Spiritus sanctus; ut idem velle, Holy Spirit have the same; so that
et idem posse non ex affectione sit to have the same will and the same
8. PL 16, pp. 771-772.
9. (St. Ambrose of Milan 1896), p. 132.
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voluntatis, sed in substantia Trini- power does not arise from the affec-
tatis..11 tion of the will, but inheres in the
substance of the Trinity.12
–Book II, Ch. 13.
Etenim secundum nostram sen- According to our opinion, be-
tentiam quia unus Deus, una divini- cause there is one God, one Godhead
tas, et unitas intelligitur potestatis. and oneness of power is understood.
Sicut unum Deum dicimus, et For as we say that there is one
Patrem vero deitatis nomine confi- God, confessing the Father, and
tentes, nec Filium denegantes; ita not denying the Son under the true
etiam Spiritum sanctum a deitatis Name of the Godhead; so, too, we
non excludimus unitate, et tres deos exclude not the Holy Spirit from the
non asserimus, sed negamus; Unity of the Godhead, and do not
assert but deny that there are three
Gods,
quia pluralitatem non unitas because it is not unity [of power]
facit, sed divisio potestatis.13 but a division of power which makes
plurality.14
–Book III, Ch. 13.
We can even see hints of this theology in Roman law passed as a result of
the Second Ecumenical Council.
Codex Theodosianus XVI.1.3 (July 30, 381 AD):
Idem aaa. ad Auxonium procon- The same Augustuses to Auxo-
sulem Asiae. nius, Proconsul of Asia.
Episcopis tradi omnes ecclesias We command that all churches
mox iubemus, qui unius maiestatis shall immediately be surrendered
adque virtutis patrem et filium et to those bishops who confess that
spiritum sanctum confitentur eius- the Father, the Son, and the Holy
dem gloriae, claritatis unius. . . Spirit are of one majesty and virtue
[power], of the same glory, and of
one splendor . . .
quos constabit communioni . . . to those bishops who appear to
Gregorio episc(opo) Nysseno . . . have been associated in the com-
munion of . . . Gregorius [Gregory],
Bishop of Nyssa . . .
10. Incidentally, this seems to show that Ambrose, at least, is working with a distinction
between “oneness” (“unitas”) and “sameness,” the former of which is clearly “looser” than
classical identity, but the latter of which I take just to be classical identity.
11. PL 16, p. 776.
12. (St. Ambrose of Milan 1896), p. 135.
13. PL 16, p. 799.
14. (St. Ambrose of Milan 1896), p. 148.
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Hos ad optinendas catholicas ec- Those bishops who are of the
clesias ex communione et consor- communion and fellowship of such
tio probabilium sacerdotum oportebit acceptable priests must be permit-
admitti: ted to obtain the Catholic churches.
omnes autem, qui ab eorum, All, however, who dissent from
quos commemoratio specialis expres- the communion of the faith of those
sit, fidei communione dissentiunt, who have been expressly mentioned
ut manifestos haereticos ab ecclesiis in this special enumeration shall be
expelli . . . expelled from their churches as man-
ifest heretics . . .
Dat. III kal. avg. Heracl(eae) (Given on the third day before the
Evcherio et Syagrio conss.15 kalends of August at Heraclea in the
year of the consulship of Eucherius
and Syagrius. – July 30, 381).16
Humfress notes that, “taken in conjunction with the Edict of Thessalonica,
this law is considered by modern scholars to have settled the legal definition of
orthodox belief.”17 I note that the edict contains no mention of unity of essence,
nature or substance at all – only of “majesty . . . power . . . glory,18 and . . .
splendor.”
And the view seems to have continued in the subsequent orthodox Trinitarian
tradition, for example:
Pope St. Leo the Great (mid-400’s AD) Sermon LXXV :
Ideo enim hanc beatam Trini- For we confess this blessed Trin-
tatem unum confitemur Deum, quia ity to be One God for this reason,
in his tribus personis nec substan- because in these three Persons there
tiae, nec potentiae, nec voluntatis, is no diversity either of substance,
nec operationis est ulla diversitas.19 or of power, or of will, or of opera-
tion.20
I conclude, then, that what is really essential to Gregory’s solution to the
LPT – that “God” expresses an energeia, that the hypostases synergize on that
energeia, and that synergizing on this energeia is the fact in virtue of which
the hypostases count as “one,” was clearly part of the orthodox (pro-Nicene)
consensus. I would even be prepared to argue that it derives from a tradition
earlier than that, which goes back at least to the second century, if not to the
15. CT 16.1.3. Latin text from (Mommsen and Meyer 1905), p. 834.
16. Translation from (Pharr, Davidson, and Pharr 1952), p. 440. Emphasis mine.
17. (Humfress 2000), p. 145.
18. On the equivalence of “glory” and energeia, see (Bradshaw 2006), esp. pp. 291-292.
19. PL 54, p. 402.
20. (Pope St. Leo the Great and St. Gregory the Great 1895), p. 191.
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New Testament writings themselves (on which, see p. 294 ff.), although that is
not necessary to show for our present concerns.
Again, historical arguments are always open to potential revision, whether
we are speaking of the link between my formalization and Gregory’s actual
view, or that between Gregory’s view and the pro-Nicene consensus itself. But
since I have presented my historical arguments, it would be incumbent upon the
anti-Trinitarian to attack them if he wishes to show PGNT not to be formally
adequate for P.
6.2 Semantic Objections
Probably the single aspect of Gregory’s solution to the LPT that one could
most easily attack, and that, although not strictly logical, would come closest
to counting as a “logical” problem, would be his semantics for counting by agent
nouns. Also, while it would clearly not count as a “logical” problem, one could
take issue with his view that “is God” predicates an energeia (activity) rather
than an ousia (a nature or kind). We’ll take these in reverse order.
The main concern I have about the second issue is that it seems, so to speak,
too “private.” Externalist concerns notwithstanding, it seems like Gregory and
other church fathers should be able to mean whatever they want to mean by
“is God.” (And see just above as well as 4.2.3, p. 146 ff. for evidence that
this particular bit of semantics was common among pro-Nicenes and earlier
Christians as well.)
On the other hand, if one wants to hold him to the standard of the Bible,
then one will have to respond to his arguments about how the Bible itself uses
the predicate “is God” (Chapter 4.2.3, p. 134 ff.).
But even if one could make the case that “god” in the Bible does in fact
express the divine nature rather than, as Gregory claims, an activity, it’s not
clear how devastating this objection would be in the end, because it isn’t clear
how important the semantics really is to Gregory. Or rather, it’s pretty clear
that, at least in a certain sense, it isn’t very important to him.
The objection seems very much analogous to a somewhat common, deeply
problematic objection one sometimes hears from undergraduates studying the
Ontological Argument. From time to time I have students object that, “Perhaps
God really isn’t that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Perhaps
there is some conceivable being that would be even greater than God.” But of
course, it is up to Anselm what he wants to use the word “God” to mean. So I
often say something like this:
Suppose we gave Anselm a computer and a copy of Microsoft Word.
Suppose he types up his Ontological Argument as a Word document.
Suppose further that you argue with Anselm that God really isn’t
that than which nothing greater can be conceived after all, or that
for whatever reason he shouldn’t use “God” to mean that than which
nothing greater can be conceived.
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Now suppose Anselm says, “Very well. I give in. Henceforth, I vow
never again to use the word ‘God’ to mean that than which nothing
greater can be conceived.” Then he opens his file in Microsoft Word
and clicks on “Find and Replace.” In the “Find” field, he enters the
string “God.” In the “Replace With” field, he enters the string “that
than which nothing greater can be conceived.” Then he clicks on
“Replace All,” whereupon all instances of “God” in the Ontological
Argument are changed to “that than which nothing greater can be
conceived.” Now the argument doesn’t even mention God at all –
only that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
Then Anselm turns to you and says, “Now. I take it that, al-
though you rejected my definition that God is that than which noth-
ing greater can be conceived, you will admit that that than which
nothing greater can be conceived is that than which nothing greater
can be conceived. And so on for the rest of my premises. And now
the conclusion will simply be that “that than which nothing greater
can be conceived, cannot be conceived not to exist.” So, although
you reject the claim that God cannot be conceived not to exist, un-
less you have further, more substantive objections, you will still have
to admit that that than which nothing greater can be conceived can-
not be conceived not to exist. We won’t call it “God,” of course, but
this being (whatever it is to be called) must have every great-making
property conceivable, and to the highest conceivable degree. It must
be omniscient, omnipotent, omni-benevolent, immortal, and so on.
And we must believe that it exists, not only in the mind, but in
reality.
That is, he seems to get all the same substantive theological results, but
simply can’t utter the sentence “God exists” due to his newly-adopted semantics.
Would Anselm (should Anselm) really be very upset about this outcome?
You may have kept him from being able to assert the sentence “God exists.”
But hasn’t he gotten every bit of the substance of what he wanted to prove?
He can still believe in the existence of a being of exactly the sort he believed in
before. He’ll just have to call it something other than “God.”
Likewise, suppose we allow Gregory the result that there are three uncreated
hypostases that all synergize on all of their activities, including “beholding.” But
we insist that he can’t call them “God,” or else that, if he did, then he would
have to admit there are “three” Gods, because “God” predicates a kind, and that
is how we count by kind terms.
Would Gregory (should Gregory) really be very upset about this outcome?
We may have kept him from being able to assert the sentence “there is exactly
one God.” But hasn’t he gotten every bit of the substance of what he wanted
to prove? He can still believe all of the substantive theology he believed before.
He’ll just have to eschew using the word “God” and replace it with something
like “Lord” (or “Beholder,” or “Creator,” or some other agent noun, or a noun
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expressing some kind of power, so that he can again say there is only “one” of
it.)
So, it seems to me that merely attacking Gregory’s understanding of the
predicate “is God” here (without also attacking his counting principle, which of
course would then make the current objection superfluous) is not much different
from attacking Anselm’s definition of “is God” in the Ontological Argument.
If Anselm still gets to hold onto the same picture with respect to his meta-
physics and substantive theology, who cares if he doesn’t get to use the word
“God” when describing his view?
Likewise, if Gregory gets to hold onto the same picture with respect to his
metaphysics and substantive theology, who cares if he doesn’t get to use the
word “God” when describing his view?
So, not only does this not count as a strictly logical problem with Trinitarian
theology – it doesn’t seem to count as much of a problem at all. At most, it
might play a role in a larger argument that Trinitarian theology is not biblical.
But see below in the section on theological objections why such attempts all
share an important, and in my view probably insurmountable, difficulty (6.4
293).
Returning, then, to the first issue (Gregory’s semantics for counting by agent
nouns), the main concern I have is that, while in this case the semantics seems
“public” enough that it makes more sense to criticize it, it isn’t quite as obviously
a problem with the logical form of the doctrine of the Trinity itself as one might
initially think.
First, as I mentioned above,21 at least the most obvious facts about our
ordinary linguistic practices on this point don’t seem capable of settling the
matter, as we always use agent nouns to count by pairs of hypostasis-plus-
energeia.
That is, when we count “one shoemaker,” we count one pair of hypostasis-
plus-token-shoemaking-energeia. And when we count “two shoemakers,” we
count two distinct (non-overlapping) pairs of hypostasis-plus-token-shoemaking-
energeia. And, outside of the Trinity, there are no instances of multiple hy-
postases sharing a single, token energeia. Thus, there simply are no ordinary
counting practices there to make reference to that provide a straight-forward
analogy to the case of the Trinity.
Thus, there simply are no facts of this sort about our ordinary linguistic
practices that settle the question of how many shoemakers to count should
there bemultiple hypostases participating in a single token shoemaking energeia.
This is not to rule out the possibility that there might be other facts about our
ordinary linguistic practices that could settle the question. (Indeed, Gregory,
at least, believes other such facts rule in his favor.) I only flag that the issue is
not such a simple one to settle.
But even if turned out one could show that Gregory was wrong about his
semantics for counting by agent nouns, it isn’t clear that the way in which he
21. Chapter 4.4.5, p. 191.
275
would be wrong would count as a “logical” problem.
Here is an analogy:
Suppose someone says, “it’s raining and it’s not raining,” and agreed to
the standard truth table definitions for “and” and “not” and that he wasn’t
equivocating on “it’s raining.” That would certainly be a logical problem. That
is, it would certainly mean that what this person was asserting was formally,
logically inconsistent.
But suppose someone says, “it’s raining and it’s not raining,” and agreed to
the standard truth table definition for “not” and that he wasn’t equivocating on
“it’s raining,” but then said that, in his view, the semantics for “and ” is much
more complicated than we usually think. In most cases it will match up to the
standard truth table definition we have for it, but in certain rare circumstances,
given this more complicated semantics, it ends up computing an importantly
different function.
Then it doesn’t seem he has so blatantly contradicted himself. It seems,
rather, to be a much deeper disagreement, a disagreement more like those in
the philosophy of logic. Not a disagreement about our pictures of the world,
but about the meanings of certain logical operators.
Here is an even better analogy:
Suppose A says that, “If John is in London, then he is in England” and “If
John is in Paris, then he is in France” entail “either if John is in London, then he
is in France, or if John is in Paris, then he is in England,” because he believes
that the logical connective “if. . . then,” as it appears in these sentences, is
definable by the standard truth table for material conditionals. He argues that
if B accepts the first two, he must not – on pain of contradiction! – deny the
third.
Suppose B argues that this is absurd, and maintains that the first two state-
ments are clearly true, while the third is false. Suppose he then proposes a more
complicated semantics, not for any of the non-logical constants involved, but for
the logical connective “if. . . then” itself. (Perhaps he proposes a Stalnakerian or
Lewisian possible-worlds semantics, or something even more complicated than
those).
A can accuse B of being wrong about his logic. And if A is right, then the
propositions expressed by B’s statements, as interpreted according to standard
English usage, may in fact be inconsistent. But at a deeper level, there is
nothing particularly untoward about B’s picture of the world – his metaphysics
and his substantive theory. He simply thinks that London is inside England
but not inside France, and Paris is inside France but not inside England, and
he believes certain things about the properties of relations like “inside of” and
so forth. And since B understands the semantics of “if. . . then” differently, he
thinks the disjunctive statement is false. And while, if he is wrong about that,
so that the set of sentences he endorses express contradictory claims, it is only
276
because they express something other than what B takes them to express, and
other than what B actually believes about the world. So, while one can call this
a case of B endorsing a formally inconsistent set of propositions, it isn’t so in the
same sense as we would normally think when hearing that sort of accusation.
Normally when we think of someone affirming a formally inconsistent set,
we are thinking of a case where how we understand the uses of the natural
language logical operators involved is agreed on or held constant. The notions
of being “inconsistent” and “unsatisfiable” in a formal language are intimately
tied to the idea of possible interpretations specifically for the non-logical con-
stants, holding the logical operators themselves fixed in their definitions. And
therefore the notions of being inconsistent or unsatisfiable are intimately tied
to the assumption that there is no issue as to what the semantics for the logical
operators themselves should be.
Thus, since Gregory of Nyssa quite clearly has a particular view about count-
ing, it seems to me that if one attacks him on the point of his semantics in S7,
one may (or may not) have some reasonable objection to make to his view,
but it would be less analogous to a “logical problem” like saying, unequivocally,
“it’s both raining and not raining” while agreeing to the truth tables for “and”
and “not” (a formal contradiction), and more like the sorts of “logical problems”
involved in debates over the philosophy of logic.
In other words, while the anti-Trinitarian has promised to show the doctrine
of the Trinity to be a blatant contradiction (like saying, unequivocally, “it’s both
raining and not raining,” while agreeing to the truth tables for “and” and “not”),
he now would only be saying that the doctrine of the Trinity relies on a certain
view about language or logic that (he alleges) isn’t how natural languages really
work. That is, he seems to have begun by promising us a devastating objection
to the truth of Trinitarian theology itself, but ended by saying only that, while
the substantive theology involved may be consistent, Trinitarians have faulty
views about how to use language, and that it would be more accurate for them
to express themselves by saying that there are three gods.
Now I admit that, if Gregory’s semantics could somehow be shown to be
wrong on this point, it would be in some sense a problem or embarrassment for
Trinitarians. Still, it doesn’t seem like the kind of problem we were promised.
What’s more, as we discussed above (Chapter 4.4.5, p. 191), even if one could
show that the sober truth of the matter is that, given Gregory’s substantive
theology, it is strictly and literally true that there are three gods, there is still
an issue of whether the claim that there are three gods would not be more
misleading than the technically false but non-misleading claim that there is only
one God. Indeed, compare this to the example immediately above. Suppose it
turns out that B is wrong in his semantics, and that, strictly speaking, it really
is true that, either if John is in London then he is in France, or if John is in
Paris then he is in England. Still, wouldn’t B be right to claim that it is, even
if strictly speaking true, nevertheless highly misleading? And that, even if it is
false to say that it is neither the case that if John is in London then he is in
France nor that if John is in Paris then he is in England, it is nevertheless not
nearly as misleading as its negation?
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And finally, attacking Gregory’s semantics here (just as in the previous se-
mantic objection) raises a deeper question. Namely, “which is more important:
whether certain canonical sentences end up being true, or whether the theolog-
ical states of affairs behind those sentences actually obtain?”
After all, two people could, in theory, have radically different metaphysics,
and radically different theology, but end up agreeing on certain sentences being
true or false, because they also have radically different semantics – they use the
same words to mean different things.
On the other hand, two people could have precisely the same metaphysics
and precisely the same theology, but end up disagreeing on what sentences are
true or false, because, again, they have different semantics – they use different
words to mean the same things.
Historically, both of the above sorts of issues arose during the Trinitarian
controversy. And in both cases, the church fathers seem to have come down
clearly on the side of substantive theology being what was primarily important,
not semantics.
On the first point, when arguing with the Arians, the introduction of the
homoousion itself was motivated precisely by the fact that the Arians had a sig-
nificantly different substantive theology, but were willing to agree on all the same
creedal sentences as the homoousians, by simply re-interpreting them (adopt-
ing a different semantics). They used the same words, but meant a different
thing. And the homoousians didn’t think that was enough. So they added the
controversial term “homoousios” to the creed. It was only when that term was
added that the orthodox could even use the creed to exclude Arian theology.
St. Athanasius explains:
Τῆς συνόδου βουλομένης τὰς μὲν The Council wishing to do away
τῶν Α᾿ρειανῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας λέξεις with the irreligious phrases of the
ἀνελεῖν, τὰς δὲ τῶν γραφῶν ὁμολο- Arians, and to use instead the ac-
γουμένας φωνὰς γράψαι, ὄτι τε υἱός knowledged words of the Scriptures,
ἐστιν οὐκ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ that the Son is not ‘from nothing’
θεοῦ, καὶ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία, ἀλλ’ but ‘from God,’ and is ‘Word’ and
οὐ κτίσμα οὐδὲ piοίημα, ἴδιον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ‘Wisdom,’ and not creature or work,
piατρὸς γέννημα, οἱ piερὶ Εὐσέβιον ὑpiὸ but a proper offspring from the Fa-
τῆς piολυχρονίου κακοδοξίας ἑαυτῶν ther, Eusebius and his fellows, led
ἑλκόμενοι ἐβούλοντο τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ by their inveterate heterodoxy, un-
κοινὸν εἶναι piρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν τοῦ derstood the phrase ‘from God’ as
θεοῦ λόγον μηδέν τε ἐν τούτῳ δι- belonging to us, as if in respect to
αφέρειν ἡμῶν αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ γεγράφ- it the Word of God differed nothing
θαι· from us, and that because it is writ-
ten,
«εἷς θεὸς ἐξ οὗ τὰ piάντα», ‘There is one God, from whom,
all things;’
καὶ piάλιν· «τὰ ἀρχαῖα piαρῆλθεν, and again, ‘Old things are passed
ἰδοὺ γέγονε τὰ piάντα καινά, τὰ δὲ away, behold, all things are become
piάντα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ». new, and all things are from God,’
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ἀλλ’ οἱ piατέρες θεωρήσαντες But the Fathers, perceiving their
ἐκείνων τὴν piανουργίαν καὶ τὴν τῆς craft and the cunning of their irre-
ἀσεβείας κακοτεχνίαν ἠναγκάσθησαν ligion, were forced to express more
λοιpiὸν λευκότερον εἰpiεῖν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ distinctly the sense of the words
θεοῦ ‘from God.’
καὶ γράψαι ‘ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Accordingly, they wrote ‘from
θεοῦ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν’ ὑpiὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἐκ the ousia of God,’ in order that
τοῦ θεοῦ κοινὸν καὶ ἴσον τοῦ τε υἱοῦ ‘from God’ might not be considered
καὶ τῶν γενητῶν νομίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ common and equal in the Son and in
μὲν ἄλλα piάντα κτίσμα, τὸν δὲ λόγον things originate, but that all others
μόνον ἐκ τοῦ piατρὸς piιστεύεσθαι. might be acknowledged as creatures,
and the Word alone as from the Fa-
ther.
κἂν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ piάντα For though all things be said to
λέγηται, ἀλλὰ ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ἔστιν ὁ υἱὸς be “from God,” yet this is not in
εἴρηται. the sense in which the Son is “from”
Him. . .
Τῶν δὲ ἐpiισκόpiων piάλιν λεγόν- Again, when the Bishops said
των δεῖν γραφῆναι δύναμιν ἀληθινὴν that the Word must be described as
καὶ εἰκόνα τοῦ piατρὸς τὸν λόγον the True Power and Image of the Fa-
ὄμοιόν τε καὶ ἀpiαράλλακτον αὐτὸν ther, in all things exact and like the
κατὰ piάντα τῷ piατρὶ καὶ ἄτρεpiτον Father, and as unalterable, and as
καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀδιαιρέτως always, and as in Him without di-
οὐδέpiοτε γὰρ οὐκ ἦν, ἀλλὰ ἦν ὁ λό- vision (for never was the Word not,
γος ἀεὶ ὑpiάρχων ἀιδίως piαρὰ τῷ piα- but He was always, existing everlast-
τρὶ ὡς ἀpiαύγασμα φωτός—οἱ piερὶ ingly with the Father, as the radi-
Εὐσέβιον ἠνείχοντο μὲν μὴ τολμῶν- ance of light), Eusebius and his fel-
τες ἀντιλέγειν διὰ τὴν αἰσχύνην, lows endured indeed, as not daring
ἣν εἶχον ἐφ’ οἷς ἠλέγχθησαν, κατ- to contradict, being put to shame
ελήφθησαν δὲ piάλιν piρὸς ἑαυτοὺς by the arguments which were urged
τονθορύζοντες καὶ διανεύοντες τοῖς against them; but withal they were
ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὄτι καὶ τὸ ὄμοιον καὶ τὸ caught whispering to each other and
ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ὄνομα καὶ τὸ winking with their eyes, that ‘like,’
ἐν αὐτῷ κοινὰ piάλιν ἐστὶ piρὸς ἡμᾶς and ‘always,’ and ‘power,’ and ‘in
καὶ τὸν υἱόν, καὶ οὐδὲν λυpiεῖ τούτοις Him,’ were, as before, common to us
ἡμᾶς συνθέσθαι. . . and the Son, and that it was no dif-
ficulty to agree to these. . .
ἀλλ’ οἱ ἐpiίσκοpiοι καὶ ἐν τούτῳ But the Bishops discerning in
θεωρήσαντες τὴν ὑpiόκρισιν ἐκείνων this too their dissimulation . . . were
. . . ἠναγκάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὖθις again compelled on their part to
συναγαγεῖν ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν τὴν collect the sense of the Scriptures,
διάνοιαν καί, ἅpiερ piρότερον ἔλε- and to re-say and re-write what they
γον, ταῦτα piάλιν λευκότερον εἰpiεῖν had said before, more distinctly still,
καὶ γράψαι, ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τῷ piα- namely, that the Son is ‘one in ou-
τρὶ τὸν υἱόν, ἴνα μὴ μόνον ὄμοιον sia’ with the Father: by way of sig-
τὸν υἱόν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸν τῇ ὁμοιώσει nifying, that the Son was “from” the
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ἐκ τοῦ piατρὸς εἶναι σημαίνωσι καὶ Father, and not merely like, but the
ἄλλην οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ ὁμοίωσιν same in likeness, and of shewing that
καὶ ἀτρεψίαν δείξωσι piαρὰ τὴν ἐν the Son’s likeness and unalterable-
ἡμῖν λεγομένην μίμησιν, ἣν ἐξ ἀρετῆς ness was different from such copy
διὰ τὴν τῶν ἐντολῶν τήρησιν ἡμεῖς of the same as is ascribed to us,
piροσλαμβάνομεν. . . 22 which we acquire from virtue on the
ground of observance of the com-
mandments. . . 23
Thus, according to Athanasius’ account, merely assenting to the same sen-
tences or creedal formulae was not what was important to the fathers of Nicea,
but accepting the same propositions they understood. One sometimes hears
the claim that the results of the early councils were simply certain linguistic
formulae that are essentially so open to interpretation as to be without any
determinate meaning. I’m not convinced, though, that this was how the partic-
ipants themselves saw what they were doing, as the passage above shows. Of
course, one can say that, even if the fathers of Nicaea believed themselves to
be, and intended to be, having a substantive theological discussion, they were
simply mistaken about themselves, and they failed in their attempt. I’m not
convinced of that either, although it is not essential to my point here. The point
is that it seems to me that there was intelligible content in the Arian position
that the fathers wished to deny, not merely that they disliked the way certain
characteristically Arian noises sounded. But in any case, that is not the point
to be argued here. What I am arguing is that Athanasius here at least claims,
and thus commits himself to the view, that he is not interested in mere verbal
agreement, that agreement on mere words is not sufficient, when one is using
the same words to mean different things.
Now on the second point (using different words to mean the same thing),
when certain groups at Antioch had ceased communion with each other, on
suspicion of heresy, but in reality due to having a different semantics, Athanasius
united them upon inquiring into their substantive theology. Because, just as in
the above example, it was the substantive theology that seemed important to
him, and to them all, not what sentences turned out to be true. I think it’s
instructive to read a bit from the Tome of Antioch issued after the synod in
question (AD 362):
Ο ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΥΣ ΑΝΤΙΟ- Tome or Synodal Letter to the
ΧΕΙΣ ΤΟΜΟΣ ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΟΥ People of Antioch
ΑΡΧΙΕΠΙΣΚΟΠΟΥ ΑΛΕΞΑΝ-
ΔΡΕΙΑΣ
. . . Πάντας τοίνυν τοὺς βουλομέ- . . . As many then as desire peace
νους εἰρηνεύειν piρὸς ἡμᾶς, καὶ with us, and specially those who
μάλιστα τοὺς ἐν τῇ Παλαιᾷ συναγομέ- assemble in the Old [Church] and
νους, καὶ τοὺς ἀpiοτρέχοντας δὲ ἀpiὸ those again who are seceding from
22. (St. Athanasius 1941), Ch. 19, Sec. 1 – Ch. 20, Sec. 3.
23. (St. Athanasius 1892), pp. 162-164.
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τῶν Α᾿ρειανῶν piροσκαλέσασθε piαρ’ the Arians, do ye call to yourselves,
ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ ὡς μὲν piατέρες υἱοὺς and receive them as parents their
piροσλάβεσθε, ὡς δὲ διδάσκαλοι sons, and welcome them as tutors
καὶ κηδεμόνες ἀpiοδέξασθε, καὶ and guardians; and unite them to
συνάψαντες αὐτοὺς τοῖς ἀγαpiητοῖς our beloved Paulinus and his peo-
ἡμῶν τοῖς piερὶ Παυλῖνον, μηδὲν ple, without requiring more from
piλέον ἀpiαιτήσητε piαρ’ αὐτῶν ἢ them than to anathematize the Ar-
ἀναθεματίζειν μὲν τὴν Α᾿ρειανὴν ian heresy and confess the faith con-
αἴρεσιν, ὁμολογεῖν δὲ τὴν piαρὰ fessed by the holy fathers at Nicæa,
τῶν ἁγίων Πατέρων ὁμολογηθεῖσαν and to anathematize also those who
ἐν Νικαίᾳ piίστιν, ἀναθεματίζειν δὲ say that the Holy Spirit is a Crea-
καὶ τοὺς λέγοντας κτίσμα εἶναι τὸ ture and separate from the ousia of
Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, καὶ διῃρημένον Christ. For this is in truth a com-
ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Χριστοῦ. Τοῦτο plete renunciation of the abominable
γάρ ἐστιν ἀληθῶς ἀpiοpiηδᾷν ἀpiὸ τῆς heresy of the Arians, to refuse to di-
μυσαρᾶς αἱρέσεως τῶν Α᾿ρειανῶν, vide the Holy Trinity, or to say that
τὸ μὴ διαιρεῖν τὴν ἁγίαν Τριάδα, καὶ any part of it is a creature. For
λέγειν τι ταύτης εἶναι κτίσμα. Οἱ those who, while pretending to cite
γὰρ piροσpiοιούμενοι μὲν ὀνομάζειν the faith confessed at Nicæa, ven-
τὴν ὁμολογηθεῖσαν ἐν Νικαίᾳ piίστιν, ture to blaspheme the Holy Spirit,
τολμῶντες δὲ κατὰ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύ- do nothing more than in words deny
ματος βλασφημεῖν, οὐδὲν piλέον the Arian heresy while they retain it
piοιοῦσιν, ἢ τὴν Α᾿ρειανὴν αἴρεσιν in thought . . .
τοῖς μὲν ῥήμασιν ἀρνοῦνται, τῷ δὲ
φρονήματι ταύτην κατέχουσιν. . .
Οὓς γὰρ ἐμέμφοντό τινες ὡς τρεῖς For as to those whom some were
λέγοντας ὑpiοστάσεις, διὰ τὸ ἀγρά- blaming for speaking of three hy-
φους καὶ ὑpiόpiτους αὐτόθεν εἶναι τὰς postases, on the ground that the
λέξεις, ἠξιώσαμεν μὲν μηδὲν piλέον phrase is unscriptural and therefore
ἐpiιζητεῖν piλὴν τῆς κατὰ Νίκαιαν suspicious, we thought it right in-
ὁμολογίας· ἀνεκρίναμεν δὲ ὄμως τού- deed to require nothing beyond the
τους διὰ τὴν φιλονεικίαν, μὴ ἆρ’ ὡς confession of Nicæa, but on account
οἱ Α᾿ρειομανῖται λέγουσιν ἀpiηλλοτρι- of the contention we made enquiry
ωμένας καὶ ἀpiεξενωμένας, ἀλλοτρι- of them, whether they meant, like
οουσίους τε ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἑκάστην the Arian madmen, hypostases for-
καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑpiόστασιν διῃρημένην, eign and strange, and alien in ou-
ὡς ἔστι τά τε ἄλλα κτίσματα, καὶ οἱ ἐξ sia from one another, and that each
ἀνθρώpiων γεννώμενοι· ἢ ὤσpiερ δι- hypostasis was divided apart by it-
αφόρους οὐσίας, ὤσpiερ ἐστὶ χρυσὸς, self, as is the case with creatures
ἢ ἄργυρος, ἢ χαλκὸς, οὔτω καὶ αὐτοὶ in general and in particular with
λέγωσιν· ἢ ὡς ἄλλοι αἱρετικοὶ τρεῖς those begotten of men, or like dif-
ἀρχὰς καὶ τρεῖς θεοὺς λέγουσιν, οὔτω ferent ousiai, such as gold, silver,
καὶ οὗτοι φρονοῦντες, τρεῖς ὑpiοστά- or brass;—or whether, like other
σεις λέγωσι· heretics, they meant three Begin-
nings and three Gods, by speaking
of three hypostases.
281
Διεβεβαιώσαντο μήτε λέγειν, They assured us in reply that
μήτε piεφρονηκέναι piοτὲ οὔτως. they neither meant this nor had
᾿Ερωτώντων δὲ ἡμῶν αὐτούς· Πῶς ever held it. But upon our ask-
οὖν ταῦτα λέγετε· ἢ διὰ τί δὲ ὄλως ing them ‘what then do you mean
τοιαύταις χρῆσθαι λέξεσιν· ἀpiεκρί- by it, or why do you use such ex-
ναντο, διὰ τὸ εἰς ἁγίαν Τριάδα pressions?’ they replied, Because
piιστεύειν, οὐκ ὀνόματι Τριάδα they believed in a Holy Trinity, not
μόνον, ἀλλ’ ἀληθῶς οὖσαν καὶ a trinity in name only, but exist-
ὑφεστῶσαν, Πατέρα τε ἀληθῶς ὄντα ing and subsisting in truth, ‘both
καὶ ὑφεστῶτα, καὶ Υἱὸν ἀληθῶς a Father truly existing and subsist-
ἐνούσιον ὄντα καὶ ὑφεστῶτα, καὶ ing, and a Son truly substantial and
Πνεῦμα ἅγιον ὑφεστὼς καὶ ὑpiάρχον subsisting, and a Holy Spirit sub-
οἴδαμεν, μήτε δὲ εἰρηκέναι τρεῖς sisting and really existing do we ac-
θεοὺς ἢ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς, μήθ’ ὄλως knowledge,’ and that neither had
ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν τοῦτο λεγόντων, they said there were three Gods or
ἢ φρονούντων· ἀλλ’ εἰδέναι ἁγίαν three beginnings, nor would they at
μὲν Τριάδα, μίαν δὲ θεότητα, καὶ all tolerate such as said or held so,
μίαν ἀρχὴν, καὶ Υἱὸν μὲν ὁμοούσιον but that they acknowledged a Holy
τῷ Πατρὶ, ὡς εἶpiον οἱ Πατέρες, τὸ Trinity but One Godhead, and one
δὲ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, οὐ κτίσμα, οὐδὲ Beginning, and that the Son is ho-
ξένον, ἀλλ’ ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τῆς moousios with the Father, as the
οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ Πατρός. . . fathers said; while the Holy Spirit
is not a creature, nor external, but
proper to and inseparable from the
ousia of the Father and the Son. . .
Α᾿piοδεξάμενοι δὲ τούτων τὴν ἑρ- Having accepted then these men’s
μηνείαν τῶν λέξεων, καὶ τὴν ἀpiολο- interpretation and defence of their
γίαν, ἀνεκρίναμεν τοὺς αἰτιαθέντας language, we made enquiry of those
piαρὰ τούτων, ὡς λέγοντας μίαν ὑpiόσ- blamed by them for speaking of One
τασιν, μὴ ἆρα ὡς Σαβέλλιος φρονεῖ, hypostasis, whether they use the ex-
οὔτω καὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ἐpiὶ ἀναιρέ- pression in the sense of Sabellius,
σει τοῦ Υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύμα- to the negation of the Son and the
τος, ἢ ὡς ἀνουσίου ὄντος τοῦ Υἱοῦ, Holy Spirit, or as though the Son
ἢ ἀνυpiοστάτου τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύμα- were non-substantial, or the Holy
τος· Οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ διεβεβαιώσαντο Spirit impersonal. But they in their
μήτε τοῦτο λέγειν, μήτε οὔτω piε- turn assured us that they neither
φρονηκέναι piώpiοτε· ἀλλ’ ὑpiόστασιν meant this nor had ever held it, but
μὲν λέγομεν, ἡγούμενοι ταὐτὸν εἶ- ‘we use the word hypostasis thinking
ναι εἰpiεῖν ὑpiόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν· μίαν it the same thing to say hypostasis
δὲ φρονοῦμεν, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας or ousia;’ ‘But we hold that there
τοῦ Πατρὸς εἶναι τὸν Υἱὸν, καὶ διὰ is One, because the Son is of the
τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως· μίαν γὰρ ousia of the Father, and because
θεότητα, καὶ μίαν εἶναι τὴν ταύτης of the identity of nature. For we
φύσιν piιστεύομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλην μὲν believe that there is one Godhead,
τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς, ξένην δὲ τούτου τὴν and that it has one nature, and not
τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύ- that there is one nature of the Fa-
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ματος. Α᾿μέλει κἀκεῖ οἱ αἰτιαθέν- ther, from which that of the Son
τες ὡς εἰρηκότες τρεῖς ὑpiοστάσεις and of the Holy Spirit are distinct.’
συνετίθεντο τούτοις· καὶ αὐτοὶ δὲ Well, thereupon they who had been
οἱ εἰρηκότες μίαν οὐσίαν τὰ ἐκείνων blamed for saying there were three
ὤσpiερ ἡρμήνευσαν καὶ ὡμολόγουν. . . hypostases agreed with the others,
while those who had spoken of one
ousia, also confessed the doctrine of
the former as interpreted by them. . .
Τούτων τοίνυν οὔτως These things then being thus
ὁμολογηθέντων, piαρακαλοῦμεν confessed, we exhort you not hastily
ὑμᾶς τοὺς μὲν οὔτως ὁμολογοῦν- to condemn those who so confess,
τας καὶ ἑρμηνεύοντας οὔτω τὰς and so explain the phrases they use,
λέξεις, ἃς λέγουσι, μὴ κατακρίνετε nor to reject them, but rather to
piροpiετῶς, μηδὲ ἀpiοβάλλετε, ἀλλὰ accept them as they desire peace
μᾶλλον εἰρηνεύοντας καὶ ἀpiολο- and defend themselves, while you
γουμένους piροσλαμβάνεσθε· τοὺς check and rebuke, as of suspicious
δὲ μὴ βουλομένους οὔτως ὁμολο- views, those who refuse so to con-
γεῖν καὶ διερμηνεύειν τὰς λέξεις, fess and to explain their language.
τούτους κωλύετε καὶ ἐντρέpiετε, ὡς But while you refuse toleration to
ὑpiόpiτους τῷ φρονήματι. Τούτων the latter, counsel the others also
τε μὴ ἀνεχόμενοι συμβουλεύετε who explain and hold aright, not
κἀκείνοις τοῖς ὀρθῶς ἑρμηνεύουσί τε to enquire further into each other’s
καὶ φρονοῦσι μηδὲν piλέον ἀλλήλους opinions, nor to fight about words
ἀνακρίνειν μηδὲ λογομαχεῖν ἐpi’ οὐδὲν to no useful purpose, nor to go on
χρήσιμον, μήτε ταῖς τοιαύταις λέξεσι contending with the above phrases,
διαμάχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῷ φρονήματι but to agree in the mind of piety . . .
τῆς εὐσεβείας συμφωνεῖν. . . piάντων and value above all things peace of
δὲ μᾶλλον piροκρίνετε τὴν τοιαύτην that kind, faith being sound. Per-
εἰρήνην, οὔσης ὑγιαινούσης piίστεως· haps God will have pity on us, and
ἴσως ὁ Κύριος ἐλεήσει ἡμᾶς, καὶ unite what is divided, and, there be-
συνάψει τὰ διῃρημένα, καὶ γενομένης ing once more one flock, we shall all
μιᾶς piοίμνης, piάλιν piάντες ἔνα have one leader, even our Lord Jesus
ἔχομεν καθηγεμόνα, τὸν Κύριον Christ.25
ἡμῶν ᾿Ιησοῦν Χριστόν.24
Thus, merely disagreeing about sentences or creedal formulae was not what
was important, but agreeing or disagreeing about substantive theological con-
tent. Thus, again, if an opponent insisted on making objections merely to
Gregory’s semantics, it is simply unclear whether Gregory would (or should)
have any reason to care, as it is unclear whether semantic disagreements of
this sort are important to him or were to his peers in the intellectual milieu of
fourth-century Trinitarian debates. Again, examples could be multiplied, but I
will give a last example from Gregory himself, in his second Contra Eunomium
24. PG 26, pp. 796-805.
25. (St. Athanasius 1892), pp. 483-485.
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lest there be any question as to whether Gregory shares the same views on
semantics:
οὐδεμίαν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις κατὰ . . . For we understand no differ-
τὸ σημαινόμενον διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦ- ence in the sense of these terms, but
μεν, ἀλλ’ ἓν δι’ ἑκατέρων τῶν λόγων we signify one and the same thing
ἀpiοσημαίνομεν, κἂν τὸ μὲν θέσιν τὸ by both, though the one may seem
δὲ ἀναίρεσίν τινος ἔχειν δοκῇ. . . to convey the notion of affirmation,
and the other of negation. . .
ὤστε τὰ μὲν ῥήματα δοκεῖν τῇ while the words seem by the for-
τοῦ σχήματος ἐξαλλαγῇ διαφόρως mal change to be at variance with
ἔχειν piρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸν δὲ νοῦν τοῖς each other, the sense remains one
λεγομένοις ἔνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δι- and the same. For the object to
αμένειν. τὸ γὰρ σpiουδαζόμενον ἐν be aimed at, in questions respect-
τοῖς piερὶ θεοῦ λόγοις ἐστὶν οὐχὶ ing God, is not to produce a dulcet
ῥημάτων εὐφωνίαν εὔκροτόν τε καὶ and melodious harmony of words,
ἐναρμόνιον ἐpiινοῆσαι, ἀλλ’ εὐσεβῆ but to work out an orthodox formula
διάνοιαν ἐξευρεῖν δι’ ἧς τὸ piρέpiον τῇ of thought, whereby a worthy con-
ὑpiολήψει τῇ piερὶ θεοῦ φυλαχθήσεται. ception of God may be ensured. . .
ταύτης ἡμῖν ἐρηρεισμένως τῆς δι- [I]f this opinion is established,
ανοίας μενούσης τίς ἔτι piερὶ τὰ ῥή- what further contention of words re-
ματα τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν καταλείpiεται mains for men of sense and judg-
μάχη, piάσης φωνῆς, καθ’ ἣν τὸ τοιοῦ- ment, when every word whereby such
τον ἐξαγγέλλεται νόημα, τὸ αὐτὸ a notion is conveyed to us has the
piαριστώσης· same signification?
γὰρ . . . piάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἰσοστά- For . . . all these words are, in
σιά piως ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν δύ- a manner, of like force, and equiv-
ναμιν τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ ὁμοτίμως alent to one another, as far as the
ἔχει τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ μάταιος ὁ ζυγο- meaning of the things signified is
μαχῶν piερὶ τὸν τοιόνδε τῆς φωνῆς concerned; and it is mere folly to
ἦχον, ὡς οὐχὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ταῖς δὲ συλ- contend for this or that vocal into-
λαβαῖς καὶ τοῖς φθόγγοις ἐγκειμένης nation, as if orthodoxy were a thing
τῆς εὐσεβείας.26 of sounds and syllables rather than
of the mind.27
But perhaps the objector might disagree with the fathers here, insisting
that, even if it wasn’t important to them, it is still for some objective reason
important. But it would then be incumbent on the objector to tell us why.28
I myself can’t think of any very plausible line of attack that one could take in
this regard, except to parlay the semantic objection into a theological one in
something like the following way:
But the Bible is emphatic that there is exactly one God, and so, if
26. (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1960), Book 2, Chapter 1, sections 134–138.
27. Translation from (St. Gregory of Nyssa 1893), pp. 263-264. Emphasis mine.
28. I once heard it said, in an accent that made the phrase rhyme, “We ought to use Bible
names for Bible things” – but it was never made clear why.
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one’s substantive theology is biblical, and one’s semantics is biblical,
then it ought to turn out that the sentence “There is exactly one
God” is true. So that if one could argue Gregory into admitting
that, given his overall views, it turns out that the sentence “There
is more than one God” is true, it would at least show that there
is something unbiblical about his view – either in the realm of his
substantive theology or in his semantics.
I’ll offer two responses. First of all, the claim that the Bible is emphatic
that there is exactly one God is not so obviously true as is usually assumed.
Famously, as we saw Gregory allude to, (Chapter 4.2.3, p. 134 ff.) parts of
the Bible seem to be merely monolatrous, rather than monotheistic. Various
statements made in Old Testament writings seem to imply that there are other
gods, but simply that Abraham and others only worshipped one God.
The main proof texts usually pointed to in arguments like these are (1) the
First Commandment and (2) the Shema.
(1) But the First Commandment in fact does not say there are no other
gods, or anything that might even seem to imply that there are no other gods.
It merely says not to put any other gods before the Lord. (And in fact, this
at least seems to, or could not unreasonably be taken to, imply that there are
other gods that one could put before the Lord.)
(2) And the Shema in fact does not say “there is exactly one God,” but “the
Lord is your God; the Lord is one.” Famously, there are two words for “one” in
Hebrew, yachid (די¢חָי ), with a meaning closer to something like “single” or “only”
(as in “only-begotten”) and echad (ד´חֶא), with a meaning closer to something like
“a unified whole” (as one might describe, to take an example from Gregory, “one
people” or as in Genesis 2:24 the man and the woman are “one (ד´חֶא) flesh,”
and in Genesis 11:6 “the people [building the tower of Babel] were one (ד´חֶא).”)
And famously, the Shema uses the latter (ד´חֶא), “the Lord is your God; the Lord
is one (ד´חֶא).” Naturally, there is enormous debate over the precise meanings
of those terms, as well as how, precisely, to interpret them in the context of
the Shema. The point I am making is simply that it is, to understate, less
than clear that the Shema can only be interpreted as meaning that there is a
single God (which would, anyway, contradict other passages from the Hebrew
Bible),29 much less that it must be taken to mean, more precisely, that there is
a single hypostasis that is divine (which of course, on Gregory’s view, are two
quite different claims).
Less famously, Hebrew also has the word yesh (שׁ¨י), which is just the exis-
tential quantifier, and ayn (N!י¦א), which is just the negation of the existential
quantifier. Thus, if one really wanted to say, very precisely, that there is exactly
one God, one could say, “There is one God and there is not a God other than
(distinct from) it.” And if one wanted to say that there is exactly one thing
that is divine, one could say there exists a davar (ר´בָדּ) that is divine and there
does not exist a davar such that that davar is divine and distinct from the
29. See 4.2.3, p. 134 ff.
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first-mentioned divine davar. Of course, that would all be cumbersome. But
there are other ways in Hebrew that one could put the point precisely, but less
awkwardly. “There is a single God” (yesh el yachid) (די¢חָי לֵא שׁ¨י) for example.
And for the more restrictive claim, “There is a single divine thing” (yesh davar
elohi yachid) (די¢חָי י¢הֹלֵא ר´בָדּ שׁ¨י).
Thus, so far from being emphatic that there is exactly one God, the evidence
even from these proof texts is, at best, inconclusive as to whether there are
supposed to be other gods in the view of the author(s) of these passages.
Furthermore, as we noted Gregory points out numerous passages from the
Hebrew Bible that in fact seem to clearly admit the existence of other gods,30 or
at least created hypostases that participate accidentally in divinity (whatever
exactly that is).31
We saw that the Lord says to Moses, “See, I have made thee a god to
Pharaoh.”32 (Exodus 7:1) Also, “The gods of the gentiles are demons.”33 (Psalm
96:5 LXX) To which many other passages could be added, “I have said ye are
gods, all of you, sons of the Most High.” (Psalm 82:6) Likewise, “Among the
gods there is none like unto thee, O Lord; neither are there any erga like unto
thy erga.” (Psalm 86:8, LXX.) And, “For the Lord your God is God of gods,
and Lord of lords, a great God, mighty, and terrible . . . ” (Deut. 10:17) And so
on.
Though there’s little about the Bible that is uncontroversial, at least many
scholars today would also agree that the primitive Judaic or Abrahamic faith
was not monotheistic but simply monolatrous. That is, it was acknowledged
that other gods existed, only that they were not worthy of worship (or that,
in any case, Israel had made a covenant with the Lord not to offer latreia or
service to any other God but the Lord.)34
One might be uncomfortable with this fact. Why only worship one god, if
the Bible and later Christian tradition admit the existence of multiple gods?
Are the demons that the gentiles worship on an equal footing with the Lord?
Are we? (As the “sons of the Most High?”)
Gregory’s answers to these questions are obvious: Only the Holy Trinity
participate in divinity by nature. Other things that participate in the divine
energeia (or in some other token energeia of the same type) do so only acciden-
tally.
But the second, and to my mind much more important, response I will give
to the charge that the doctrine of the Trinity is unbiblical is given below, in the
section on theological objections (Chapter 6.4, pp. 293 ff.).
In conclusion, the semantic objections we’ve considered seem to turn out to
be dead ends. Objecting to Gregory’s semantics for the predicate “is God” was
30. See Chapter 4.2.3, p. 134.
31. See Chapter 4.2.3, p. 137.
32. Chapter 4.2.3, p. 137.
33. Chapter 4.2.3, p. 134.
34. E.g., (Smith 2002), p. 13. “By the end of the monarchy much of the spectrum of religious
practice had largely disappeared; monolatrous Yahwism was the norm in Israel, setting the
stage for the emergence of Israelite monotheism. As chapters 2 through 5 illustrate, the period
of the monarchy produced the conditions for the gradual development of monotheism.”
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a non-starter. Further, objecting to his semantics for counting by agent-nouns
might initially seem more plausible, and closer to a “logical” objection, but this
turns out to be problematic on many levels. It’s not clear that our ordinary
counting practices can even settle the question, or if they did whether they
wouldn’t settle it in Gregory’s favor, and if they didn’t, whether it wouldn’t
make the anti-Trinitarian argument less clearly an accusation of inconsistency
in the usual sense, and more like just a disagreement in the realm of the philos-
ophy of logic. Finally, even if it could somehow be shown that the correct view
of counting here is such that it would be strictly speaking true given Gregory’s
theology that there are three gods, it seems that this would only be so in a very
technical, but highly misleading sense. And given Gregory’s concerns, it isn’t
ultimately clear why he should ignore the misleadingness of the statement that
there are three gods and why he should be more invested in purely semantic
concerns. Unless, that is, one wants to parlay the objection into a purely the-
ological objection that his view is unbiblical. And for my response to that, see
both immediately above, and below (Chapter 6.4, p. 293 ff.)
6.3 Metaphysical Objections
Suppose, then, that the anti-Trinitarian gives up on the attempt to press an
allegedly purely “logical” argument against the doctrine of the Trinity, and even
gives up on at least the semblance of a purely logical objection that the objec-
tion to Gregory’s semantics for counting considered just above would provide.
He might, then, move on to what we can call the Metaphysical Problem of the
Trinity (MPT), saying that P is not formally inconsistent, but that it is implic-
itly inconsistent (see Chapter 1.1, p. 10). That is, he could say that, although
one can’t simply derive a contradiction from P via some logical axioms, P is in
conflict with certain necessarily true propositions, so that when we add those
propositions into the mix, we can then derive a formal contradiction.
Again, I flag that this would not count as the strictly “logical” problem we
were promised (which seemed to be that P was simply a formal contradiction),
but still it would be at least fairly closely related to the original worry, and
might be a serious problem for Trinitarianism, even if not the problem we were
promised. And while it may be that there are other orthodox accounts of the
Trinity within the pro-Nicene consensus (or within the category of orthodox
accounts of the Trinity, if that is a broader category than the pro-Nicene con-
sensus), it seems fair enough if the anti-Trinitarian wants to begin by criticizing
P as understood on GNT.
But unfortunately for the anti-Trinitarian, there is surprisingly little to ob-
ject to here. For although it’s nice that Gregory gives us a fully fleshed out
Trinitarian Theory, it is not clear that everything Gregory says about the meta-
physics and theology of the Trinity is essential to orthodox Trinitarianism, or
indeed even to his own ultimate theological motivations. What’s more, we also
saw that most of Gregory’s Trinitarian Theory actually just consists of the logi-
cal consequences of a handful of metaphysical and theological assumptions, most
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of which seem fairly tame, so that if one wants to raise any objection to the
consequences of his basic assumptions, they ought, as a matter of philosophical
etiquette, to try to trace the problem back to one of those basic assumptions.
Even if one is unsure how to locate the problem in that way, the essential ques-
tion here is whether the anti-Trinitarian could find some aspect of Gregory’s
understanding of P that both:
(A) is essential to his response to the LPT, and
(B) is genuinely problematic (viz. false).
Without seeing such an argument fleshed out, although it’s easy to see as-
pects of Gregory’s view that might be argued to be one or the other, it’s difficult
to see how one would argue that there is some aspect which is both.
For example, one might object to Gregory’s bundle-theoretic account of hy-
postases and to one or the other (or both) of the criteria of individuation of
hypostases we might attribute to him (Chapter 4.3.4, p. 165 ff.). But it isn’t
clear that any of that is actually essential to Gregory’s account, or to orthodox
Trinitarianism in general. Suppose one argued that hypostases simply “come
from the factory” already individuated. This might certainly have consequences
for other theological questions (the filioque controversy, say, or issues about
divine simplicity or the incarnation), but as far as the “threeness / oneness”
problem of the Trinity, or really anything specifically about the Trinity in itself,
it doesn’t seem like it would make much difference. As long as the hypostases can
be numerically distinct somehow, and as long as they can all bear all the same
relations to all the same other objects as before (or at least can be homoousios
and synergistic – even if they don’t have any idiomata) such an objection would
seem to have little consequence.
We’ve seen that, in fact, all that is strictly essential to Gregory’s response
to the LPT is GNTLite (because, essentially, GNTLite is all that results from
analyzing S according to Gregory’s N-semantics). And there is not much meta-
physics going on in GNTLite (though we will consider what little there is shortly).
So, to press the MPT against Gregory, one would have to find some aspect of
GNTLite to object to. But as I said, there is surprisingly little to object to here.
First, the anti-Trinitarian will surely not want to object to the non-identity
of the hypostases in P4GNT–P6GNT, since that is what makes the LPT “work”
in the first place.
Second, as for P1GNT–P3GNT, to deny, not that these are what S1–S3 mean,
or at least that they are the truth conditions for S1–S3 (as in the first semantic
objection above), but simply to say that they couldn’t possibly be true, is really
a theological objection. That is, to say this and nothing more, is to object
to Gregory’s substantive theology (discussed below), not to his metaphysics.
Within the context of GNT, it would be to say that atheism is necessarily true.
Now that would certainly be a problem for Gregory’s view. But it’s hard to take
seriously the idea that that is what the “threeness / oneness” problem amounts
to. It would be better called, simply, “the oneness problem,” or the “there is
no God in the first place” problem. And it’s difficult to see how one wouldn’t
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either just beg the question against Gregory here, or, if one argued for the
thesis, argue for it on grounds that have essentially little or nothing to do with
the considerations originally alleged by the anti-Trinitarian.
Finally, that leaves P7GNT, and various entailments of PGNT as a whole.
As for claiming, again, not that Gregory’s semantics for S7 is false (discussed
in the second semantic objection above), but that P7 so explicated (P7GNT) is
necessarily false – that would be to say that (1) there cannot be any god (as just
above), or that (2) there could not be more than one hypostasis that “gods,” or
that (3) distinct hypostases cannot share a token god-ding. And it’s not obvious
what else would be entailed by PGNT as a whole that the anti-Trinitarian might
object to.35
As for (2), of course, the anti-Trinitarian doesn’t seem to want to take it
to be a premise in his argument that there simply couldn’t be more than one
divine hypostasis. He seems to want to take it to be entailed by the Trinitarian’s
own premises. I can imagine, though, one trying to raise some kind of argument
that there simply couldn’t be more than one divine hypostasis. But again,
this doesn’t sound like a “threeness / oneness” problem, so much as a “more
than oneness” problem. Indeed, not even a “more than oneness” problem, since
on Gregory’s view there is still one God. It is a specifically “more than one
hypostasis” problem. Although it’s slightly easier here to imagine finding some
way not to just beg the question against Gregory, one would like to see what the
argument would be. And whatever it might be, it again seems like the sort of
thing that would have to be argued for on grounds that have essentially little or
nothing to do with the considerations originally alleged by the anti-Trinitarian.
That brings us to (3). The anti-Trinitarian can deny that distinct hypostases
can share a single token energeia between them, or what I have called Gregory’s
metaphysics of synergy. This seems to me to be the only real bit of metaphysics
that is genuinely essential to Gregory’s analysis of P and that might at all be
objectionable. If the phenomenon of synergy were impossible, Gregory’s account
of why the hypostases count as a single God would indeed be wrecked. We’ve
seen that Gregory’s metaphysics of synergy falls out of his more fundamental
view about the individuation of token energeiai. Therefore, let’s take a moment
to consider objections to the related issues of synergy and the individuation of
token energeiai.
First, it seems to me that the burden of proof at this point is on the anti-
Trinitarian to show there is some problem with Gregory’s metaphysics of syn-
ergy. So, there seem to be two salient questions we might ask at this point:
1. Are there good philosophical reasons to think synergy is, not just prac-
tically, but metaphysically impossible? (That is, not merely that it is
impossible for all spatio-temporal hypostases, due to the way in which
they happen to be individuated, but that it is impossible tout court.)
2. Should the Christian for some other reason resist being committed to this
bit of metaphysics? That is, if Gregory’s account of the Trinity commits
35. See Combination Objections below, p. 307.
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one to synergy, is that itself a reason to rethink Gregory’s account, and
to go back to the “business of Trinitarian theorizing,” as it were?
With respect to the first question, I only note that Davidson has defended
a theory of the individuation of events (and therefore actions) roughly parallel
to Gregory’s theory of the individuation of token energeiai,36 and which has
the result that synergy is at least logically possible. That is, without adding in
an additional assumption to the contrary, no formal contradiction arises merely
from claiming that multiple agents perform the same actions. 37 There is not
much that I could add to Davidson’s discussion of event individuation. I will
only register the fact that I am persuaded by the considerations he offers. There
seem to me to be excellent reasons for taking events to be individuals. So, it
is the anti-Trinitarian’s burden to show why the Trinitarian shouldn’t accept a
Davidsonian view on event individuation, and along with it the possibility of
synergy.
That brings us to the second question, whether there are some sort of theo-
logical reasons to want to avoid a metaphysics that allows for synergy. Again,
we would need to see the argument why. But I register my view that, prima
facie, things seem quite the opposite to me. The notion of synergy is not only
the metaphysical centerpiece of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity – it would
seem to be an incredibly fruitful concept in other areas of philosophical theology
as well. For a wee bit of further discussion on that point, see the section on
theological objections below (6.4, p. 298).
As far as I can see, the metaphysics of synergy is the only aspect of Gregory’s
substantive theology and metaphysics that is both obviously essential to his
response to the LPT (his analysis of P) and open to any serious philosophical
objection. So since I don’t see any serious reason why synergy should be rejected,
I can see no reason to reject Gregory’s response to the LPT, or his analysis of
P, on purely metaphysical grounds.
But one might object that the homoousion is so central to Gregory’s thought,
as well as to that of all of the Cappadocians and indeed to the pro-Nicene
consensus more generally, that a certain amount of metaphysics surrounding
ousiai is also essential to the doctrine of the Trinity, more broadly speaking. I
hasten to reiterate that, surprising as it may be, the homoousion is not, in fact,
essential to Gregory’s solution to the LPT specifically, nor indeed even directly
to his understanding of P. And so I flag that this takes us yet further away
from our original concern. Still, perhaps the anti-Trinitarian will want to move
on from objecting merely to the allegedly problematic subset of the doctrine of
36. For Davidson’s views on the individuation of actions and events, see (Davidson 1963),
(Davidson 1966), (Davidson 1969b), and (Davidson 1970) all reprinted in (Davidson 2001),
as well as (Davidson 1969a).
37. Though, of course, a contradiction would arise if those agents are individuated by various
spatio-temporal relations, and that their actions are in turn individuated by the same spatio-
temporal relations as the agents. This is precisely the reason why Gregory draws a real
metaphysical distinction between the Trinity – whose token energeiai are not individuated
“parallel to” the hypostases – and three shoemakers – whose token energeiai are.
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the Trinity we’ve named “P,” either via the LPT or the MPT, and ascend to a
yet higher or broader level, attacking the larger doctrine of which P was only a
part.
I note again that this takes us yet another step further away from the problem
we were originally promised. What we are considering now has left behind even
the appearance of a merely “logical” problem with just a limited subset of the
doctrine of the Trinity. Still, I will admit that, if it were impossible for their
to be three distinct hypostases with a single ousia, the homoousion would be
untenable, and that would in some sense be the end of the world for the Gregory,
the Cappadocians, and the pro-Nicene consensus in general.
But while it is certainly important to Gregory’s overall view that there be
three distinct hypostases sharing a single ousia, it hardly seems problematic.
Distinct hypostases in Gregory’s sense (individuals, like Peter, James and John,
for example), share ousiai in Gregory’s sense (natures, like humanity in this
case) all the time.
One might make a different objection, namely that ousiai are not individu-
ated by energeiai, so that Gregory’s argument for the homoousion is flawed.
But first, even if true, this would not show that the homoousion must be
false. It would only undercut one of Gregory’s arguments in favor of it.
Secondly, it seems true anyway. As Michel Barnes has shown in detail, the
principle has a long pedigree in Greek philosophy beginning with pre-Socratic
medical authors and continuing through Plato and up to the time of the Church
Fathers who took it up.38 And as noted above, in recent times, Sydney Shoe-
maker has defended the thesis that properties are individuated by their causal
powers, a thesis clearly analogous to Gregory’s.39 The metaphysical objection
under consideration, then, would take one into these debates. (And if one wants
to argue that the idea is not biblical, see my discussion of this point below in
the section on theological objections (p. 299.)
In conclusion, then, besides there being no strictly logical problem with
Gregory’s account of the Trinity, there seems to be no clear basis for making
metaphysical objections to his account – neither to Gregory’s understanding of
P specifically, nor even to the broader metaphysical framework within which
that understanding is situated.
6.4 Theological Objections
Finally, one might object neither to the logic proper, nor to the purely philo-
sophical (semantic and metaphysical) framework involved in Gregory’s account
of the Trinity, but simply to his substantive theological assumptions, directly.
But first, for non-Christians to object to specific bits of the theology involved
seems question-begging, or at least out of place. Without arguing there is some
38. (Barnes 2001).
39. See 4.4.4, p. 185 above, and all of (Shoemaker 1979)(Shoemaker 1980a)(Shoemaker
1980b)(Shoemaker 1984)(Shoemaker 1998)(Shoemaker 2003)(Shoemaker 2011), for the
development of his view over time
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kind of logical, metaphysical, or other problem with a bit of theology, on what
basis would the non-Christian argue against it? More to the point, what kind of
objection would the non-Christian make to Gregory’s theological assumptions
that would count as specifically a problem with the Trinity, rather than simply a
general problem with theism? (E.g., that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit simply
don’t exist in the first place? A devastating criticism, if true. But really just
the thesis of atheism, and not anything to do with the doctrine of the Trinity
specifically.)
On the other hand, a Christian might try to object to a bit of theology (or
a non-Christian might offer the same objection “in the voice of” a hypothetical
Christian, as it were, as an “internal” criticism) on the basis of some other aspect
of Christian theology.
In particular, a significant amount of criticism of the orthodox doctrine of the
Trinity rests on the assertion that it is not biblical. Specifically, this usually takes
the form of pointing to scriptural passages that seem to make Christ unequal to
the Father, or to a lack of explicit scriptural support for taking the Holy Spirit
to be equal to the Father (in some sense of “equal” and “unequal” that would
be relevant to the homoousion and/or the synergy of the hypostases), or to the
lack of the philosophical use of “ousia” in the Bible.
Indeed, the charge of un-biblicality seems to be, admittedly, one of Dale
Tuggy’s biggest concerns. In an interview on his views about the Trinity, Tuggy
admits that, “Not all versions of Trinity doctrines are contradictory. The more
important question is, ‘are they well-founded in the scripture?’.”40 James An-
derson likewise argues convincingly that the debate between Tuggy and Himself
ultimately centers not on purely philosophical disagreements, but on differences
of biblical exegesis.41
Without making it entirely explicit, Tuggy’s thought process here (along
with most who raise the charge of “unbiblicality” against the doctrine of the
Trinity) seems to be essentially a form of “Great Apostasy” mythology, and this
argument from unbiblicality shares the same fundamental difficulty as all such
arguments from Great Apostasy theorists.
The myth of the Great Apostasy takes many forms. What is essential to it
is that it claims that, at some point, or through some gradual process (call it
“the Great Apostasy”), mainstream Christianity lost its way, so that what came
to be mainstream Christianity is in fact a perversion of what Christianity once
was, or was supposed to be. (Some give this resulting perverted or heretical form
of Christianity the charming biblical title of “the Whore of Babylon.”) Thus,
the Great Apostasy theorist argues, we must go back through the history of
the church and separate out the gold from the dross, the wheat from the chaff.
40. With my apologies to Tuggy for holding him accountable for something said verbally in
an interview posted on YouTube. It may be uncharitable to bring this kind of “unofficial”
statement into the discussion. But I do think it is relevant, and that the view also comes
through in some of his “official” statements (papers) on the subject. As of 02-21-2014, the
video can be found at URL = http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBzA-4vtToo and the
quote occurs around 10:40.
41. (Anderson 2011) pp. 24-29.
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Only then can we recover the original, pure Christianity (call it “primitive”
Christianity) and either restore Christianity to its primitive form, or at least
save ourselves from the Whore of Babylon that displaced primitive Christianity.
What is accidental to Great Apostasy mythologies are precisely what ele-
ments of mainstream Christianity are claimed to have been part of primitive
Christianity, what are claimed to be perverse accretions or distortions that re-
sulted from the Great Apostasy, and when, how and why the Great Apostasy
is supposed to have taken place.
Now I am not of course claiming that telling a full-blown story about a Great
Apostasy is somehow a necessary condition on making the case that the doctrine
of the Trinity is unbiblical. Rather, I am pointing out that the argument that
the doctrine of the Trinity is unbiblical shares the same, fundamental problem
as all arguments within the broader Great Apostasy family of arguments, as
follows. In a nutshell, the strategy of the Great Apostasy theorist is to argue
that:
1. Some particular aspect of the Christian tradition X (in this case the ortho-
dox doctrine of the Trinity) is in some way in irreconcilable conflict with
some other aspect of the Christian tradition Y (in this case the Bible).
2. Y (in this case the Bible) takes precedence over X (in this case the doc-
trine of the Trinity). Y is more clearly or obviously a part of primitive
Christianity, or more likely to be, than X; or Y is more central to the
primitive Christian web of belief, as it were, than X; or Y is a practice
that is more essential to primitive Christianity than X, or what have you.
3. Therefore, Christians should reject X (in this case the doctrine of the
Trinity) in favor of Y (in this case the Bible).
Now besides the difficulty in establishing the first premise, it is always left
unclear what non-arbitrary criteria one could possibly employ that would make
sense out of the second premise in arguments of this type.
Thus, there are two problems for this kind of argument, corresponding to
the two premises. Let’s first look at what I regard as the less deeply problematic
(though still incredibly problematic) issue – backing up the claim that the Bible
and the doctrine of the Trinity are in conflict in the first place.
There is no shortage of passages anyone would consider “biblical”42 depict-
ing Christ as pre-existent (e.g., John 1:1-2, 1:15, 1:30), explicitly referring to
Him as “God” (e.g., θεός at John 1:1 and, with the definite article, ὁ θεός at
Hebrews 1:8), as participating in the creation of the universe (e.g., John 1:3,
1:10, Hebrews 1:2, etc.), and so on. And there is no shortage of contemporary
scholarship legitimizing an orthodox Trinitarian understanding of these passages
42. For problems with the concept of what counts as “biblical,” see my second objection
below, p. 299 ff., and for more on the difficulty of showing the doctrine of the Trinity in
particular is not biblical, see p. 305 ff.
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(e.g., Larry Hurtado’s work).43 But we will not enter into that debate here. I
simply flag the fact that there would be a lot of work to do even to make this
part of the argument stick.44
But what’s worse on this score is that, although as we’ve seen, Christ’s being
homoousios with the Father is in some sense essential to Cappadocian triadology
broadly speak, it is not a basic theological assumption for Gregory. It is rather
a consequence of other theological and metaphysical assumptions, so that if we
reject this consequence, we need to examine the more basic premises from which
it follows.
But Gregory’s purely theological assumptions are fairly few, and mostly un-
controversial. Aside from the uncontroversial (among Christians) assumptions
that there are such things as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and the only
mildly controversial assumption that these three are distinct, the only purely
theological assumption he makes in the context of the LPT is that the hypostases
engage in energeiai of the same type. And at least in the case of Christ and the
Father this seems to be amply supported by the words of Christ Himself in the
gospels. See all of the following discussion on this, but especially the quote from
John 5:17-19 below, p. 295 (“the Son doeth the same. . . ”). One might actually
interpret Christ here as meaning that He and the Father synergize on all of their
actions, in which case Gregory has everything he wants. But even if Christ is
only saying that He and the Father perform energeiai of all the same types
(i.e., the Cappadocian Assertion), it then follows from Gregory’s metaphysics
(not additional theological assumptions) that they have the same, uncreated,
nature, and from the fact that there are no idiomata to individuate their token
energeiai, it follows that they synergize anyway. Thus, to attack Gregory’s view
here, we are led back to making metaphysical (not purely theological) objections
after all.
Additionally, besides the fact that Gregory’s theological views that the hy-
postases are homoousios and synergistic are really just consequences of his meta-
physics and some fairly uncontroversial theological assumptions, it doesn’t seem
unreasonable to believe that the overall gist of this view – that is, the basing of
the unity of the Father and the Son on their synergy, the view that the Father
and Son count as “one” because of synergy – is simply taken into the tradition
from the New Testament itself (though the New Testament uses the less tech-
nical word ergon rather than the more philosophically loaded term energeia).
Consider this passage from John 10:
10:24 The Jews then gathered around Him, and were saying to Him,
43. See, e.g., (Hurtado 2003) and (Hurtado 2005).
44. Also, anti-Trinitarians here sometimes seem to confuse the issues of showing that the
doctrine of the Trinity lacks support from the Bible (e.g., showing that the sorts of passages I
mentioned above aren’t to be interpreted in a Trinitarian way), with showing that the negation
of the doctrine of the Trinity has support from the Bible (e.g., showing that a passage like
“No man knoweth the day. . . not even the Son” (Matt. 24:36; Mark 13:32) is to be taken in
an anti-Trinitarian sense). Treating the two as equivalent makes sense only to the extent that
we both reject any kind of mysterian stance and assume at the outset that the Bible does not
contradict itself, neither of which is uncontroversial in the context of a debate involving both
mysterians and anti-Trinitarians.
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“How long will You keep us in suspense? If You are the Christ, tell
us plainly.” 25 Jesus answered them, “I told you, and you do not
believe; the erga that I do in My Father’s name, these testify of
Me. . . 30 I and the Father are one.” 31 The Jews picked up stones
again to stone Him. 32 Jesus answered them, “I showed you many
good erga from the Father; for which of them are you stoning Me?”
33 The Jews answered Him, “For a good ergon we do not stone You,
but for blasphemy; and because You, being a man, make Yourself
out to be God.” 34 Jesus answered them, “. . . 37 If I do not do the
erga of My Father, do not believe Me; 38 but if I do them, though
you do not believe Me, believe the erga, so that you may know and
understand that the Father is in Me, and I in the Father.”
Thus, in 25-30, Jesus seems to connect the fact that he does certain erga
(energeiai) to the fact that He and the Father “are one.”
In 32, He claims that these erga are “from the Father.”
Finally, in 37-38, He connects doing the same erga with His being “in” the
Father and the Father “in” Him. He also moves from the metaphysical claim
that the unity of Him and the Father is grounded in their performing the same
erga, to the epistemic claim that one should believe in Him if and only if He
does “the erga of My [His] Father,” and that one can “know and understand”
that the Father is “in” Him, and He “in” the Father, due to the fact that He
does “the erga of My [His] Father.”
Later, in chapter 14, He again connects this concept of the Father being “in”
Him and He “in” the Father to their unity in virtue of synergy and to Christian
knowledge and belief:
14:8 Philip said to Him, “Lord, show us the Father, and it is enough
for us.” 9 Jesus said to him, “Have I been so long with you, and yet
you have not come to know Me, Philip? He who has seen Me has
seen the Father; how can you say, ‘Show us the Father’? 10 Do you
not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me? The
words that I say to you I do not speak on My own initiative, but
the Father who dwelleth in Me, He doeth the erga. 11 Believe Me
that I am in the Father and the Father is in Me; otherwise believe
because of the erga themselves.
This theme of synergy with the Father, and its being the basis on which
Christ claims equality with God the Father, runs all through the gospel of
John. After being accused of blasphemy for having healed the paralytic in the
pool of Bethesda on the Sabbath, Christ says:
5:17 . . . “My Father works (ergazetai) until just now, and I work
(ergazomai).” 18 Because of this, therefore the Jews sought even
more to kill him, because not only had he broken the sabbath, but
also said that God was his Father, making himself equal with God.
19 Then Jesus answered and said to them, “Amen, Amen, I say to
295
you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he sees the Father
do: for whatsoever things He doeth, the Son doeth the same thing,
in the same way . . . ”
This again shows the author of John connected Christ’s being “equal to God”
with His doing all of “the same thing(s), in the same way,” as the Father, i.e.,
the concept of synergy.45
We already saw how John connects the Father and Son’s synergy with their
unity and with being “in” one another. He later also connects unity and being
“in” one another with the relation of Christians to one another and to God, as
well as to making known who are His true disciples. In the High Priestly Prayer
of Christ, we read:
17:20 Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall
believe on me through their word; 21 That they all may be one; just
as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one
in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me. 22 And
the glory which thou gavest me I have given them; so that they may
be one, even as we are one: 23 I in them, and thou in me, so that
they may be made perfect in one; and so that the world may know
that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me.
24 Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with
me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast
given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world.
25 O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee: but I have
known thee, and these have known that thou hast sent me. 26 And
I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare it: that the
love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them.
Here He speaks of the “glory” instead of the “erga” (though one can argue
they are the same thing, or at least that the Shekhinah is one of the divine
energeiai),46 but in any case He claims that Christians will be “one” in the
same sense as that in which He and the Father are one, and that He will be “in”
them and they will be “in” Him and “in” the Father. And we have already seen
that John connects being “in” with synergy.
It is no wonder, then, that Paul constantly refers to his friends as “synergiz-
ers” of his,47 as well as to his synergy with Christ,48 (the author of the third
epistle of John may well be making the same claim when he speaks of “being
synergizers with the Truth,” “Truth” being a title of Christ).49
45. Though one could interpret this as only asserting the CA. But we’ve seen how easily
Gregory can get from the CA to the homoousion, and from the homoousion to Universal
Synergy.
46. (Bradshaw 2006), pp. 291-292.
47. E.g., Romans 16:3, Romans 16:9, Romans 16:21, 1 Corinthians 16:16, 2 Corinthians
8:23, Philippians 2:25, Philippians 4:3, Colossians 4:11, 1 Thessalonians 3:2, Philemon 1:1,
Philemon 1:24.
48. 2 Corinthians 6:1.
49. 3 John 1:8
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Paul also explicitly grounds the “oneness” he has with other Christians in
his synergy with them. “I have planted, Apollos watered; but God gave the
increase. . . Now he that planteth and he that watereth are one. . . For we are
synergizers with God. . . ”50
Although more pronounced in John, the theme of the Father and Son syn-
ergizing with one another, and of Christians synergizing with one another and
with the persons of the Trinity, is present in the synoptic gospels as well. (E.g.,
Mark 16:20, “And they went forth, and preached every where, the Lord syner-
gizing with them, and confirming the word with signs following. Amen.”)
Indeed, once one knows to look for it, the term “synergy” (συνεργέω) and
its inflections shows up all over the New Testament to describe the relationship
between the Father and Son, and similarly the relationship between Christians
with each other and with Christ, in ways that certainly sound as though this
is the fact in virtue of which, and the sense in which, they count as “one.”
(Compare the story of the Tower of Babel in Genesis 11 as well).
Thus, not only does Gregory’s view here seem to lie comfortably at the heart
of the pro-Nicene consensus, it seems not unlikely that he derived his views from
an even earlier Christian tradition, and in turn there seems to be ample support
for the view from the Bible itself on anyone’s understanding of what counts as
“the Bible.”51
I hasten to stress that I don’t imagine this brief foray into the Bible will
be sufficient to persuade anyone to accept the interpretations I’m suggesting
who doesn’t already accept Gregory’s views. Although I would be willing to
defend the view in the detail that it deserves, my point at the present is not to
show that Gregory interprets the Bible correctly. Although I obviously find the
interpretation of the Bible I am suggesting plausible, I acknowledge that the
Bible is a hard book to interpret and there is more to be said here.
The point of my remarks, however, is not to establish that Gregory’s view
is biblical in the sense of being in accordance with a correct interpretation of
the text (a point I would have to argue for separately, and at greater length).
Rather, it is, as I said, to show that “it doesn’t seem unreasonable to think that
the overall gist of this view – that the Father and Son count as ‘one’ because
of synergy – is simply taken into the tradition from the New Testament itself.”
That is to say, that it does not seem unreasonable to read the Bible in the way
I have briefly outlined above, and so one can suppose, not unreasonably, that
Gregory, not unreasonably (and not disingenuously), derived his views from an
earlier Christian tradition in combination with the Bible itself. The burden of
proof here seems to be on the anti-Trinitarian to show that Gregory’s theological
assumptions are in some sense un-biblical, either in the sense that he doesn’t
really believe that the various aspects of his triadology were really intended by
the authors of the biblical passages we have in view (that he is “imposing them”
on the text), or in the sense that his belief on that point was incorrect. The point
I am trying to make clear is that Gregory’s most basic theological premises are
50. 1 Cor. 3:6-9
51. Though see below, p. 299, for problems about what does count as “the Bible.”
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not quite what one might assume they would be, and that when we see the very
few theological assumptions he is actually making, there is hardly any reason at
all to think that he couldn’t have been sincere in his belief that these most basic
theological premises were contained in the Bible. And, although a full defense
of the point would be beyond my qualifications, there are at least some positive
reasons to suppose that he was correct, and.
Of course, one might direct one’s charges of un-biblicality not at Gregory’s
theological premises, but directly at his conclusions. But then, if one doesn’t
object to his theological premises, one must go back and attack his metaphysics
or semantics, specifically the metaphysical views that (1) synergy is possible, or
(2) that ousiai are individuated by their natural energeiai, or the semantic views
that (3) by calling something “God” or “divine” we predicate its engagement in
a certain kind of energeia, or (4) that synergizing on a token energeia is that in
virtue of which two hypostases count as “one” doer.
We’ve already seen some of the biblical reasons Gregory holds (3). (See 4.2.3,
p. 134 ff.) And just now we’ve gotten at least a taste of how much the Bible talks
about synergy (1), as well as the ways in which multiple New Testament authors
conceive of synergy as that in virtue of which “two” count as “one” (4). One
might argue that the Bible is only ever speaking of the human or creaturely sort
of “synergy” – the kind of cooperation that is possible for beings separated by
time and space. But nevertheless, there doesn’t seem to be any biblical reason
to suppose that the beefier sort of synergy Gregory attributes to the Trinity is
not possible for the Trinity. And anyway, even if one thinks that the Bible is
talking here about some lesser kind of synergy – if two things can count as one
in virtue of a lesser kind of synergy than what Gregory imagines, how much
more so would the Trinity count as one. Indeed, if the biblical requirement for
counting as one is only some lesser kind of synergy, then it wouldn’t matter
even if synergy were metaphysically impossible – the Trinity could count as one
anyway.
What’s more, the concept of synergy as Gregory understands it actually
seems quite promising. Much of the mystery people seem to find in the issue of
divine inspiration seems to be dispelled by it, for example. (We need not accept
any dichotomy between the Holy Spirit magically moving a man’s hands versus
a mere mortal simply being “inspired” by God in the way one can be “inspired”
by a painting when there is the possibility of dual agency in the same events.)
There is a parallel problem with the agency of miracles, not as much noticed as
the problem of inspiration, but equally difficult. The Bible sometimes attributes
miracles to the Lord (e.g., the parting of the Red Sea and the drying up of the
Jordan in Joshua 4:23).52 But sometimes to a prophet (e.g., Elisha’s raising the
widow’s son from the dead, and his other miracles, in 2 Kings 8:1-5).53 Yet it
52. “For the LORD your God dried up the waters of Jordan from before you, until ye were
passed over, as the LORD your God did to the Red sea, which he dried up from before us,
until we were gone over.” (Joshua 4:23).
53. “8:1 Then spake Elisha unto the woman, whose son he had restored to life, saying, Arise,
and go thou and thine household, and sojourn wheresoever thou canst sojourn: for the LORD
hath called for a famine; and it shall also come upon the land seven years. . .
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seems we want to say both that Moses parted the Red Sea and that God did,
and both that Elisha raised the widow’s son and that God did. Again, this can
be a bit of a conundrum if we assume an exclusionary principle that two distinct
individuals cannot both perform the same action. The conundrum is easy to
dispel when we accept a metaphysics of synergy.
Finally, the claim that ousiai are individuated by their natural energeiai
seems to me even more clearly biblical. It seems to me to be only a fancy way of
saying, “By their fruits shall ye know them. Do men gather grapes from thorns,
or figs from thistles?” (Matt. 7:16)
We come at last, then, to the second, and in my view much deeper and more
problematic, issue I see for the kind of criticism we are considering. And that
is that, even if the Trinitarian were to simply grant that the doctrine of the
Trinity were in conflict with the Bible, it wouldn’t be at all clear that it would
be the doctrine of the Trinity, rather than the (or a) Bible, that should be the
one to go.
Recall Tuggy says:
When it comes to viewing the councils as instruments of revelation,
many agree that the record of councils, even the major ones, is ex-
tremely spotty. One finds contradictory, morally objectionable, and
unintelligible claims in their documents, as well as some which seem
a poor fit with scripture. As to the way these proceedings occurred,
one finds a lot more than the hand of God there! Still, one could try
to make a case that, in these proceedings, God revealed the truth of
the Trinity to His people. But whether one grounds the doctrine in
the Bible or in council documents, one will be hard pressed to show
that we are so justified in believing that God revealed doctrine X
that we should believe X, even though it seems as contradictory as
the claim that there is a square circle.54
Note how Tuggy simply assumes that the being “a poor fit with scripture” is
a criterion by which to judge the councils and the doctrine of the Trinity, rather
than the other way around.
And yet the doctrine of the Trinity is both older than, and – even to this
day – more widely accepted among Christians than, any of the several canons of
scripture that one might intend to refer to as “the” Bible.55 This might sound
surprising. What do I mean?
8:4 And the king talked with Gehazi the servant of the man of God, saying, Tell me, I pray
thee, all the great things that Elisha hath done.
8:5 And it came to pass, as he was telling the king how he had restored a dead body to life,
that, behold, the woman, whose son he had restored to life, cried to the king for her house
and for her land. And Gehazi said, My Lord, O king, this is the woman, and this is her son,
whom Elisha restored to life.” (2 Kings 8:1-5)
54. (Tuggy 2003), p. 13.
55. It was apparently John Chrysostom who first used the term “τὰ βιβλία” to refer to the
scriptures. Ironically, what he was referring to was probably closer to the Peshitta than to
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At the simplest level, even when a given canon of scripture is shared by
two Christians or two groups of Christians, and when it is agreed what passages
constitute the books that in turn constitute the Bible, they might disagree about
what particular text type to identify as a given passage.
For example, Tuggy (presumably) and I both accept canons of scripture in
which the books of Samuel and the books of Chronicles count as part of the
“Old Testament.” But if Tuggy follows most Protestants in terms of the canon
of scripture, then what he refers to as “the books of Samuel” and “the books
of Chronicles” are the Masoretic texts known by those names (one particular
Hebrew text type), while what I (an Eastern Orthodox) mean are the Septuagint
texts known by those names (a Greek translation of a different, and probably
older, Hebrew text type). Thus, Tuggy will be committed to saying that 2
Samuel 8:4 reads:
“And David took from him 1,000 chariots, and 700 horsemen, and
20,000 footmen. . . ”
while he is committed to saying that 1 Chronicles 18:4 says, concerning the
same battle:
“And David took from him 1,000 chariots, 7,000 horsemen, and
20,000 foot soldiers. . . ”
On the other hand, what I, as an Orthodox Christian, refer to as “the Old
Testament” (the Septuagint) reads:
“And David took from him 1,000 chariots, 7,000 horsemen, and
20,000 foot soldiers. . . ”
in both passages. So which of these counts as “the” Bible Tuggy wants us to
adhere to?
I note in passing that, when Tuggy says, “one will be hard pressed to show
that we are so justified in believing that God revealed doctrine X that we should
believe X, even though it seems as contradictory as the claim that there is a
square circle” and given the particular way in which he resists mysterianism,
and given that the claims that, in the exact same battle, David took 7,000
horsemen versus 700 horsemen might “seem as contradictory as the claim that
there is a square circle,” there is a serious question as to whether Tuggy ought
not abandon the Masoretic text of the Old Testament in favor of the Septuagint
But of course, the more interesting point here is that there are a great number
of more important discrepancies between the Masoretic text and the Septuagint
the Protestant Bible, or even the Roman Catholic or Eastern Orthodox Bibles.
“According to Suicer he [John Chrysostom] is the first writer who gave the Bible its present
name τὰ βιβλία, The Books. Of approximately 11,000 quotations that Chrysostom makes from
the New Testament, according to Baur there are none from 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, Jude, or
Revelation. In other words, his canon of the New Testament appears to be the same as that
of the Peshitta, the Syriac version current at Antioch in his time.”
– (Metzger 1997), pp. 214-215.
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text, and I claim that Tuggy should abandon the Masoretic text because it is
“a poor fit with scripture,” to use Tuggy’s words. And of course by “scripture”
I mean “the Septuagint.” Naturally this is begging the question against Tuggy.
But by the same token, he begs the question against me to argue the reverse.
And that is the point. Namely, that we now face the question: if we must judge
other aspects of the Christian tradition by “the” scripture, then which version
of “scripture” counts as the standard by which to judge?
What’s more, beyond mere disagreements over the precise wording of in-
dividual passages, Christians disagree over the inclusion or exclusion of whole
passages from the Bible. Suppose we find a way to settle disagreements over text
types. Perhaps we agree to simply accept (de dicto) that “the original versions
of these texts are scripture,” assuming that critical scholarship can reveal what
the original versions are, or perhaps we simply set these discrepancies aside. A
Protestant like Tuggy and an Eastern Orthodox like myself might then seem
to at least “agree” that, say, the book of Psalms counts as part of the Bible.
But I accept an entire additional psalm (Psalm 151) as being part of the book
of Psalms, while Tuggy presumably does not. Similarly, I accept the Song of
the Three Holy Children as counting as part of the book of Daniel, while again
Tuggy presumably does not. So we seem to disagree even about what passages
constitute the various books we “agree” are canonical.
Suppose, then, that we even find a way around those disagreements. Still,
beyond disagreement on what passages are to be included in what books, we
even disagree over what list of books succeeds in enumerating all of the books of
the Old and New Testaments. As an Eastern Orthodox, I accept the entire books
of Wisdom, Sirach, Tobit, the Maccabees, and the other so-called “apocryphal”
books as legitimate parts of the Old Testament, while Tuggy and other “biblical”
unitarians presumably do not.
Finally, suppose we take, for example, one of the two (!) canons of scripture
(both) accepted by the Orthodox Tewahedo church of Ethiopia. These give
us yet larger Old Testaments even than that of any of the Eastern Orthodox
churches. Besides the so-called Apocryphal books from the Septuagint, their
Old Testament includes, for example, the only surviving version of the books
of Enoch and Jubilees, as well as I, II, and III Meqabyan (entirely distinct
from the Septuagint books of the Maccabees, despite having the same name) as
well as yet additional passages in certain Old Testament books like Jeremiah,
etc. Furthermore, in their “broader” New Testament canon, they have, besides
those 27 books familiar to most of us, four books of Sinodos, two Books of the
Covenant, Ethiopic Clement, and the Ethiopic Didascalia.56
There are similar variations between the canons of scripture accepted by
numerous ancient churches, such as the Assyrian, Syriac, Coptic, Armenian,
Roman Catholic, various Eastern Orthodox, and other churches.
However, one issue on which there is no variation among any of the churches
named above, is on the issue of accepting the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, as
enshrined in the first and second ecumenical councils. Even non-Chalcedonian
56. (Metzger 1997), p. 226.
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Christians like the Coptic or the Ethiopian Tewahedo church, despite rejecting
the council of Chalcedon, still accept the councils of Nicaea and Constantinople.
The same cannot be said for any of the various Christian canons of scripture.
And that, of course, is because, among all of the canons ever issued by any
of the ancient ecumenical councils, not one was a canon of scripture (this being
left to local councils).57
One wonders, then – for what reason are we supposed to prefer “the” Bible
(one particular canon of scripture) over the doctrine of the Trinity?
Perhaps Tuggy simply takes belief in (the Protestant) Bible as basic. But
then, why could one not take belief in the doctrine of the Trinity as basic?
And even if, for some reason, it turns out that one’s belief in the Bible could
be properly basic, but one’s belief in the doctrine of the Trinity could not be
– why take as basic a belief in Dale Tuggy’s Bible in particular (a canon of
scripture that, if, as I presume, he accepts the Protestant Bible, did not even
exist until well over a thousand years after the councils that anathematized the
classical Trinitarian heresies of Modalism and Arianism)?
The point here is not to bash the Protestant Bible. The point is to show
the arbitrariness of accepting it over the doctrine of the Trinity. It’s true that
one can make a case for the Protestant Bible. The question is how? How,
if one wants, at the same time, to reject the doctrine of the Trinity? The
most obvious way to argue for the Protestant Bible is to note that the list of
books it takes to constitute the Bible first appears in history in AD 367, in the
39th Festal Epistle of none other than “Mr. Trinity” himself – St. Athanasius –
probably the only person who could be argued to occupy an even more central
role in the fourth-century Trinitarian controversy and the ultimate development
of a pro-Nicene consensus than Gregory of Nyssa and the other Cappadocians.
And as for the Hebrew text-type, one can argue for it on the basis that it was
preferred (even if later rejected) by St. Jerome.58 But then on the basis of
what non-arbitrary criterion would one argue that, when St. Athanasius and
St. Jerome recommend we accept the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, we are
free to reject their views, putting ourselves in judgment over them, yet when the
self-same men recommend we accept a particular (and, we must admit, at the
57. There is in a certain sense a very odd exception to this. And that is that the so-called
Quinisext Council or Council in Trullo ratified the canons of a number of previous, local
councils, some of which contained canons of scripture, as well as a canon of scripture given by
Gregory Nazianzen. However, these lists are not identical. The result is multiple conflicting
canons of scripture all implicitly ratified by the Quinisext Council, so that there is still no
single list of books that can claim an advantage over every other in this respect. See (Metzger
1997), p. 217.
58. In a bygone day, one could argue that the Masoretic text, being Hebrew, was obviously
the original, and that where the Septuagint (a translation into Greek) seemed to differ, it
must simply have been a bad translation. But with the discovery of the Dead Sea scrolls, that
avenue has been closed as it seems there were simply multiple Hebrew text types in antiquity,
and that the Septuagint is not a particularly bad translation of the Masoretic, but probably
just a reasonably good translation of a different Hebrew text type.
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time, novel !) canon or text-type of scripture, we can no longer question them,
but must reject older canons and text-types of scripture in favor of theirs?
After all, if one accepts, say, an Arian theology as being “more primitive,”
why not also accept the Arian canon of scripture, which in some sense was more
primitive, and which seems to have (still) included The Shepherd of Hermas for
example?59 Or if one accepts an even lower Christology, alleging it to be “more
primitive,” why not accept the canon of scripture accepted by whatever allegedly
more primitive group one claims to find one’s view accepted by? For a biblical
unitarian, this might mean going with the canon of scripture accepted by the
early Ebionites, which seems to have rejected all of the gospels but Matthew,60
and on the other hand included some spurious Acts, the Periodoi of Peter, and
the “Degrees of James,”61 Thus, a Bible not only somewhat different from the
Protestant Bible, but radically unlike any Bible accepted by any Christians
today. Again, the point is not that the Protestant Bible is crazy. The point is
that it is entirely unclear how one would, at the same time, argue in favor of the
Protestant Bible, but against the doctrine of the Trinity. How without being
pushed, on the question of the scriptural canon, in the direction of accepting
such a foreign canon of scripture that referring to oneself as a “biblical” unitarian,
or making the charge that the doctrine of the Trinity is “unbiblical” becomes
simply laughable?62
And in yet another great irony, Great Apostasy theorists frequently claim
that the doctrine of the Trinity was in some sense “shoved down the throats” of
the ecumenical councils by the “political” machinations of unscrupulous bishops
or emperors. But whatever exactly these criticisms amount to, the question
is, were the local, North African councils in which the New Testament most
commonly accepted today was adopted,63 or indeed any of the councils sanc-
tioning any other canon of scripture in use by any churches anywhere today,
significantly different in this respect from any other church councils in history
(like the first or second ecumenical councils)? What is it that makes these
“good” councils that give us a canon of scripture somehow different from the
“bad” ones that give us the doctrine of the Trinity (or whatever other aspect
of the Christian tradition the Great Apostasy theorist wants to reject)? Again,
what we want is a non-arbitrary criterion that somehow distinguishes between
the two. To take the Great Apostasy theorist’s criticisms seriously, we would
need to get some kind of clarity on just what the alleged problem with what
the Great Apostasy theorist sees as the “bad” councils amounts to, such that it
isn’t obviously shared by what he sees as the “good” councils. And it’s entirely
59. (St. Athanasius 1892), p. 162. “And in the Shepherd it is written (since they allege
this book also, though it is not of the Canon) . . . ”
60. (Epiphanius of Salamis 1987), p. 122.
61. (Epiphanius of Salamis 1987), p. 131 ff.
62. And of course, the considerations in this paragraph show that even if the Great Apostasy
theorist were to abandon the peculiarities of the Protestant Bible, opting to accept the Roman
Catholic or the Eastern Orthodox (or the Armenian, or Coptic, or the Peshitta, or what have
you), a substantially similar case might still be made for any more traditional Bible.
63. I.e., the Synod of Hippo Regius (AD 393), whose acts are now lost, but which were read
and accepted at the Synod of Carthage (AD 397), see (Metzger 1997), p. 314.
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unobvious what such a criterion could possibly be.
On top of that, of course, within whichever of those councils the Great
Apostasy theorist wants to appeal to in order to support some version of the
Bible, we will most likely also need some non-arbitrary criterion that allows us
to separate out the canon of scripture in particular from all of the other canons
passed by the same council. For example, in addition to ratifying the favorite
canon of scripture of most Protestants, the third council of Carthage also passed
a canon requiring clerical celibacy. So, if the Great Apostasy theorist does not
himself want to be obligated to have a purely celibate priesthood, yet still wants
to obligate others to accept the council of Carthage’s canon of scripture, he will
need a non-arbitrary criterion to sort through “bad” canons and “good” canons
within the “good” councils. (Of course, he might employ multiple criteria to do
all of the different jobs he needs done, or he might try to find a single criterion
that will do all of them at once.)
And what’s more, he will need a criterion that will allow him to be pretty
precise about which canon(s) of scripture make the cut and which don’t. For it
will not do to say that just any of the canons of scripture traditionally in use by
some ancient church or another that we would countenance as Christian counts
as a legitimate version of the Bible. Otherwise, we would have to go back again
to the question of whether the doctrine of the Trinity is, after all, “biblical,” in
the fullest and most problematic sense of the term. Why so?
Although I do not have access to a copy of the Ethiopian Book of the
Covenant, included in the Ethiopian Tewahedo Church’s “broader” New Tes-
tament canon (I am not aware that there exists any English translation, and I
do not know Ge’ez), I do know that section 61 is supposed to be quite similar
to the Testamentum Domini (Testament of the Lord),64 which is well known
for its anti-Arian theology, and in which we read such gems as:
Let the church be thus: let it have three entrances as a type of the
Trinity. . . 65
We lay hands on the servant of God, who hath been chosen in the
Spirit. . . for the delivering of true judgement and divine and holy
revelations, and of divine gifts and faithful doctrines of the Trin-
ity. . . 66
Let him offer on Saturday three loaves for a complete symbol of the
Trinity. . . 67
[We confess] Him who is pre-existent, and was present, and is, and
cometh; who suffered and was buried, and rose, and was glorified by
the Father; . . . who is not only Man but therewith also God ; who
. . . descended in the Godhead into Sheol. . . the indivisible Thought
who is from the Father, and [is] of one will with Him. . . 68
64. According to (Metzger 1997), p. 228.
65. (Maclean 1902) ch. 19, p. 62.
66. (Maclean 1902) ch. 21, p. 65.
67. (Maclean 1902) ch. 23, p. 69.
68. (Maclean 1902) ch. 28, pp. 84-85.
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It also seems that the Ethiopian Sinodos contains a number of (pseudo-)
canons from the council of Nicaea, a section titled “The discourse of the Nicene
Fathers on the Holy Trinity,” and another titled “On the Essence of the Holy
Trinity.”69 In addition, some manuscripts of it contain “The Creed of Africa,”
which is just the Athanasian Creed in Ge’ez.70
Of course, it is true that these books must have been written after the time
of the council of Nicaea, and that versions containing “The Creed of Africa”
must have only come about after the Athanasian Creed was written. But it is
equally true that they were thought worthy to be included in what Ethiopians
consider the (or at least a) biblical canon. And it is equally true that, though the
broader Ethiopian canon may have been formed quite late, it was still formed
over a thousand years before the canon of scripture Tuggy presumably subscribes
to (the Protestant Bible), and not significantly later than any of the others
commonly in use today (late 4th to early 5th century at the earliest).
It seems, then, that there exists at least some credible version of “the” Bible
that in fact explicitly asserts the doctrine of the Trinity. The Great Apostasy
theorist, then, will need his criterion (whatever it turns out to be) to rule out
the Ethiopian canon as somehow illegitimate. But again, how were the rele-
vant Ethiopian councils (or whatever other factors in the determination of the
Ethiopian canon) somehow different from any others? On what basis will Tuggy
insist that this Bible is somehow defective and that it is rather his Bible, his
version of scripture, that all other Christians must bow to? One can imagine
an Ethiopian Orthodox Christian saying to Tuggy something like the following:
There are over 40 million of us Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, and
very few (surely fewer than a million) of you “biblical” unitarians.
Our church has existed as the dominant religious force in our land
since about the fourth century, and in at least some form ever since
the apostle Philip himself preached Christ to our Kandake’s eunuch.
(Acts 8:26-40). Your church has only come into existence in (rela-
tively) recent times.
Our people have had just this Bible, in just this text type, since
before your people so much as had a language called “English,” or
were given an alphabet by certain of our fellow Trinitarians with
which you would later translate their Bible into your language.
And this canon of scripture of ours has been in use for more than a
thousand years before yours was ever even begun.
So how is it that your Bible sits in judgement over us and ours?
And it seems to me that the Ethiopian would deserve a response from Tuggy.
Now on the Ethiopian’s part, he would be willing to tolerate the fact that
Tuggy works with a much smaller Bible. (The Ethiopian is in communion with
69. (Wright 1877), pp. 269-270.
70. (Harden 1926), p. 62. See also, (Wright 1877), p. 274.
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the Coptic, who has a smaller Bible.) But one thing that the Ethiopian would
not tolerate, is the fact that Tuggy does not accept the doctrine of the Trinity.
And the reason for this discrepancy in what he would be willing to tolerate
is simple. Let us grant that the councils are “spotty,” whatever precisely that
amounts to. Still, one thing that can be said for the doctrine of the Trinity
is that it at least has been accepted at a “spotty” ecumenical council and by
Christians all over the world. The same cannot be said for any of the various
Christian Bibles – neither the Ethiopian’s, nor Tuggy’s.
Again, all of this is just a specific playing out of the general, fundamental
problem with all “Great Apostasy” mythologies. Namely, that the Great Apos-
tasy theorist must give us some non-arbitrary criterion by which we are to carve
up the history of the Christian tradition. So that, when pitting two aspects, X
and Y, of the Christian tradition against one another, we end up preferring Y
over X, instead of vice-versa.
Usually the criterion is chronological. Tuggy cites, for example, the book
A.D. 381: Heretics, Pagans, and the Dawn of the Monotheistic State by Charles
Freeman,71 the thesis of which should be obvious from the title. Suppose for
argument’s sake we say that the doctrine of the Trinity is something Christians
may reject, since it fails to meet the criterion of being an object of consensus
among Christians prior to 381 AD. In that case, we may then reject any and
all of the biblical canons currently in use as well. And that is not likely to be
a welcome result for a “biblical” unitarian like Tuggy.
On the other hand, suppose that instead of a chronological criterion, we
make the criterion that the aspect of Christian tradition to prefer (the one that
is more primitive, or more likely to be primitive, or whatever the claim is) is
the one sanctioned at the largest number of councils, or the biggest councils,
or the most widely accepted councils, or the earliest councils, or by the most
Christians or the most bishops, or the earliest bishops. All of these criteria
would again give us the doctrine of the Trinity before any particular canon of
scripture.
But then, what happens if we simply lower the bar? Low enough that the
Bible – some Bible the Great Apostasy theorist would want to accept – now
passes our test. Then the doctrine of the Trinity (along with, likely, a host of
other nasty doctrines and practices) will be let in as well.72
In summary, to make his argument work, the Great Apostasy theorist needs
to give us some non-arbitrary criterion that would let the doctrines he likes (e.g.,
his particular canon of scripture) pass, but that would not let the doctrines he
doesn’t like (e.g., the doctrine of the Trinity) pass. Although there is no way to
rule out such a possibility in theory, the fact that Great Apostasy mythology
has been around now for a number of centuries, and still awaits such a criterion,
suggests that there is none to be had.
71. (Freeman 2009).
72. Essentially the same points I am making are made fairly briefly, and much more enter-
tainingly, in David Bercot’s non-scholarly, but still very well-argued books, (Bercot 1992)
and (Bercot 1989), which I highly recommend.
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Again, I emphasize that I am not arguing that objections that the doctrine of
the Trinity are unbiblical necessarily entail a full-blown Great Apostasy theory.
I am only saying that any such objection shares the same, familiar, problematic
features. Even if such an opposition between a particular Bible and the doctrine
of the Trinity were simply granted, we would need to be presented with some kind
of non-arbitrary criterion with which we can distinguish between those aspects
of the Christian tradition that are “primitive” and those that are corruptions,
such that the Bible will count as primitive, but not the doctrine of the Trinity.
And so far no such criterion has been presented, nor is it obvious how one could
be. I conclude that it is unlikely for there to be any good argument for directly
opposing the theology involved in the doctrine of the Trinity.
Combination Objections
Finally, I have mostly been considering objections to individual assumptions of
Gregory’s, one at a time. One might take, dare I call it, a “synergistic” approach
here, saying that, although perhaps unobjectionable in isolation, there is some
reason why certain of Gregory’s assumptions are problematic taken together.
Perhaps some aspect of his theology and some aspect of his metaphysics are
for some reason not compossible, or have some other problematic feature when
taken together.
But to stave off every possible objection to every possible combination of
Gregory’s basic assumptions would be at best tedious, at worst impossible. In
any case, it would be incumbent on the anti-Trinitarian to present such a case,
and it is not obvious to me that there is any such case to be made. The next
move there belongs to the anti-Trinitarian.
6.5 Final Conclusion
We’ve seen, then, in the course of this dissertation, that the LPT has a for-
mally adequate solution in Gregory of Nyssa’s account of the Trinity. Thus, the
doctrine of the Trinity is not logically inconsistent – or at least, if it were, it
wouldn’t be for the reasons usually alleged.
What’s more, Gregory’s broader, general philosophical framework (meta-
physics and semantics) relies, ultimately, on only a very few assumptions, most
of which (save, perhaps, his view on counting by agent nouns, and the meta-
physics of synergy) are, if not uncontroversial, at least certainly not outrageous.
Likewise, most of Gregory’s Trinitarian theory, we saw, turned out simply to
consist of the logical consequences of those metaphysical principles and a small
number of theological assumptions, all of which seem to have precedent in the
Christian tradition prior to his time, and plausibly in the New Testament itself.
Assuming I have done my history rightly, assuming Gregory’s view is indeed
roughly what I’ve presented it to be, there is no denying that the doctrine of
the Trinity is, at a minimum, logically consistent. Furthermore, even stepping
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outside the primary scope of this dissertation into broader questions of whether
there are any serious objections to be made to Gregory’s doctrine of the Trinity
at all, it turned out that there were only two points to attack the doctrine that
turn out to be at all plausible – his semantics for counting by agent nouns, and
the metaphysics of synergy.
On the first issue (the semantics for counting by agent nouns), we saw, first,
that it’s a good question whether any disagreement could ever be definitively
resolved at all. Second, even if Gregory could be shown to be wrong about
his semantics here, it seems more like an (alleged) mistake in the philosophy
of logic, rather than like the formal contradiction the anti-Trinitarian origi-
nally promised. Next, even if it could be persuasively argued that Gregory’s
semantics (or philosophy of logic) is wrong here, so long as there is nothing
impossible about Gregory’s substantive theory, it’s not clear how worried Trini-
tarians should be about the semantic questions involved anyway. And finally,
even if it could be shown that, at least in some technical sense, it would be true
to say “there are three gods,” the case can still be made that saying so would
simply be so misleading that it would actually be less misleading to assert the
technically false, but non-misleading statement that “there is one God.”
On the second issue (the metaphysics of synergy), it would more obviously
be a problem for the Trinitarian if the anti-Trinitarian can make it a problem.
But it also is less obvious that the anti-Trinitarian can problematize it at all.
Indeed, to my mind, the possibility of the phenomenon of synergy seems to
constitute an exciting contribution that patristic thought can make to contem-
porary philosophical theology, and rather than shying away from it, Trinitarians
should gladly embrace the possibilities it offers.
Any direct objections to Gregory’s theology that have anything to do specif-
ically with the Trinity, whether from an external (non-Christian) or internal
(“biblical”) perspective, seemed ultimately question-begging. And finally, for
any objection directed at some combination of Gregory’s assumptions, it would
be incumbent on the anti-Trinitarian to articulate those objections before the
Trinitarian needs to respond. But however any of these further possible discus-
sions might go, it is clear that the doctrine of the Trinity, properly understood, is
not formally inconsistent. At least not for the reasons alleged in the LPT. And
the prospects for attacking the broader philosophical framework of Gregory’s
solution to the LPT seem limited, and dim.
We began this dissertation saying that the doctrine of the Trinity might
seem to be an easy target for anti-Christian arguments. It is clearly central to
the faith of mainstream Christians, and yet seemed obviously incoherent. But
what seemed like an easy target turns out to be mostly a dead end. Upon
examination, there is surprisingly little to object to, and none of the possible
avenues of attack seem very promising. In any case, should there turn out to be
any problem with the doctrine at all, it will clearly not be one of mere logical
inconsistency in saying that “These Three are One.”
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Appendix A:
Appendix of Proofs
Rather than presenting them in the main text, I’ve relegated the more involved
inferences from Chapter 5 to this appendix. In what follows, rather than defining
a language, axioms and so forth, I simply follow a fairly standard version of
predicate logic and make use of well-known inference rules that anyone familiar
enough with predicate logic to understand the proofs at all will surely be familiar
with.
I have taken shortcuts when it is entirely obvious that I am, and what the
shortcut is, and that there is a valid inference there to be had. E.g., deriving
P & Q & R & S from P & R & S and Q in one step of & Introduction, rather
than decomposing the whole bunch and building it back up again. Likewise, in
a few rare cases I’ve used abbreviations like o = n = m for (o = n) & (o = m)
& (n = m), and derived o = m from o = n = m by one step of & Elimination.
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A.1 Ohomoousion
The following:
IDO: (∀x)(∀y)[(Ox & Oy) → (x=y ↔ (∀z)[E*z → (Nzx ↔ Nzy)])]
CA: (∀x){E*x → (Nxo ↔ Nxn ↔ Nxm)}
O(i): Oo
O(ii): On
O(iii): Om
entail:
Ohomoousion: o=n=m
Proof:
1 (Oo & On) → (o=m ↔ (∀z)[E*z→(Nzo↔Nzn)]) †
2 Oo & On O(i),O(ii) & Int
3 o=m ↔ (∀z)[E*z→(Nzo↔Nzn)] 1,2 MP
4 Select: a For ∀ Int
5 Suppose: E*a For → Int
6 E*a → (Nao↔Nan↔Nam) CA ∀ Elim a/x
7 Nao↔Nan↔Nam 5,6 MP
8 Nao↔Nan 7 & Elim
9 E*a → (Nao↔Nan) 5-8 → Int
10 (∀z)[E*z→(Nzo↔Nzn)] 4-9 ∀ Int z/a
11 o=n 3,10 ↔ Elim
12 (On & Om) → (n=m ↔ (∀z)[E*z→(Nzn↔Nzm)]) ††
13 On & Om O(ii),O(iii) & Int
14 n=m ↔ (∀z)[E*z→(Nzn↔Nzm)] 12,13 MP
15 Select: b For ∀ Int
16 Suppose: E*b For → Int
17 E*b→(Nbo↔Nbn↔Nbm) CA ∀ Elim b/x
18 Nbo↔Nbn ↔Nbm 16,17 MP
19 Nbn↔Nbm 18 & Elim
20 E*b→(Nbn↔Nbm) 16-19 → Elim
21 (∀z)[E*z→(Nzn↔Nzm)] 15-20 ∀ Int z/b
22 n=m 14,21 ↔ Elim
23 o=m 11,22 = o/n
24 o=n=m 11,22,23 & Int
† IDO T Axiom, followed by ∀ Elim o/x n/y
†† IDO T Axiom, followed by ∀ Elim n/x m/y
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A.2 NE*E
The following:
NDef: (∀x)(∀y){Nxy ↔ (∀z)[Pzy → (∃w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]}
entails:
NE*E: (∀x)(∀y){(E*x&Oy&Nxy) →
(∀z)[(Hz&Pzy) → (∃w)(Ew&Pwx&Pzw)]}
Proof:
1 Select: a For ∀ Int.
2 Select: b For ∀ Int.
3 Suppose: E*a&Ob&Nab For → Int.
4 Select: c For ∀ Int.
5 Suppose Hc&Pcb For → Int.
6 Nab 3 & Elim
7 Nab↔(∀z)[Pzb→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)] †
8 (∀z)[Pzb→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)] 6,7 ↔ Elim
9 Pcb→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pcw) ††
10 Pcb 5 & Elim
11 (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pcw) 9,10 MP
12 (Hc&Pcb)→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pcw) 5-11 → Int.
13 (∀z)[(Hz&Pzb)→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)] 4-12 ∀ Int z/c
14 (E*a&Ob&Nab)→(∀z)[(Hz&Pzb)→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)] ‡
15 (∀y){(E*a&Oy&Nay)→(∀z)[(Hz&Pzy)→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)]} ‡‡
16 (∀x)(∀y){(E*x&Oy&Nxy)→(∀z)[(Hz&Pzy)→(∃w)(Ew&Pwx&Pzw)]} ∗
† NDef ∀ Elim a/x, b/y
†† 8 T Axiom, followed by ∀ Elim c/z
‡ 3-13 → Int
‡‡ 2-14 ∀ Int y/b
∗ 1-15 ∀ Int x/a
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A.3 E*Lemma
The following:
NE*E: (∀x)(∀y){(E*x&Oy&Nxy) →
(∀z)[(Hz&Pzy) → (∃w)(Ew&Pwx&Pzw)]}
O(i): Oo
H(i): Hf
RH(i): Pfo
entail:
E*Lemma: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃y)(Ey & Pyx)]
Proof:
1 Select: a For ∀ Int
2 Suppose: E*a&Nao For → Int
3 (E*a&Oo&Nao)→(∀z)[(Hz&Pzo)→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)] †
4 E*a 2 & Elim
5 Oo O(i)
6 Nao 2 & Elim
7 E*a&Oo&Nao 4,5,6 & Int
8 (∀z)[(Hz&Pzo)→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)] 3,7 MP
9 (Hf&Pfo)→(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pfw) 8 ∀ Elim f/z
10 Hf H(i)
11 Pfo RH(i)
12 Hf&Pfo 10,11 & Int
13 (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pfw) 9,12 MP
14 Ec&Pca&Pfc 13 ∃ Elim c/w
15 Ec&Pca 14 & Elim
16 (∃y)(Ey&Pya) 15 ∃ Int y/c
17 (E*a&Nao) → (∃y)(Ey&Pya) 2-16 → Int
18 (∀x)[(E*x&Nxo) → (∃y)(Ey&Pyx)] 1-17 ∀ Int x/a
† NE*E ∀ Elim a/x, o/y
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A.4 EUnique
The following:
E*Lemma: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃y)(Ey & Pyx)]
EE*≤1: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Ex & E*y & Pxy & E*z & Pxz) → y = z]
IDE: (∀x)(∀y){[Ex & Ey] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)([Iz v E*z]→[Pxz↔Pyz])]}
¬EI: ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)
entail:
EUnique: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyx)]
Proof:
1 Select: a For ∀ Int
2 Suppose: E*a & Nao For → Int
3 (E*a & Nao) → (Ey) (Ey & Pya) †
4 (Ey) (Ey & Pya) 2,3, MP
5 Eb & Pba 4, ∃ Elim, b/y
6 Eb 5, & Elim
7 Select: c For ∀ Int
8 Suppose: Ec & Pca For → Int
9 Ec 8, & Elim
10 Eb & Ec 6,9 & Int
11 [Eb&Ec] → [b=c↔(∀z)([IzvE*z]→[Pbz↔Pcz])] ††
12 b=c ↔ (∀z)([Iz v E*z] → [Pbz ↔ Pcz]) 10,11 MP
13 Suppose: b6=c For Reductio
14 ¬(∀z)([Iz v E*z] → [Pbz ↔ Pcz]) 12,13 ↔ Elim
15 (∃z)¬([Iz v E*z] → [Pbz ↔ Pcz]) 14 DeM Quant
16 ¬([Id v E*d] → [Pbd ↔ Pcd]) 15 ∃ Elim, d/z
17 [Id v E*d] & ¬[Pbd ↔ Pcd] 16 ¬ → Equiv.
18 Id v E*d 17 & Elim
19 ¬[Pbd ↔ Pcd] 17 & Elim
20 ¬([Pbd & Pcd] v [¬Pbd & ¬Pcd]) 19 ↔ Equiv.
21 ¬[Pbd & Pcd] & ¬[¬Pbd & ¬Pcd] 20 DeM
22 [¬Pbd v ¬Pcd] & [Pbd v Pcd] 21 DeM
23 Pbd v Pcd 22 & Elim
24 Suppose: Pbd For → Int
25 Suppose: E*d For Reductio
26 (Eb&E*a&Pba&E*d&Pbd) → a=d ‡
27 Eb 6
28 E*a 2 & Elim
29 Pba 5 & Elim
30 Eb & E*a & Pba & E*d & Pbd 27-29,25,24 & Int
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31 a = d 26,30 MP
32 ¬Pbd v ¬Pcd 22 & Elim
33 ¬Pba v ¬Pca 31,32 = a/d
34 ¬(Pba & Pca) 33 DeM
35 Pba 5 & Elim
36 Pca 8 & Elim
37 Pba & Pca 35,36 & Int
38 ¬E*d 25,34,37 Reductio
39 Id 18,38 Dis. Syl.
40 Eb & Id & Pbd 27,39,24 & Int
41 (∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy) 40 ∃Int x/b y/d
42 Pbd → (∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy) 24-41 → Int
43 Suppose: Pcd For → Int
44 Suppose: E*d For → Int
45 (Ec&E*a&Pca&E*d&Pcd) → a=d ‡‡
46 Ec 9
47 E*a 2 & Elim
48 Pca 8 & Elim
49 Ec & E*a & Pca & E*d & Pcd 46-48,44,43 & Int
50 a = d 45,49 MP
51 ¬Pbd v ¬Pcd 22 & Elim
52 ¬Pba v ¬Pca 51,50 = a/d
53 ¬(Pba & Pca) 52 DeM
54 Pba 5 & Elim
55 Pca 8 & Elim
56 Pba & Pca 54,55 & Int
57 ¬E*d 44,53,56 Reductio
58 Id 18,57 Dis. Syl.
59 Ec & Id & Pcd 9,58,43 & Int
60 (∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy) 59 ∃ Int x/c y/d
61 Pcd → (∃x) (∃y) (Ex & Iy & Pxy) 43-60 → Int
62 (∃x) (∃y) (Ex & Iy & Pxy) 23,42,61 C.D.
63 ¬(∃x) (∃y) (Ex & Iy & Pxy) ¬EI
65 b=c 13,62,63 Reductio
66 (Ec & Pca) → b=c 8-65 → Int
67 (Eb & Pba) 5
68 (Eb & Pba) & {(Ec & Pca) → b=c} 66,67 & Int
69 (∀z)[(Eb & Pba) & {(Ez & Pza) → b=z}] 7-68 ∀ Int z/c
70 (∃y)(∀z)[(Ey & Pya) & {(Ez & Pza) → y=z}] 69 ∃ Int y/b
71 (∃!y)(Ey & Pya) 70 ∃! Equiv.
72 (E*a & Nao) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pya) 2-71 → Int
73 (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyx)] 1-72, ∀ Int x/a
† E*Lemma ∀ Elim a/x
†† IDE T axiom, followed by ∀ Elim b/x, c/y
‡ EE*≤1 T axiom, followed by ∀ Elim b/x, a/y, d/z
‡‡ EE*≤1 T axiom, followed by ∀ Elim c/x, a/y, d/z
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A.5 Σ*∀
The following:
NDef: (∀x)(∀y){Nxy ↔ (∀z)[Pzy → (∃w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]}
Σ*Def: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){Σ*xyz ↔
[Hx & Hy & E*z & x 6=y & (∃w)(Ew & Pwz & Pxw & Pyw)]}
EUnique: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyx)]
entail:
Σ*∀: (∀x){[E*x&Nxo] → (∀y)(∀z)[(Hy&Hz&y 6=z&Pyo&Pzo) → Σ*yzx]}
Proof:
1 Select: a For ∀ Int
2 Suppose: E*a&Nao For → Int
3 Select: b For ∀ Int
4 Select: c For ∀ Int
5 Suppose: Hb&Hc&b 6=c&Pbo&Pco For → Int
6 (E*a&Nao) → (∃!y)(Ey&Pya) †
7 (∃!y)(Ey&Pya) 2,6 MP
8 Nao ↔ (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)] ††
9 Nao 2 & Elim
10 (∀z)[Pzo → (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pzw)] 8,9 ↔ Elim
11 Pco → (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pcw) ‡
12 Pco 5 & Elim
13 (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pcw) 11,12 MP
14 Ed&Pda&Pcd 13 ∃ Elim d/w
15 Pbo → (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw) ‡‡
16 Pbo 5 & Elim
17 (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw) 15,16 MP
18 Ee&Pea&Pbe 17 ∃ Elim e/w
19 Ed&Pda 14 & Elim
20 Ee&Pea 18 & Elim
21 (∃y)(∀z)[(Ey&Pya)&[(Ez&Pza) → y=z ] ] 7 Equiv.
22 (∀z)[(Ef&Pfa)&[(Ez&Pza) → f=z ] ] 21 ∃ Elim f/y
23 (Ef&Pfa)&[(Ed&Pda) → f=d ] 22 ∀ Elim d/z
24 (Ef&Pfa)&[(Ee&Pea) → f=e ] 23 ∀ Elim e/z
25 (Ed&Pda) → f=d 23 & Elim
26 (Ee&Pea) → f=e 24 & Elim
27 f=d 19,25 MP
28 f=e 20,26 MP
29 d=e 27,28 = d/f
30 Pbe 18 & Elim
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31 Pbd 30,29 = d/e
32 Ed&Pda&Pbd&Pcd 14,31 & Int
33 (∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw&Pcw) 32 ∃ Int w/d
34 Hb&Hc&b 6=c 5 & Elim
35 E*a 2 & Elim
36 Hb&Hc&E*a&b 6=c 34,35 & Int
37 Hb&Hc&E*a&b 6=c&(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw&Pcw) ∗
38 Σ*bca↔[Hb&Hc&E*a&b 6=c&(∃w)(Ew&Pwa&Pbw&Pcw)] ∗∗
39 Σ*bca 37,38 ↔ Elim
40 (Hb&Hc&b6=c&Pbo&Pco) → Σ*bca 5-39 → Int
41 (∀z)[(Hb&Hz&b 6=z&Pbo&Pzo) → Σ*bza] 4-40 ∀ Int z/c
42 (∀y)(∀z)[(Hy&Hz&y 6=z&Pyo&Pzo) → Σ*yza] 3-41 ∀ Int y/b
43 [E*a&Nao] → (∀y)(∀z)[(Hy&Hz&y 6=z&Pyo&Pzo) → Σ*yza] ?
44 (∀x){[E*x&Nxo] → (∀y)(∀z)[(Hy&Hz&y6=z&Pyo&Pzo) → Σ*yzx]} ??
† EUnique ∀ Elim a/x
†† NDef ∀ Elim a/x o/y
‡ 10 T Axiom, followed by ∀ Elim c/z
‡‡ 10 T Axiom, followed by ∀ Elim b/z
∗ 33,36 & Int.
∗∗ Σ*Def ∀ Elim b/x c/y a/z
? 2-42 → Int
?? 1-43 ∀ Int x/a
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A.6 P7GNT-EQ
The following:
P7Lemma: (∃!y)(Ey & Pyg*)
RH(xxi): Pfg
E(i) & RE(i): Eg & Pgg*
entail:
P7GNT-EQ. (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy])→y=x]}
Proof:
1 Select: a For ∀ Int.
2 Suppose: Ea & Pag* & (∃w)[Pwa] For → Int
3 Ea & Pag* 2 & Elim
4 Eg & Pgg* E(i) & RE(i)
5 (∃!y)(Ey & Pyg*) P7Lemma
6 (∃x)(∀y){(Ex & Pxg*) & [(Ey & Pyg*) → y = x]} 5 Equiv
7 (∀y){(Eb & Pbg*) & [(Ey & Pyg*) → y = b]} 6 ∃ Elim b/x
8 (Eb & Pbg*) & [(Ea & Pag*) → a = b]} 7 ∀ Elim a/y
9 (Eb & Pbg*) & [(Eg & Pgg*) → g = b]} 7 ∀ Elim g/y
10 (Ea & Pag*) → a = b 8 & Elim
11 (Eg & Pgg*) → g = b 9 & Elim
12 a = b 10,3 MP
13 g = b 11,4 MP
14 a = g 12,13 = g/b
15 (Ea & Pag* & (∃w)[Pwa]) → a = g 2–14 → Int
16 Pfg RH(xxi)
17 (∃z)(Pzg) 16 ∃ Int z/f
18 Eg & Pgg* & (∃z)(Pzg) 4,17 & Int
19 [Eg&Pgg*&(∃z)(Pzg)]&[(Ea&Pag*&(∃w)[Pwa])→a=g] †
20 (∀y){[Eg&Pgg*&(∃z)(Pzg)]&[(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy])→y=g]} ††
21 (∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)]&[(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy])→y=x]} ‡
† 18,15 & Int
†† 1-19 ∀ Int y/a
‡ 20 ∃ Int x/g
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A.7 φGNTα 6|= α=t i for any t i such that t i 6= α
(∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)
does not fit the description:
φα such that φα |= α = t i for some term t i such that t i 6= α.
Suppose (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pαx) |= α = t i for some term t i such that t i 6= α.
Then ∅ |= (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pαx) → α = t i for some term t i such that t i
6= α.
So, ∅ |= ¬[(∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pαx) & α 6= t i ] for any term t i such that t i
6= α.
So there is no model for (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pαx) & α 6= t i) for any term t i
such that t i 6= α.
So there is no model for (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pfx) & f 6= s (since “f” is not the
same term as “s”).
But MP-GNT-F, is a model for (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pfx) & f 6= s.
So, (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pαx) 6|= α = t i for any term t i such that t i 6= α.
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Appendix B:
Summary of GNTF
Legend
0 = Stipulative definition, naming of an arbitrarily selected individual from a
set known to be non-empty, or logical consequence of other proposition(s).
+ = Substantive assumption
B.1 Gregory’s Metaphysics
B.1.1 Possible Object Types
“is a hypostasis” : “H”
“is an idioma” : “I”
“is an ousia” : “O”
“is an energeia type” : “E*”
“is an energeiai token” : “E”
B.1.2 Possible Relations Between Tokens of the Object
Types
“Metaphysical Predication” or “Having”
“x has y” : “Pxy”
The “Natural To” Relation
0 NDef: (∀x)(∀y){Nxy ↔ (∀z)[Pzy → (∃w)(Ew & Pwx & Pzw)]}
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Synergy
0 ΣDef: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){Σxyz ↔
[Hx & Hy & Ez & x6=y & Pxz & Pyz]}
0 Σ*Def: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){Σ*xyz ↔
[Hx & Hy & E*z & x 6=y & (∃w)(Ew & Pwz & Pxw & Pyw)]}
B.1.3 Relations Possible for the Objects
Statements of the form Pxy can be true where:
x is a hypostasis and y is an idioma
x is a hypostasis and y is an ousia
x is a hypostasis and y is a token energeia
x is a token energeia and y is an idioma
x is a token energeia and y is an energeia type
Statements of the form Nxy can be true where:
x is an energeia type and y is an ousia
B.1.4 Relation Requirements
+ NHI: (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Iy & Pxy)]
+ NHO: (∀x)[Hx → (∃y)(Oy & Pxy)]
0 NHE: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Pxy & Nzy) → (∃w)(Pwz & Pxw)]
+ NOE*: (∀x)[Ox → (∃y)(E*y & Nyx)]
0 NE*E: (∀x)(∀y){(E*x&Oy&Nxy) →
(∀z)[(Hz&Pzy) → (∃w)(Ew&Pwx&Pzw)]}
+ EE*≤1: (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Ex & E*y & Pxy & E*z & Pxz) → y = z]
B.1.5 Identity Conditions for the Types of Objects
Identity Conditions for Hypostases
+ IDHStrong: (∀x)(∀y){[Hx & Hy] → [x=y ↔ (∃z)(Iz & [Pxz & Pyz])]}
+ IDHWeak: (∀x)(∀y){[Hx & Hy] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)(Iz → [Pxz ↔ Pyz])]}
Identity Conditions for Idiomata
Intrinsically distinct.
Identity Conditions for Ousiai
+ IDO: (∀x)(∀x)[(Ox & Oy) → (x=y ↔ (∀z)[E*z → (Nzx ↔ Nzy)])]
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Identity Conditions for Energeia Types
Intrinsically distinct.
Identity Conditions for Energeia Tokens
+ IDE: (∀x)(∀y){[Ex & Ey] → [x=y ↔ (∀z)([Iz v E*z] → [Pxz ↔ Pyz])]}
B.2 Gregory’s Theology
B.2.1 Postulated Token Objects
Hypostases
+ H(i): Hf
+ H(ii): Hs
+ H(iii): Hh
Idiomata
+ I(i): Ib
+ I(ii): Ip
+ I(iii): Ib*
+ I(iv): Ip*
Ousiai
0 O(i): Oo
0 O(ii): On
0 O(iii): Om
Energeia Types
0 E*(i): E*g*
Energeia Tokens
0 E(i): Eg
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B.2.2 Relations Posited Between the Token Objects
Relations Had by the Hypostases
0 RH(i): Pfo
0 RH(ii): Psn
0 RH(iii): Phm
(0 Ohomoousion : o=n=m)
0 RH(iv): Pso
0 RH(v): Pho
+/0 RH(vi): Pfb
+/0 RH(vii): Pfp
+ RH(viii): ¬Pfb*
+ RH(ix): ¬Pfp*
+/0 RH(x): ¬Psb
+/0 RH(xi): Psp? / ¬Psp?
+ RH(xii): Psb*
+/0 RH(xiii): ¬Psp*
+/0 RH(xiv): ¬Phb
+/0 RH(xv): ¬Php
+ RH(xvi): ¬Phb*
+ RH(xvii): Php*
0 RH(xviii): Pfg′
0 RH(xix): Psg′′
0 RH(xx): Phg′′′
(0 Σg*: g = g′ = g′′ = g′′′)
0 RH(xxi): Pfg
0 RH(xxii): Psg
0 RH(xxiii): Phg
0 P1GNT-F. (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Pfw)
0 P2GNT-F. (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Psw)
0 P3GNT-F. (∃w)(Ew & Pwg* & Phw)
Relations Had by the Idiomata
See Relations Had by the Hypostases, RH(vi)–RH(xvii) above. Also:
+ ¬EI: ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)
Relations Had by the Ousia
See Relations Had by the Hypostases, RH(i)–RH(v) above, and Relations Had
by the Divine Energeia Types, RE*(i) below. Also:
0 Ohomoousion : o=n=m
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Relations Had by the Divine Energeia Types
0 RE*(i): Ng*o
Relations Had by the Divine Energeia Tokens
The divine energeia tokens are had by the three hypostases in the ways described
in the section on hypostases above (RH(xviii) – RH(xxii) and ¬EI) in addition
to RE(i):
0 RH(xviii): Pfg′
0 RH(xix): Psg′′
0 RH(xx): Phg′′′
(0 Σg*: g = g′ = g′′ = g′′′)
0 RH(xxi): Pfg
0 RH(xxii): Psg
0 RH(xxiii): Phg
0 RE(i): Pgg*
+ ¬EI: ¬(∃x)(∃y)(Ex & Iy & Pxy)
B.2.3 Individuation of the Token Objects
The Individuation of the Hypostases
0 P4GNT-F: f 6= s
0 P5GNT-F: f 6= h
0 P6GNT-F: s 6= h
(Summary of the Idiomata:)
Pfb & ¬Psb
Pfp & ¬Psp†
¬Pfb* & Psb*
¬Pfp* & ¬Psp*
Pfb & ¬Phb
Pfp & ¬Php
¬Pfb* & ¬Phb*
¬Pfp* & Psp*
¬Psb & ¬Phb
¬Psp† & ¬Php
Psb* & ¬Phb*
¬Psp* & Psp*
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The Individuation of the Idiomata
The idiomata are all intrinsically distinct. It is clear that:
b 6= b*,
p 6= p*, and
b* 6= p*
There is some unclarity as to whether:
b = p.
The Individuation of the Ousia
0 Ohomoousion : o=n=m
The Individuation of the Divine Energeia Types
Energeia types are intrinsically distinct. There must be at least one divine
energeia types, which we have named g*.
The Individuation of the Divine Energeia Tokens
0 EUnique: (∀x)[(E*x & Nxo) → (∃!y)(Ey & Pyx)]
0 Σ*∀: (∀x){[E*x & Nxo] → (∀y)(∀z)[(Hy&Hz&y6=z&Pyo&Pzo)→Σ*yzx]}
0 Σ*g*: g = g′ = g′′ = g′′′
B.3 Gregory’s Semantics
B.3.1 Gregory’s Semantics for S1 through S3
S1: “The Father is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)”
is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in
English (“ὁ piατήρ” in Greek) has some token of the divine energeia type
we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).
S2: “The Son is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Psx)” is
true, if and only if the hypostasis named “s” in PLI or “the Son” in English
(“ὁ ὑιός” in Greek) has some token of the divine energeia type we have
named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or whatever it is).
S3: “The Holy Spirit is (a) God” is true, if and only if “(∃x) (Ex & Pxg* & Phx)”
is true, if and only if the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or “the Holy Spirit”
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in English (“τὸ ἄγιον piνεῦμα” in Greek) has some token of the divine en-
ergeia type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding,” or “beholding,” or
whatever it is).
B.3.2 Gregory’s Semantics for S4 through S6
S4: “The Father is not the Son” is true, if and only if “f 6=s” is true, if and only
if the hypostasis we have named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in English (“ὁ
piατήρ” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “s” in PLI or
“the Son” in English (“ὁ ὑιός” in Greek).
S5: “The Father is not the Holy Spirit” is true, if and only if “f 6=h” is true, if
and only if the hypostasis we have named “f” in PLI or “the Father” in
English (“ὁ piατήρ” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “h”
in PLI or “the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἄγιον piνεῦμα” in Greek).
S6: “The Son is not the Holy Spirit” is true, if and only if “s6=h” is true, if and
only if the hypostasis we have named “s” in PLI or “the Son” in English
(“ὁ ὑιός” in Greek) is not identical to the hypostasis named “h” in PLI or
“the Holy Spirit” in English (“τὸ ἄγιον piνεῦμα” in Greek).
B.3.3 Gregory’s Semantics for S7
As an Equivocation Account
S7: “There is exactly one God” is true, if and only if
“(∃x)(∀y){[Ex&Pxg*&(∃z)(Pzx)] & [(Ey&Pyg*&(∃w)[Pwy]) → y=x]}” is
true, if and only if there is some token energeia x of the energeia type we
have named “g*” in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we call it in
English – “θεωρεῖν,” or “θέειν,” or whatever we call it in Greek) such that
x is had by some z, and if there is any token energeia y of the energeia
type we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we
call it in English – “θεωρεῖν,” or “θέειν,” or whatever we call it in Greek)
such that y is had by some w, then x and y are identical.
As an NCIC Account
S7: “There is exactly one God” is true, if and only if P7GNT-NCIC is true, if
and only if there is a u that has some token energeia of the energeia type
we have named “g*” in PLI (“godding” or “beholding” or whatever we call
it in English – “θεωρεῖν,” or “θέειν,” or whatever we call it in Greek) and
if any v has any token energeia of the energeia type g*, then u and v are
single-tokened with respect to g*.
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B.4 MP-GNT-F
Domain: {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
o = 0
f = 1
s = 2
h = 3
g = 4
g* = 5
b = 6
b* = 7
p = 8
p* = 9
H: {1, 2, 3}
I: {6, 7, 8, 9}
O: {0}
E: {4}
E*:{5}
P: {<1,0>,
<2,0>,
<3,0>,
<1,6>,
<1,8>,
<2,7>,
<3,9>,
<1,4>,
<2,4>,
<3,4>,
<4,5>}
N: {<5,0>}
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B.5 MP-GNT-Lite
Domain: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
f = 1
s = 2
h = 3
g = 4
g* = 5
E: {4}
P: {<1,4>,
<2,4>,
<3,4>,
<4,5>}
333
B.6 GNTF-Lite
“Lite” Metaphysics
Possible Object Types
Hypostases : (We will need no predicate for hypostases)
Energeia types : (We will need no predicate for energeia types)
Energeiai tokens : E
Possible Relations
1. Performing or Being “of” a Type
We will represent the predicate “performs or is a token of type” with the
two-place predicate “P.”
The first relation (performing) can hold between hypostases and energeia
tokens. Thus, sentences of the form Pxy can be true where x is a hypostasis
and y is an energeia token.
The second relation (being of a type) can hold between energeia tokens
and energeia types. Thus, sentences of the form Pxy can be true where x
is an energeia token and y is an energeia type.
“Lite” Theology
Token Objects
Hypostases
The Father : f
The Son : s
The Holy Spirit : h
Energeia Types
God-ding (type) : g*
Energeia Tokens
God-ding (token) : g
E(i): Eg
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Relations Posited Between Token Objects
P1Lite (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Pfx)
P2Lite (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Psx)
P3Lite (∃x)(Ex & Pxg* & Phx)
P4Lite f 6=s
P5Lite f 6=h
P6Lite s 6=h
RE(i)Lite Pgg*
EUnique-Lite (∃!y)[Ey & Pyx & (∃z)(Pzy)]
“Lite” Semantics
1. S1–S3: Statements of the form x is (a) God are true if and only if x does
some token action of the God-ding type, i.e., (∃y)(Ey & Pyg* & Pxy).
2. S4–S6: Statements of the form x is not y are true if and only if x is not
identical to y (x6=y).
3. S7: “There is exactly one God” is true if and only if there is exactly one
token action of type g* that is done,
i.e., (∃!y)[Ey & Pyx & (∃z)(Pzy)].
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